


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
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














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VOL. XLIII.

SIR WILLIAM MONSON'S  
NAVAL TRACTS

VOL. III.





47691



THE NAVAL TRACTS

OF

*Naval & Mil*

Sir William Monson (A)

IN SIX BOOKS

EDITED

WITH A COMMENTARY DRAWN FROM THE STATE PAPERS  
AND OTHER ORIGINAL SOURCES

BY

M. OPPENHEIM


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
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## THE SECOND BOOK.

*Which contains several actions of the English nation, and some Particulars and Accidents that happened on the Narrow Seas after King James made his Happy Entrance into the Crown, as is to be seen by the Catalogue.*

Sir William Monson to his Second Son.

GOOD SON,—By computation of years, it is now nine complete years since I addressed my advice to you in writing, which number of nine changes one's complexion, and many times one's conditions: nine times seven, or seven times nine, make sixty three, which is the climacterical, or dangerous year.\*

This ninth year hath begotten greater alterations in you than either in complexion or condition: her malice and perils towards others have

\* The theory of the climacteric is Pythagorean and perhaps derived primarily from Chaldæan lore. Every seventh year of life was supposed to be peculiarly dangerous to bodily health, and a survival of the belief may still sometimes be noticed in the popular impression that a total change of the bodily tissues is completed by the end of every seventh year. It is difficult to decide from the text whether Monson, notwithstanding his definite statement, understood the seventh, the ninth, or the sixty-third year to be the dangerous one.

begotten a contrary effect in you, and in so high a measure, by your marriage, that the climacterical rule has lost its reputation with the observers of it. For in despite of it Fortune has given you a lady of birth, parts, and means, far above your merit or thought ; and seeing Fortune has been so liberal, do not give her cause of scandal or to cast ingratitude in your face by your carriage to your lady. For an unthankful man incites God to punish and people to abhor him.

No man can treat with an ungrateful person without suspicion of him ; and next to the name of an evil Christian, the word *Ingratitude* is the worst. God, for all his blessings on man, requires nothing at his hands but thankfulness.

Next the respect to your lady let your carriage to all others be with that moderation and affability that they may perceive you are no more elevated with good fortune than you would be dejected with bad ; but stand like a tree well rooted, which no wind can stir or move.

The reputation that you may seek to get in this world depends not so much upon prudence as goodness. For a man ought to get credit and esteem of all, and to be suspicious of his own advice and carriage. Time will inform you that the greatest gift nature can bestow on a young man is comeliness of body, discretion in his carriage, and eloquence of tongue ; and yet all this is nothing if it be not attended with good fame. The true property of a gentleman, which I would have you carefully to observe, is to be temperate in speech, liberal and frank in giving, moderate in diet, honest in life, and courteous in carriage. For it is not titles or riches that makes men esteemed, but the favour they do and the gifts they bestow.



## DEDICATION TO HIS SECOND SON 3

The mischiefs that breed contrary effects to these, as hate, spite, and contempt, are covetousness, pride, and disdain. The cure to salve this is not to presume too much upon yourself without the counsel of others; for many times people (and especially young men) attribute more to themselves, than others can discern in them. Solomon says, 'That wise men take counsel; and he that does things with advice governs prudently; and he that does otherwise perisheth and faileth in his own designs.'

This counsel is not to be expected from one of twenty or thirty years of age, but from hoary hairs. Lycurgus ordered that old men should be more revered because their counsels were more to be regarded.

The greatest combat in this world is to conquer one's self, and to tame one's heart, as Plato says. But how young men may be made victors in this battle must rest upon patience to suffer, advice to hear and humbleness to submit, for naturally youth is inclined to have an opinion of itself and to abandon the counsel of others, which commonly engenders pride, vain-glory, and ambition. Then followeth reproach, contempt, and scorn; which makes their paths as dangerous to walk in as the slipperiest of ice or glass to tread on.

Be careful in the choice of your friends and esteem them more for virtue than honour: the one is but a title of power; the other of desert. Know there's no end of friendship where the interest is founded upon love and requited with the same. To such a friend one ought to be scarce in words but prodigal in works, for the true perfection of friendship is to supply a man's wants and advise him in his errors. But Seneca saith,

that such are rare ; and a man ought to seek but one of them, and to have never an enemy, for as it is dangerous to have enemies so it is troublesome to have many friends. If he be poor, you must give ; if rich, you must observe ; if favoured, you must adore ; if disfavoured, you must support ; if cross and perverse, you must flatter ; if choleric, you must forbear ; if proud, he is not long to be endured.

Above all other vices beware of that of pride, for it is a humour young men are subject to ; it is called vanity in women, and ambition in old age. Youth are prone to be proud of their persons and external parts : women are as vain therein, and what they want by nature they help by art. Young men affect ostentation and to be praised : women vain-glory and to be adored. A man endures no competitors, nor woman equal.

Many women by reason of their lightness, and young men for want of knowledge, are inconsiderate : they apprehend, and execute, all with one breath, which many times brings them to repentance. And yet do I rather approve the vanity of women, which are governed by the inconstant motion of the moon, than men's pride that can give no reason for their being so, if they seriously consider how indifferently God distributes his gifts to all creatures, so that no man can assume that to himself but that thousands do equal him.

If he is proud of the favour of a prince he may as well be proud of his fortunes ; for, comparing his merits with others, he will find many competitors exceed him. If of his parentage, or other parts of his ancestors, Kings reward men's proper virtues, not what they can challenge to descend from others. If of learning, his waste hours



permit him not to attain to that perfection ordinary scholars do by continual study. If he affect popular applause, it is like an echo, to be heard, but no man knows where. And let him not be deceived, for no proud man is either valued or beloved, as himself can witness, for the nature of pride is to abhor it in another. If he be frank and liberal, for pride without bounty is like a spot in a fair face that defiles it, his esteem will be according to his spending ; but that ceasing, men turn their hearts against his pride.

Ambition is more sufferable and allowable in an old man than pride in a young one. For there are two distinctions in ambition ; the one is allowable and commendable when a man hath an opportunity to compass his allowed desires by his lawful endeavours.

Most divines hold free-will in man to do well ; and where ambition tends to well-doing pride has no power or part in him. The pride of Tarquin was so detested, that it overthrew the title of Kings in the Roman commonwealth. Cæsar settled the highest degree of monarchy by the name of Emperor. His ambition was carried with that temper, that he attained his end by love ; whereas Tarquin lost himself by pride and was worthily loathed.

No man that desires to be singular but has some spark of ambition, and yet free from any spice of pride. If the common soldier did not aspire by ambition to the degree of a captain his valour against an enemy would little appear : if a courtier had not a thought of advancement he might better employ his time than in the service of a prince. A thankful man ambitiously strives to requite the courtesy of another : then it is not the word ambition that makes it unlawful

but the manner of compassing it, and the means of employing it.

The second degree of ambition is accompanied with pride, envy, and hate ; and obtained by corruption, flattery, and unlawfully, as appears by example of some of our English Kings, who have not spared the destruction of their own blood to attain their devilish ends of ambition.

Ambition is like the insatiable sea, that receives all other brooks and rivers and yet is never filled. It may be compared to the monster Hydra, which though she loseth her head, yet it increaseth again. For the nature of ambition is never to have an end ; and as man compasseth his desire in one thing, he is not long satisfied with it but covets another, still working his own weal and woe. But he should remember the words of Plutarch, 'That none climbs so high but he has God above him, and his actions are beheld by man.' Ambition is a thing conceived in the heart and consented to in the mind.

The last and basest property of ambition is to compass its end by corruption. This age, and this our nation, is best able to testify it ; for no man's virtue can advance him, nor no man's vice hinder his ambition if he have money and means to buy his preferment. As, on the contrary, amongst the Romans, no man was advanced to honour but such as refused it—and none with us but those that buy it : nor no man was preferred but by his worth—but none with us but for their wealth. I confess that as it is reputation to have it, so it is infamy to purchase it. For a good man careth not for titles and his good name cannot be taken from him ; he may be ill used but not dishonoured.

The next thing I commend to you is patience

and temperance, as a singular virtue in itself and the cause of much happiness to man. It breeds content to the mind, ease to the body, and quietness to the soul. It abandons ambition, and makes one submit to reason. Plutarch advises Trajan to patience in troubles, to be gentle in business, and to bear with ill tongues and suffer calumnies, which time cures when reason cannot. It is as great wisdom to do no evil office when a man may do good ; or if he may have his ends by fair means not to obtain them by foul, for the true property of a wise man is to think of times past, to order things present, and to be careful of the future. Cicero says that prudence and patience is the art of life, as physic is of health ; it neither deceives, nor is deceived. As for worldly fortunes, they are uncertain and mutable, for no man can account himself happy till his death.

One thing I heartily and earnestly recommend to you at your idle hours, (I know my request is no sooner propounded than granted), which is the continuance and delight in your book ; but with this caution, *That it breeds not a vain and arrogant conceit, which may cause questions and quarrels in arguing.* Matters of history depend on the author's authority that writes, and their judgements that read. Many times writers differ, and readers are apt and prone to rely on him who suits best with their particular opinion. This over-weening conceit lives in the house of will, where reason has no power, and it is the original breeding of all heresy. And if men would read with patience, with judgement consider, with humility to submit, and with reason to receive satisfaction, neither would sects so much abound nor scholars so greatly disagree among themselves.

All men are affectionate or partial in their



opinions and sports ; some delight in hunting, some in hawking, and other exercises ; and as there are many faces that do not agree in one feature, so there are as few that agree in all points and delights. But esteem no less of him that sorts not with your humour than of a Christian that jumps not with you in points of religion.

If reason guideth actions, learning should have the pre-eminence above all other satisfactions. For he that is a lover of his book shall learn of wise men courage to imitate, prudence to counsel, grief to lament, mirth to laugh at, fools to jest with. Yea, he shall find the good he desires and may eschew what evil he pleases.

Aurelius the Emperor advised his son not to be weary of reading of books because he would find that without sorrow which others do with great trouble. He would see the mutability of human life ; the raising of some, and the falling of others ; the punishment of the evil, and the reward of the good ; that he might fly the one and embrace the other.

Good son, for an end of all, be considerate before you enterprise a thing ; be constant in pursuing it, and patient to effect it. For nothing is compassed with that facility but finds opposition, nor nothing spoils a good cause sooner than haste and choler. It is like an evil weed put into a savoury broth, or poison into a potion.

Three things there are I would advise you to remember ; the commandments of God, benefits received, and the uncertainty of your life. In the one, you will perform your duty to your Creator ; in the other, shew thankfulness to the world ; and in the last, abandon many vices and vanities this age produces.

For your duty to me, let it be as God hath

commanded. Not that I expect more than by nature is due; and for less, let Noah be your example, who being despised by his son, and being pitied by his other two sons, God sent his curse upon the seed of Shem and blessed his other children. Remember that the clear and unspotted life of the living son begets fame and glory to the dead father. And carry in mind these precepts of mine, and you need not esteem the affronts of malicious tongues, for they may throw stones but do no other hurt.\*

\* Cf. General Introduction, p. xli *et seq.*, as to this second son.

To such Gentlemen and Commanders as were Actors in the Wars with Spain in the Days of Queen Elizabeth.

NOBLE GENTLEMEN,—In my former book I have presented to the view of the world the accidents and occurrences of the late war with Spain, in which you may worthily challenge an interest by having adventured your persons in such desperate expeditions. And wherein your rewards did not equal your deserts, for time and ingratitude are the destroyers of all noble and memorable acts and have caused you to be forgot.

The Romans had never been nobly esteemed, nor their victories gloriously achieved, had they not respected the actors as the authors of their conquests. They valued men not for their birth but for their worth, accounting virtue the cause of preferment, and honour but the effect. They accounted them not gentlemen that got riches, but those that attained to reputation in war; saying, 'He was unworthy to have the praise of his ancestors that did not imitate them in virtue and valour.'

In the six hundred and forty years the Romans were victorious they never gave office to men that sued for it, but to such as out of mature discretion they chose whom they knew to be fit to execute it. Soldiers may plead their honours to be more ancient; for it is written in the province of Caria, in the Lesser Asia, they gave



spurs to the valiantest men of arms, by which they were privileged and honoured. Feathers were likewise invented to distinguish soldiers from others; and punishment inflicted on those that wore them and could give no account of some notable exploit.\*

Inscriptions on tombs and monuments were allowed only to those that gave testimony of their valour in warlike feats.

A young man, whose valour was suspected, and son to a famous captain, besought King Antigonus to give him the reward his father had given him by King Demetrius: Antigonus answered, 'I reward not the virtue of fathers, but the deserts of the son.'

Lycurgus, among his many laws for the encouragement of men to imitate the virtue of their ancestors, ordained that at the solemn and public feasts there should be three choirs of singers, according to their ages. The first were old men, who sung their own praise of times past: the second young men in their prime, who sung, 'We are young and able, and he that will not believe us may try us:' the last were boys, who sung, 'We shall be better than those that went before us.'

If these three degrees were now to sing, the old men with hoarse voices might rather exclaim against the iniquity of the times; the young men, with untuned notes, might renounce following the example and steps of those that went before them; the boys might complain that all hope of preferment and reward is taken from them.

Virtue was ever esteemed, and arms rewarded

\* Herodotus says that the Carians invented crests on helmets, and handles for, and devices on, shields.

and preferred before all other callings ; and, as a man is bound to serve a prince, so has he leave to sue to him. The powerful King Ahasuerus was wont to say, there was no man that did service to his prince or country, but they were bound to reward him. And, because his deeds might be answerable to his words, they write of him that one night in his bed, being not disposed to sleep, he caused the annals of his country to be read to him ; and finding that one Mordecai had done great service to himself and country, he asked what reward the said Mordecai had received ; and finding he was neglected, he advanced and preferred him above the rest of his subjects, saying, ' That prince was unworthy who did not reward according to the service he had done.'

Numa Pompilius commanded those to be revered that overcame in battle. Solon ordained a reward for such men as deserved well of their country.

But now you see, and with grief must confess, we make more account of the word honour than of deserving it. In ancient times none had titles of dignity but those that sought to avoid it ; and none with us but such as will buy it. We value honour by riches, not by desert, as it was first instituted.

But what shall we say of inconstant Time, which alters and changes all things ? The Romans' flourishing estate, which continued longer and more prosperous than any other nation, was at last overthrown by the luxury and delights they brought out of Asia. For after Lucius Æmilius Paulus\* overcame them, he brought such effeminacy into Rome that other nations took advantage

\* Conqueror of Macedonia.

of it, and became conquerors over them by whom they had before been conquered. And those that had been honoured for their prowess, now became infamous to succeeding ages for their cowardice.

Marcus Antonius the orator observes another bane to commonwealths ; as, namely, private and particular favourites : ' For,' says he, ' the importunity of favourites makes the prince give to him from whom he should take, and take from him to whom he should give ; they dishonour the worthy, and honour others of less merit ; they despise the experienced, and rely upon the weak and ignorant ; they prefer not men to offices for their persons, but persons to offices ; they give justice to the unjust, and refuse justice to the just ; and value justice by their own profit.'

When they are brought to preferment, thus unworthily, they make their authority greater than their place : they supply that with malice which they want in discretion ; they praise their own ill, no less than if it were goodness in another : but in the end they lose themselves by adventuring into a sea they know not. They make infamous the prince they misgovern, and commonly their end is death and destruction, for their beginning was pride and ambition and their end envy and malice.

Though it be a scandal to a commonwealth where princes make more of favourites than of well deservers, it behoves you not to approve or repine at it, but to hope that act of his will not infer a custom precedent.

Evil Kings rely more upon custom than goodness, and desire rather to be obeyed than counselled. The devil, under colour of advice, doth deceive them : but such princes are like covetous persons that live poor to die rich. They please their delights



and desires whilst they live, and leave a perpetual ignominy to the world of their shame.

Seneca says, 'That Cato deserved more glory for banishing the vices of Rome than Scipio did for conquering of Carthage.' By which you may see it is not your profession, I mean arms, that reforms commonwealths, but wisdom in grave and sage senators ; for Democritus the philosopher truly says, 'That two things govern the world, reward and punishment.' My last and best advice is that you refer yourselves and causes to time ; for that must cure when reasons cannot.

## BOOK II.

*Containing some Actions of the English after King James's Accession to the Crown; and several Discourses upon that Subject.*

The Peace with Spain after the Queen's Death, and some Accidents that happened.

As commonly news is carried with a quick pair of heels, so the Queen's death was soon divulged in all parts of Europe, every prince striving to be the first to congratulate his Majesty's happy entrance to the Crown.

And though Spain be generally observed, and by its friends much condemned, for its long and tedious dispatches, yet this action being so rare, and importuning \* them so much, the news was no sooner brought them but an ambassador was immediately nominated to perform such rites and ceremonies as princes observe, one to another, in such cases.

What succeeded in their treaty, or what labouring by other States to keep these two great kingdoms in division, concerns me not to enquire; only I will prosecute such accidents as fell out at

\* Being of so much importance.

sea in the twelve years I served as Admiral in the Narrow Seas. [1]

Though his Majesty might say, (as few princes ever did) *That he could not esteem any State in Europe his enemy*; and that his Christian-like motto, *Beati pacifici*, declared how far his heart was from war, or to support the divisions of Christians; yet he was willing to follow the example of his predecessors in keeping some ships in the Narrow Seas, to defend his right and jurisdictions there, which the Hollanders sought to impugn, as will appear by the following discourse.

This treatise was writ by Sir William Monson, who served as Admiral of those seas twelve years, and presented it to the two late Lords Chancellors at his deliverance out of the Tower. The narration shall speak for itself; and the reader may judge, if he be not too much transported in affection to the nation of Holland, to what their insolences then tended, or may tend hereafter.

But before that discourse shall take place I will entertain you with two or three accidents worth your knowledge, and which may challenge a place among the rest.

The peace between England and Spain being concluded, and published in the year 1604, the war between Holland and Spain still continued as hotly and fiercely as before. The Admiral of the Narrow Seas was now to think how to walk indifferently, and without partiality, betwixt the two nations, like a careful shepherd to keep his neighbours' flocks from intruding upon one another.

The next thing that gave occasion of debate was in the year 1605, when the King of Spain sent eight ships with a thousand soldiers through



the Narrow Seas for Flanders. He would not exceed the number of eight vessels, because the articles of peace did warrant the entertainment of so many in his Majesty's harbours.

But, as I have often shewn, the bane of actions has been in the discovery of them. So this of the Spaniards being understood by the Hollanders, they provided to intercept them at sea, where they met, and there passed a cruel and bloody fight betwixt them. Many of the Spaniards were slain, and some taken ; but the greatest part recovered Dover, where they were defended with shot from the platform. Being now arrived in his Majesty's dominions they accounted themselves under his protection, and attended an opportunity to pass over secretly and by stealth into Flanders ; or by his Majesty's mediation, who laboured with the States of Holland to that effect. But the Hollanders having the Spaniards at a bay, and knowing they durst not venture to put out, being beleaguered by their ships for the space of seven or eight months, his Majesty solicited their passage, and Sir Noel de Caron was sent over to that purpose, but could not prevail. For the Hollanders stood more upon point of honour than any hurt they could fear to receive from the thousand Spaniards.

Upon this answer, my Lord of Salisbury sent for Sir William Monson and imparted to him the state of the whole business, demanding of him if it were possible to put over the Spaniards without using his Majesty's authority or force, or hazarding to be intercepted by the Hollanders. Sir William told him it was a service of great importance, and the greater because the honour of two Kings was engaged in it ; but if it pleased his Majesty to have it done, and that his

Lordship would undertake his directions should be followed, he doubted not but to effect it as his Lordship had propounded it. Hereupon my Lord of Salisbury imparted it to the Spanish ambassador; for then was Don Pedro de Zuñiga come to succeed the Conde de Villa Mediana. My Lord desired them to deliberate and consider of it, and they took respite to determine until they had certified and received answer from the King their master.

And thus it continued for the space of eight or nine weeks, when the ambassador Don Pedro's messenger returned from Spain; and then he repaired to my Lord of Salisbury and acquainted him that his proposition was approved and accepted of in Spain. Upon this my Lord of Salisbury sent for Sir William Monson once again, requiring him to perform with care what he had formerly promised, for it was a service of extraordinary consequence. The secrecy and policy that was used to contrive this stratagem, with the several passages that happened, were too prolix to set down; only I will say that, in spite of the fleet of Holland that usually rid in the mouth of Dover pier, in the road of Gravelines and Dunkirk, to impeach the Spaniards' passage, yet they arrived safe in Dunkirk the same night assigned for them by Sir William Monson to be expected, without the help of his Majesty's ships, or other assistance by his authority from the shore. Which the Hollanders looked upon as so great an affront and scorn to be thus prevented and derided, that it made them suspect, though they had no just ground to accuse him, that Sir William Monson was the director and contriver of this stratagem. Therefore now they began to settle their hate upon him, and to urge and labour

his removal out of the Narrow Seas, as in the following narration will appear. This act of Sir William's, which he did by direction of the State, ever after procured him much hate and envy, not only from the Hollanders, but from their friends and factions in England.\* [2]

The next service Sir William was employed in, concerned the towns of Rye and Hastings, which found themselves impoverished, and almost ruined, by the French encroaching upon their fishing on the English coast, contrary to the articles and agreement betwixt the two Kings. These towns, upon just cause, complained of it, and Sir William was sent down to redress it ; which he carefully performed, though it cost the lives of some Frenchmen. For two years together he was fain to use force, and brought the French to that submission that the English enjoyed their ancient privileges. [3]

Many other accidents happened in the Narrow Seas, that need no remembrance. And yet I will conclude with the escape of the Lady Arabella, twenty four hours before Sir William Monson had notice thereof, who pursued her with that celerity that she was taken within four miles of Calais, shipped in a French bark of that town, whither she was bound.

The manner is so commonly known that no more needs be said but that it was done. Though the accident was so strange and unlooked for that few could be persuaded but that her escape was plotted with an intent to take her again : and it was the rather believed because Sir William was not rewarded according to the importance of that

\* There is no MS. authority for the passage, ' This act . . in England.'



service. But it may be answered and imputed to his misfortune; for since the death of Queen Elizabeth, who was both gracious and bountiful to him, he never tasted nor received either recompense or preferment, more than his ordinary entertainment according to the services he was employed in; for he began the wars with ten shillings *per* month pay; then with two shillings and sixpence *per* day; after with five shillings, with ten shillings, with fifteen shillings, with twenty shillings, and sixteen pages allowed him for his retinue; after with thirty shillings *per* day; and lastly, with forty shillings *per* day. He had served as a soldier, a private Captain, a Rear-Admiral, a Vice-Admiral, a Captain under the General; and lastly, an absolute General.\*

## NOTES.

[1] The following list, compiled from the *Pipe Office Declared Accounts* of the various years, shows Monson's services during his period of command in the Narrow Seas. His pay was twenty shillings a day throughout these years:—

Vanguard . . . .	21st July—31st December, 1604.
„ . . . .	1st January—31st December, 1605.
„ . . . .	1st January—14th June, 1606.
Assurance . . . .	15th June—31st December, 1606.
„ . . . .	1st January—19th June, 1607.
Rainbow . . . .	1st July—31st December, 1607.
„ . . . .	1st January—7th July, 1608.
Vanguard . . . .	29th July—31st December, 1608.
„ . . . .	1st January—5th September, 1609.
Assurance . . . .	6th September—31st December, 1609.
„ . . . .	1st January—3rd October, 1610.

\* There is no MS. authority for the passage 'But it may be . . . absolute General.' The Churchill editor probably had some such statement before him, but the term 'private Captain' is later than Monson's time. See *post*, p. 63.

# THE CHANNEL COMMAND 1604-16 21

Rainbow . . . .	4th October-31st December, 1610.
" . . . .	1st January-6th April, 1611.
Adventure . . . .	11th April-5th August, 1611.
Rainbow . . . .	7th August-28th August, 1611.
Adventure. . . .	29th August-31st December, 1611.
" . . . .	1st January-9th May, 1612.
Rainbow . . . .	10th May-31st December, 1612.
" . . . .	1st January-12th April, 1613.
Assurance . . . .	13th April-31st December, 1613.
" . . . .	1st January-19th February, 1614.
Red Lion . . . .	6th March-31st December, 1614.
" . . . .	1st January-17th April, 1615.
Nonsuch . . . .	18th April-31st December, 1615.
" . . . .	1st January-13th January, 1616.

An analysis of the ships commissioned for service in home waters 1604-15 shows:—

Third-rates.	Fourth-rates.		Fifth-rates.	Pinnaces.
		1604		
4	2		1	2
		1605		
1	2		1	2
		1606		
2	2		—	3
		1607		
2	2		—	2
		1608		
2	1		—	5
		1609		
2	2		1	2
		1610		
2	3		1	3
		1611		
1	1		1	3
		1612		
1	2		—	4
		1613		
3	3		—	4
		1614		
3	2		1	3
		1615		
3	3		—	5

Except in 1604 the third-rates were seldom in commission simultaneously.

[2] On 2nd and 3rd June, 1605 the Spanish ships, ten in number, were attacked in detail by the Dutch Admiral, Haultain. Six were taken or driven ashore; four escaped into Dover harbour. The crews and soldiers on board remained at Dover until 28th November. I am not aware of any documentary evidence relating to Monson's share in their escape beyond that written by himself. See also *post*, p. 270, and Appendix of Letters, p. 340. For the action off Dover in June see Winwood's *Memorials*, ii. p. 82 *et seq.*

[3] The presence of French fishermen on the English coast had caused friction in early centuries and had been a burning question since the days of Henry VIII. It continued to be one after its temporary settlement by Monson, if his settlement really was successful. It had been customary to grant a certain number of licences to French boats, including nine for the supply of the French King's household,<sup>1</sup> but in 1616 these licences were made to serve an indefinite number of boats by being transferred from one to another as they were filled. There were also local quarrels between the Kent and Sussex fishermen about the character of the nets used and the privileges severally claimed. In 1609 James issued a proclamation forbidding the presence of any foreign fishermen in English territorial waters without a licence from the King's representatives. The insistence upon a licence was not new in English history and was still better known in that of Scotland; the extent of territorial waters was a much more obscure question of which something is said in a subsequent note.

<sup>1</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* lxxxix. 51.



To the Right Honourable the Lord Ellesmere,  
 Lord Chancellor of England, and Sir  
 Francis Bacon, his Majesty's Attorney,  
 afterwards Lord Chancellor, Sir William  
 Monson, after his Imprisonment in the  
 Tower, Anno Domini 1616, concerning  
 the Insolences of the Dutch, and a  
 Justification of Sir William Monson.

ALTHOUGH I might well forget by reason of my long and close imprisonment, which hath bred in me disability of body and decay of memory, such points as your Lordship and Mr. Attorney examined me upon in the Tower the 21st April, yet do I well remember both your Honours' noble and worthy dealing not only in admitting me to freedom of speech in answer to such objections as were then demanded but also to the inclining your ears to one passage I recounted which happened between the Admiral of Holland and myself in the Narrow Seas. I must confess that at that time I found a disposition in your Honours to have hearkened to more particulars of the Hollander's insolences but that I considered it stood not with the point of good manners to entertain you with discourses that did nothing appertain to the business you came about. I did then promise myself, if ever God gave me liberty, to present you with some collections of the

Hollanders' insolences on the Narrow Seas, from the time his Majesty made peace with Spain till the truce betwixt Holland and Spain; in which interim there arose many doubts and questions, which bred a great deal of envy from that State against me and I did, as I might well do, impute my imprisonment chiefly to them and their friends' practices, who did often attempt my remove from my place, as the Lord Treasurer Salisbury often told me.

The first of July, 1604, the then Lord Cecyll signified to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should take charge of his Highness's ships serving on the Narrow Seas; and willed me to make such provision for transporting the Constable of Castile, who was then expected to conclude a peace, as should stand with the honour and reputation of his Majesty. After humble thanks to his Majesty, and no less to his Lordship, for doing me so high a favour, without either suit or seeking of mine, I was bold to tell him that by my employment I was to enter into a labyrinth; for though the navigation was but short, yet it was both difficult and dangerous. For I was to sail betwixt Scylla and Charybdis; the one I might call Holland, the other Spain; and seeking to avoid the displeasure of the one I might well fall into enmity of the other.

As for Holland, I considered, by the permission of our State heretofore, they might challenge a prerogative where nothing was granted by us but of courtesy, their insolence I knew was such. And therefore to curb them suddenly, that had their rein so long given them, could not be done without great envy, if not danger; for that their forces at sea did much exceed his Majesty's, who had but one ship and pinnace

commonly to guard his coast.\* On the other side, I weighed with myself, if I should give distaste to the Spaniards or Archduke I should incur the displeasure of two princes, who had their ambassadors resident near the King, and whose power, in respect of their masters, was able to crush me if I should either willingly or ignorantly commit the least error. What his Lordship's answer was to this, I omit, lest I should be charged with vain-glory, (a vice I ever detested.)

I departed from my Lord with this resolution in myself, above all things to stand upon his Majesty's honour and right, to carry myself neutrally, to do justice indifferently ; and if there happened any question of ambiguity, to acquaint my Lord Admiral, and the Lord Cecyll, from whom I would be directed in all doubtful and difficult cases.

The first of August I received a warrant for my repair to Gravelines, where the Constable remained, expecting my coming. My care was to perform so much as my Lord Cecyll gave me in charge. And to add the more grace to this service, considering the greatness of the person that was to come and the honourable occasion of his coming, I was accompanied with fifty knights and gentlemen of good account and quality. If my expense in that journey were valued, with the rest of my disbursements for the transportation of princes and ambassadors, for which as yet I have received no satisfaction, it is not the rewards or presents of ambassadors

\* On 1st July, 1604, there were five men-of-war in commission (*Pipe Off. Decl. Accts.*, 2,242). The point is of little importance except as bearing on Monson's trustworthiness in matters of detail.



that would countervail the expense of their diet.\* The day after my arrival at Gravelines I was desired by the Constable to go to Dunkirk, to see his barks with provisions secured from the Hollanders, who did usually ride with a squadron of ships before the town of Dunkirk to beleaguer it. At my coming thither I went on board the Admiral of Holland, who had been my ancient and inward acquaintance by reason of the many and several actions and services we had been in together. I told him that after twenty years spent in the wars I was now become a watchman, with a bill in my hand, to see peace kept, and no disorders committed in the Narrow Seas. And whereas I understood many misdemeanours and outrages had been offered by ships that served under him against his Majesty's subjects since the death of the Queen, I entreated him that from thenceforward things might be carried with more discretion and mildness; otherwise it would exasperate his Majesty, and alienate the English hearts from them, whose love they had sufficiently made proof of. The Admiral told me that if the English did offer to trade into the Archduke's ports of Flanders, his commission was to impeach them. I advised him, if it were so, to do it in a friendlier manner than had been; which he promised, but meant nothing less.

For the Hollanders continued rather more than less cruel in taking and burning our English ships, and sometimes murdering our men; when at the same instant, and in view of our English barks taken, they would permit and suffer their own countrymen to have free access to the

\* Cf. *ante*, i. xxiv.

harbours of Flanders without impeachment. I made many and sundry complaints of it to the Lord Cecyll, who, it seems out of policy, was willing to connive at it. I did use all the gentle and courteous means I could to draw the Admiral to a more loving proceeding, the particulars whereof I hold it not fit to relate; and yet one I will not omit. A bark of Yarmouth was met and surprised by a Hollander, in the road of Calais, under pretence that she was to go for Dunkirk. It was my hap to meet and rescue the said bark, and found fifteen Hollanders, mariners, in her whom I might have justly executed as pirates. But, because I would oblige the Admiral, after two or three days imprisonment I dismissed them, with a letter to their Admiral expressing my mild proceedings, desiring him to follow my example to his Majesty's subjects: but all in vain for he desisted not from his former courses. Their stubborn carriage at my first entrance into my place in not striking their topsails, and many other rights I required as due to his Majesty's prerogative, I forbear to express, though your Lordship may well think they could not be redressed without much hazard to me.

The 4th of October, 1604, there arrived in the Downs a ship of war of Dunkirk, where she found three or four merchant ships of Holland, bound for France. I sent for the captain of Dunkirk, and forbid him offering violence to those of Holland, they being under my protection in his Majesty's road. The captain obeyed me, and the merchants proceeded in their voyage. Within three days after there arrived three ships of war of Holland, whom I forbid meddling with the Dunkirker, as I had done to the Dunkirker

before. I advertised my Lord Admiral of this accident, and desired his Lordship's directions for my proceeding in a case that was like to begin a precedent. I was bold to add my opinion, which was, to refer it to the choice of the captain of the Dunkirker, whether he would retire into the harbour of Dover or Sandwich, or abide in the Downs to take his fortune if I should be commanded thence upon any service with his Majesty's ship; for I feared if I were gone the Hollanders would little respect his Majesty's road, for I found they obeyed rather for fear and perforce than out of duty of the place. My Lord Admiral liked well of my proposition and committed the management of it to me; and to conclude, the Dunkirker repaired to Sandwich. I considered that many questions were like to arise betwixt the Hollanders and the others, by the example of this one, if his Majesty did not declare himself how far he would protect ships on either side that should repair to his harbours for succour.

Therefore I dealt with my Lord of Cranborne, that his Majesty would express by proclamation such difficulties as were likely to arise, that all States might take notice thereof. Whereupon there was a proclamation, prohibiting all nations from offering violence one to another, within the compass of a line drawn from headland to headland, as it is to be seen by the same proclamation and map extant. And in the same proclamation was signified his Majesty's pleasure that what ship, merchant or other, of the Spaniards or Hollanders, should first arrive in his Majesty's harbour, the said ship, first arriving, should have two tides to depart before she should be pursued by the other. This proclamation directed me from committing any error: now my charge was



to see it executed accordingly. The ship of Dunkirk having remained the space of seven or eight months in Sandwich was all that while kept in by the Hollanders that she could not escape. At last, being furnished with men and provisions from Dunkirk, the ambassador of the Archduke required the benefit of his Majesty's proclamation lately published,\* of two tides to depart, whereupon I was sent from the Court to see it executed according to his Majesty's meaning. I desired the Lords,† that besides the proclamation, which I held a sufficient authority for myself, yet because I was to deal with a people that would do no right, nor take no wrong, I desired it might be ratified by a warrant from their Lordships : which they granted, and I have it yet to shew.

The 10th of May, 1605, I came to the Downs, where I found six Holland ships of war newly arrived to impeach the Dunkirker going forth. Whereupon I sent for the Holland captains, and acquainted them with my commission, requiring them to obey the tenure of his Majesty's proclamation which I caused to be translated into Dutch for them to peruse. After many expostulations and disputes they were contented to abide two tides after the Dunkirker, so that I would signify under my hand to the States that I compelled them to it by virtue of his Majesty's proclamation ; and so for that time they departed. The next morning the Hollanders weighed, and went to an anchor in the mouth of the harbour of Sandwich, one excepted, which lay close to the Dunkirker. The carriage of the Hollanders seemed strange to me, considering

\* Of 1st March 1604-5.

† *I.e.* of the Privy Council.

their promise the day before ; whereupon I immediately set sail, and anchored betwixt the Admiral and the Vice-Admiral, expecting what they would do.

The tide drawing on for the Dunkirker to come out she found that, if she offered to move, the Hollander that lay by her was ready to board her ; which the rest, seeing, went to have done the like.

The captain of the Dunkirker sent me word that he understood the intention of the Hollanders, and therefore refused to go forth, whereupon I sent for the Holland captains and charged them with breach of their words, and their contempt to his Majesty's authority. They would no longer dissemble, but told me plainly that they had better considered of it, and concluded they could not appear before their masters, the States, with safety if they consented to the escape of the Dunkirker. Upon their answer I was enraged and told them that hitherto I had treated with them in a friendly and courteous manner, and, in any reasonable man's conceit had given them good satisfaction with my letter to the States : but, seeing they dealt so indirectly, I put them on board their ships again and willed them to stand upon themselves, and vowed, if one shot was made at the Dunkirker, I would sink them or they me. When they thus saw I would believe no longer in words they permitted the Dunkirker quietly to escape, and remained themselves two tides, according to the proclamation.

If your Lordships had seen the dispositions and carriage of the people of Sandwich, you would have thought it strange that subjects durst oppose themselves so openly against the State. Thousands of people, beholding me from

the shore, looked when the sword should make an end of the difference, and publicly wished the success to the Hollanders, cursing both me and his Majesty's ship. But it was no marvel; for most of the inhabitants are either born, bred, or descended from Holland, their religion truly Hollandish, as two of the grave ministers of Sandwich have complained to me, protesting they think that town, and the country thereabouts, swarms as much with sects as Amsterdam.

Your Lordships must give me leave a little to digress, and express the state of Sandwich, and the use Holland may make of it, if ever they become enemies to England. Therefore it behoves us to prevent all dangerous advantages, which is the more in them because they neglect no occasion wherein they may benefit themselves with the loss of others.\* The first and principallest advantage all enemies have that invade a country by sea, is the safe harbour or road for the arriving of shipping.† Though Sandwich be but a barred haven, and that ships cannot enter but upon a flood, and at no time any great vessels of burthen, yet is our Downs within two miles from thence, where thousands of ships may ride as safely as in any harbour of Europe; and if ever the Hollanders be disposed to give an attempt, now that Flushing is in their possession, it is but one night's sailing from thence to Sandwich. The town is more naturally seated for strength than any I know in this kingdom, and a place of little defence as it is used. An enemy having the command of a harbour, as I have

\* The passage 'Therefore it . . . of others' is not in any of the MSS. collated.

† *I.e.* that all invaders desire.



shewed, approaching a town of no defence which may be made impregnable, being sure of the hearts of the men within it, and to be relieved within twelve hours by sea, I refer the consideration thereof to your Lordships, and return where I left off.

The 20th of April, 1605, I landed the Earl of Hertford and Sir Thomas Edmondes, in their embassy to the Archduke : the one of them passed with me in the Vanguard, the other in the Lion's Whelp, a pinnacle of his Majesty. The pinnacle, falling a league astern, was saluted by two Holland ships of war, in which salutation they put a disgrace upon her by the trumpeter's blurring her with his trumpet, which is held a scorn at sea. Sir Thomas Edmondes, being much moved at this usage, caused a piece of ordnance to be shot off for my stay ; at whose coming up he acquainted me with the wrong offered. I immediately commanded the Holland captains on board me, which, if they refused, I threatened to compel them ; but they seeing themselves over-mastered made no question to obey me. I besought my Lord of Hertford, with the rest of the gentlemen of his train, to be witnesses of my proceedings with the captains ; and told my Lord, if I carried myself otherwise than became me, he should have power to over-rule me.

Before I entered into capitulation I required their answer to one question, (which was) whether they had command from their masters, the States, to impeach his Majesty's ambassadors' passage, or no ? If they had, I required to see their commission, the copy whereof I would take and send to his Majesty, and let them depart without violence. They answered they had no such directions, neither was their intention so to do. Then I told

them that seeing the affront was offered as proceeding from themselves, and not from the States, I would right myself upon them and after acquaint their State upon what reason I did it. But upon their vows and protestations to clear themselves, imputing it to the lewdness of their trumpeter, and submitting themselves to my censure, at the entreaty of my Lord of Hertford I dismissed them, they promising to punish the offenders severely. One of these captains was he who, since that time, committed that foul murder upon his Majesty's subjects in Ireland that were under protection.

The next thing that comes to my mind is a repetition of that I delivered to your Lordships in the Tower, concerning the Admiral of Holland refusing to take in his flag. I delivered it not with those circumstances that were convenient for your Lordships' understanding ; and, because I know your weightier occasions may very well make you forgetful of what was said, I will presume to reiterate the same again.

In my return from Calais the first of July, 1605, with the Emperor's ambassador, as I approached near Dover road I perceived an increase of six ships to those I left there three days before, one of them being the Admiral. Their coming, in shew, was to beleaguer the Spaniards, who were then at Dover, as you have heard. As I drew near them the Admiral struck his flag thrice, and advanced it again, but his coming from the other coast at such a time caused me to make another construction than he pretended. And indeed it so fell out, for I conceived his arrival at that time, when he knew the ambassador was to land, was no other end than to shew him, who he knew would spread it abroad throughout all Europe, as also the Spaniards, that they might have the less esteem of

his Majesty's prerogative in the Narrow Seas, that, by their wearing their flag, they might be imputed kings of the sea as well as his Majesty. I hastened the ambassador ashore, and dispatched a gentleman to the Admiral to entreat his company the next day to dinner, which he willingly promised.

The gentleman told him I required him to take in his flag, as a duty due to his Majesty's ships. He answered that he had struck it thrice, which he thought to be a sufficient acknowledgement; and it was no more than former Admirals of the Narrow Seas had required at his hands. The gentleman replied that I expected such an answer from him; and therefore he was prepared what to say to that point. He told him the times were to be considered; for when no more but striking the flag was required, England and Holland were both of them in hostility with Spain, which caused her late Majesty to tolerate divers things in them; as for instance, the Admiral wearing his flag in the expeditions to Cadiz and the Islands, where the Lord Admiral of England, and Lord of Essex, went as Generals. And that courtesy they could not challenge by right, but by permission; and the wars being now ceased, his Majesty did require by me, his minister, such rights and duties as have formerly belonged to his progenitors. The Admiral refused to obey my command, saying he expected more favour from me than from other Admirals in respect of our long and loving acquaintance. But he was answered, that all obligation of private friendship must be laid aside when the honour of one's King and country is to be valued. The gentleman advised him in a friendly manner to yield to my demand; if not, he had commission to tell him that I meant to weigh anchor, and come



near him, and that the force of our ships should determine the question; for rather than I would suffer his flag to be worn in view of so many nations as were to behold it, I resolved to bury myself in the sea.

The Admiral, it seems, upon better advice, took in his flag and stood immediately off to sea, firing a gun for the rest of the fleet to follow him. And thus I lost my guest the next day at dinner, as he had promised.

This passage betwixt the Admiral and me was observed from the shore, people beholding us to see the event. Upon my landing, I met with Zubiaur, the General of the Spaniards, who in the time past was employed under Mendoza, the ambassador of Spain. He told me, that if the Hollanders had worn their flag, times had been strangely altered in England since his old master King Philip II. was shot through his ship by the Lord Admiral of England for wearing his flag in the Narrow Seas, when he came to marry Queen Mary. I told him that he was mistaken; for neither the Hollanders, nor any other nation, durst contend with his Majesty in his prerogative of the Narrow Seas; and the accident that then fell out was by a boy's error, who thought he had been commanded to take in the flag and to put it out again, when he was ordered to take it in for altogether; which, when the Admiral understood, he caused it to be taken in and desired I would not impute it to him as an affront offered. Thus I excused their insolence, lest it should be divulged his Majesty's prerogative had been questioned by the Hollanders. Had I yielded to a bare striking their flag, as other Admirals had done, his Majesty had not recovered his right again without bloodshed. Within few years after, an Earl, who

then came in company of the Emperor's ambassador, passed these as with me again when I transported Prince Vaudemont; to whom he recounted at large this passage of mine and the Hollanders, and ascribed great honour to his Majesty in maintaining his right and privileges on the seas, which, he said, the Hollanders went about to infringe.

The first of September, 1605, I received a warrant for transporting the Spanish ambassador, Don Juan de Taxis, and all his train, for Flanders, excepting the Lord Arundel, who was to pass with him into the service of the Archduke. Though the Lord Arundel was prohibited to go over in the company of the ambassador, because the Hollanders pretended the world would take notice his Majesty countenanced their enemies against them, which would much prejudice the reputation of their State, yet, notwithstanding, the ambassador was promised, that within ten days after his arrival, the Lord Arundel should have a free and safe passage; which did as much satisfy the ambassador as if he had gone with him. Lest the Lord Arundel should attempt to go, notwithstanding his prohibition, which I much feared because he absented himself that he might not receive this command, I forbid all ships and barks, as they would answer it at their peril, to receive him aboard them. Which he hearing, corrupted a captain of the King's, and in a disguised manner conveyed himself over in his ship. He did it more to gain reputation with the Spaniards than out of any doubt he had not to pass; for he knew, though he desired not to take notice of it, that his going was secured within few days after. When I saw him upon my arrival at Gravelines, and understood his practice with one of my captains,

I spake of it with some bitterness, and expostulated the matter with the ambassador, supposing he had known of his indirect proceeding. But the ambassador with many protestations disavowed it, and blamed my Lord's indiscretion as much as myself, saying he was as much wronged as the State; for he confessed by his humble suit he had obtained his safe passage within ten days after, which he accepted as a great favour from his Majesty. And my Lord, behaving himself so unadvisedly, he feared might breed a jealousy against him.\*

My Lord Arundel knowing I had spoken somewhat liberally of him, devised how to requite me, and took an opportunity upon the following occasion.

The same night, a little before supper, news was brought the ambassador that the barks which carried his provisions were stayed by the Hollanders as they were entering Dunkirk, and, as it was to be feared, they would not dismiss them. My Lord Arundel took advantage of this, and privately persuaded the ambassador I had betrayed them to the Hollanders. He could not carry his complaint so secretly but I came to the knowledge of it. I might perceive a strangeness in the ambassador, as though he retained a kind of jealousy; and therefore the supper ended, and my leave taken of him for that night, I besought the governor of Gravelines that the gates might be opened, and I provided of horses, for that I had occasion to go with some speed to Dunkirk, both which he courteously granted, and I immediately passed thither where I arrived at the opening of the gates in the morning. I found, as it was reported, the barks stayed by the

\* See Appendix of Letters, Nos. 15 and 16.



Hollanders, but upon what occasion, and how I caused their release, your Honours shall understand hereafter: but I must return once more to Sandwich.

Whilst the ambassador stayed at Sandwich to see his horses and baggage shipped, there arrived twelve or fourteen ships of war from Holland in the Downs; a number not usually seen thereabout but upon a greater occasion than I could imagine. I mistrusted they would have forbidden the ambassador's passage, and sent for the principal captains, of whom I required if they had commission to impeach his landing. They answered *No*; and seemed to make a frivolous excuse for their coming. Then I required them to stay in the Downs after I was gone, or to depart before me, for avoiding both rumour and suspicion. They made choice of the latter, and stood over for Gravelines road, where I found them upon my arrival, and discovered that the cause of their coming to the Downs was to have an eye on the Lord Arundel's passage.

During the time of the ambassador's stay at Sandwich those of the town thought to have put an affront upon him; which, if I had not prevented, had more distasted than all the favours he received in England had contented him. His horses being shipped, and the bark ready to depart the harbour, an informer went aboard one of them and made seizure of a fardel of bays, to the value of ten or twelve pounds, which belonged to one of the ambassador's servants; which he took for such a disgrace, knowing it, as he said, to be a practice of the offspring of the Hollanders within the town, that he resolved not to depart thence till he was righted by his Majesty's own order. I laboured to give the ambassador satis-

faction, and as earnestly persuaded the informer to restore the fardel, but could prevail with neither ; for the value was not so much looked upon as the injury offered. In the end, by threatening the informer to complain to the Lords, and persuading him how ill his Majesty would take such a wrong done to an ambassador, he restored the fardel, but writ to the farmers of the customs that I countenanced and carried over uncustomed goods under the colour of the ambassador's provisions. When they of Sandwich saw they could not detain the fardel they secretly practised with the Dutch fleet then at the Downs, that, upon the arrival of the barks at Dunkirk, they should intercept the fardel, and gave intelligence in what bark and what part of the bark it lay. The Hollanders accordingly detained the vessel as they were directed, and took out the fardel. And upon this occasion was the stay made of the ambassador's goods, as I have shewed before.

At my arrival at Dunkirk from Gravelines, upon the news of the arrest of the ships, as your Lordships have heard, I wrote to the Admiral of the Hollanders that he had exceeded his commission in intercepting the ambassador's provisions, having order from their State for a free passage ; and that the injury was no less to his Majesty. And therefore I required the discharge of the ships and his answer to the contempt. He answered, in writing, that it was true his directions from his masters, the States, did import so much, which he did willingly obey. But in his commission he was authorized to intercept any merchandize that should be transported under colour of the ambassador's furniture ; and that in one of the barks he had found a fardel of bays,

which he might justify the taking of, and so dismissed the bark. I returned answer that, if he went to the strict letter of his commission, I confessed he might do it ; but I told him the value was so small, and it having been questioned at Sandwich, that I would think myself beholding to him if he would either restore it or keep it in his custody fourteen days. To my latter request he consented ; whereupon I gave assurance to the ambassador, who was then much enraged, that a letter should be procured out of England that should compel the delivery of the fardel. Within four days after I arrived in England I acquainted the Lord Treasurer Dorset with the affront offered the ambassador at Sandwich, and the complaint made to the farmers of the customs against me. I informed my Lord Admiral and my Lord of Cranborne with the Lord Arundel's passage and the contempt of the captain, whom I displaced and detained prisoner, as also of the fardel seized on by the Hollander. My Lord Treasurer sent for the informer by a messenger, and committed him ten weeks prisoner in the Gatehouse, and would not release him till I became suitor for him. The captain was handled in the same manner, but longer imprisoned, and the fardel restored to the governor of Dunkirk by a letter from Sir Noel de Caron.

I am the more tedious herein to express the condition of the men of Sandwich, who made more account of venting their spleen and revenge than of his Majesty's reputation and honour, and did their best endeavour to make a breach betwixt the Hollanders and me. At that time they had thirty ships for two in the Narrow Seas. I observed at all times that I was to transport a Spanish ambassador, the Hollanders laboured to



shew some point of insolence. I remember, at the return of the Marquis of St. Germain, I met a Dutch fleet in the midst of the Channel, wafted by a man of war, who would not take in his flag till I was forced to use violence. I could entertain your Lordships with a volume of these discourses ; but what I have said is sufficient to shew the arrogant and unmannerly carriage of the Hollanders, who ambitiously desire to encroach upon his Majesty's jurisdiction. Had I connived at them I had purchased less hate of them and their well-wishers. And, not long before my commitment, there fell out an accident which, perhaps, might hasten my imprisonment. Sir Noel de Caron, (their agent) coming over in a man of war, was shot at by a pinnace of the King's for not striking his topsail to her, which I understood he took in evil part and cast it upon me.

If I had transgressed, or given the least advantage to have excepted against me in the twelve years I served on the Narrow Seas, it is very likely his Majesty or the State should have known it. But, seeing I was never questioned for my actions or private acts, I did no more than became a subject and a servant to his master, to defend the honour and reputation of him and his kingdoms, though it had been with the loss of my life.

And, since I have made my apology for twelve years, I will add eighteen more to it and begin with the wars of Spain, where I was an actor at the first, and General of the last fleet her Majesty ever employed. If it shall appear by records in the Admiral's court, or by petition in the council chamber, that ever I was questioned for any unlawful act, or so much as my name used for a witness, I will willingly receive my due

punishment. Or let it be proved in all my employments by sea, which has been more than any English gentleman, that either directly or indirectly I deceived either of my two sovereigns, and I will desire the reward of a traitor.

I well remember, the first time I was examined by the Chief Justice Coke, and Secretary Winwood, at Hatton House, I besought them that they would be pleased to enquire into my demeanour, and the course of my life from my infancy, and I hoped it would prove loyal, honest, and spotless. Now I humbly desire, as a second suit, that either they, or any other, would examine the service I have done to the State in the time of the late Queen, when there was greatest occasions for men to shew their abilities and deserts. As also what imprisonment I have endured in Spain; what famine, hurts, and other casualties I suffered; what wealth has been brought into England by my means; with what hazard and fortunate success I have obtained both wealth and victory; as in particular, and which is freshest in memory, the last carrack, valued at almost £130,000, and disposed of by his Majesty at his coming to the Crown.

When all these things shall be considered, and my rewards valued, the integrity of my heart will appear, and how much I endeavoured to do service to my country above my private or particular respect of gain. I must confess my folly and misfortune: the one made me too forward in complaining, and wishing a reformation of his Majesty's Navy, which has purchased me much envy: the other procured me as much hate in taking the *Lady Arabella*. And if it be considered who they are that pursue me, the obligation they have to the States of Holland, the

reasons they have to affect some of the Officers of the Navy;\* and how nearly they are joined in trust, love, and friendship, with the alliance of the Lady Arabella, then perhaps the cause of my imprisonment will more plainly appear. Some have obtained their desires in ruining my estate, made me infamous to the world, taken from me my employment, seized by way of forfeiture upon my land, denying to account with me, which they have long practised; and, above all, cast such an aspersion upon my children as all hope of preferment is taken from them. But my comfort is in the saying of David, that 'my defence is in God, who saveth the upright in heart.'

Thus have I briefly run over some particulars that happened in my employment. Wherein I have shewed in what condition I found the Narrow Seas, how with envy and hate I reduced it, and in what form and condition I left it.

And as I have given an account of twelve years' employment on the Narrow Seas, I can as well derive myself from the year 1585, when the war with Spain began; for then made I the seas my profession, being led thereunto by the wildness of my youth. And because the two barks in which I then served had the fortune to possess the first Spanish prize that ever saw the English shore, and the rareness of the fight in taking her considered, I hold it not unworthy of repetition. In the month of September 1585, and about eight a-clock in the evening, being upon the coast of Spain with two small ships aforesaid, we met and boarded a Spanish vessel of three hundred tons burden, well manned and armed. All our men

\* *I.e.* the Principal Officers. The passage, 'And if it be considered . . . the Lady Arabella' only occurs in MS.



with one consent and courage entered her, and were left fighting aboard her all night, the seas being so grown that our barks were forced to ungrapple and fall off. The Spaniards betook themselves to their close fights, and gave two attempts by trains of powder to blow up their decks on which we were, but we happily prevented it by fire-pikes.\* Thus continued the fight till seven in the morning, when the Spaniards found the death and spoil of their men to be so great as they were forced to yield. When we came to take a view of our people we found few left alive but could shew a wound they received in that fight. The spectacle, as well of us as of the Spaniards, was woeful to behold; and I dare say that in the whole time of the war there was not so rare a manner of fight, or so great a spoil of so few men on both sides. I confess it exceeds the bounds of good manners to trouble your Honours with this impertinent discourse; but I do it that it may appear I had no thought but to employ my pains and travail to serve my prince and country. And so I humbly take my leave.

\* Firepikes were made with a coating, along the pike head, of fine powder, sulphur, saltpetre, sal-ammoniac, powdered glass, resin, spirits of wine, and oil. Pieces of lead and iron were stuck in the mixture which was lit by a wick fixed upon a needle imbedded in it. Fire balls, a similar contrivance, were sometimes made of clay filled with an inflammable and explosive mixture containing one part of powder; other fireballs were made by twisting gun match round iron rods, which crossed each other, and filling the interstices with an inflammable mixture. In both cases wicks communicated with the interior through several apertures (*Sloane MSS.* 2497; *Arantegui y Sanz, Artilleria Española* . . . Madrid, 1887, p. 377; *Tartaglia, Arte of Shooting*, Lond. 1588, p. 65).

## THE SALUTE.

Some of the difficulties with the Dutch were of a kind which ordinarily arise between belligerents and a powerful neutral; those relating to the Salute of the English flag were of a different nature.

The claim to the Salute, which was performed by taking in the flag, passing to leeward, and lowering some or all of the sails of the foreign ship in the presence of an English man-of-war, was based on the presumed ownership of the Four Seas by the English Crown. The same marks of respect were exacted from English merchantmen although in a less stringent form, *e.g.* of their canvas they struck their topsails only, and eventually the demand made upon foreigners assimilated to this also.

The incident in the text is described differently by Weldon<sup>1</sup> who, it will be noticed, says that he obtained his version direct from Monson:—

The old Earl of Hertford was conveyed over by one of the King's ships by Sir William Monson, in whose passage a Dutch man-of-war coming by that ship would not vail, as the manner was, acknowledging by that our sovereignty of the sea. Sir William Monson gave him a shot to instruct him in manners but instead of learning he taught him, by returning another, he acknowledged no such sovereignty. This was the very first indignity ever offered to the royal ships of England which since have been most frequent. Sir William Monson desired my Lord of Hertford to go into the hold and he would instruct him by stripes that refused to be taught by fair means, but the Earl charged him upon his allegiance first to land him on whom he was appointed to attend; so, to his great regret, he was forced to endure that indignity for which I have often heard him wish he had been hanged rather than live that unfortunate commander of a King's ship to be chronicled for the first that ever endured that affront although it was not in his power to have helped it. Yet, by his favour, it appeared but a copy of his countenance for it had been but hazarding hanging to have disobeyed my Lord's commandment, and it had been infinite odds he had not been hanged having to befriend him the house of Suffolk; nor would he have been so sensible of it had he not been of the Spanish faction and that a Dutch ship.

It will be seen that Weldon's story is entirely different from that given by Monson, but the only point that need

<sup>1</sup> *Court of King James*, i. 358.

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interest us is the former's assertion that it was the first time that the Salute had been refused. The statement hardly needs a denial for, although the claim was of comparatively ancient origin, it had invariably been rejected by France and usually by Spain; when grudgingly given at sea or tacitly admitted by diplomacy it had been yielded to superior force and under the menace of shotted guns. When Holland broke away from Spain and was ready to pay any price for Elizabeth's assistance the sentimental question of the Salute was not likely, for the time, to prove an obstacle.

The demand for the Salute was based upon the supposed English ownership of the Four Seas and was the outward and objective sign of that ownership. Maritime jurists founded their argument of continued proprietorship on the legendary accounts of Eadgar's maritime power, and on a charter of 964 to the church of Worcester in which the same monarch is styled King 'of the ocean lying about Britain.' That charter is now known to be a forgery. Moreover the striking weakness at sea of the Anglo-Saxon monarchy and that, actually, the kingdom was hardly ever able to meet its Viking adversaries afloat sufficiently disposes of the claim, besides the fact that the mere circumstance of a sovereign giving himself a title is no proof of its acceptance elsewhere. For centuries the Kings of England called themselves Kings of France and the Kings of Spain are still, in name, Kings of Jerusalem. To become actual such titles, if not admitted, must be imposed by force. Canute, who really held the overlordship of the North Sea and Channel, is not known to have indicated it titularly, nor did the Norman Kings while they held, until 1204, both shores of the Channel and made it practically an English lake. An ordinance of John, of the year 1200, which orders the capture of foreign ships not striking their sails in English waters, only exists in a late copy and contains words not in use in the time of John. Whatever legal fictions may have been invented to give the colour of law to an existent claim or possession it must have been founded originally, like all other conquests and possessions, on military supremacy.

Mr. R. G. Marsden<sup>2</sup> thinks that the English sovereignty of the sea was not heard of before the institution by Edward I. of the 'admiralship of the sea.' Edward, a far-seeing statesman, may have had some ulterior purpose, possibly commercial,

<sup>2</sup> *Nautical Magazine*, 1898.



in erecting a new overlordship, or, which is perhaps more likely, it may have been a definite revival for political reasons of the former practical lordship of the Channel possessed by the Norman Kings, the political purpose being the reconquest Edward had in view of the lost French provinces. The Domesday of Ipswich, however, compiled towards the end of the thirteenth century, refers to 'the iiii sees of Ingeland,' an expression which suggests an already traditional claim. The King had before him an example of such a claim, formally made and upheld by force of arms, in the Republic of Venice which, since 1269, had proclaimed itself sovereign of the Adriatic. But whatever may have been the early signification, exact or vague, of 'admirallatus maris' it seems by 1336 to have crystallized into a formal assertion that Edward III. and his ancestors had always been 'lords of the sea and the passage of the sea.' Whether this included more than the English Channel may be doubted; but the institution of the Admiral's court and the appeal to its jurisdiction would have a gradual effect in extending the area of its authority and thus, working in a circle, the claim of English ownership. The Flemings, more interested in commerce than in the question of honour, admitted, in 1320, that the Kings of England were lords of the sea, but the Flemings were the only people down to Monson's lifetime who had formally admitted it. This admission of 1320, indeed, extended the English lordship as far as Brittany,<sup>3</sup> and the English possession of Guienne and Gascony would account for enlargement southwards of the area of sovereignty just as after the defeat and acknowledgement of the Dutch in 1654 it was carried northward and eastward as far as Norway. The extension south had taken place by 1350, for in that year the King's representatives at Bayonne were instructed to prepare a naval force to attack Castile and Leon whose King, among other wrongs, was held to have in view the purpose of 'dominum maris ad se attrahere.'<sup>4</sup> Therefore by that time the English claim was actually enforced to an extent which aroused active opposition in a neighbouring power affected by it. Conversely, as the English continental empire was lost so the claim over the adjoining seas lapsed until, in the sixteenth century, the former English sovereignty was ignored to an extent that permitted the Bay of Biscay to be called 'the Spanish Sea' without, apparently, any protest from the English Crown.

<sup>3</sup> *Pat. 14 Edw. II.*, pt. ii., m. 26d.

<sup>4</sup> *Fœdera*, v. 681.

But Edward III. certainly made his claim effective; his popular title of 'King of the Sea' is well known, and in one instance he is called officially 'Lord of the English Sea on every side.'<sup>6</sup> As this was in 1337, while England was actually suffering reverses at sea, it is evident that the right was held to be one of law rather than of conquest.

In 1420 the Commons petitioned that whereas the King and his progenitors had 'always been lords of the sea,' and whereas he now possessed both coasts of the Channel, he would exercise his sovereignty by laying an imposition or tax on all strangers passing.<sup>6</sup> This, whatever may have been the exact meaning the Commons attached to their proposal, shows that to the men of that generation the sovereignty of the Channel was a very real and practical thing to be reckoned in terms of money as well as of titular honour. During the century or more that the sovereignty had existed documentarily its recognition had no doubt been enforced practically when there was sufficient armed or diplomatic strength to carry conviction and ignored or neglected when there was not. But during all this time there is no reference to any objective sign of respect to be given by those subject to the claim although such a mark of honour would be in accordance with what obtained in every other relation of feudal, official, or social life. In the fifteenth century, however, there were two incidents which may refer to the form of the Salute as known in later times: in 1449 Richard Wynnington, at sea with a squadron, met a fleet of Dutch and Hansa merchantmen and bade them 'strike in the King's name of England;'<sup>7</sup> again, in 1458, Warwick captured a Flemish squadron 'because they would not strike in the King's name of England.'<sup>8</sup> Taken alone these two extracts would, as worded, hardly prove that the refusal of the Salute was, necessarily, the cause or excuse for an attack, but if the original of the document attributed to John was really, as supposed, a fifteenth century one the definite reference in it to lowering sails is, taken in conjunction with the two illustrations quoted, sufficient evidence that an actual sign of respect and inferiority was exacted in that century and perhaps long previously. There is no reference to the Salute in the *Libel of English Policie*, of 1436, but the whole poem is instinct with the consciousness of the English sovereignty

<sup>6</sup> *Rot. Scot.* 10 Ed. III., m. 16.

<sup>6</sup> *Rot. Parl.* iv. 126.

<sup>7</sup> *Paston Letters*, Lond. 1875, i. 84.

<sup>8</sup> *Three XV<sup>th</sup> Century Chronicles* (Camd. Soc.), p. 71.

of the sea, the national right to which is taken for granted. Edward III. is referred to as 'Master and lorde enviroin of the see.'

Concerning the policy of Edward IV. in the matter of the Salute we have no information, and Henry VII. was hardly a King likely to risk war on a point of honour. Moreover, neither sovereign sent ships or squadrons to sea to nearly the same extent as did most of their predecessors. Edward IV. had no men-of-war until towards the end of his reign, and those belonging to Henry VII. were usually kept in port unless required to serve in large expeditions such as those to Brittany and Scotland. Thus, with no power at sea to enforce it, the claim became a latent one; but it was by no means forgotten, for when Henry VIII. re-created the Navy on a large scale the Salute was again exacted by a monarch very sensitive of his royal dignity and very ready to use his new navy. For him, however, the question was a little complicated by the fact that he was most of his time at war with France and in alliance with Spain, so that as the one would refuse and the other could not be quarrelled with on such a point, there remained only English merchantmen or an occasional stranger from more distant regions to render obedience. But Charles V. in any case could not venture to contest the claim, for the English Navy was supreme in the Channel and therefore commanded the communications between Spain and the wealthiest provinces of his empire. The years of Henry's insistence bore fruit, for there are several references under Edward VI. which show that the Salute was again systematically demanded. The Flemings, though Spanish subjects, lowered their sails without much protest and even did so in Dieppe roads to an English man-of-war which came into the port.<sup>9</sup> France, now as ever, refused it except on terms of equality, and the Privy Council when an English and a French fleet were at sea simultaneously, the former being the weaker, directed the Admiral sometimes to give and sometimes to receive the honour, the French 'being stronger upon the sees.'<sup>10</sup> It was probably the example of England, and as a countermove against her, that led Henri II. in 1555 to issue a royal edict requiring the Salute of the flag and topsail to be rendered to French men-of-war. In northern waters it remained nothing more than a form of protest against the English claim, but in the Mediterranean, especially after it was

<sup>9</sup> *Journal of Edw. VI.*, April, 1550; 2nd July, 1551.

<sup>10</sup> *Acts of the Privy Council*, 17th May, 1552.



emphasized by another edict of 1584, it led to conflicts with Spanish ships and those of other powers met there.

Monson refers (p. 35) to the story that Philip II. was fired upon by Lord Howard of Effingham, the then Lord Admiral, for not striking his flag when he met the English fleet in coming to marry Mary. The fact has been doubted but there seems to be sufficient evidence that the incident occurred, and it may have been the real reason why Howard was superseded not very long afterwards. During the reign of Elizabeth Spanish ships were never seen, from 1585 onwards, except as enemies; France, ruined by faction, had no navy and could make no official protest, and the Dutch were, as has been said, ready to yield any honour. But private French crews were ready to fight for the honour of their flag and, indeed, sometimes tried to make the English go to leeward and strike to them,<sup>11</sup> a *contre-coup* of protest which shows that our ships were not ceasing to exact what they considered their rights. Before the war, in 1570, when Anne of Austria took ship in the Netherlands to travel to Spain to marry Philip, the Spanish agent in London, Don Antonio de Guaras, who was acting as ambassador, professed to think it ridiculous that Philip's ships would be compelled to give the Salute to the English fleet. In this case, as there was some fear of treachery in the Spanish armament being used for the sudden transport of an army corps to England, the Queen's fleet watching was powerful enough to ensure respect and is said to have enforced the Salute. So far as their lessened opportunities permitted the Queen's navy captains upheld their monarch's rights, although the victims were mostly English. In 1593 the Admiralty Court ordered the restoration of a merchant ship seized for not 'valing bonnet' to a man-of-war, no doubt after humble apologies from the master and owner and the payment of substantial costs.<sup>12</sup>

The Dutch, in the early years of the seventeenth century, were in an entirely different position politically from that existing when they had come cap in hand to Elizabeth. Not only was their independence won, but they had become a great naval State and were becoming an important continental power. As subjects of the Dukes of Burgundy and of Spain they could afford to yield a mark of submission which was then, primarily, the business of their masters; as an inde-

<sup>11</sup> R. O., *Oyer and Terminer*, 363.

<sup>12</sup> R. G. Marsden, *Select Pleas of the Court of Admiralty*, ii. p. lxxiii.

pendent State, and a new one, it was of some political importance to them to assert their right to be received on terms of equality into the European group of States. Moreover, the very circumstance that, as subjects of Spain, they had performed a certain act was in itself a reason why, having become independent, they should emphasize their new status by a rejection of any mark of their former condition as no longer applicable in the new situation. France, also, reunited under Henry IV., developing a commerce and creating anew a nascent navy, was in a very different position from the France torn by religious wars and paralyzed by Spanish intrigue. On the other hand there was, in England, a King with a very high estimate of monarchical rights and, as representative of a new dynasty, all the more sensitive to comparisons and unable, even if he wished, to surrender any claim made by his predecessors. Thus there were all the materials ready for an active conflagration; there was no war because the Dutch had enough on their hands for the time, and the French, steadily resisting the claim, were on our side, used more tenderly than were the Dutch. On paper, at any rate, the English claims were still asserted vigorously; on 8th June, 1609 Cecyll wrote to Winwood, at Paris, that the Channel 'belongs' to England, although he allowed that in the ocean territorial rights extended only for 'about' 100 miles.<sup>13</sup> Also, in the regulations issued in 1605 relating to the conduct of the belligerent Dutch and Spanish ships in English ports, there is a distinct claim of sovereignty in that James professed to take it for granted that he might equally forbid hostilities 'in all his Narrow Seas' as well as in English harbours, but that 'suddenly to tie the hands of his friends and allies in open hostility is not for some reasons held convenient at this time.'<sup>14</sup>

With the accession of Charles I. there was a recrudescence of more active measures in the enforcement of the claim; Charles had as high an idea as his father of the kingly prerogative with less 'canniness' in using it, and was prepared to make the fleet a stronger factor in his policy. Therefore there are many instances in the State Papers of the consistent demand for the Salute at all risks and in all circumstances, not only at sea but also in foreign ports. In 1630 a man-of-war captain claimed the Salute in the Texel,<sup>15</sup> and the same man

<sup>13</sup> Winwood, *Memorials*.

<sup>14</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.*, xi. 40.

<sup>15</sup> *Hist. Man. Com. Rep. XII.*, App. i. 442.

made two French ships strike to him in Calais roads<sup>16</sup>; again, a year later, another captain compelled Dutch men-of-war to strike to him in the same anchorage,<sup>17</sup> and, in 1633, in Boulogne roads.<sup>18</sup> Sir Isaac Wake made the French at Calais render the Salute to him,<sup>19</sup> and in at least one instance the master was taken out of a French ship and put in irons for refusing it.<sup>20</sup> Of course, when foreigners were thus treated, English naval officers who failed to carry out their orders to demand the Salute, or English seamen who failed to give it, were severely dealt with. In 1637 the captain of a King's ship was tried for allowing a Frenchman to pass, and the trial educed the dictum that 'no foreign ship may fly her flag at the main within sight of a King's ship or pass to windward of her.'<sup>21</sup> Masters of English merchantmen were often heavily fined, or put in irons, for wearing their flags or neglecting to lower topsails within sight of a man-of-war.

Charles, perhaps under the influence of Buckingham who had been consistently adding to the material strength of the fleet for some years, began his reign with the intention of putting a new vigour into the demand for the Honour of the Flag. The Instructions for the Cadiz expedition of 1625 included the statement that the King of Spain intended 'to take from us that honour and dominion of the Narrow Seas that have been justly assumed by our predecessors and given to them and us by all our neighbours.'<sup>22</sup> Whether the facts were or were not exactly as stated they concerned Spain less than France or Holland, but the declaration may be considered a profession of public policy and intended to be taken in that sense. France soon closed a war with England, was becoming entangled in the Thirty Years' War, and was averse to a renewal of hostilities; Holland also was at war, and did not wish to add to its political embarrassments. Thus, for the time and with the unknown power of the ship-money fleets to back him, Charles seemed to have established once more an ancient right. When the Earl of Lindsey went to sea in command of the fleet of 1635 he was directed to make foreign fleets perform their 'duty and homage' and, if they

<sup>16</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.*, clxvi. 67.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* cxcvi. 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxxiv. 5.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* ccxx. 25.

<sup>20</sup> *Hist. Man. Com. Rep. X.*, App. pt. iv. 286.

<sup>21</sup> R. G. Marsden in *Naut. Mag.* 1898, p. 616.

<sup>22</sup> *Fœdera*, xviii. 181.



refused, to punish them for their 'high contempt';<sup>23</sup> the combined French and Dutch fleet was reported to be quite ready and willing to fight the question out, but Richelieu had no mind to bring it to an issue at the moment and the French and Dutch were ordered out of Lindsey's way.

The Commonwealth was not less desirous than the Monarchy of upholding the national honour, so that in 1647 a convoy of Swedes were brought into Portsmouth for refusing the Salute. The requirement of the Salute was a factor, if a minor one, in bringing on the first Dutch war and to some contemporaries loomed so large that it appeared to be the only one; it was the cause of the actual outbreak of hostilities and the first engagement off Dover. The crowning triumph was that of 5th April, 1654, when by the treaty of that date, the Dutch formally conceded the British right to the Salute in the 'British Seas.' The extent of the British Seas was the subject of a dispute that extended over many years and one that jurists never agreed upon.

In 1673 Charles II. directed that the Salute should not be required from French men-of-war.<sup>24</sup> This was a more or less graceful concession, because neither politically or militarily was Charles in a position to enforce the claim against Louis XIV. who, in 1662, had written to his ambassador in London that he did not 'crave or look for any accommodation in the affair of the Salute at sea,' and that he would not be moved from that determination by any consideration.<sup>25</sup> With Holland the Salute was used as an excuse to bring on the Third Dutch War, but with France the question hardly arose during the reigns of Charles and James and after them there was war; sometimes, however, a too patriotic captain nearly embroiled the two countries, as happened in 1684 when a French man-of-war was engaged 12 leagues W.S.W. of the Scillies for not lowering her topsails,<sup>26</sup> but the relations between the two Crowns were not then so good as they had been. In 1677, when England was on the brink of war with France, the master of a French merchantman was taken out of his ship, tried in the English Admiralty Court, and fined 500*l.* for refusing to Salute and for firing upon H.M.S. Bristol.

<sup>23</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.*, 2nd May, 1635. See also *post*, p. 276.

<sup>24</sup> *Memoirs of Eng. Affairs* . . . by James, Duke of York, p. 277; *Orders and Instructions*, 28th April, 1673.

<sup>25</sup> Jusserand, *An Ambassador at the Court of Charles II.*, p. 18.

<sup>26</sup> *Hist. Man. Com. Rep. XI.*, App. pt. v. 115.

His defence was not a denial of the English right but that he took the Bristol for a Dutch man-of-war.<sup>27</sup> After the peace of Ryswick the subject was felt to be a delicate one, and when Admiral Aylmer was under orders to sail in 1698 the Admiralty wrote to him that he was to 'use all possible caution to avoid any occasion of obliging any of the French King's ships to strike which you may meet with this side Finisterre.'<sup>28</sup> With France the dispute was practically closed; England had persistently asserted her dominion and had sometimes extorted, actually or by implication, the objective indication of it but had never been strong enough to obtain a formal national recognition. Holland, as a State, had recognized it; Spain had ceased to have any northern commerce or to send men-of-war into northern waters, but she herself claimed the Salute in the Mediterranean. There remained only Sweden and Denmark, and if Charles II. was careful in his dealings with France there was no consideration shown to less powerful States. In 1661 Captain Robert Holmes was imprisoned for allowing a Swedish war-ship to pass without striking, and the claim on the northern powers was maintained insistently by Charles and his successors. There are several instances during the eighteenth century of Danish and Swedish men-of-war being brought to action on account of their refusal to yield the Salute. So far as British subjects were concerned the last instance of the prosecution of the master of a merchantman for failing to salute a man-of-war occurred in 1829.<sup>29</sup>

In the *Franconia* case, tried in 1876 before fourteen judges, the claim to the sovereignty of the sea was dismissed as baseless and extravagant. Sir Alexander, afterwards Lord Chief Justice, Cockburn remarked that 'the claim to such a sovereignty was at all time unfounded.' Judges, however great as lawyers, are not necessarily good, or even mediocre, authorities, as lawyers, on obscure historical questions. The Honour of the Flag was only the outward and visible evidence of the existence of the English sovereignty of the British or Narrow Seas, and except as a witness and admission of that sovereignty it had no meaning nor *raison d'être*. But the Honour of the Flag existed; it was maintained at the cannon's mouth, it was yielded, willingly or unwillingly, by friend and foe for centuries and was finally admitted in one instance by treaty. That is indubitable proof that the sovereignty it was

<sup>27</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.*, 10th January, 1676-7.

<sup>28</sup> *Add. MSS.* 28123, f. 15.

<sup>29</sup> *Naut. Mag.* 1898, p. 619.

meant to typify was also an actual fact, based on force and subject to the uncertainties of war, sometimes admitted, either actively or passively, and sometimes rejected, but as clear and logical in principle as any other dominion founded on force and dependent, like any other conquest, on military success.

The special pleading of international jurists long ago found it necessary to lay down as an axiom that the sea is free and that there can be no right of ownership in it. Within the historic period the story of every great power gives the lie to such a contention, for all such powers have found the dominion and mastery of the sea, or of such seas as were essential to their military and commercial developement, a necessary condition for the growth or maintenance of empire. If they failed to obtain it they never fully developed; if they failed to keep it they speedily went under. In this, as in many other instances, international jurists lay down theoretical law, but the guns make or alter actual law at their will and keep the jurists gyrating to their tune.

Whether the Honour of the Flag, with the basic claim it typified, was worth the bitter hatred it aroused in foreign nations may be questioned, although it must undoubtedly have encouraged the growth of the *morale* of the English Navy. But all races will sooner forgive injuries to their material interests than to their national pride, and this was a ceaselessly recurrent one.

It is not inconceivable that in the future another great naval power may arise, in North America, able and willing to exact a Salute signifying an ownership of two oceans.

[The Editorial Introduction to Book VI, on the Fisheries, dealing with the question of fishing licences, the nominal reason of the quarrel with the Dutch, contains further material bearing, indirectly, upon the claim to the Sovereignty of the Sea.]



A Voyage by Sir William Monson, during  
the Time he served as Admiral in the  
Narrow Seas, about England, Scotland,  
and Ireland. Anno Domini 1614.

HIS Majesty being earnestly importuned by his Scottish subjects to have the help of some of his ships to redress the spoils committed by the pirates on their coast, out of care to them, and honour to himself, he dispatched Sir William Monson and Sir Francis Howard in great haste upon that service, commanding such victuals and other wants as they stood in need of to be sent after them. We departed from Margate road the 14th of May, and arrived at Leith in Scotland on the 23d of the same. Thence I immediately went to Edinburgh, and presented myself to the Lords of that realm,\* acquainting them with the cause of my coming and the charge I had from his Majesty to defend that coast from pirates; and therefore desired to be informed by their Lordships concerning their strength, their number, and place of abode. I desired to be furnished with able pilots, for his Majesty's ships were of greater burthen and value than usually had been employed on those coasts; and besides, that the navigation to the northward of that place was not frequented by our nation, and therefore unknown to us. It

\* The Privy Council.

pleased their Lordships to recommend the care thereof to the Trinity House of Leith, expressly commanding them to appoint the ablest and sufficientest pilots that could be chosen amongst them. This command of theirs was accordingly obeyed, and their pilots repaired aboard the next morning. At the instant time I set sail, leaving instructions for my victuals to follow me to the Islands of Orkney; which the Lords of Scotland took into their provident care and performed it accordingly.

The first of June I arrived at Sinclair Castle, the house of the Earl of Caithness, the utmost promontory of all Britain. Here I found neither the number nor the danger of pirates so terrible as report made them. From twenty they were vanished to two, and both of them men of base condition; the one of them not long before my boatswain's mate in the Narrow Seas; the other of as mean a calling and rank and first made a seaman by me. Neither can this man be properly called a pirate; for being amongst them, and misliking their damnable courses, he, with three others, left their society, and, in an English bark they had taken, stole from them and put himself into the hands of the Earl of Caithness where I found both him and the bark,<sup>r</sup> which I brought away with me. The day before I came to Caithness I was deceived of meeting my boatswain's mate, the pirate, Clarke by name, who had been ashore with the Earl and friendly entertained, out of fear, because his house and tenants lay open to his spoil. That day there arrived a Scottish bark from the Frith, which gave an account of my coming to Leith with an intent to pursue such pirates as I could hear of. This news made Clarke quit that coast, and fly into

Iceland,\* where he refreshed himself amongst the fishermen.

But I being now out of hope of him, and out of doubt of any others thereabout, stayed not at Caithness but the same night passed to the Islands of Orkney, where I found more civil, kind, and friendly usage than could be expected from such kind of creatures in shew. Here I left Sir Francis Howard for guard of the coast, and prosecuted my intentions against Clarke, not sparing any place to seek him in where there was a possibility to find him. After some time spent at sea I put into the Islands of Shetland, and after to the Hebrides, where I designed Sir Francis Howard should meet me. The brutishness and incivility of those people (of the Hebrides) exceeds the savages of America, and it may be well said of them that education is a second nature, for there cannot be greater difference betwixt day and night than betwixt the conversation of those of Orkney and those of the Hebrides.

Being wearied, or rather discomforted, of meeting with Clarke, I directed my course for Broad Haven in Ireland, a harbour frequented by pirates, in respect of the security thereof and the remoteness, few knowing it, and the relief such people find by a gentleman there dwelling, who spared not his own daughters to bid them welcome. The danger I suffered in coming thither was great, and makes me fearful to think that two ships of his Majesty's of that consequence should be hazarded on so slender an occasion as the pursuit of a few petty pirates. Betwixt those islands and Ireland I met with so great a storm and grown seas that it

\* B, reads Ireland ; A, S, and R, Iceland. The Churchill text has 'The island,' an old form for Iceland.



were fitter for a poet than for me to describe. Of four vessels I had in company one was swallowed up in the seas ; the other three were separated, and saw one another no more till they met in England. After the seas had vented forth their fury the storm began to abate, and the 28th I arrived at Broad Haven, a place unknown to any one in my ship but the pirate aforesaid I had taken from Caithness, as you have heard, of whom I made use to execute this stratagem.

Being now come to the well-head of all pirates, and being desirous of resolving myself, as well by some act as by hearsay, of the condition of those people of Broad Haven, as soon as I came to an anchor I made choice of such persons of my company as formerly had been pirates, to give the less suspicion of my purpose. These men I sent in my boat to the gentleman of that place, and took upon myself to be a pirate, and the name of Captain Manwaring.\* The man I trusted in this service extolled the wealth I had on board and my royal disposition and liberality to those that shewed me courtesy. This hope of wealth and reward set their hearts on fire. I used the commendations and names of sundry pirates, their acquaintance, and feigned messages to the women from their sweethearts, who, he made believe, had sent them tokens which he had on board for them.

The silly women conceived so great a joy at it that it took away all suspicion of deceit.

\* Monson took the name of Manwaring with intention ; see note pp. 70, 71. This man is usually supposed to have been the Sir Henry Manwaring who, before and afterwards, commanded royal ships, became Lieutenant of Dover Castle, and was one of a commission that advised Charles I. on ship-building, but the identification has never been closely examined and is not certain.

The gentleman of that place, like a wily fox, absented himself, and left his wife and daughters to entertain the new welcome guests till he beheld the coast clear. When he saw his time he returned ; and to make his credit and reputation seem the greater with Captain Manwaring, expressed the favours he had done to sundry pirates, though it was to his eminent peril, which he did not esteem if he might do Captain Manwaring any service ; so much he was devoted to his person when he heard the report of his wealth. To endear him the more, he promised to send two gentlemen of trust the next morning on board him to give him the better assurance of his fidelity. In the mean time, because he should not be unfurnished of victuals, he directed him to send his men ashore armed, and in a warlike manner, that it might appear their cattle were taken by violence, which he would appoint in a place with their ears slit to be distinguished from other beasts.

The messenger being fully satisfied, and concluding to execute this stratagem, returned aboard that night. At the dawning of the day the play began, for that was the hour appointed for the wolf to seek his prey ; and Captain Chester, with fifty armed men, in a disorderly manner, like pirates, went on shore and acted so much as was agreed on. And the cattle being killed, he was, in a secret manner, invited to the house of the gentleman ; but, at his entreaty, was to make it appear publicly that he came not by invitement but by his own insinuation. Here he was welcomed, and friendly entertained by the daughters, whose desire was to hear of their sweethearts and to receive their tokens. But all in general coveted to see Captain Manwaring, who they confidently believed would enrich them all. The gentleman, Mr. Cormack

by name, was punctual in all his undertaking, and the two ambassadors he promised came aboard, and delivered a friendly (though in a rude manner, like their country) message of their love, and assurance of their service to Captain Manwaring. Their message ended, I willed them to observe and consider whether they thought that ship and company to be pirates, for they could well judge of pirates because of their familiarity and acquaintance with them.

It was a folly to dissemble any longer for, though they would, yet they could not give light of my design. And therefore in as rough and rude a manner as they delivered their message, I told them how they had transgressed, and the next thing they were to expect was death, and commanded them to be put in irons in dark and several places, being careful to permit neither boat nor man to go ashore until my own landing.

The time approached I had promised to visit them ; and for my greater honour they had drawn down four or five hundred people to attend on the shore side, which I seeing and being doubtful of their assembly, as I pretended, I seemed scrupulous to go on land for fear of treachery. But if oaths, vows, or any kind of protestations would serve me, I had them ; and when they saw me satisfied of their royal dealing, and that I put myself upon them, three of their principal men run up to the arm-pits in water, striving who should have the credit to carry me ashore. One of these three was an Englishman, a late tradesman in London, and attended the arrival of pirates. The second had been a schoolmaster, and a man attended like another Apollo amongst those rude people. The third a merchant of Galloway,



but his chiefest traffic was to buy and sell with pirates.

These three gallants, like gentlemen-ushers, conducted me to Mr. Cormack's house, and the meaner sort followed with acclamations of joy. At my landing, happy was he to whom I would lend my ear. When I spake, one told me they knew my friends, and if my name had not discovered it yet my face did shew me to be a Manwaring. In short, they made me believe I had a command of them and their country, and that no man was ever so welcome as Captain Manwaring. Entering into the house of Mr. Cormack, his three hackney daughters rose to entertain me, and conducted me to the hall newly strewed with rushes, as the richest decking their abilities or the meanness of the place could afford. In the corner was a harper who played merrily to make my welcome the greater. After some discourse, and several questions asked by the three daughters concerning their acquaintance and friends; but above all being desirous to handle the tokens promised, and laughing and jeering at their two messengers aboard who they did not suspect were detained prisoners but drinking and frolicking in the ship, as the use was upon the arrival of pirates. After these passages the women offered themselves to dance, one choosing me, which I excused, but gave free liberty for the rest of my company. The Englishman was so pleasant and delightful that he seemed to have new life infused into him: he told me the heavens did foresee he was born to serve me, and I to relieve him. He shewed me a pass, procured upon false pretences from the sheriff of that county, authorizing him to travel from place to place to make inquisition of his goods, which he

falsely pretended he was robbed of at sea. He laughed at the cheat he had used to the sheriff in getting his pass, and alleged the benefit that might be made of it in sending to and fro in the country without suspicion. He proffered me the service of ten mariners of his acquaintance that lay lurking thereabouts, expecting the coming in of men of war,\* which seafaring men he had power to command. His antic behaviour was enough to put the melancholiest man out of his humour; sometimes he played the part of a commanding sheriff; then he acted his own, with many witty passages how he deceived the sheriff. I embraced his offer of ten mariners, with a promise of great reward, and caused him to write effectually for them, as may appear by his letter following:

Honest brother Dick, and the rest, we are all made men; for valiant Captain Manwaring and all his gallant crew are arrived in this place. Make haste; for he floweth in wealth, and is most kind to all men. Farewell; and once again make haste.

This letter being writ, and the pass enclosed in it, I took it into my own hand, offering to hire a messenger to carry it. But night drawing on, which required my return on board, and having drawn from the country the secret I desired, I caused the harp to cease playing, and commanded silence, for that I was to speak.

I told them, that hitherto they had played their

\* *I.e.* pirates. At this period any ship prepared especially for fighting—pirate or privateer—was called a man-of-war. The man-of-war proper was spoken of as a 'King's ship' or 'Queen's ship.' Later in the century a privateer was often called a 'private ship,' and during the eighteenth century ships of the line, not wearing an Admiral's flag, were also often spoken of as 'private ships.'

part and I had no part in the comedy ; but though my scene was last, and might be termed the epilogue, yet it would prove more tragical than theirs. I put them out of doubt that I was no pirate, but a scourge to such, and was sent from his Majesty to discover, suppress, and punish them and their abettors, whom his Majesty did not hold worthy to retain the name of subjects. I told them that that harbour, and the name of Cormack, was assigned me as a place whence all such mischief sprang, and that I could find no better expedient to confirm what had been told me than by taking upon myself the habit of a pirate and one of their associates. That they had made themselves guilty in the law without farther accusations : and now there remained nothing but to proceed to their execution, by virtue of my commission, and to that purpose I had brought a pair of framed gallows, which I caused to be set up, meaning to begin the mournful dance with the two men they thought had been merry dancing aboard the ship.

I told the Englishman he should be the next that should follow, for that his offence did surpass the rest, being an Englishman, who should be a pattern of good life to those people we have sought to reduce to civility since we first possessed that country. And, seeing man by nature is rather apt to follow evil example than good, he should be hanged for example sake.

I told M<sup>r</sup> schoolmaster he was a fit tutor for the children of the Devil, and that he had apt scholars to follow his damnable teachings. And that, as the members are governed by the head, the way to make his members sound was to shorten him by the head, and therefore willed him to admonish his scholars from the top of the gallows



which should be a pulpit prepared for him. I asked the merchant whether he imagined there could be stealers if there were no buyers? And as the contriver and plotter of evil is worse than he that executes it, so is the abettor and a receiver to be condemned before the thief. I told him that pirates could no more live by their occupation, were it not for buyers, than a poor labourer work without wages; that the offence in a merchant was more heinous than in another man because his trade must be maintained and upheld by peace. His time, I told him, was not long, and wished him to make his account with God, that he might be found a good merchant and factor to him though he had been a malefactor to the law.

Here was seen the mutability of the world; their mirth was suddenly turned into mourning, and their dancing into lamenting, each one bewailing and repenting as is the custom of offenders. The night calling me away I appointed them their guard to the boat, and left the carpenter ashore to finish the gallows, which was done by morning and the prisoners ready to receive their doom. But being sued to by the whole country, with a promise never to connive again at pirates, after four and twenty hours fright in irons I pardoned them. The Englishman was banished, not only from that coast but from the sea side throughout Ireland; and a copy of his pass sent to the sheriff with advice to be more provident for the future to whom he granted his safe conduct. Here my master died; and all that country could not afford a pilot to the southward of Ireland, so little use those people make of God's blessings in those parts. For were they industrious, as in other countries, both land and sea would afford

them as great plenty of trade and commodities as any part in Europe.

The next morning as I was at anchor in Broad Haven, I espied a ship bearing into that harbour ; which seeing me sprung her luff,\* and came to an anchor under the weather shore. By her working I judged her to be a pirate, and though it blew much wind I put myself into my boat, having the opportunity of a great fog, thinking to steal upon her at unawares. But finding the fog, like other weather at sea, inconstant, when I came within falcon shot of her it cleared up ; which she espying, cut cable in her hawse and stood off to sea, where I pursued her with great danger of drowning in my boat. Six days she kept the sea in foul weather, and the seventh arrived at the island of Iniskea, seven leagues to the southward and windward of Broad Haven, where she was out of fear of any attempt to be made upon her, by reason of the wind.

In the darksomeness of the night, when there was least suspicion of discovery, the pirate wrought a means to have a letter secretly conveyed to Cormack, their agent and trustiest friend. But Cormack, being lately burnt, did dread the fire ; and no sooner received the letter but he brought it to me, which was to this effect :  
Dear Friend,

I was bearing into Broad Haven to give you corn for ballast, but that I was feared by the King's ship I took to be there. I pray you send me word what ship it is, for we stand in bodily fear. I beseech you, provide me two kine, for we are in great want of victuals : whensoever you shall make a fire on shore I will send my boat to you.

This letter pleased me, hoping to make good use of it, as I did. The first thing was to conjure Cormack to keep secrecy, laying my command, upon

\* Came up to the wind.

charge of his allegiance, to follow my directions. I writ his answer, which I caused Cormack to sign as from himself : the purport of it was,

That he rejoiced to hear of his health, and desired to see him. He bid him be confident this ship could not endanger him ; for she was not the King's, as he imagined, but one of London that came from the Indies with her men sick, and many dead. He promised him two oxen and a calf ; to observe his directions by making a fire ; and gave him hope to see him within two nights.

A man could not work too secretly and securely with those people, who in their hearts were piratically affected, and therefore I clothed three or four of my company in Irish habits, to accompany the messenger, commanding them to lie in ambush not far off ; as well to behold the behaviour of the bearer as to defend him from any violence of the pirates, fearing they might surprise him if they mistrusted any deceit. The pirates kept as good a watch to observe the fire as the country doth a beacon upon suspicion of an enemy, and espying it were not long a rowing to shore, and as little a while on shore ; for it was the letter only at that time they coveted, and having it they hastened aboard to read it. The letter gave them great content because they found themselves free from danger of the ship they took to be the King's ; as also because they were promised relief in their extremity by the two oxen to be sent them.

This day they were frolic and merry, to make amends for the six before spent in foul weather at sea. In the mean time I contrived a stratagem the pirates neither dreaded nor dreamed of. For understanding that at the head of the river where they lay, and not above seven miles from me, there was a nook of land two miles in breadth



that parted it from another river, which opened itself into the sea over against Iniskea where the pirates lay, I carried my purpose secretly from the Irish, who I knew would not much further my design against pirates, and on a sudden took so many of those Irish, with the help of my own company, as drew my boat and another over land; and having recovered the next river, with no little marvel to the Irish, they were to row thirty miles to the place assigned for the fire to be made. After a wearisome row,\* casting to be at the place by midnight, as soon as the boat arrived they kindled the fire. And by the time they conjectured the pirates' boat might be ashore, who, they made account, would carry so many men as would be a great weakening to the ship, they rowed off with speed, and came within sight of, and surprised her before they could be suspected, which did so much bemuse and amaze the pirates that they had not power to resist, but yielded like so many wolves betrayed in their own snares.

Being thus circumvented and apprehended they were brought to Broad Haven, a place not long before by them feared, where I did execution upon the principallest man of them, shewing mercy to the rest so far as I durst; for I was commanded in my instructions to execute justice with some rigour. Examining the behaviour of all the pirates, of many I picked out the worst who had tasted twice before of his Majesty's gracious pardon. This severe justice gave a terror to the people of that country, and no less satisfaction to the owner of the ship whom they kept prisoner aboard them, and who might see his Majesty spared not his own subjects if they

\* A; B, R, and S all read 'roath.'

offended. The pirates ever after became strangers to that harbour of Broad Haven, and in a little time wholly abandoned Ireland, which was attributed to the execution of that man. For before that time they were in those parts rather connived at than punished.

From hence I went groping along the coast, the country, as was said, not being able to afford me a pilot. On the 12th of July I came to the Ventry, a place that had twice relieved me before, coming from sea in great extremity. On the 28th to Bear Haven, the 1st of August to Plymouth, the 8th to the Isle of Wight, and the 10th to the Downs, having circuited His Majesty's three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

And here I bid farewell to the sea, for this was the last voyage I ever went in King James's time,\* and the last year but one I served on the Narrow Seas, which wanted not much of twelve years. In which space I will boldly and truly say there was never service neglected nor unperformed that I was commanded upon ; which I presume is strange, and not to be paralleled by any that enjoyed my employment before. And if the time be considered, six years of those twelve bred many doubts and differences how an English Admiral should carry himself betwixt the Hollanders and Spaniards, the wars continuing between them, yet such was my hap and care that I committed no error for the one or the other justly to except against me.

#### JACOBEOAN PIRACY.

A proclamation of 23rd June, 1603, recalled all privateers, and as many of these had been little less than pirates under

\* S is the only MS. which contains ' King James's time,' which shews it to be later than 1635.

colour of letters of marque, the result was that a large number of them took up the business frankly. Some of the better equipped ranged the Mediterranean, sometimes coming north to revictual from the Newfoundland fishing fleet or to sell their plunder; the smaller fry haunted the British seas and the coast of Spain and Portugal, but as in those days all merchantmen were more or less well armed their victims were mostly coasters or other small craft. The more ambitious took their occupation seriously and simply refused to make peace with Spain, emphasizing their position by professing to spare all British ships; the base used by these English pirates, with their French and Dutch associates, was Mamora, near Sallee, where a pirate city and port was in process of evolution. Ireland and Barbary were called the pirate bases.<sup>1</sup> In 1612 Sir John Digby wrote home from Madrid that six galleons were being fitted out to deal with the English pirates who had been having a very good time, 'but they have dealt very honestly of late with their countrymen, for having taken a ship of London bound for Seville with 16 or 20,000*l.* they have sent the merchants all their goods; insomuch that one of them that had to the value of 2,000*l.* in the ship sends me word that he hath not lost 10*l.*'<sup>2</sup> Two men, John Warde and Simon Dauncer, or Danseker, the former a Kentish ex-man-of-war's man and the latter a Dutchman of Flushing, were especially obnoxious to the Spaniards who, in 1608 and 1609, expected them to cruise with at least twenty ships and were apprehensive of an attack on the Flota.<sup>3</sup> Warde, like William Bishop of Plymouth, Richard Gifford, Henry Manwaring, Francis Verney and others, often acted with, or in the pay of, the Tunisian and Algerine pirates, and it was the tuition of these men that eventually led the Mahommedans into the English Channel a few years later. Peter Eston, or Easton, probably a Somersetshire man, was another famous pirate admiral who at one time collected a fleet, and Sir John Ferne another; in 1611 the two together mustered forty sail and 2000 men.<sup>4</sup> Ferne, pardoned, later commanded a ship for James in the Algiers expedition of 1620-1. Another pirate, Walsingham, who was admiral of an Algerine squadron in 1617, made his peace with James and was also employed

<sup>1</sup> There is an illustration of this in Mansell's voyage of 1620, *post*, pp. 100, 108.

<sup>2</sup> Hist. Man. Comm. Rep. X., App. pt. vii. 578.

<sup>3</sup> Winwood, *Memorials*, 7th September, 1608; 20th July, 1609.

<sup>4</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* lxx. 161. See also *post*, p. 379.



under Mansell against Algiers, but in 1622 he was committed to the Tower for conspiring to seize H.M.S. Dreadnought in order to recommence his old trade.<sup>5</sup> For Easton and others the Newfoundland fishing fleets were at once a victualling reserve and a recruiting ground; in one visit, that Easton made with a squadron of nine vessels, he pressed or persuaded 500 fishermen to join him and took victuals, guns, and stores to the value of 10,000*l.*;<sup>6</sup> Manwaring came with eight sail and added 400 men to his crews. In 1623 the Bermudians, in consequence of the pressure of the English regulations about the import of tobacco, threatened 'to revolt to the pirates,'<sup>7</sup> but in that instance probably the buccaneers, who were beginning to become formidable, were meant.

Around the English coast, especially in the west and in Irish waters, complaints of depredations, although on a smaller scale, were ceaseless. Beyond proclamations, which were designed to tempt pirates to apply for a pardon by the promise of life and property, little was done to deal with the evil. Often the pirates took the pardon but returned to their criminal career when the conditions were sufficiently tempting; the general impression among them, founded upon experience, was that at the worst only the leaders would be executed, but that the chances were that they would only suffer a little 'lazy imprisonment.'<sup>8</sup> We see (p. 59) that Monson knew that many of his crew had been pirates and would, no doubt, be pirates again when it suited them. The quiescence of the Government was due mainly to the fact that to exterminate the marauders it would have been necessary to equip a really large squadron of small cruisers; not only would their maintenance have pressed heavily on already maimed finances, but it would have been necessary, first, to build them, and there was no money in the Treasury for even more urgent needs. On the other hand the influential commercial class which could have compelled its complaints to be taken seriously was much less affected by these small freebooters; their victims were small provincial shipowners who possessed a coaster or two, fishermen, or an occasional foreigner. Large and well-armed ships, belonging to owners in London and other

<sup>5</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I. cxxix. 62.*

<sup>6</sup> Prowse, *Hist. of Newfoundland*, p. 102.

<sup>7</sup> *Hist. Man. Com. Rep. VIII., App. pt. ii. p. 6.*

<sup>8</sup> *Cott. MSS. Otho E. viii. f. 317.*

important commercial centres, were left alone; the wail of the small owner met only polite sympathy.

Monson writes that James, being 'earnestly importuned' by his Scottish subjects, sent the two ships north to clear the Scotch coast. James was being continually earnestly importuned from the western counties and Ireland, entreaties which he endured impassively; there must have been some reason unknown for the prompt assistance extended in this instance, and the despatch of the commander-in-chief in the Channel in person to deal with the two pirate cock-boats which seem to have been the only ones troubling Scottish waters at the moment. The sister kingdom of Ireland had swarmed with petty freebooters since his accession, but there had never been more than one pinnacle, which every pirate could sail round, on the station, and the requests of the Irish Government for more assistance were always ignored. The official frame of mind is indicated in a letter of the Lord Admiral Nottingham, in 1612, in which he dwells on the cost of sending men-of-war to Ireland, where the pirates only appear, he says, for provisions and other supplies, and asks why the towns affected cannot fit out ships for themselves as some of the English ports had done.<sup>9</sup> Cecyll's letter to Winwood<sup>10</sup> is, stripped of its diplomatic verbiage, a striking admission of the inability or unwillingness of the Government to deal firmly with piracy and their readiness to adopt any expedient, however shameful and derogatory to the honour of the Crown and nation. It was no doubt as the result of this letter that three Dutch men-of-war were sent a month later into Irish waters, but with what success is not known.

Monson presented himself before the Privy Council of Scotland on 24th May; the Council, not conversant with his naval dignity, simply refer to him in their Minutes as a nameless captain of a King's ship who came to declare himself ready to follow their directions and asked for pilots.<sup>11</sup> On 26th May a commission was made out to George Sinclair, fifth Earl of Caithness, constituting him a justice and commissioner in the matter of local piracies, and empowering him to raise men and fit out ships to seize them, but making no mention of Monson nor ordering the Earl to act with him in any capacity either of subordination or direction. The

<sup>9</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 165, f. 192.

<sup>10</sup> *Post, App. B.*, p. 376.

<sup>11</sup> *Register of Pr. Co. of Scotland*, x. p. 240.

ship brought in by the pirate who surrendered comes under the notice of the Privy Council in a Minute of 7th July.<sup>12</sup>

There were several reasons why the Irish coast was a favourite pirate station. Probably the chief one was that the statute of 28 Henry VIII., which made piracy a felony at common law and brought the offence under the ordinary rules of evidence and legal procedure, did not yet apply to Ireland. Previous to the Act of Henry VIII. a piratical offence had to be proved by the evidence of two disinterested witnesses, and these, in the nature of things, could seldom be present when piracy was committed at sea. Other reasons were to be found in the situation, which was to windward of the usual course into or out of the Channel, and the numberless small harbours and anchorages which offered a safe refuge from inquiries. If it was 'a far cry to Loch Awe' it was much farther from the seat of Government in Ireland to the coast, with which communication was slow, and which was inhabited by a sullen and disloyal population whose sympathies were always with the pirates who could obtain news and assistance much more readily than could the government officials. Then, again, the material force at the disposal of the Government, one small pinnace from the Navy with an occasional vessel hired locally, was ludicrously insufficient, nor were some of the officials themselves altogether free from suspicion of being in collusion with the criminals.<sup>13</sup> If one was captured it was necessary, after many formalities, that he should be sent to England to be tried, a proceeding probably in itself illegal, and during the lengthy process or transit he usually managed to escape.<sup>14</sup> The pirates who worked the coast of Spain usually came north during the fishing season and revictualled themselves at the expense of the English fishermen who came to the Irish fishing grounds in 1607 they plundered upwards of 100 English boats.<sup>15</sup> Whether there were no Irish boats, or whether they were spared, is not said, but the pirates on the Irish station, like their bigger comrades who sailed farther south, were sometimes, perhaps often, merciful to British ships and allowed them to pass unharmed if there were no foreign owned goods on board,<sup>16</sup> and many of them offered their services to catch

<sup>12</sup> *Register*, x. p. 250.

<sup>13</sup> *S. P. Ireland*, ccxxiii. 64, 74; *ibid.* (Phil. Papers), iil. p. 325.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxii. 101; ccxxiii. 55; *ibid.* (Phil. Papers), iii.

pp. 195, 252.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* ccxviii. 4.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxvi. 65; ccxxix. 114.



'rebels and fugitives.'<sup>17</sup> In 1609 the Mediterranean pirate, Bishop, was off the coast in control of eleven sail manned by 1000 men by whom he had been elected admiral; Sir Richard Moryson wrote from Youghal to Lord Salisbury that he was too weak to take any steps against them and that it was bad policy to irritate them lest they ravaged the coast and took openly to traitorous courses.<sup>18</sup> Bishop, Moryson said, was a man of brains, resource, and experience and might be usefully employed in the King's service. About the same time the Lord Deputy was also writing to Salisbury that he had heard that the pirates intended to burn the Newfoundland fleet and that they should therefore be pardoned.<sup>19</sup> They were always ready to accept a pardon if allowed to keep their plunder, but the Deputy's statesmanship is reminiscent of that of the later Caesars. A year previously, in June 1608, Lord Danvers, the Lord President of Munster, had felt himself compelled for the sake of the fishermen to come to an agreement with those pirates who had their headquarters at Baltimore.<sup>20</sup> For this he was censured by the Council at Dublin who viewed the matter serenely from afar, but later in the year Danvers, who wished to sail to England, was absolutely blockaded in Cork by a pirate squadron.<sup>21</sup>

Of Monson's little commission, which he seems to have executed neatly enough, his own account and the notices in the Scotch papers are the only records. We see that, compared with normal piratical occurrences, it was an affair of very small importance and did not call for any correspondence; in any case none has been preserved. The greater number of the pirates was always to be found on the south and south-western coasts, and although piracy was endemic all round Ireland the attention of the government at Dublin was mainly directed to the quarter where it was most dangerously prevalent.

<sup>17</sup> *S. P. Ireland*, ccxxv. 184; ccxxvi. 5.    <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxvii. 120.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxix. 114.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxiv. 118.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* ccxxvi. 5.

The Names of such Ships of the Queen's,  
King James's, and King Charles's, as I  
served in, besides divers others not  
mentioned.\*

In the Charles, whereof I had no command	
	<i>Anno</i> 1588
In the Victory, in which voyage I was Vice- Admiral to my Lord of Cumberland	1589
In the Garland	1591
In the Lion	1593
In the Repulse and Rainbow	1596
In the Rainbow	1597
In the Defiance	1599
In the Garland†	1600
In the Nonpareil†	1601
In the Swiftsure and Mary Rose	1602
In the Merhonour	1603
In the Vanguard	1604
In the Vanguard	1605
In the Assurance and Vanguard	1606
In the Rainbow and Assurance	1607
In the Rainbow and Vanguard	1608
In the Vanguard and Assurance	1609
In the Assurance and Rainbow	1610
In the Rainbow and Adventure	1611
In the Adventure and Rainbow	1612

\* This list has been corrected from official papers.

† See *ante*, i. xvii.

In the Assurance and Rainbow		1613
In the Lion and Assurance		1614
In the Nonsuch and Lion		1615
In the Nonsuch	1-13 Jan.	1616
In the James		1635



A Note of such Princes, Ambassadors, and others, whom Sir William Monson transported from the 20th of July, 1604, till the 13th of January, 1616, with the Number of their Followers and their Meals, at his own Charges, aboard his Majesty's Ships, for which he is as yet unsatisfied, and which did amount to the Sum of 1500*l*.

—	Year	Month	Day	Princes, Ambassadors, &c.	Follow- ers	Meals
1	1604	August	5	The Constable of Castile at his coming over .	200	3
2	1604	August	31	The Constable at his return . . . .	300	3
3	1604	November	7	The Duke of Holstein . . . .	40	2
4	1604	December	23	The Duke of Lenox at his going into France	110	—
5	1604	February	20	Two gentlemen of the Archduke's chamber .	10	3
6	1604	March	13	The Duke of Lenox at his return out of France	300	*4
7	1605	April	19	The Earl of Hertford going into Flanders .	300	4
8	1605	May	19	The Earl at his return from Flushing . .	300	4
9	1605	June	30	The Emperor's ambassador . . . .	70	4
10	1605	July	25	The Emperor's ambassador at his return .	74	4
11	1605	September	1	The Earl of Villa Mediana aboard five days in foul weather . . . .	200	10
12	1606	April	21	The Marquis of St. Germain's coming . .	50	4
13	1606	May	3	The same Marquis at his return . . . .	74	4
14	1606	September	14	Count Vaudemont at his coming over . .	300	3
15	1606	October	13	In his return . . . .	250	3
16	1607	May	5	Prince Joinville at his coming over . .	40	4
17	1607	June	1	At his return . . . .	40	4
18	1607	November	27	The Landgrave of Hesse . . . .	30	4
19	1608	October	1	The ambassador in ordinary of Venice .	40	4
20	1608	February	5	The Spanish ambassador Don Hernando Giron at his return . . . .	30	3
21	1610	March	25	The Duke of Brunswick coming over . .	38	5
22	1610	May	6	Sir Tho. Edmondes, and the Duke of Wurtem- burg's ambassador . . . .	50	3
23	1610	June	3	Don Pedro de Zuñiga at his return . .	35	5
24	1610	June	18	The Duke of Brunswick at his return . .	35	5
25	1610	August	20	The Lord Wotton going over . . . .	46	1
26	1611	September	5	The Spanish ladies coming over . . . .	28	2
27	1611	February	11	The Marshal de Lavardin at his return .	200	2
28	1612	April	23	The Duke of Bouillon coming over . .	200	2
29	1612	June	27	Don Pedro de Zuñiga coming over . .	50	3
30	1612	August	24	The Spanish ladies returning . . . .	25	2
31	1612	October	16	Don Pedro de Zuñiga at his return . .	53	3
32	1613	April	25	The Earl of Arundel and his lady going over with the Lady Elizabeth's Grace, for which I received allowance.		

\* B, and R, read 50 followers, and no meals.

There were divers English Lords and others that passed with me by warrant also, which I have not set down because they concern not his Majesty's service so particularly.

A Consultation before the Lords of the Council in 1617, unto which I was called, and a Proposition made how the Pirates of Algiers might be surprised, and the Town attempted. My Advice to it was as follows :

BECAUSE an expedition against the pirates will not depend upon the employment of one fleet for the space of six months only, but that it is to be feared it will rather prove a work of years, it is necessary that all the maritime towns of Europe do contribute towards the expense and charge. For considering the profit will be universal, if the pirates be destroyed, there is no reason but the charge should be as general. Because every nation is not provided with swift ships and strength alike for such an action, which are the two principal things, it is fit the fleets that must second one another consist of English, Spaniards, and Hollanders, as most able to perform the service in respect of their strength and swift sailing, as aforesaid. And all other towns and countries bordering upon the seas, that cannot furnish able ships, to supply it in money. This being agreed upon, it must be likewise resolved, that as the charge is general so the gains may be equally distributed and divided, which must arise from the sale of such Turks and Moors as shall be taken for slaves, and of such goods as shall be recovered out of the pirates' hands, where no proprietor can challenge it.



The ships employed to be rated after the proportion of men and tonnage. As for example, so many ships of his Majesty's as will carry three thousand tons burthen, and twelve hundred men ; Spain and Holland sending ships to that rate will be a force sufficient to encounter the whole number of the Turkish pirates. It is not convenient to employ any ships under two hundred and fifty tons, nor above three hundred, the King's ships excepted, because a lesser ship, losing company, will be a prey to an enemy, and if bigger than three hundred it will fill up the quantity of tonnage and number of men and be able to do little more service than the lesser ship. For the more number of ships there are of two or three hundred tons they will be the abler to pursue the pirates if they be forced to scatter, every ship undertaking a pirate, and if there be more pirates than ships of ours the overplus in number to ours will escape for want of ships to follow them.

The Generals are to execute martial law, and to determine their authority before they meet, to avoid questions and differences that otherwise may happen. To have safe conducts to all Christian ports, and authority to be supplied with necessaries they shall want. As also provision for the sick and hurt men ; and such ships or spoil as they shall take from the pirates to be left in safe custody in the said ports. To carry money or commodities to revictual, and all manner of provisions to trim and careen their ships, with one master carpenter to have the overlooking and ordering the state of the shipping. It is better to carry commodities than money for their occasions because of the loss between our money and the money of Spain ; secondly, it is not fit to transport money out of England ; and,

thirdly, there will be a gain in commodities by way of traffic. To have a treasurer to look to the payment of money, and a stock to be disbursed upon every necessary occasion that either the men or ships shall stand in need of. To be extraordinary well provided with muskets and all other munitions, and especially with dice shot\* to be shot out of ordnance; because, where there are many men, as commonly there be in pirates, dice shot will make a great slaughter amongst them, and such confusion withal, where there are so few sailors to tackle their ships, that they will be taken upon the stays, or upon the lee, and not be able to defend themselves or to fit their sails again. To make the King's ships musket-proof, which will be done with little charge, and no burden to the ships. And to have all the spar decks and other things of weight taken down, and only netting† put up when there shall be occasion of fight.

Forasmuch as the chiefest care in a sea-action consists in keeping the designs secret this intended journey requires special secrecy; for there being several Englishmen who have been too busy in trading with pirates, and furnishing them with powder and other necessities, it is to be feared those same Englishmen will endeavour to give the

\* The Churchill editor evidently thought 'dice shot' a clerical error and altered it to 'chain shot,' the former being unknown, and the latter known, to him. Dice shot were square pieces of iron used under the same conditions as the later grape shot and they are often mentioned among the artillery stores in the reigns of Henry VII. and Henry VIII. and occasionally during the reign of Elizabeth. Towards the end of the sixteenth century they are more often referred to in text books than in lists of stores, therefore it is rather surprising to find Monson writing of them as in ordinary use.

† See *ante*, ii. p. 324, and Young's 'Notes on Sea Service,' *post*, iv. p. 221.

pirates intelligence, fearing their own danger if the pirates be taken and their naughty dealings discovered. For prevention whereof it is necessary that our ships be provided under pretence of another employment, and such men whose opinions may be demanded to give them secretly and in writing. Out of which there may be collections for instructions to be given to the General when he shall be ready to put to sea and not before. The French King must prohibit his subjects, and especially those of Marseilles and Toulon, to trade with pirates, who now make it a common and daily commerce, and from whom they will be certified of our preparations if they be not prevented.

The place of rendezvous to be at the islands of Bayona,\* the hithermost part of Spain, as most convenient for all squadrons to meet without suspicion. England and Holland may pretend several enterprises, without knowledge of one another till their meeting. The squadron of Spain coming thither from San Lucar, Cadiz, or Lisbon, will make the pirates of Algiers and Tunis think the preparations cannot be against them, the Spanish fleet being furnished in the highest part of Spain to them and carried to the furthest from them. The time of the year to be in August or September; for in those months the pirates usually put to sea because then begins the greatest trade, and commonly in those months the fleets from the Indies return into Spain. As, also, in those months the Christian galleys retire into harbour so that they need not fear them.

Our fleet is not to appear within the Straits until they hear of the pirates being at sea; for

\* Off Vigo.



our only fear and doubt will be that if they understand of a greater force than their own to be made out against them they will not adventure to put to sea. Our greatest advantage upon them is that if they are at sea we shall have daily intelligence where they are by ships we shall meet that have been chased by them, and, observing the winds, can direct us where we shall have them. Or, if we shall hear that they are scattered, we will do the like and have signs to know one another. Another advantage we shall have, is, that no harbour can entertain or defend them from their going out till they return home. For all Christian shores are their enemies, and Barbary hath only two open roads, Saphee and Santa Cruz,\* which can give them little defence against us; and Tunis, within the Straits, is a wide open bay that lies at the mercy of an enemy, as appears by the Spaniards twice burning them in three years as they lay at an anchor. If we happen to miss them at sea we may safely intercept them if we spread two squadrons ten or twelve leagues short of Algiers as they return. They will then of necessity fall in with us when they do not suspect us, for they have no hope of intelligence from the shore because we cannot be descried from thence.

That no mariner or sailor of the Turk be ransomed or set at liberty after they are taken, for their seamen being taken away they cannot set a ship to sea. We know their numbers cannot be great because it is not above twelve years since the English taught them the art of navigation in ships. Such renegadoes as shall be taken, or such Christians as have willingly served the Turks, to be

\* Agadir.

executed immediately for the terror of others. For if Christian sailors can be kept from them their piracy must consequently cease, which otherwise will turn to the destruction of the better part of the ships of Europe.

That such an English General be appointed, and the ships with that care fitted, that may give reputation to our action. For considering the reputation we have had in sea causes it behoves us, now most especially, to maintain it because we shall be joined with strange nations who shall behold us. And as it is necessary a General should have experience so ought it now the more to appear in respect many eyes of several countries are to see him. He should not be strictly limited to his commission but many things referred to his discretion, as opportunity and occasion shall offer, so it be done by the advice of the council of war appointed for his assistance. Such a General should be appointed as shall have more care to perform the service than to his own ease, pleasure, or ostentation. That especially he keep the sea, and avoid seeking harbour, unless necessity compels him, and then not to let it be to the leeward of Algiers; for so the pirates may go in and out at their pleasure.\* Moreover, that he enter no harbour but such as have good outlets lest the service be neglected for want of a wind to get forth. Many other advices are to be given to a General, too tedious to rehearse, only I will conclude with this admonition that as the ships shall grow foul, and be forced into harbour to careen, that he do it by degrees, as thus, that he keep a squadron out at sea whilst the others are fitting

\* This and the preceding sentence sound as if they had been inserted after the return of Mansell, when Monson had seen Coke's annotations on Button's relation of the voyage.

in harbour ; and upon the return of the clean squadron to sea, whilst the other squadron is in trimming, to put himself into one of those ships. For it is not the part of a General upon any occasion to leave his fleet, though for a time he may leave his ship.



The Danger and Uncertainty in surprising  
Algiers, or the undertaking it by Siege,  
or otherwise.

WHOSOEVER knows Algiers cannot be ignorant of the strength of it. The inhabitants consist principally of desperate rogues and renegadoes, that live by rapine, theft, and spoil, having renounced God and all virtue and become reprobates to all the Christian world. This town is, and has been, of so great annoyance to all the Christians living over against it, that they have been oftentimes forced to attempt it by surprise; but still have failed of their designs, either by intelligence the town has had, or by their carefulness to defend it. For no man but must think that a town which depends on its own strength, being in continual danger of stratagems and sudden surprises from the bordering enemies who have the commodity of galleys to transport and land an army at pleasure, will be extraordinary watchful and circumspect to foresee and prevent all dangers that may be thought of. Or else they are less careful than all other towns that lie either on the Christian or Turkish shore, who live in such continual danger, one of the other, that their often alarums make them give little advantage to their enemies by way of surprise. And if those Christians, who, out of revenge or to avoid the mischiefs they daily received, could never prevail in their sundry attempts, being nigh them, and having

conveniences to embark and transport an army without suspicion or rumour, and to be succoured by the islands of Majorca and Minorca if wind, weather, or other casualty did happen, but especially having intelligence with some of the town for the delivery of it, as about fourteen years since it happened by the practice of a renegado, called Spinola, which failed—what hope have we then to prevail, who cannot so secretly furnish an army and fleet but that all the world must ring of it in gazettes and other intelligences? Or, if it be once known in Marseilles, it cannot be concealed many hours from Algiers, which daily trades and has correspondence with them as I have said before. But allowing our action to be kept secret till the very time we arrive upon that coast of Barbary, yet the warning will be sufficient for a garrison town of less force and fewer men than Algiers, to prevent any design. In such a case as this the time and wind is principally to be regarded; for a wind that is large and good to carry a fleet into a landing place in an open bay will be dangerous if it blow a hard gale upon a lee shore. And it will make so great a sea that it will be impossible for men with their furnitures and arms to land without apparent danger; and what resistance a few men are able to make I refer to consideration.

On the other side, a scant wind from the shore that is disadvantageable to seize the coast is the smoother for us to land our men, but, though it gives us a smooth landing, having there arrived yet it doth much advantage the defendant. They shall have the longer space to make provision to defend themselves from the time they should descry our fleet at sea until our approach to the shore with a scant and contrary wind as aforesaid. To

this design there are many things to be considered and many casualties to be feared, all depending upon wind and weather which governeth all sea actions. If a fleet bear into the shore with a fair gale of wind, and be taken with a shift of wind, or calm, and be discovered from the land, the enemy shall have time and opportunity to strengthen the town to withstand our landing, and to draw out their galleys to cut off our boats and men if we come to an anchor such a distance from the shore that our ships and ordnance be not able to command it; as we see by example in our offer to land at Cadiz the day before we took the town, and as I have before discoursed. The second consideration is the convenience of boats to land, for if you make two or three returns in landing for want of boats (which you cannot choose but do) you bring but the third part of your force to fight at your landing, which will be easily resisted. Or suppose that the first troops we land in our boats arrive safely; before they can be succoured with a second or third supply they may well have their throats cut by the inhabitants of the country, though the town makes no sally, who are always ready upon an hour's warning to take arms. The third consideration is the distance from the town where you will land, proposing to land some few leagues short of it because you will think it to be done with more security, but in my opinion it may prove more dangerous, for by reason of continual scouts upon that shore (who give sudden alarms by beacons) they will in one quarter of an hour give speedier intelligence than you can march in a whole day. Thus you see the peril of landing nigh the town or farther off. The fourth consideration is that, if we fail in our surprise of Algiers, whether we shall attempt



it by siege. Yea or No? And if we do, how the ordnance may be landed and drawn to the places of battery, wanting engines, cattle, and provisions for the purpose. It must also be thought how to relieve the siege with all necessities, and how to defend our men against the sallies of the town, who have fifteen men to one of ours. It must likewise be forecast how to bring off our men with safety, if we prevail not, wanting the help and succour of the ships, for after the landing our men there will be no abiding for the ships in an open road. It is needless to cast these doubts because I think it is not intended to continue a long siege against it, but to take it by surprise. And it doth not stand with sense that a town can be surprised by sea unless it be with galleys, which have advantage as well of wind as calm, and may land their men both when and where they list without suspicion, rumour, or noise, with one labour and at one instant without embarking in boats. Galleys may run so nigh the shore as with their ordnance they may annoy the defenders and command a landing place. Galleys may make offer to land in one place and, when an enemy shall have drawn his greatest forces thither, they may suddenly wind about and land in another place without danger or loss. Thus did the Marquis of Santa Cruz, at the island of Terceira when he took it. An action of ships must depend upon a gale of wind, and but few points of the wind for their advantage; they are subject to be descried, by which means the enemy shall gain time to strengthen themselves, and it is therefore impossible to surprise a sea town with ships. Their boats are inconvenient to land men with, neither can they land many men at once, and if their

boats fail their whole action is overthrown. They dare not draw near the shore for fear of embaying or shoalness of water, and they cannot remove for their advantage from the place they first anchored at as galleys do. If an army be landed and put to a retreat so many of them must fall into the mercy of the enemy as their boats cannot carry aboard the ships.

But all I can say is nothing to what follows ; for you must understand the Algerines are a sort of outlaws, or miscreants, that live in enmity with all the world, acknowledging the great Turk in some measure for their sovereign, but no farther than they please themselves. Now that part of Barbary where Algiers is seated is a spacious and fruitful country, and abounds in numbers of people ; and though the King of it be a Mahommedan, as well as the Algerines, yet they live in perpetual hatred and war ; but so that, if either of them is attacked by Christians, they will presently join as partners in mischief. And we shall no sooner land, but be welcomed by threescore or fourscore thousand of those ungodly people.\*

Having declared the impossibility of taking Algiers, either by surprise or siege, I will now suppose it to be ours. Then let us consider what small use we can make of it, either to annoy the King of Spain, or any other Christian enemy if there be occasion, or what commodity we shall raise by it, that would not so much as defray a garrison, or what further conquest we can hope to make by help of it. For one of these three

\* There is no MS. authority for the paragraph ' But all . . . ungodly people.'

ends princes desire a footing in another country. As to annoying an enemy, it lies more subject to be annoyed than to annoy by reason of the distance from England to be relieved, and the many dangers we shall undergo at sea having both the Christians and the Turks our enemies, both having ships and galleys to impeach us in the narrow strait of the Mediterranean sea, like a pond, where we cannot pass unseen or unmet. The harbour of Algiers, for our arrival, so small and little that it will not entertain above twenty good ships, which proportion of shipping, for want of harbour, you must allow and no more, both to annoy and defend ourselves from all enemies either Christians or Turks.

The place affords neither victuals, powder, masts, sails, ropes, or other habiliments that belong to ships, and if there be but a want of the least of them England alone must supply them. Then consider the charge and danger that is like to follow to so little purpose ; for the expense is certain, and less than five thousand men cannot be allowed for garrison, and the twenty sail of ships aforesaid. The profit and advantage that can be made of it is uncertain because it must be by theft and rapine at sea. Upon the Turks there is no hope, they having little or no trade in shipping but what is brought unto them by Englishmen, Frenchmen or Hollanders. The princes of Italy are in the same condition ; and therefore our only hope of gain must depend on the spoils of Spain, and where ? Not in the Straits, for there the Spaniards have no trade of any importance, and if without the Straits I will undertake sooner do it from England than Algiers. And prizes so taken will be sooner and



safer brought for England than carried to Algiers, where they must pass so many dangers, as I have said before.

When this following action against the Turkish pirates was in agitation, it was solicited by the late Lord Admiral of England, the Earl of Nottingham, who not long after resigned his office to the Duke of Buckingham, who being young, and infected with the disease of youth to hearken to base flattery, gave ear to those that thought to make use of his favour with the King and advised him to the furtherance of this voyage, promising it should redound to his everlasting honour at his first entrance into his place. But the success that followed shall appear by the evil carriage of it, which should somewhat excuse the young Lord who had an honourable intention in his undertaking, and was only injured by those that advised his youth with a too confident course for their own ends.

Besides this, there were two other ill undertakings, and as evil governed, which fell out in the following years, 1625, and 1627, whereof I design to give an account one after another; the one was to Cadiz, the other to the isle of Rhé. Wherein our rashness appeared far greater than our discretion, in bidding defiance to the two mighty and potent princes of Europe, Spain and France, both at one time, without help or assistance from abroad, and under the uncertainty of money, the then Parliament opposing his Majesty's demands.

To the Spaniards we only shewed our teeth, with a desire to bite. France provided for us and plucked out our teeth before we could bite, as is to be seen by the unfortunate and

unadvised journey to the isle of Rhé, which hath left that mark of dishonour upon our nation that in succeeding ages the English shall be ashamed of these present times, when they shall read of the famous deeds done by our progenitors in times past.

The ill-managed Enterprise upon Algiers  
in the Reign of King James, and the  
Errors committed in it.

BUT notwithstanding these two unfortunate undertakings in the reign of King Charles, occasioned by ill advice and counsel, yet I must say and confess that our dishonour at sea began the way to future mishaps in the enterprise against the pirates of Algiers, in the reign of King James. Though I must say it was royally undertaken by his Majesty with a noble, gracious, and religious intention; but by the carriage of it, it proved no better than those that ensued. His Majesty did commiserate the daily complaints, not only of his own subjects, but of all other Christian people in Europe, many thousands of whom groaned under the miserable cruelty and barbarous slavery the unbelieving Turks put them into by their irresistible piracies daily committed upon them. Whereupon it entered into the compassionate and merciful heart of his Majesty to endeavour to redress their calamities, as appeared by the chargeable fleet he set out to suppress the insolences of those miscreants, who were become the spoil and bane of the Christian commonwealth by sea.

This fleet, by contract, was to receive some assistance from the King of Spain, when it once appeared on his coast. But such was the misgovernment of those ships, and the negligence



and vain-glorious humours of some to feast and banquet in harbour when their duty was to clear and scour the seas, that they rather carried themselves like amorous courtiers than resolute soldiers, by which means they lost the opportunity which offered itself to do hurt upon those hellish pirates ; as may be collected out of a pamphlet published at their return to which I refer you. But with this observation, that besides their going and coming, they spent not twenty days at sea whilst they continued in the Straits, but retired into harbour, where the pirates might find them, but not they the pirates. This evil carried voyage proved little better than a public scorn for all nations to laugh at considering the reputation this realm had gained in their former expeditions by sea. And yet the chief actors in that voyage, like men naturally given to excuse their errors, divulged in their purgation, which afterwards grew common in every man's mouth and belief, that the want of authority, and their limited commission, was the cause of their ill success. This report was so universally credited that I have often wondered with myself that the State did not except against it for their own honours and reputation, if it had not been really so. For commonly, in such cases, if a State do err in their directions they will cast it upon those that had the execution rather than that the imputation should light upon them ; and, indeed, this was the reason that carried me into the general error of believing as others did until I reflected upon the following reasons. The first was, that a fleet of his Majesty's could not depart England without a commission under the Great Seal. Secondly, I know that all Generals of fleets have special directions and instructions to guide

them, for it is rarely known that the managing of the affairs of a fleet is committed to one man whatsoever experience or judgement he is of. Thirdly, I considered that there were but two ends of this employment, *viz.* either peace or war; if peace, I marvelled that so great a fleet should make an overture of peace when a pinnace and a letter from the King was as authentic as the greatest person, or the greatest fleet his Majesty could send to treat. Fourthly, I saw that notwithstanding this friendly overture of peace, ships used hostility, took and destroyed some prizes, made an attempt to destroy their ships with fire in harbour, which failed; and whilst our fleet remained upon the coast they carried themselves as enemies.

And seeing, as I have said before, that either peace or war must be the ground of their employment, that they attempted both and prevailed in neither, I know not how they can lay the blame on their want of commission, but rather on their own improvident and inconstant carriage. But too true it is, that since that time, our poor English, and especially the people of the west country who trade that way daily, fall into the hands of those pirates. It is too lamentable to hear the complaints, and too intolerable to suffer the misery that has befallen them; and all occasioned by the indiscreet managing of this unlucky action of 1620. This making up three unfortunate voyages, as you shall soon hear, as many more were performed with no better success, two of them under the command of the Lord Willoughby, and the third under the Earl of Denbigh. These three had no advantage of one another; for there was nothing done worth remembering; and therefore I can say no more

than that I have wished as a thing desired by all men to give satisfaction on the subject—what the defects, ignorance, and errors of this voyage were, that upon examination all may appear, and every man receive either due punishment or a noble reward as he justly deserves. His Majesty and the State could not have been more honoured, nor all in general better pleased. For people are persuaded that the realm never enjoyed braver and more warlike ships than now, commanders of greater antiquity and valour, seamen of greater experience and skill, more abundance and choice of ammunition and arms, greater quantity of victuals, and all things else to furnish such an action.

Then would have appeared the weakness of a speech of a great person in authority, who upon an exception by a man of greater blood than himself, who told him he did not see a man of experience employed in the fleet to Cadiz, which made him doubt of the good success thereof, answered, not like one that thinks example of more weight than conceit, but rashly, inconsiderately, and disrespectfully, that they were all fools who commanded in the Queen's time in comparison of those now employed. But it might have been more truly told him that a man in authority, who governs more by will and chance than by reason and advice, is the most dangerous person in a State and that the dearest favourite at Court is not always the best man to make a General of a host. He had not experience to know that the first action in war gets the best reputation, therefore he ought to have heard many advisers and esteemed the later counsel best and safest as founded on reasons at first not thought on. But he shewed himself in this.



as in many other actions in the course of his life, weak and simple, seeming to know much when indeed he knew nothing at all.\*

#### THE ALGIERS EXPEDITION.

It may be presumed that Monson was actually called before the Council, but the passage (p. 84) about 'ostentation' and it being the duty of the leader to keep at sea and not go into any port to leeward of Algiers is strong evidence that the section was, at least, edited in later life in the light of after knowledge of the history of the expedition.

The Privy Council are not likely to have been much helped towards a decision if Monson's opinion was really put before them in the form given in the text; the conclusion seems to be that Algiers could not be taken, but the arguments are extraordinarily contradictory and weak as will best be understood by the following synopsis:—

1. All the maritime towns of Europe are to contribute because to crush Algiers will be the work of years (p. 79).

2. The best prospect of success lies in surprise and secrecy (p. 82); English, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons are to be fitted out, with the pecuniary assistance of all the European ports, experts are to be consulted and their opinions obtained, and Algerine commerce with Toulon and Marseilles is to be stopped, but the object of the expedition is not to be permitted to leak out (pp. 79, 81, 82).

3. Surprise impossible because if we fit out a fleet and army all Europe rings with the news; even if the enterprise be kept secret our very appearance is sufficient warning (p. 87).

4. If they are at sea we can get intelligence of their whereabouts; assumption that they cannot get intelligence the same way but are dependent on what they may hear from the shore (p. 83).

5. Algiers can only be taken by surprise by a galley attack (p. 89).

6. Algiers cannot be taken either by siege or surprise (p. 90).

Some collateral points may also be noticed. Monson does not express himself explicitly on the subject of acting by a bombardment, but there can be no doubt that he would have condemned it as unwaveringly as he does the other

\* Cf. General Introduction, pp. xlv, xlvii.

courses. But Mansell, after he had been at Algiers, was of an entirely different opinion: 'I wanted neither will nor power to have battered down the town upon their heads, an act very feasible howsoever the States of Christendom have been abused by the ignorant information of the strength of that place.' He was probably wrong, but he held to his view and repeated it again, adding that he could take up such a position that there would be little risk of serious injury to the ships, which shows that he had thought out the subject.<sup>1</sup> But he seems to have abandoned the idea after his second visit, when the Algerines had strengthened the weak points of the defence. Monson dwells on the peril of a beach landing and his assertions, taken severally, are all true enough, but war cannot be made without running some risks, and history shows that the landing itself, if opportunity and situation have been well selected, has not usually been the most dangerous part of such attempts. Algiers, however, could not have been taken by storm by any landing force, numerically small and deficient in artillery stores, and reserve ammunition, that Great Britain could have put ashore. If the general conclusion of his argument may be guessed at he would appear to have favoured a continuous blockade, with the chase of all such Algerines as got to sea, but he has written so vaguely that his real view, if he had any, remains in doubt. It is complimentary to describe the political side of his argument as only elementary in its reasoning. The reconciliation of the jarring interests of England, France, Holland, Spain, and the minor powers is taken for granted, and it is assumed (p. 90) that the other powers, having helped to destroy the Algerines, would contentedly allow the city to remain in English hands. It is true that he does not advise its retention but he condemns the idea only for what may be called local and professional reasons. When Monson was called before the Council the Spaniards showed how little likelihood there was of real co-operation by hastening, when the scheme seemed about to take actual form, to announce that they were fitting out ships themselves to act against Algiers with the object of taking from James any excuse for sending a fleet to the Mediterranean. But once taken, and being an English possession, the advantage of holding Algiers would seem, in Monson's eyes, to be not the extension of prestige and trade but the opportunity for the exercise

<sup>1</sup> *Add. MSS.* 36445, ff. 6, 9.

of piracy on an imperial scale, and there is nothing in the text to show that he meant such an exercise to be confined to time of war. But even if retained under more civilized conditions and with the tacit consent of the Christian powers, the arguments against any attempt to make it an English possession are conclusive. In truth neither did the amount of English trade at the time warrant the enormous risk and expense of the maintenance of a Mediterranean naval base nor were the national resources equal to such a demand if it had, for the acquisition of a distant base to be used in war always involves unknown, and nearly invariably underestimated, requirements in the future. Even forty years later, after the great naval expansion of the Commonwealth era, and with greatly augmented national wealth as a reserve, the possession of Tangier proved too great a strain, although it was only attacked by the local tribes and was much more easily supplied from England.

There was also another political objection to the retention of Algiers which Monson entirely ignores. It was not an independent state but a Turkish possession governed by a Viceroy appointed from Constantinople, and to have aroused the active hostility of the Sultan would, even if it did not bring a Turkish army and fleet on the scene, have had very serious results for English commerce in the Levant. The English Government, therefore, had to consider the susceptibilities of that of the Sublime Porte and although there was really no cause for the latent fear always possessing the Spaniards of an alliance between England and Turkey, for English public opinion would no more have permitted that than in the days of Elizabeth, there was every reason why Turkey should not be converted into an active enemy. The possibility of mutual assistance, even without an alliance, was always a strong card in the political game as affecting Spain.

On the attitude of the Lord Admiral, Nottingham, to the expedition, cf. General Introduction, *ante*, i. pp. xxxvii, xxxviii.

It has been remarked (*ante*, p. 70) that the appearance of the Algerine and other Mahomedan corsairs in northern waters was due to the tuition of the Christian renegades who acted as their pilots and sailing masters. Until these taught them the use of ocean-going, square rigged vessels they had been confined to the use of galleys whose radius of action was necessarily very limited. The plague increased in intensity each year, and in England affected an entirely different and much more influential class of merchant shipowner from that harassed by the customary small pirate; the latter contented



himself with coasters and other vessels of small value, the Algerines were on the lookout for large vessels with valuable cargoes. The 'Turks,' the generic name for all Mahomedan pirates, were said to have taken 466 British ships between 1609 and 1616 and to have reduced their crews to slavery.<sup>2</sup> In the Mediterranean the Levant and Spanish Companies, in which many wealthy London merchants were interested, were often victims, but complaints came fast also from as much nearer home as the western Channel and the adjacent coast; at Swanage the inhabitants feared a raid and petitioned for the protection of a small fort, and in 1616 one of the pirates was taken off Leigh in the Thames itself.<sup>3</sup> In 1618 the number of prizes taken by them within recent years was said to be 300,<sup>4</sup> but whether this number is a correction of the previous 466 or an addition must remain uncertain. The French were suffering as much or more. Between 1613 and 1621 the Algerines took 936 French ships into Algiers besides sinking many others at sea, and in 1626 it was supposed that there were 8,000 French slaves at Algiers and Tunis.<sup>5</sup> At the court of Spain their depredations were causing 'sadness and distraction,' and in 1616 they had two squadrons blockading the coast, one inside and one outside, the Straits of Gibraltar; in 1617 they swooped on Madeira and returned loaded with plunder and with 1,200 captives.

Whatever the exact amount of their losses the London merchants were not disposed to submit passively to them nor to a continuation of the organized terrorism which bid fair to stop commerce to the southward. They determined to influence James through Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton, who was interested in the Virginia Company and other semi-commercial undertakings. The merchants volunteered to bear two-thirds of the expense and Southampton, who was intended by the King to be the Admiral,<sup>6</sup> prepared a scheme for the capture of Algiers with, as the Spaniards believed, an alternative seizure of Genoa or some other Italian port if the principal plan failed. James professed to approve the project, for he was quite willing to have a fleet in the Mediterranean at the cost of his subjects which might further the aims of his foreign policy, but, at the moment, the only practical result

<sup>2</sup> Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Letters of Geo. Lord Carew* (Camd. Soc.), p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cv. 88.

<sup>5</sup> Masson, *Commerce Français dans le Levant*, p. 33.

<sup>6</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* lxxxix. 136.

was to set every Spanish dockyard at work in the preparation of ships avowedly designed against Algiers but suspected to be intended for aggression against Venice. But if, as was likely, Southampton's scheme had leaked out it would be a sufficient explanation of the Spanish fears, while Philip's preparations caused James, with an unusual amount of determination, to resolve to cut short any possible Spanish intrigue by really sending a squadron into the Mediterranean with, as he hoped, the co-operation of a Dutch fleet. The combined force would also give weight to the mediation he offered between the Emperor and his son-in-law, the Elector Palatine. The obvious political complications and military difficulties attendant on operations against Algiers would have normally influenced James to defer an attack as long as possible, although the complaints of the London merchants, whom the King could no more than his predecessor dare to ignore, would no doubt have induced action eventually. But, at the time, the determining factor causing the decision to send the Algiers fleet was the circumstance that the diplomatic situation abroad made the King's dynastic and family interests coincide with the commercial advantage of his subjects.

London had already offered to pay a large proportion of the cost and was assessed at 40,000*l*. As it was not known how long the English fleet would have to stay in the Mediterranean the estimate of the total expense must have been very vague, and James would certainly not be averse to finding himself with a balance in hand. Recourse was had to the principle of ship-money, as exercised by Elizabeth and her predecessors, but on a limited scale as befitted the purpose. Except, however, as a voluntary levy—and the element of spontaneity was soon lost sight of in dealing with the provincial towns—the call on the ports was, in this instance, quite unconstitutional, for it had always been in essence a levy for the defence of the coasts and only by verbal and legal quibbling could the despatch of a fleet to the Mediterranean be so considered.<sup>7</sup> There was also another departure from previous custom; the port towns were to be assessed not as heretofore for the supply of an actual ship or ships manned, armed, and stored, but by the supply of a sum of money to be applied by the Government for the maintenance of men-of-war and the hire of suitable merchantmen. In view of the fact that

<sup>7</sup> The Cadiz fleet of 1596 was the only apparent precedent, but there was no real similarity.

men-of-war were steadily increasing in size and complexity of equipment for their especial purpose, and that London was almost the only port which could provide merchantmen sufficiently large and well fitted, this, although a difference in practice, was an alteration which might easily be defended, and it does not seem to have aroused comment.

The port towns were assessed by the Privy Council at 8,550*l.* divided as follows:<sup>8</sup> Bristol 2,500*l.*, Exeter, Plymouth, and Dartmouth 1,000*l.* each, Hull and Barnstaple 500*l.* each, Weymouth 450*l.*, Southampton and Newcastle 300*l.* each, Ipswich and Colchester 150*l.* each, Poole, Chester and Lyme 100*l.* each, Yarmouth 200*l.*, and the Cinque Ports 200*l.*

The 40,000*l.* from London was raised by a rating, also made by the Privy Council, among the chartered associations: East India Company 8,000*l.*, Merchant Adventurers 6,000*l.*, Turkish and Spanish Companies 17,000*l.*, French Company 2,000*l.*, Eastland Company 2,000*l.*, Muscovy Company 1,000*l.*, Trinity House 4,000*l.*, which sums were to be paid in two years.<sup>9</sup> The Londoners had no cause of complaint because in essentials their assessments were only what they had offered, but the protests from the ports were immediate and loud, not so much against the call itself to which, at least in its ancient form, they were accustomed, as against the amounts and, in some cases, because they, having little or no Mediterranean commerce, were now required to pay for the benefit of London. The Plymouth owners said that their trade was much injured by the Algerines and Tunisians but still more by the encroachments of the Londoners whose proportion of 40,000*l.* was, they thought, quite inadequate 'considering they engross the commerce of the world.'<sup>10</sup> The mayor of Barnstaple reported that he could not raise more than 330*l.*,<sup>11</sup> and at Poole 50*l.* was the limit.<sup>12</sup> As in the time of Elizabeth the assessed towns tried to throw as much as possible of the burden upon their neighbours and subsidiary towns, or members, and these, in their turn, often flatly repudiated any liability. The burgesses of Yarmouth professed to be unable to collect 200*l.* and reported that Woodbridge, Lowestoft, Aldeburgh, Orford, Southwold, and Walberswick all ignored or absolutely refused the applications of the head town for assistance.<sup>13</sup> Totnes refused to help Dartmouth, but offered to give 500*l.* if freed

<sup>8</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cv. 89.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* xcii. 92.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 39.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 44.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* cvii. 25.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* 26.



from the interference of Dartmouth or any other place.<sup>14</sup> The Plymouth merchants protested that they could not find one-third of their 1,000*l.* and endeavoured to extend their jurisdiction to Cornwall, as they held they were entitled to, but from Truro, which they said was rich enough to subscribe 300*l.*, only 10*l.* could be obtained.<sup>15</sup> Nearly all the other ports made excuses of some sort; it is evident that they were not so poor as they pretended to be, but the feeling which had shown itself a generation earlier that the method of assessing the port towns was out of date and bore unfairly upon them was gathering strength although as yet it showed itself only in attempts at evasion. Even in 1588 the response to the Queen's demand for armed merchantmen was by no means so ready and unquestioning as it is usually supposed to have been, while in 1597 some of the Yorkshire towns actually raised the question of by what authority they were assessed. The Privy Council answered boldly at the time,<sup>16</sup> but during the closing years of Elizabeth's reign the Government were chary of these demands and usually hired such merchantmen as were required.

James being far less interested in the destruction of Algiers than in the restoration of the Elector Palatine, and the fleet being intended to help, directly or indirectly, the Elector's cause, the probability of its despatch fluctuated with the political situation. After the assessments were made in 1618 the intention was dropped for a time and the period of vacillation, dependent on the moves of diplomacy, extended through 1619, although six ships were actually got ready during that year.<sup>17</sup> When, in 1620, a final decision was made the Earl of Southampton had ceased to be spoken of as the commander-in-chief and Sir Robert Mansell was selected for the post. Mansell was Vice-Admiral of England and therefore next in rank to the Lord Admiral, Buckingham, in the titular hierarchy of the Navy. On the one occasion when he had been in independent command he had shown some tactical skill and foresight,<sup>18</sup> but as Treasurer of the Navy between 1604 and 1618, and as such the head of its civil administration, he was personally and officially most iniquitous. His incapacity and

<sup>14</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cvii. 10; cix. 95.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* cviii. 49; cxi. 58; cxiii. 63, 97.

<sup>16</sup> *Acts of the Privy Council*, 30th October, 1597.

<sup>17</sup> *Pipe Off. Decl. Accts.* 2257.

<sup>18</sup> *Ante*, ii. 192.

dishonesty had been exposed by the inquiries of a Commission in 1618 but do not appear to have affected his favour with James. Monson says nothing directly of his own disappointment at the selection, but his Spanish pension, his connexion with the Howards, the suspicion perhaps attaching to him in relation to the Overbury intrigue and murder, and the fact that one of his sons had been pushed forward in opposition to Buckingham explain quite sufficiently why he was passed over. His hatred of Buckingham is shown in several places in the text, and his criticisms of the voyage are vitiated not only by personal prejudice and disappointment but by the fact that he was ignorant of Mansell's Instructions and, apparently, of the political influences which were the dominating factors from the inception to the end of the enterprise.

The fleet was ready by August, 1620, when it was at Plymouth, and there was then an additional reason for its arrival in the Mediterranean in the expectation that the expiry of the Truce of Antwerp in the following year would see a renewal of the war. As Lord Digby told Gondomar, many people desired to see the ships used against Spain; in any case their presence near the Peninsula might have a beneficial influence on pending negotiations. The fleet consisted of: <sup>19</sup>—

Men-of-War.	Brass guns.	Captains.
Red Lion	40	Sir Robert Mansell, Admiral.
Vanguard	40	Sir Richard Hawkyns, Vice-Admiral.
Rainbow	40	Sir Thomas Button, Rear- Admiral.
Constant Reformation	40	Arthur Manwaring. <sup>20</sup>
Antelope	34	Sir Henry Palmer. <sup>21</sup>
Convertine	36	Thomas Love.
Hospital and Store Ship.		Captain.
Goodwill		Thomas Squibb.

<sup>19</sup> *Pipe Off. Decl. Accts.* 2259; *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cxxii. 106; Purchas, *Pilgrimes*, ii. 881; *Algiers Voyage in a Journal or Brief* . . . by J. B. 1621 (the same as in the State Papers). J. B. was John Button, a relative of the Rear-Admiral.

<sup>20</sup> Died 2nd April, 1621; succeeded by Palmer.

<sup>21</sup> Succeeded by Alex. Brett on 17th April, 1621. Brett was related to Buckingham (*Harl. MSS.* 1581, f. 70).

Merchantmen.	Iron guns.	Tons.	Commanders
Golden Phoenix	24	300	Samuel Argall.
Samuel	22	300	Christopher Harris.
Marygold	21	260	Sir John Ferne.
Zouch Phoenix	26	280	John Penington.
Barbara	18	200	Thomas Porter.
Centurion	22	200	Sir Francis Tanfield.
Primrose	18	180	Sir John Hampden.
Hercules	24	300	Eusabey Cave. <sup>22</sup>
Neptune	21	280	Robert Haughton.
Restore	12	130	George Raymond.
Merchant Bonaventure	23	260	John Chudleigh.
Marmaduke	12	100	Thomas Herbert.

On 16th February, 1621 the fleet was joined by the Mercury, 20, of 240 tons (Captain Phineas Pett), and the Spy, 18, of 160 tons (Captain Edward Gyles), built, at the cost of the merchants, by Pett and sent out as fast sailers and to help in inshore work. Mansell's pay was 2*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a day, the Vice-Admiral, Hawkyns, received 1*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* and Button, as Rear-Admiral, 13*s.* 4*d.*; the captains were paid the usual half a crown a day, according to the Navy Treasurer's accounts, but it seems that they, or some of them, obtained ten shillings a day, probably by an additional grant from the Exchequer.<sup>23</sup>

There was a committee of London merchants associated in the preparation of the fleet, who must have looked sharply after their own interests in the expenditure of their money, and had a word in the selection of the merchantmen<sup>24</sup> which were probably, therefore, sound and seaworthy. Later, this committee ordered the Mercury and Spy at their own expense. Perhaps, also, they helped to choose the merchant captains who are, in many instances, found serving the Crown in the subsequent fleets of 1625-7-8. Local knowledge was to be obtained by the employment of Ferne and Walsingham, formerly Algerian pirates themselves (*ante*, p. 70), and no doubt there were others with the same experience who were taken for the same reason. It is to be noticed that there were no comments previous to its departure about any deficiencies in this fleet, and that there was a hospital ship attached to it which was an entirely new proceeding in naval hygiene. It would be interesting to know to whom

<sup>22</sup> Died 1st February, 1621; succeeded by Alex. Brett.

<sup>23</sup> *S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* cxxiv. 68.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* cxxvii. 106; cxxviii. 44.



the innovation was due, and whether it was done at the suggestion of the merchants' committee or of some one who remembered the sickliness characteristic of the Elizabethan expeditions. In view of his experience, and of what he had previously written on the subject, Sir Richard Hawkyns may be guessed to have been the person suggesting it. The sick comforts included sugar, prunes ('pruones'), currants, mace, nutmegs, and rice.

The force, as a whole, was compact and serviceable as a cruising squadron, and one of a strength that many an Elizabethan admiral would have been glad to have had with him, although it bore within it the seeds of disablement in the sickness, probably an epidemic typhus, which broke out shortly after its departure and seems to have affected nearly every ship. But as a fleet intended either to reduce Algiers by force, as the merchants may have expected, or to influence the policy of continental courts, as James expected, it left something to be desired. Practically, the six men-of-war, carrying 230 guns, were all that the Admiral could rely on for fighting, and even for them we must suppose an efficiency which the events of 1625 showed not to exist and which would probably not have been found in 1620-1 under the strain of contest with another organized naval power. Merchantmen had long been notorious as only increasing the number but not the effective of a fleet; they also were to show, in 1625 and the following years, that they were even of less use than they had been in the Elizabethan fleets.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps, as the choice of the merchants' committee, Mansell's merchantmen were exceptionally efficient in officers and crews, but, even so, the best of armed merchantmen could have, structurally and in armament, but a fractional value of the specialized fighting ship. Therefore, in deciding whether the fleet was well adapted for the ends in view it is necessary to consider in association with it Mansell's Instructions dated 10th September, 1620.<sup>26</sup> They recite that the suppression of piracy was the principal object of the expedition, and that 'as Algiers is known to be the nest and receptacle of the pirates every means should be taken to destroy that nest.' This instruction is, however, immediately qualified by a prohibition from any 'open assault,' because the town is known to be of great strength and on account of

<sup>25</sup> See also Young's contemptuous remarks about merchantmen auxiliaries, (App. B. of Bk. III.) *post*, iv. p. 216.

<sup>26</sup> *Add. MSS.* 36445, ff. 15-19.

the friendly relations existing between England and Turkey ; also, as in the Elizabethan Instructions, Mansell was not to imperil the ships ' without some likelihood of success,' which meant that he could only make any decisive attack at the risk of his head. Otherwise, negotiations, which were to take the form of a request to the Dey<sup>27</sup> to deliver up or to execute his chief adherents and supporters, having failed ' no means should be omitted, be it force or stratagem, to destroy the pirate ships within the Mole of Algiers or to get possession of their ships.' We shall see that Mansell did eventually plan and put into execution an attempt to burn the Algerine vessels in the port. On his way down from England he was especially ordered to chase pirates, of whatever nationality, on the Spanish coast, and for that purpose particular arrangements had been made by Buckingham to obtain information from Ireland and Spain as to what pirates were known to be at sea. His ships might sometimes catch ordinary rovers, but it was quite certain, as he knew himself and wrote subsequently, that there was hardly a vessel afloat in northern latitudes that could keep in sight of an Algerine. Therefore, as far as concerned the ostensible object of his voyage, as he was not strong enough to attack the forts of Algiers, as he could not chase the Algerines at sea, and as the Viceroy could not alienate his principal maintainers by giving up plunder and captives, and thus arouse their enmity by injury done to their material interests and offence given to their religious fanaticism, Mansell was confined either to a blockade or to such attempts as he could make on the vessels within the Mole. In theory the blockade was possible, as long as his ships remained seaworthy and his crews healthy, for he was supposed to be able to obtain all the supplies necessary from the Spanish ports. Practically, the blockade of a port like Algiers was never possible in this stage of the developement of naval organization for any effective length of time, nor, it may be surmised, would it have suited the policy of James to have had his fleet chained to Algiers instead of being able to regard it as a free unit for ulterior objects. For the purpose of those ulterior objects dependent, if they arose, on the issues of European politics, it may be doubted, again, whether the fleet was strong enough to

<sup>27</sup> James wrote to him that if satisfaction was not given ' we will double and redouble our forces until that we and our subjects have received sufficient satisfaction.' Brave words !

exercise the moral influence or to interfere with the material weight that James anticipated. Possibly it could have acted once against a Spanish fleet or played havoc with a Flota nearing home, but it could not have undertaken any ocean cruise and would soon have disintegrated under the strain of actual warfare. The Dutch were sending a far more powerful fleet to the Mediterranean and the Spaniards had, themselves, a force of some strength in commission. From the point of view of general politics the despatch of the fleet was, in the circumstances, an interesting example of the peace strategy which designs to prevent war or to prepare for it under the most favourable conditions. It was the first English attempt to bring such influence to bear by a demonstration to the rear of the central and southern European powers, and in a sea hitherto held to be outside the radius of English operations of war. Like most such extensions of a sphere of action there was no flash of insight or genius about the movement which followed naturally from the lessons learned during the Elizabethan war and the extension of maritime commerce, and had, also, been anticipated by the Dutch during the earlier years of the century.

Mansell was directed to keep on good terms with the Spaniards and Dutch, to mediate between them if the necessity arose, and not to go east of Cape Spartimento. He was told that although the King 'chiefly relies on his judgement,' he was to confer on all important matters with a council consisting of Hawkyins, Button, Manwaring, Palmer, Argall, Love, and Edward Clark, the secretary appointed by Buckingham. In especial cases he was to call together 'all the captains, commanders and masters.'

The fleet sailed from Plymouth 12th October, 1620, and made Gibraltar on the 31st; it sailed as close inshore all the way as was consistent with safety, nominally to look for pirates, in reality to be within reach of possible despatches which were promised, in any case, for Gibraltar. On their arrival there was a great deal of saluting done between themselves, the Spanish forts, and the Spanish ships; two Spanish men-of-war struck their flags and went to leeward of the English.<sup>28</sup> Button's *Journal* in the State Papers is enriched by MS. notes in the hand of Sir John Coke, which are, naturally, ill-natured, and also remarkably stupid. His observation on the occurrences at Gibraltar and other Spanish ports is 'hitherto nothing but shooting and ostentation,' but Coke knew quite

<sup>28</sup> *Journal*.



well that making a hideous noise was then, even more than now, an indication of mutual love and respect between nations and individuals, and that both James I. and Philip III. would have considered themselves greatly insulted had their subjects failed to expend powder in honour of each other. Greater seamen than Mansell have wasted ammunition in the same way, but he had especial reasons for his certainly very liberal saluting in the passage of his Instructions which enjoined him to 'observe all necessary outward ceremonies' towards the Spaniards; evidently it was considered of importance. Gibraltar was quitted on 2nd November and a stay made at Malaga from the 3rd to the 6th when Mansell divided his fleet into three squadrons, distinguished by pendants at main, fore, and mizen for himself and his two subordinates. They arrived at Alicante on the 19th and at both ports there was much saluting. More serious than the salutes was the fact that there was already so much sickness in the fleet that, although many men had been put ashore at Gibraltar, it was found necessary to land thirty-seven from the Lion alone at Alicante, while the hospital ship Goodwill was left behind, it being necessary to distribute her crew among the other ships.

No pirates had been taken, or even seen, during the voyage out and on 25th November Mansell proceeded to Algiers where he arrived on the 27th. His salute was not answered and there was too much sea running to send ashore until the next day when Captain Thomas Squibb, late of the Goodwill, was landed. The Viceroy was polite and promised to send provisions, but the same night three prizes—one Dutch and two English<sup>29</sup>—were brought in without any interference from Mansell. On the 29th the envoy had an interview with the Viceroy who evaded receiving James's letters, and in the evening three pirates came into the port peaceably. On 1st December nine more came in and on the 2nd four went out. Mansell seems to have resolved to trust to negotiations alone and not to commit any act of hostility until they had failed; in leaving the port open, leniency which the Algerines of course attributed to weakness of force or character, he could hardly have adopted any course more likely to ensure their failure, but it is possible that he considered himself debarred from any punitive measures, until negotiations had failed, by the tenour of his Instructions. On the 3rd six Spanish men-of-war came in who began firing on the town but well out of range, although,

<sup>29</sup> The English ships belonged to Plymouth and Yarmouth.

perhaps, it was meant as an object lesson for the English. Mansell subsequently complained bitterly, and more than once, of the scandalous insinuations made by the Spaniards as the consequence of his passive attitude. They may well have held that the very object of their joint presence before Algiers was to attack it, but, as we have seen, Mansell was forbidden to make any 'open assault.' Interviews and letters continued until the 8th when Mansell sailed away with forty rescued prisoners whom the Algerines had sent on board with the impudent assurance that they were all the English they held captive. He could scarcely have borne himself more meekly if he had come as a missionary, and it is, on the surface, extraordinary that he should have left without firing a shot. He may well, as he wrote to Aston at Madrid on 13th January, have been then 'oppressed with many sad considerations,' for although not allowed to bombard Algiers there were other courses open to him. In a later letter of 16th January, 1620-1 to the merchants' committee<sup>30</sup> he makes jejune excuses about the Viceroy's 'smooth letters' and 'faithless performances,' and says that 'my hopes at first were as weak and as full of despair as any man's' although, when writing, he professes more confidence. Why did he do nothing? He had had no opportunity in his career of performing anything desperately courageous, but where he had served he had never shown himself to be shy of fighting, and he had been trained in a school whose chief merit was its readiness to appeal to the guns. His admission of faith in the Algerine letters and assurances and his confession of temporary despair, both intended for the merchants' committee, do not sound very genuine,<sup>31</sup> but even if true he still, when they failed, had his ships and men to use and all the more reason for trying to use them. Yet he did nothing and sailed away leaving Algiers victorious in the first round. Perhaps the explanation is to be found not in war but in diplomacy; possibly he knew before he left England that he was to do nothing, at any rate at first, which might injure or destroy the fighting value of his fleet. On 26th December Mansell anchored at Alicante and waited there, evidently for despatches from England, which, sent

<sup>30</sup> *S. P. Barbary States*, i. f. 29.

<sup>31</sup> They are in direct contradiction to the statements in his letter, three days earlier, to the ambassador at Madrid in which he says that he could have easily 'battered down' the town if his Instructions had allowed him.

off on 23rd November,<sup>32</sup> did not arrive until 12th January. This communication ordered him to continue in the Mediterranean. It is clear that there must have been an alternative present in Mansell's mind as the possible decision of the home Government, and it is also possible that he had sailed with secret instructions, or had received them on his way out, not, until further orders, to take any steps which would convert the Algerines into embittered political enemies. Their help, given either openly or by an underhand arrangement, might be more immediately useful in a war in the Mediterranean than a suppression of piracy, which could only be partial and temporary and would equally benefit the enemies of England. It must not be forgotten that the active or passive friendship of Algiers would have connoted the assistance of the other Mahommedan ports of north Africa, and that, if only as victualling bases, they would have been of inestimable value to an English fleet. The idea was not even new; at Cadiz, in 1596, the English leaders had been on the brink of opening communications with the Moors,<sup>33</sup> and the possibility of using the Mahommedan powers against Spain had presented itself to more than one Elizabethan politician. The English Government found no fault with Mansell for coming away immediately from Algiers, and in writing to Buckingham he did not excuse himself for doing so; it must therefore be presumed that he acted in accordance with what he knew to be their intentions.

If, on the other hand, Mansell went to Algiers with a free hand within the limits of his Instructions; went without having thought out any line of action in the event of the failure of negotiations; went without informing himself of the strong and weak points of Algiers and the Algerines, and the best way to execute the attack he was sent to make, from the men serving under him who knew both the place and the inhabitants well; refrained of his own will from interference with pirate vessels and their captures; allowed himself to be fooled for eleven days by the letters and messages of the Viceroy and then, accepting helplessly his diplomatic defeat, sailed away afraid to fire a gun or risk a man, and unable

<sup>32</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 1581, f. 70. Button's *Journal* gives 14th December as the date when the despatch left England, but the *Harleian MS.* is Mansell's own letter of acknowledgement to Buckingham written 13th January. Perhaps two despatches were received together.

<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, ii. pp. 1, 2, and *post*, p. 144.



either to form any plan himself or adopt any suggested to him, he has damned himself as perhaps the weakest and most incompetent admiral who has ever commanded a British fleet.

On the night of 25th December, between Majorca and Alicante, the fleet fell in with a squadron of eight or nine 'Turks.' There was a partial engagement while the enemy remained within range, but Mansell wrote to Buckingham that 'it is almost incredible in how short a time those ships out-sailed the whole fleet out of sight.' In his letter of 13th January he complains of the lack of assistance from the Spaniards, but as far as supplies went he had been informed that six months' stores were to be sent to Malaga for him. In writing on 16th and 17th January to the merchants' committee he dwells on the utility the two pinnaces promised would be (the Mercury and Spy), and the value of the squadron of Spanish galleys which were also to join him, 'without the help of which these H.M. forces may serve only to terrify the pirates, never to take them.' At this date, therefore, he had in view the chase of the Algerines at sea, but he proposed to be at Algiers again by 15th March if everything went well.<sup>34</sup> Released, perhaps, from the restrictions which had brought him away from the port, he proposed to burn the Algerine vessels there in accordance with his Instructions. In the interval the fleet was by no means idle; many salutes were still exchanged, but single ships and small squadrons were continually detached for cruising. They caught nothing, or at least only one small prize, but Monson's version that the fleet, as a whole, stayed lazily at anchor is quite untrue. Tetuan and Tangier were visited, and Mansell himself tried to negotiate an exchange of slaves at the former port but without success. In January he met the Dutch fleet under Haultain who offered to go with him to Algiers under his command, but Mansell refused because he did not consider himself authorized by his Instructions to accept any assistance but that of Spain, which was probably not the true reason. On 16th February the Mercury, Spy, and two victualling ships from England joined at Gibraltar but the fleet was still very sickly; on 6th February ninety-two men were landed at Alicante from the Reformation, and the strength must have been steadily deteriorating from this cause.

Mansell had intended to be off Algiers again by 15th March; he was nearly ten weeks later in the event, a delay

<sup>34</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 1581, f. 72.

mainly due to the non-appearance of the provisions and ammunition from England, and of the promised squadron of Spanish galleys. When the victualling ships did arrive they brought only a proportion of the six months' supplies he had expected, so that he wrote that he would be compelled to sail with what he had and would be unable to blockade Algiers for three or four months as he had proposed to do if necessary. During the four or five months that he had been in the Spanish ports communications from England must have reached him more than once; possibly some of the waste of time was due to the hesitation of the home Government, and it may be that the determination again to act against the pirate port resulted from the knowledge James possessed that the Spanish government was really bent on peace and was doing its best to arrange some tolerable terms between the Emperor Ferdinand and the Elector Palatine. If the fleet was not wanted against the Flota it might well be used against Algiers and thus satisfy the London merchants. The promised squadron of Spanish galleys had never appeared and, dependent on his own endeavours, Mansell bought two small vessels to be prepared as fireships and four others to tow them, a service for which he had relied on the galleys; he also trained the crews of the fireships in their especial work. He arrived at Algiers on 21st May and Button describes the way he came to anchor, done with a regularity, symmetry and simultaneity new in such operations, which seem to show that he had at least some ideas of his own in training and discipline. The men-of-war anchored in line ahead from north to south and the merchantmen at right angles to them in line abreast from their respective flagships, but six of the merchantmen were kept under sail to prevent Algerine ingress or egress. Mansell dropped anchor intending to send in his fireships the same night, but the wind was off shore and prevented him; it continued from the same quarter during 22nd and 23rd May. It changed on the 24th and that night the fireships—one of them being under the command of Walsingham—and the boats went in. The wind again came offshore before the Mole was reached and after an attempt to tow the fireships, and then some hesitation about proceeding, the boats pulled in without the fireships. They reached the Mole, cheered on by Captain Hughes who commanded the other fireship, and, assaulting to the soul-inspiring cry of 'King James! King James! God bless King James!' set alight several of the pirate ships; this was done under a heavy fire and twenty or thirty men were killed and wounded

in the hand to hand fighting which followed before the English were drawn off. From this qualified success we may infer that if Mansell had effected a determined boat attack in force, to be pushed home, within forty-eight hours of his first appearance in November, while his men were fresh and keen and the Algerines relatively unprepared and unsuspecting, there is every probability that it would have been completely successful. He ascertained, later, that the Viceroy had been warned four days before his arrival, by a French ship, of his coming, and that preparations had been made, so that an assault in November would have been given in circumstances in every way more favourable.

Mansell, in his despatch to Buckingham of 9th June, says that he waited at Algiers ten days in the hope of being able to repeat his attack but that there was no wind 'fit for the attempt.'<sup>35</sup> Button tells us that the fleet sailed the next day, the 25th, and did not return until the 30th;<sup>36</sup> before he left, on the 25th, four pirates came in notwithstanding the six patrolling merchantmen, probably by creeping along with their oars close inshore, and seven more entered immediately after his departure. We do not know why he went, nor why, having gone, he came back, unless he yielded to the importunity of his principal subordinates, but his irresolute and futile proceedings show that he was at the end of his resources. On the 31st two Genoese slaves, who escaped by swimming off to him, gave the information that the entrance to within the Mole had been boomed by the Algerines, that a score of guard boats were watching it, and that advice boats had been sent out in all directions to warn returning pirates. As, this time, Mansell had anchored three miles out in the bay he could not in any case have effectually closed the port; he contented himself with sending in boats at night to pick up any captives who might attempt to escape by swimming off. Provisions, he says, were running short, and at a council of war it was decided to return to Alicante, after, we may suppose, the discussion of the possibility of trying further attempts. Practically the only proceeding now open to him was another boat attack, for a boom was not necessarily an impregnable barrier; from a blockade he was debarred by the weather-worn condition of his ships, the fact that sickness must by this

<sup>35</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 1581, f. 73.

<sup>36</sup> *Journal.* Perhaps Mansell beat about in the offing, in which case he might consider himself as being still, technically, before Algiers.



time have reduced his crews to half strength or less,<sup>37</sup> and the knowledge that a blockade was not only not contemplated by his Instructions but would have been incompatible with the general intention of his presence in the Mediterranean.

He sailed, finally, on 4th June, arriving at Alicante on the 8th, where he found orders awaiting him to send home four of the men-of-war; to these he was compelled to add four of the merchantmen as no longer seaworthy. His despatches of 9th June and 6th July show that, when writing, he expected them all to be replaced and to be allowed to resume the campaign against the Algerines which he proposed to carry on by means of blockade and another attempt at burning the pirate ships. The motive of the English ministry in recalling the ships was, however, political, and unconnected with any knowledge of the condition of the fleet. On 12th July Mansell was at Cadiz where the homeward bound ships separated, and where 400 or 500 shots were fired in salutes. Sir John Coke notes on this: 'More ostentation after so prosperous a journey! Query why they went to Cales?' The explanation is obvious; at Cadiz the Admiral was nearer England and his reliefs, and there, at a great naval base, he could obtain the stores immediately necessary to refit his ships more readily than in any other port along the Spanish coast. In any case he could do nothing more against Algiers until refitted, remanned, and reinforced. The event showed that his movement westward was the right one. A dispute had arisen between the English Government and that of Holland in connexion with the blockade of the Flemish ports which had ensued on the renewal of the war between Spain and the United Provinces, and James, in consequence, was strengthening his fleet in the Channel. To do this he recalled Mansell with the remainder of the fleet.

<sup>37</sup> On board the *Vanguard* there were not sufficient healthy men to work the ship (*Harl. MSS.* 1581, f. 76).

A Resolution of War with Spain ; and what followed upon the second Journey to Cadiz in 1625, in the Reign of King Charles I.\*

KING James dying on the 27th of March, 1625 left his kingdom doubtful whether peace or war should be embraced, having just occasion of hostility offered him by the King of Spain. For the noble prince his son, now our blessed King, being distasted with the delaying course of Spain held to prolong the marriage that was then entertained, and that his Highness's journey into Spain gave him not the satisfaction he expected ; wherefore, out of his noble and heroical disposition being sensible of the injury done him, he could do no less in requital thereof but let Spain see its error in the ill usage given him, and accordingly in the year 1625 sent a fleet to

\* In view of the existence of several authoritative modern accounts of the expeditions of 1625-6-7-8, and the size to which this edition of the ' Tracts ' is already extending, it has been decided not to write yet another relation of these events. There is little or nothing to be said for the statesmanship, organization, or generalship shown during those years, but in reading Monson's criticisms his soreness at not being employed should always be borne in mind. This is shewn with some naïveté in the passage (p. 166), now newly printed, where he remarks that one who had been at Cadiz in 1596 would have been a great help to them, and it is evident in many other places, *e.g.* pp. 92, 97, 144. In the circumstances it is extraordinary that he could for a moment have expected an appointment.

sea to revenge himself upon them. But the winter season approaching, an ill time taken for such an enterprise, besides some other miscarriages, which may be imputed to the want of experience in the commanders, as is to be seen in the answer to a book published by the General at his return, it had no better success than the author hereof foretold before their going from hence.



The Author's Opinion of that Expedition, which he writ to a noble Friend of his before the Fleet sailed. As also what he conceived of the first News brought of the taking of the Fort of Cadiz with hopes to possess the Town and keep it.

NOBLE SIR,—I have addressed to you my conceit of this secret and concealed fleet, whose design and unknown orders,\* give cause of admiration,† and consequently of censure ; every man judging as his fancy leads him, but all concluding of victory to us, and ruin to Spain, whither it is conceived to be intended by the rendezvous of ships and men in the western parts. Some threatening Portugal, some the Islands,‡ others the bay of Cadiz, and city of Seville ; others the State of Genoa, and islands adjacent ; some the West Indies, and the fleet from thence expected.

I will begin with Portugal, as the country nearest us, and upon which most men's opinions are settled, having experience of the force of that kingdom by an attempt formerly made in the year 1589. You must conceive that Portugal fronts upon the heart of Spain ; and that Spain hath sundry entrances into it, as namely by the south and west sea there, upon the east Castile,

\* B, R, and S read ' whose designs and unnominated commanders.'

† Wonder.

‡ *I.e.* the Azores.

upon the north Galicia, and towards the south Andalusia. Portugal is far inferior to those countries in strength, which are a means not only to keep the people in obedience but to give present aid and assistance against foreign invasions. I confess, if our actions in 1589 had been well carried, we had spoiled and ruined the city of Lisbon, for they had been surprised before we had been suspected. But we could expect no other advantage besides taking and destroying the city ; for though the merchandize in it was of an inestimable wealth, yet neither could we transport it to our ships, nor our ships repair to receive it, the passage being stopped by the castles of St. Julian and Belem. Our hope was as little to settle Don Antonio for King, the Portuguese being a multitude of poor-spirited people, without arms or hearts, that further than in their tongues and wishes would not afford a finger to fight. And besides, the barrenness of the country is such that it affords not three parts corn for food, nor other provisions, were it not for the help of the sea. And I dare boldly aver, the kingdom had better fail of their trade to the East Indies than of their fishing for pilchards upon their coast. And let this be the first consideration—how an army can subsist in that country, and the rather, by the proof we had of it in 1589? Moreover, by possessing Lisbon and the northern part of Portugal we were nothing nearer enjoying the south part, which yields greatest plenty of food, cities, and nobility. For from Lisbon we were to begin, as it were, a new conquest, and to pass three leagues to the Alemtejo side, over against Lisbon, where the Spanish galleys, which were then there, would have been our destruction in landing.

## The State of Portugal in the year 1625 compared with the year 1589.

IN our enterprise of 1589 we had no cause to complain of Fortune, for she gave us a happy entrance into the kingdom by the surprise of Peniche castle, that afforded us a landing. And, after a peaceable march to Lisbon, we found the city unarmed and unprovided, the castle excepted ; but yet our success proved miserable and unhappy. We can scarce hope for the like fortune now, their forts being better armed, and their forces better ordered by the late warning they have had. I conceive, the river of Tagus excepted, there are but two places which advantage us in landing, which, if we fail of, our enterprises are frustrated. The one is Peniche, the other Cascaes. The ports to the northward of Peniche are in the bottom of the bay of Portugal, a place all ships will shun and avoid, and too far distant from Lisbon to march. Those to the southward of Cascaes are on the other side of Lisbon, and the river Tagus, which I have shewed the impossibility to pass over. And had not the Duke of Alva provided to pass his army in galleys upon his taking of Portugal, he might at that time have possessed the south parts of Portugal, and have left the north part to the Portuguese themselves.

Peniche has a small harbour only capable of barks and fishermen. The other two are open roads, and not secure from a southerly or westerly



wind. Our landing must be in one of these two open bays, where ships lie subject to southerly winds which will hazard the destruction of them if they come with violence. The sea on the shore is disadvantageous to the invader in landing, and as vantageable to the enemy in resisting. Our means to land is not the least mischief to us where we shall have no help but by the boats we carry, which cannot contain the number of our soldiers at thrice ferrying, and thereby we shall not bring above the third part of our men to fight at the time of our greatest need. A fleet coming to an anchor that distance from the shore that ships cannot command their landing with their ordnance, their boats and men will be cut off by the galleys of Portugal, who, no doubt, will attend them and take all advantage upon them, as in the same case of the landing at Algiers as before expressed.\* We neither having castle nor harbour our field-pieces cannot be landed, which must be the strength to force the castle ; the want whereof I refer to consideration.†

My second observation is the state of Portugal since the year 1589 when we attempted it. The Portuguese nation in their nature are better reconciled to the Spaniard than they have been, and not without reason grounded upon necessity. For they have no hope ever to recover their loss in the East Indies or Brazil, or to enjoy what they possess but by the help and force of Spain. Secondly, the nobility, gentry, and

\* The Churchill text has 'the galleys will cut off our boats and utterly defeat us, as they had done at St. Sebastian's Point, in our journey to Cadiz, if we had attempted it as it was directed.'

† The Churchill text has 'the want whereof was our loss of Lisbon in 1589.'

others in Portugal, that were most discontented with the managing of things in those days, are consumed and dead. Their descendants, who never knew other times, have framed themselves willingly to it, and obtain favour of the King in their employments. Nor does the King himself make any difference betwixt them and his other subjects. Thirdly, the Portuguese are more exasperated against the English than they have been, by the spoils done them at sea, and the evil usage of them in the East Indies. Fourthly, many Portuguese in those days were transported by their love to Don Antonio: others believed in his title; but the most disliked to be under the Spanish government. Since which Don Antonio is dead, his issue gives little hope for them to rely on, and especially the children of the now pretended prince. Since which both father and children have repaired to the Archduchess, which takes away all comfort from the discontented Portuguese. Fifthly, it is worth observation, that in our voyage to Portugal in 1589 our army consisted of fourteen thousand brave soldiers and four thousand choice seamen, our design being to settle that King, who had been formerly crowned in that kingdom. Yet such was the condition of the people of that country that there was neither duke, marquis, earl, viscount, baron, knight, nor gentleman, repaired to him, or shewed himself of his party, except only a mean knight in calling, named Duarte Pais, with whom I was after fellow-prisoner in Lisbon, his commitment being for that offence, *viz.* for flying to Don Antonio: he would often complain to me of his folly, and commend the King's mercy.\*

\* There is no MS. authority for the passage 'Fifthly . . . King's mercy.'

## The Islands.

FROM Portugal I will shape my course for the Islands, as well the Canaries as Terceiras, though I will say little of the Canaries, it being an action fitter for ten ships and a thousand soldiers to attempt than so glorious an army as is now intended. I may say less for the Islands of Azores, the impregnable isle of Terceira excepted, which giveth reputation to the rest. All these Islands, as well the one as the other, cannot boast of one harbour to entertain ships, but open bays, subject to all dangers, and outerly winds, which many vessels of great value have felt that have there perished. The island of Terceira, by nature and situation, exceeds all other islands in strength, being circuited about with mighty high cliffs, a few bays excepted, which are fortified by art to prevent an enemy's landing. As well that island as the rest are shore deep, and no possibility of anchoring but close on board the land. The ground rocky, that if it fret the cable the waves of the sea will force a ship on shore ; or being near the land, and a gale of wind coming off from sea, that a ship cannot claw it off but must of necessity be wrecked. Both which my Lord of Cumberland had proof of in the Victory, a ship royal of the Queen's, which being at an anchor at Flores, and the weather calm, his cable was cut with the rocks ; and had it not been for the help of boats that towed him off he had been forced on shore.



After that, being at an anchor at Fayal, which island he took, one day, many of the principal men on shore who had brought the ransom of the town being aboard him, suddenly the wind chopped up southwardly, which forced him from his anchor, and with great peril of life he doubled the point of the land or else he had perished.

No man that knows the sea will advise an enterprise upon the Islands now towards winter, for in August begin their storms, and commonly last nine months with great violence. For which cause they are held the most inconstant seas in the world, and I say nothing that I will not avouch by proof and precedent. Don Pedro de Valdes, who was taken prisoner in the action of 1588 for England, was commanded, with certain ships and six hundred soldiers, to repair to the Islands, before Terceira had yielded to the King of Spain, there to guard and defend all the ships coming from either of the Indies, Guinea, and Brazil. His commission gave him no absolute authority to land, but yet finding an opportunity he put his soldiers ashore, with a determination to fortify the landing place which seemed to lie open for his advantage. Immediately thereupon the wind shifted and forced him to sea, leaving his men to the mercy of the islanders. As the wind rose the surges did the like on shore, that his boats durst not put in with the land, nor he approach so nigh it with his ships as to give succour to his men with his ordnance, by means whereof they were pitifully massacred, not one of them returning.\* In my Lord of Essex's voyage to those islands he landed and took Villa Franca, a town in the island of St. Michael, which afforded him not so much as his trouble was to

\* In 1581.

land. But when he came to embark his men again the wind began to blow ; which, if it had done but three hours sooner, it would have forced his ships to sea and left his troops ashore, both he and they being slenderly provided of victuals and uncertain of the ships' return, the weather being so constantly ill and outrageous at that time of the year. Myself was witness of this, as well as of that of my Lord of Cumberland's in 1589. The Marquis of Santa Cruz had failed of taking Terceira if he had not had more help by his galleys in landing his men than by his ships and boats. And besides, June and July proved extraordinary fair, to his great advantage. The twelve galleys he carried from Spain were the first vessels of that kind ever seen so far in the ocean. The prows of those galleys \* dismounted a piece of ordnance on shore, which secured their landing, and then were they ready upon that accident with celerity to land their men, which was the first beginning of their great success that followed. The town of Angra, which is the head and principal of all the rest, by help of the point of Brazil is made the impregnablest place in the world. Then what hope have we, if we were ashore, to surprise it, or by siege to take it, the seas being, as I said before, so inconstant, our ships keeping so far off that should yield a supply ? Especially the Spaniards having the road of Angra, by which they will be continually succoured and relieved, besides many other casualties too long to rehearse.

\* The bow guns.

## The Coast of Spain.

LEAVING the Islands, I will repair once more to the main land of Spain, and arrive at the bay of Cadiz, a place fatal to the Spaniards and fortunate to us, by two attempts made upon it, the one in 1587 by Sir Francis Drake, the other in 1596 by the two Lords Generals, the Earl of Essex and the Lord Admiral. These two expeditions alone did twenty times more prejudice and impoverish the Spaniards than all other attempts of ours in our wars. Drake had the spoil, sacking, and burning of thirteen thousand tons of shipping, most of them laden with provision for an intended fleet against England ; which being this year by Sir Francis Drake's good fortune diverted, was the following year, 1588, attempted. In the second, the Lords had the destroying of fifty five great ships ; the galleons of war excepted, all the rest were richly laden and ready in two days to sail to the Indies. I love not to tax dead men, though, in truth, I must say there was great negligence that those ships were not as well possessed and enjoyed by us as destroyed by the enemy. But I must tell this pretended fleet of ours that, though no place gives us better advantage to annoy the King of Spain than the bay of Cadiz, because of the breadth thereof, which cannot be fortified to impeach our entrance, yet shall we now vainly undertake an attempt upon it, the ships of the Indies being long before



they can arrive departed ; for commonly they let not midsummer day pass before they set sail.

I must a little digress, and shew how much our two great Lords were abused in their attempt upon Cadiz in 1596. They were made believe the taking of it was feasible, the honour great, the wealth inestimable, and the annoyance of the enemy beyond all the rest ; never dreaming of that which gave glory to the enterprise, which was the shipping we there found. For had it not been for our destroying the fleet, though otherwise no profit to us, the Lords had returned with the bare taking of Cadiz, which had given no reputation to their greatness but rather have questioned their judgement for so mean a design. As for the feasibility of taking it, if we had landed at San Sebastian's, where our projectors of the voyage directed, not a man had returned. For, besides the strong fortifications made against us, four galleys were appointed to have cut off our boats and men as we landed, our ships lying without command of them or their shore. The wealth found in Cadiz was so small, considering it was conveyed away the day before in the galleys, that, the two galleons we brought from thence excepted, the Queen saw not 200*l.* towards her charge. Nay, I dare be bold to aver, the meanest of twenty ships there burnt was of more value than the whole town, and by us neglected, as I have said before. For upon my reputation I advised my Lord of Essex, the same morning we arrived at Cadiz, to seek rather to possess himself of the ships than town, alleging that it was the ships afforded both wealth and honour ; for that riches in ships could not be concealed as in towns it might. Also that ships being brought for England

they were always in the eyes of the people to behold them and put them in remembrance of the exploit in gaining them ; as perhaps the town soon won would not be long enjoyed and as soon forgotten. All this I have declared where I treated of the voyage to Cadiz 1596 in the former book.

## Andalusia and Seville.

IF an invasion upon the continent of Spain be intended, and especially upon Andalusia and Seville, as the country of all Spain that flows with milk and honey, in respect of the soil and trade, there ought to be consideration of the place of landing and the distance and wearisomeness of the march in an insufferable parching sun which our inexperienced soldiers can never endure. Besides, the provisions of victuals, of carriages, and all other necessities, must be thought of, which we are wholly unprovided of. I will not much insist upon the attempt, because I think it is much less reasonable than any of the rest. First, in seeking to invade a country where we have neither friend nor faction, but shall find their hands and hearts all one to repulse us ; a country populous, and the more for their mighty and continual trade, fronting upon their enemies in Barbary, which makes them ready to receive every alarm and put themselves under arms. If we believe history, and not above two hundred years past, before Spain was grown great by their Indies, the Moors of Granada had often more men by many degrees to invade Andalusia, out of their bordering territories, than we carry, and could not prevail. Then what hope can we expect, Spain being since that time so mightily increased in greatness and wealth ? It seems we make less esteem of the strength of Spain than of any other country. For I am persuaded no kingdom in Europe, having warning of the approach of an enemy, is so unprovided that they will suffer twelve or fourteen thousand men to march quietly forty or fifty leagues into their country.



## The Straits.

FROM hence I will sail into the Straits towards the port of Genoa, which it is supposed the French, we, and the rest of the league, will possess ourselves of, and give a further entrance into Italy.\* If this be intended, though indeed it is not probable, the invader ought to have two principal considerations, without which a fleet and army goes in perpetual peril. The one is to be defended by a safe port to entertain his ships; the other, that it be not far from home, but with care to be continually supplied and relieved. For where soldiers are transported far by sea, ships cannot contain victuals for any time to maintain them; and to hope for relief in the country invaded were too desperate a thought to rely upon.

The service I conceive the ships could perform, our soldiers being landed, is to beleaguer Genoa by sea, riding with our ships in the face of the town. This, as all things else, I refer to consideration, my drift being no more than to relate the true state of things for men of greater wisdom and capacity than my own to judge of. Whereas I advise, as a main thing of providence, not to attempt the invasion of a country without gaining a port for

\* Genoa had been for a century under the domination of Spain and supplied a galley division, under the command of the D'Orias, to the Spanish navy. Raleigh, Southampton, and Buckingham had all, at various times, considered the possibility of an attack upon it.

the receipt of shipping, therefore I must say our design upon Genoa is not without great hazard and danger, being hopeless of a harbour nearer than Marseilles in France, one hundred leagues distant from thence.\* In anchoring before Genoa to beleaguer it we shall lie open to the sea and a southerly wind, which makes the hazard no less than the two attempts upon Algiers, opposite to it, the one by Hugo de Moncada, the other by Charles V.† both which were overthrown by storms from the sea. There is no difference betwixt the two actions but that the southerly wind is death upon the Christian shore, as the northerly upon the coast of Barbary, and the greatest conflict our fleet is to endure is against the rage of the sea. I do not conceive we shall either hurt or damnify the city of Genoa by this adventure of ours, for in anchoring near the shore the lanthorn of Genoa ‡ will beat us from the road. If further off we cannot impeach the galleys going in and out, but they will be able to relieve the town in spite of us ; besides, that with galleys they may use stratagems of fire against us as we ride. I confess, if Corsica or Sardinia could be surprised, they would yield us relief and refreshment, with good harbours for our safety and ease ; but that is impossible or else the Turks had enjoyed them before this time.

We have found, by our unlucky and unadvised voyage to Algiers, how unable our bodies are to endure that coast by the sickness they found

\* It is about 200 miles. Cf. note on the league, *post.* iv. p. 159.

† Charles V. experienced a disaster at Algiers in 1541. The reference to Hugo de Moncada, in 1518, is to the well-known Spaniard of that name, who was Viceroy of Naples for Charles and perished in a sea fight with the Genoese, and not to the Hugo de Moncada who commanded one of the divisions of the Armada.

‡ *I.e.* the fort at the lighthouse.

though they had the help, we shall now want, of the main land of Spain and the bordering islands to give us relief. The unmeasurable heat on shore is no less dangerous to our soldiers, in whom we must expect a miserable sickness, the air and diet disagreeing so much from their accustomed feeding and breeding. And if the King of Spain, in the meantime, upon the return of his fleet from Brazil, shall arm to sea, and take advantage of our weakness and want, in such narrow seas as the Straits, which are like a pond, their meeting cannot be avoided. Or if with that navy, or any other, the Spaniard shall send to attempt Ireland in the absence of our ships, I hold it dangerous, and worthy to be had in consideration.\*

\* Don Fadrique de Toledo sailed, with a combined Spanish and Portuguese fleet, in 1625 for the recapture of Bahia taken by the Dutch. He succeeded; but, as usual with Spanish fleets, most of his ships were lost during the gales experienced coming home. Such as recovered their home ports had all returned by the beginning of September; the English fleet did not sail until 8th October. The passage in the text must have been written much later than August (cf. *ante*, pp. 118; 125) when Monson could hardly have been ignorant of the Spanish disaster.

This short section on the Mediterranean is one of the most interesting in the 'Tracts,' because here, almost for the first time, Monson is reasoning deductively from theory instead of merely describing and criticizing events in which he or others had taken part; in seas with which he was well acquainted. Neither he nor any other English seaman had had any experience of warfare in the Mediterranean, nor could the maritime history of that sea have been known to them in anything more than outline. The Admiral was therefore applying the strategical principles he had learnt during his career to the solution of a problem to which he had no guide in the shape of similarity of conditions, for none of the Elizabethan expeditions had been designed to effect conquest and occupation of territory, and of course the earlier English invasions of France were executed under entirely different





circumstances. It will be observed, that while realizing that the true function of the fleet should be confined to carrying on the blockade of the port, he does not consider the possibility of its fighting and destroying the galleys as a necessary part of the blockade, and in this he is almost exceptional among Elizabethan seamen who mostly despised them as fighting instruments, if only because the galley appealed to races who were soldiers rather than sailors. Monson, on the contrary, always speaks of them with more or less respect. But here, as elsewhere, he dwells on the necessity for a fleet base, by which he means not a flying base—a refuge from wind and weather—but an established port (see p. 147). But the reference to Corsica or Sardinia is a striking one seeing that, less than a century later, the principle involved had become general knowledge and resulted in the occupation of Port Mahon, within the Mediterranean, in 1708, while Nelson gave an illustration of the flying base by carrying on the blockade of Toulon from Maddalena bay in Sardinia. Here Monson was certainly in advance of his contemporaries. Inferentially, by pointing to the possibility of an unbeaten Spanish fleet falling upon the English force before Genoa, or sailing into English waters, he illustrates the maxim that an enemy's fleet must be sought out and destroyed before any invasion, intended to be more than a raid, can be undertaken with safety ; but, of course, in dwelling upon this he was only repeating a rule understood and applied by the English soldier Kings centuries before he was born. The Mediterranean was still almost an unknown sea to the English Admirals. When they knew it better they found that it was large enough to enable the French Admirals to avoid them. Nelson, at least, would have said so.

## The West Indies.

I WILL not leave my voyage till I have visited the West Indies, that I may relate my opinion of those parts as well as of the rest that went before. Many are ignorantly carried away with the name of Indies, and the spoil we shall there commit ; thinking it will afford wealth and riches to the King and kingdom sufficient to maintain a war, and preferment and gain to the undertakers, not valuing nor esteeming the King of Spain's force in those parts to resist us. But for the better satisfaction of the ignorant, who are thus vainly carried away with the conceit of our actions, I will shew the true state of the Indies, and the Spaniards inhabiting, by comparing times past, when we had wars, with the time present, when we covet wars.

I confess that in the year 1585, when the war began, and Sir Francis Drake possessed himself of San Domingo, Cartagena, and St. Augustine, her Majesty had a notable opportunity, by keeping those places to impeach the Spaniards, and encroach upon their Indian territories.

First, in respect her Majesty in those days was rich, and her subjects no less able than willing to contribute to what she proposed, they were so much devoted to her in their hearts. Secondly, in point of reputation, as well as profit, it behoved them to maintain those places after they were taken, as a motive to encourage them to go on with the victory thus begun. Thirdly, her

Majesty in those days might have drawn such conditions as she pleased from the States of Holland, who were then at her mercy. For presently ensued the Earl of Leycester's going over to protect them, so that she might have bound them to her with her own enterprises upon the Spaniards. Whereas from that time till the year 1603, when the Queen died, we see, that notwithstanding we were drawn into the war by them, yet they traded peaceably into the King of Spain's dominions, and never offered to impeach the Spaniards by hostile actions at sea, but supplied them with ships, habiliments of war, and intelligence against us. Fourthly, if we had kept our footing in the Indies it would have shaken the fidelity of the Portuguese in the East Indies, Guinea, and Brazil, which countries were lately become obedient and subject to Spain; but, withal, so discontented in each place that it had been an easy thing to have made a combustion in each country whilst the Spaniards had been taken up in the Indies and Holland. Fifthly, the King of Spain in those days was altogether unfurnished with ships and mariners. For, till we awaked him by the daily spoils we committed upon his subjects by letters of reprisal, he never sought to increase his forces by sea. Sixthly, he held himself so secure in his Indies, no enemy having ever appeared in those seas before, and thought them so far off to be enterprised, that he little feared what would be there offered.

But leaving our opportunities and advantages as negligences or ignorances of times past, let us enter into the state and condition of our attempts as they are now to be undertaken and followed. Whosoever makes an enterprise on a town in America, with an intent not to keep it, will do no



more than a malicious person that seeks the destruction of his neighbour, in setting his house a fire, without any other prospect in so doing but mischief and revenge. I confess we shall damnify the inhabitants of the town so sacked and spoiled, as the owner of a house burnt will be damnified. But it is no more loss or prejudice to the King of Spain, or to the bordering countries, than to the neighbour of the man that shall have his house burnt, for every one bears his own particular loss. And whereas the master of the house and people in it are often so suddenly surprised that they have not time or leisure to save any part of their goods, after the fire is kindled, it is otherwise in a town that is to be surprised by sea ; for the inhabitants will descry ships before they approach the shore, and either provide to withstand them that land, or to leave and quit the town and bury or carry away their wealth. For notwithstanding the several towns taken by us in time of war, as well in the Indies as other places, I dare be bold to say the wealth found in them did not countervail the twentieth part of the charge of the voyage as I have shewed in the First Book.

The state of the towns in the West Indies, near the sea, is as follows: if they be of strength they arm and fortify themselves so that they do not fear a sudden assault of an enemy. For a long siege they well know the invaders cannot be provided, because it is so far from home, where victuals and all things else will quickly fail and be consumed. Or suppose upon their first landing they possessed themselves of some cattle, which is all the victuals they can expect in those parts, you must understand that no flesh in the Indies will take salt, or continue man's meat above three or four hours, so that our present relief will be

little. In the mean time we shall spend our store on board and be forced to great misery and danger. Such towns as are weakly provided for defence in those parts they never trust with wealth of value, but are in readiness, upon the approach of an enemy, to quit them and carry or bury their goods. So that if the town be taken their loss will only be of a few slight houses, which are soon re-edified again.

If we think to inhabit and dwell in such towns as shall be surprised, we ought to consider the following mischiefs and inconveniences.

1. The first is the distance from England, and to compute the time they may be supplied and succoured from thence.
2. The casualty of the sea, and the danger of sickness which northern bodies are subject to in hot countries.
3. The number of Spaniards in those places, their strength, and in what time they may be drawn together.
4. The keeping us from victuals, and driving their cattle into the inward country where it will be in vain for us to pursue them.
5. The building of sconces, and keeping us in towns like prisoners, that we shall not be able to make any sallies upon them, or to pass into the country to annoy them.
6. The small distance from Spain to relieve them, and the certainty of the winds from thence to the Indies, which many times makes the journey shorter and easier than from Dover to Plymouth.
7. The country, the straits, and the passages, all known to the Spaniards, and not to us, will much advantage them.
8. But perhaps all men will not be satisfied with truth or reason, for some are of such a nature as to rely more upon opinion and fortune than upon proof. But for the better satisfaction of such, I will collect and repeat the success of our

enterprises upon towns in time of war, as well in the Indies as other places, and make them judges of their future hopes by looking back upon times past.\*

And I will begin with San Domingo, Cartagena, and St. Augustine, surprised by Sir Francis Drake before they could be warned or armed, and yet (the ordnance excepted) the wealth of them did not countervail the value of the bread in the fleet. Puerto Rico, taken by my Lord of Cumberland, proved so poor that the adventurers had good cause to repent their designs upon towns; for it afforded them not the fourth part of the expense. There was a town surprised in the island Trinidad by Sir John Burgh; and another in the island of Margarita by Sir Walter Raleigh, but of so little value that they scarcely afforded sixpence to each man. Cumana was taken by Sir Amyas Preston, and Vera Cruz by Captain Parker; both which did not afford so much wealth as to be accounted for an adventure. Puerto Bello and Nombre de Dios were taken by Sir Francis Drake that voyage when he died. Instead of riches they afforded him a most miserable and infectious sickness; but for wealth they yielded none. The same town of Puerto Bello was after taken by Captain Parker, with as little profit to him as the other; the same captain also took Campeachy in New Spain, which afforded him no more wealth than the rest. There were divers towns taken at Cape Verde in several voyages; and in the West Indies, Rio de la Hacha, Capuri, Santa Maria, Puerto Santo, St. John Bellona,†

\* R has a marginal note to these eight reasons, or to some one of them; 'I can answer this by a project I conceal.'

† *Sic.* Perhaps St. John Borriquen, *i.e.* San Juan de Puerto Rico.



Tepeaca, Vera,\* and several houses and farms burnt or ransomed.† Sir Walter Raleigh's unfortunate attempt upon St. Thomé and Guiana, which was his own bane, and his son's death, yielded only stinking tobacco, a commodity that could not be conveyed away, because of the bulk ; and his voyage proved much less worth than smoke.

And if we sail further, and through the Straits of Magellan, and pass into Peru, thinking there to find silver and gold, as the well-head from whence it springs, let us ask Mr. Cavendish, if he were now living, what wealth Morro Morreno, Arica, Santa Maria, Pisco, Paraca, Chinche, Payta, the island of Puña, Aguatulco, the port of Navidad, the port of Santiago, and the island of St. Andrew, and other places yielded him, which he burnt because they would not be ransomed, though he required not much more than victuals for their redemption. Which proves my former discourse, that the Spaniards little esteem their houses, and may easily convey away their wealth upon the approach of an enemy. And if we come nearer home : I pray you, what did the sack of Cadiz afford the Queen ? or the Canary Islands ? or St. Thomé the Hollanders ? or the island of Fayal my Lord of Cumberland ? and after the Earl of Essex ? for it was twice taken. Or Villa Franca, or Faro by him taken ? Or two or three forts taken upon Cape St. Vincent ? Or Cape Sagres by Drake ? Or Peniche, and other towns in Sir John Norreys his march to Lisbon, and the suburbs thereof ? And in the same voyage Drake with his few forces took Cascaes. I omit Lanzarote, and many other

\* *Sic.*

† There is no MS. authority for the portion 'The same town . . . burnt or ransomed.'

places seized upon by private ships. We may conclude that our actions proved the ruin of some, without any great advantage to ourselves. And this shall suffice for our attempts upon towns in the Queen's time.

But indeed, whosoever will annoy the State of Spain, it must be by obstructing their trade by sea, for all other spoils are nothing in comparison of it, as I have before shewed, for wealth in ships can neither be concealed nor embezzled ; but how to do it shall rest in my breast until times mend, or that I may see a grateful and respective age for my services past. For when I remember my own merits by advancement of others, my inferiors in blood, rank, and experience, I repent me of my occupation.

Thus much I writ to an honourable friend of mine, as I formerly said, before the setting out of the unhappy fleet to Cadiz, in 1625. Which friend of mine is ready to justify and produce, if need require, the copy of this verbatim word by word.

Upon the News of the arrival of our Ships at Cadiz, with the taking a Fort, and afterwards the Town, intending to keep it, I added this as follows :

THE fort I conceive to be Puntal, the place where we landed when we formerly took Cadiz, above three miles distant from it by land. I should be glad to hear they had taken the bridge of Suazo, which passes between the main land and the island of Leon where Cadiz stands. For by that bridge succour must come to relieve the island and town, or obstruct any such relief if an enemy get possession of it ; and therefore we having no news of the surprise of that bridge I doubt the truth of the taking the town. We know Cadiz is strongly fortified since we enjoyed it, and the rather out of a fear they conceive of the Turkish pirates, who, since they have attained the art of navigation and shipping, which before they were ignorant in, have of late made many attempts upon the continent of Spain to the great hurt and spoil of the inhabitants. And if the Spaniards have not fortified and furnished Cadiz with an extraordinary strength and care, it lying nearer and more open to the Turks than all other towns in Spain, they worthily deserve all the mischief that can befall them.

If we fail of surprising Cadiz, and be forced to besiege it, these dangers following may ensue :

Firstly, the force of Andalusia, and all the



countries thereunto adjoining, which yield more good men and horses than all the other parts of Spain, will come down upon us. Secondly, the Spaniards, holding the bridge of Suazo, will bring multitudes of people to besiege our besiegers; and with their horse cut off all succours sent from our ships, which must only afford us relief, for the island yields nothing of itself. Thirdly, if we so begirt the town by land that we permit no entrance into it that way, yet we cannot do the like by water. For with their galleys they will daily relieve it in despite of us, Port St. Mary in the main land lying opposite to it, which makes me hopeless of taking it by siege if we fail of a surprise. Fourthly, one other reason I have to mistrust it is not taken, which is that the news of taking the town and fort would have come all together. If all were not done at one instant I much fear the success, for the reasons aforesaid, and by the example of us in 1596.

The Second Rumour was of keeping Cadiz  
when taken.

THE consultation of keeping Cadiz in 1596 was long debated by the two Lords Generals, and the most experienced soldiers of that time, whom I think all men will confess this age doth not equal. The manner how to supply it out of Barbary and England was thought of, and Sir Edward Hoby was to undertake an embassy to the King of Morocco to that purpose. But to use the words of the author who writ that voyage, as it is set down in the chronicle, he says, there was a great dispute about the keeping of Cadiz, and the opinion of all old soldiers and seamen asked. But because it appeared not how it might at all times be relieved with men, munition, and victuals, and other causes best known to the Generals, it took not effect. It was then discussed and disputed by men of experience, as I have said, and concluded upon mature deliberation that it was not possible to keep the town. I would gladly know what reason men have to induce them to it more now than then, but especially when I see never a man called upon for advice whose opinion was thought worthy to be taken at that time.

If it was then held impossible to relieve it I now compare and collect the reasons of times past we had to hold it, with the time present, if we had it.

1. Our army was then stronger, in that most

of our men were old soldiers and better experienced than those that are in this action. 2. They were healthful in body, and victorious in taking the town and bridge with little loss, which is a great encouragement to people that undertake an enterprise. 3. The bridge of Suazo was taken and possessed by us, so that we might keep the town from relief by land, as we had done with our fleet by sea. 4. We knew the King of Spain was unfurnished with shipping to hinder our designs, we having burnt and taken fifty odd vessels of his and his subjects in that harbour. 5. The kingdom of Barbary was then in peace amongst themselves, and would have rejoiced at the occasion to have aided us against Spain. Since then there have been mortal wars continued betwixt the succeeding Kings of that kingdom, to the wasting the most part of their people and food the earth affords. 6. In those days the King of Barbary had three maritime towns fronting upon Cadiz, as namely, El Araish, Sallee, and Mamora. Since which time two of them are possessed by the Spaniards, and only Sallee remains to that King, forty or fifty miles further from Cadiz than the other two, and has a harbour only for small vessels with a dangerous bar at the entrance of it.

I must now say, as I said to the Earl of Essex, when himself, Sir Francis Vere, and I, stood upon the castle of Cadiz, and saw the galleys in their flight to Rota, after their escape through the bridge of Suazo, I told him he had lost his opportunity of keeping Cadiz, shewing how much the galleys would have availed him if we had kept the town, and the annoyance we should find by their escape. For with these galleys we might have transported all necessaries from Barbary, whereas they would



now be able to cut off such single and small ships as should be sent thither for relief.

In the year 1596, and many years before, the French King and we were in war with Spain, and aided one another, and if the King of France had seen us have footing in Spain it would have been a motive to have diverted him from his peace with Spain, which in less than two years after he concluded. Our design was to keep Cadiz, to exchange for Calais in Picardy, not long before taken by the Spaniards. And no doubt but the King of Spain would willingly have consented to it, as thinking it fitter in matter of State that England should enjoy Calais than France. For they well knew they could no longer hold it than the wars continued between them and France, and that peace would cause the restitution of it. They likewise knew that if England possessed it there would be a perpetual jealousy and dislike between France and England, which would prove their security. Moreover, a treaty being set on foot, though but to exchange those two towns, yet it might have given an entrance to a peace betwixt England and Spain. If that had taken good effect her Majesty had not needed to have relieved Ireland with so great hazard and charge, as afterwards she did, by reason of the aid Tyrone had from Spain, when he was ready to quail, and almost forced to yield to her Majesty's mercy. Which enterprise from Spain brought the Queen into such a strait before her death that she was compelled to pardon him, though much against her will.

And this shall suffice by way of comparison betwixt our holding Cadiz in times past with the present, and the advantages that might have ensued by keeping it.

I doubt not, but as the keeping of Cadiz was thought of before the departure of our fleet, (if it should be taken) so the reasons for keeping it were no less discussed. For it is a maxim, that no place in another country far from home is worth keeping that will not defray the charges of maintaining it, unless it be for security, or to give a farther entrance into a country. In my discourse, where I treat of our attempt upon Genoa, I advised, as the principal thing in an invader, to possess himself of a harbour for the safety of his shipping. Wherein I mean not only from the weather, but for securing themselves from an enemy. I will therefore distinguish betwixt a harbour that is to be fortified on both sides by him that possesses it, and an open bay, such as Cadiz, that is ten or twelve miles in breadth, so that whosoever is master, and strongest in shipping, has the command of it and the ships within it. If we intend to keep Cadiz we must be sure in our supplies to master the Spaniards in ships, by reason of the breadth of the bay, which cannot be fortified, therefore the stronger will subdue the lesser.\* The relief we give Cadiz must either be from Barbary or England; and the distance from England is four hundred leagues at the least; a long navigation, subject to storms, the uncertainty of winds, loss of company, the danger of the enemy, being separated, and many other casualties the sea is subject to. On the contrary, the Spanish fleet that shall impeach us is furnished nearer home, and runs no such hazard.

We are to expect no other help or succour after our departure out of England, till our return, but what we carry with us. On the contrary, the

\* Cf. vol. i. p. 385.

Spaniards will be supplied from their own shore, and that with speed. Suppose, as we ride in the bay of Cadiz, the Spaniards attempt us with a fleet, and that by accident or force they drive part of us ashore. Then are we void of all comfort to recover either ship or man, whereas, if the Spaniards run ashore, they shall not be endangered, it being their own country where it happens, which will afford them present succour. We being at anchor in Cadiz road they may tow fire-ships amongst us with their galleys for that those vessels have a great advantage over us, and hazard the burning or forcing us ashore, as our fireships did among theirs in 1588, when we had done them more hurt had we been assisted by galleys. They may prevent any such stratagem of ours by casting hooks out of their galleys aboard any such ships as we shall fire, and so tow them clear of their fleet and make them burn themselves in vain. If the Spaniards assault us with a fleet in the road of Cadiz, it will be with a large wind and a leeward tide, to keep themselves to windward of us, and consequently out of danger for it will be in their power to board us, and we not to board them. Our advantage over the Spaniard is and ever hath been in our excellent sailing in open sea, where we may take and leave at our pleasure, the only advantage in sea service. We are frustrate of any such advantage in harbour fights where ships cannot sail by reason of the narrowness of the channel.

If you will enter into the true state and strength betwixt the galleons of Spain and ours, laying aside the advantage of our men or swift sailing, according to the old phrase they are bound to fight—*Fight Dog, fight Bear*—till one side be overcome, which cannot be better decided



than at the anchor in a harbour. Let us judge the difference of ships: the Spaniards are bigger in burthen, and by consequence have the advantage to board; more spacious within board, and therefore contain more men; more decks, and therefore carry more ordnance. Then consider that the greatness of vessels, the number of men and ordnance, makes the strength of ships. I refer it to consideration, and will conclude, that if we do not relieve Cadiz from time to time with a stronger fleet than Spain can make, we shall undergo great hazards, dangers, and disgraces which ought to have been well considered and argued before undertaking the last enterprise upon it. And this shall suffice for our attempt upon Andalusia, or the city of Cadiz; and so I will proceed to the answer of the pamphlet.

The Voyage ended, there was published a Book of the Proceedings of that Expedition;\* which Book was not long after answered, as appears by what follows.

*Author.* The 8th of October, 1625, they departed from Plymouth, and the 9th fell in with my Lord of Essex, the Vice-Admiral, who had put into Falmouth.

*Answer.* That month and day had been fitter (if the action had been carried with reason and discretion) to have sought England after a voyage, winter approaching, than to have put themselves and ships to the fortune of a merciless sea, that yields nothing but boisterous and cruel storms, uncomfortable and long nights, toil and travail to the endless labour of the poor mariners. And what was no less than the rest, I fear, an inexperienced General, by his phrase in saying, he 'fell in' with my Lord of Essex the 9th day; when the proper word of falling in was with the land, and not with ships. He should rather have said, 'We met my Lord,' or, 'We and my Lord met together': and the reason is, the land is a steadfast firm thing to be found, and a ship is ever moving, not certain to be fallen in withal, but accidentally to be met with.

*Author.* The 11th he called a council, and

\* Wimbledon's *Journal*, published in 1626.

settled the instructions for a sea-fight, as appeared in the 7th and 10th articles, *viz.* If the enemy's approach be in such sort as the Admiral of the Dutch and his squadron, or my Vice-Admiral of our fleet and his squadron, may have opportunity to begin the fight, it shall be lawful for them so to do till I come, using the form, method, and care, as aforesaid.

*Answer.* This instruction in my opinion was unadvised, and should have been conditionally, (as thus) ; If the enemy had offered to fly, then not to lose any opportunity, but to assail him. But if they meant to abide it, presuming upon their force, it was great folly to hazard part of the fleet to all the enemy's, but rather to have stayed for the Admiral and the rest of the ships, to observe the working of the enemy, and then to have directed every squadron accordingly how to have ordered themselves. For it were a madness in a single combat of six to six, or more, for two of them to charge their opposites before the approach of the rest.

*Author.* If any ships of the enemy do break out and fly, the Admiral of any squadron that shall happen to be next, and in the most convenient place for that purpose, shall send out a competent number of the fittest ships of his squadron, to chase, assault, and take such ship or ships so breaking out. But no ship shall undertake such a chase without the command of the Admiral, or at least an Admiral of the squadron.

*Answer.* The General's want of experience shall appear in this article ; for if no ship shall undertake the chase without order of the Admiral, or Admiral of the squadron, what if a ship that is chased be near some of your fleet and a good distance from your self ? Shall your ship or ships



lose the opportunity of chasing, and repair to you for orders? By that time the ship chased will be out of sight, or so far off that it will be a folly to follow her. For your learning another time, these are the directions you ought to have given in such a case. If there shall happen a chase, the next ship to her to follow her; and if there be more than one chased, the rest of our ships next to her to single themselves as they shall think themselves able to overcome them. And when you chase to wear your flag half furled in the head of your topmast so long as you chase; and if the Admiral would have you leave your chase he will shoot off two pieces of ordnance and strike his topsail. But if you cannot discern it then the next ship to you to take that sign, and so one of another, until you discern it. And if you be brought to leeward by that chase, then to ply into your height again. This article contains as much as the Admiral or Vice-Admiral of a squadron can give, after the loss of so much time as by a ship coming to him for his directions: and time in such case is the principal thing. In your article there was no provision how far such a ship should be chased, when to leave the chase, or whither to repair after the chase; but confusedly, and to the loss of the advantage aforesaid.

*Author.* The 12th day the wind north-north-west, the seas grown so high that the long boats were lost, and many other damages sustained.

*Answer.* At that time of the year you are sure to find that weather, and to look for such disasters; and therefore it is a folly to undertake a sea journey towards winter, as I have said. If in that storm the wind had been southerly you would have returned into the harbours of

England, where would have been found such defects in ships that you had seen the end of your voyage. And, amongst wise men, it is a great question whether your going or staying would have proved more honourable and profitable to the kingdom.

*Author.* The 18th a council was called, and Sir William St. Leger writ a letter that he suspected the plague in his ship, but it proved not so. And here the General gave special order for the ships to come near together and hail their Admiral every morning, reproving their former negligence. And now he gave the ships their orders, which should have been done before but was hindered by storm.

*Answer.* I know not this gentleman, Sir William St. Leger, but having now occasion to judge of him I think the suspicion of plague in his ship might have hazarded the overthrow of the action, for if it had been publicly known it would have caused most of the ships to have quitted the fleet, and therefore his doubt should have been grounded upon more assurance. If the ships were negligent in keeping near together they deserved blame, but no punishment, as not having received their instructions. The blame was worthy to light upon the General, when in winter, and the weather so uncertain, he delayed giving his orders, which should have been done in harbour, and sealed up, until such an accident happened as foul weather at sea or loss of one another. I will let pass many trivial things not worth answering or excepting against; as namely, the defects of ships, the losing company and meeting again; the winds, victuals, sickness, and other things of that nature.

*Author.* The 20th he called a council, to debate how he should put into San Lucar, according

to an intention of the council held at Plymouth, when his Majesty was present. Who, upon the doubtfulness thereof, thought it good to refer it to be decided upon the spot when we should be arrived, upon better enquiry of the inconveniences and disadvantage for going into the harbour and landing our army. Then follows a long circumstance, of the impossibility of going into San Lucar.

*Answer.* I dare undertake never enterprise at sea departed a shore with such doubtful directions as to take their resolutions when they should come to the place, the port of San Lucar, and the danger of the bar, being as well known to the masters before their going from home as after they came thither. And, if they did not inform his Majesty with it at the council held at Plymouth, they deserved to be hanged upon the Hoe of Plymouth, for in truth it was the greatest point of treason that could be to know a hazard and not to reveal it ; to know how much it concerned his Majesty in reputation and not to avoid it ; how much it regarded the safety of ships and subjects and thus to conceal it. For no man that had heard of the bar of San Lucar but knew the danger expressed in the pamphlet.

*Author.* The General demanded, both of the captains and masters, why they did not speak of these difficulties before his Majesty : they answered, ' It was now the depth of winter, and stormy.'

*Answer.* If the masters knew no more than the captains he might as well have asked the opinion of so many shepherds, for I am informed few of the captains had much more experience ; and the masters' answer was as ridiculous to the General's demand, why they acquainted not his



Majesty with the difficulty at Plymouth ; for, say they, 'It was the depth of winter, and stormy.' What was this in answer to the impossibility of going to San Lucar ? Could the summer remove the bar and give them a safe entrance and exit ? Could the summer season give them more knowledge of pilotship than they had before their coming thither ? Or did they not know that winter was approaching when they were called to the council of Plymouth, for it could not be above twenty days more winter than it was when they were at Plymouth ? 'I could say no more to them,' says the author, 'being I was no great seaman.' And in the 16th leaf, he says, he made no account but the ships were ours ; for, speaking of seamen, he says they knew more than he did how to set upon them.

Would any man thus confess his ignorance in a command he undertook ? Or would any man ever take upon him the charge of a General by sea, that had never passed further than betwixt England and Holland ? It were good to know whether he sought the employment, or whether it was put upon him against his will. If he was led unto it by ambition let him answer his error, and that with severity : if it was procured by others they ought to have the same chastisement he deserved. Betwixt the one and the other it is a pitiful thing that the kingdom should bear the dishonour, which in truth cannot be justly taxed ; for England affords as good ships as ever it has done ; men of as great experience and valour if they had been called upon. No reason therefore but that every horse should bear his own burthen, and that the defect be not laid upon ships and men, but upon the adviser and undertaker of the journey.

*Author.* In the same council it was determined, that the whole fleet should bear into the bay of Cadiz, and anchor before Port St. Mary. It was appointed how every ship should anchor, *viz.* that the General and Dutch Admiral should anchor together, and give directions to the Vice-Admiral and Rear-Admiral.

*Answer.* It was a most ridiculous resolution to anchor and land at Port St. Mary. First, in respect of the danger of an outwardly wind ; secondly, their galleys would have cut off our long boats and men if we had attempted to land, the ships being out of command of them or the shore ; thirdly, such Spanish ships as were in the road of Cadiz would have had leisure to have saved themselves and convey away their wealth ; fourthly, the town of Cadiz had space to prepare for its defence, and the country would quickly have given relief to it, as well as the place where they pretended to land. My next observation is the place they chose to anchor in, that he might give directions ; and yet before he excused himself as inexperienced, and by consequence unfit to direct. He that shall read this little pamphlet to Cadiz, shall find more directions, more councils, more letters writ, and more absurdities committed, than in any action a man shall read of.

*Author.* The General gave orders for every ship to break down their cabins, to be ready to fight.

*Answer.* This every ship would have done without directions : still directions to little purpose, and nothing came of it.

*Author.* I writ to my Lord of Essex to make all the haste he could ; and that I would command his squadron to follow him, which I did.

But I must confess they went the most untowardly way I ever saw men, for they did not hoist up their sails as they were commanded.

*Answer.* This was not a time to write, and I marvel your leisure would admit of it, for what you were to act was now or never. If you had not directed before you came to the port what ships should go in, and what ships should second one another, you were very unfit for the command you had. This did the two Lords Generals, in their expedition to Cadiz: they consulted and resolved what ships should attempt the enemy the next morning. And when it came to be executed, never greyhounds strove to overcome, or outstretch one another in a course as those ships did to draw near to the Spaniards. And if you had had but one man that had known the affairs of that voyage, you needed not but to have walked in the path they had trodden out before you.

In your often accusing you urge you could not learn by all the seamen in your ship who were those that were so backward. And in the 13th leaf you say, 'Because I would lose no time I went from ship to ship crying out, "Advance for shame," but I found them not very hasty to do it.' Shall a General say men were backward to fight, when he had authority to compel them? Or that he was not obeyed, having martial law to execute upon them? No, no; but they knew who they had in hand when they refused to tell what ships were backward to fight. For a General that had known the sea would have known every ship of his fleet, being so nigh them. But, indeed, if all your directions had been converted into this one direction following you had saved yourself from writing, sending,



or your labour in going to give the command. That is to say, if before your coming to Cadiz you had appointed, if you would not have been the leader yourself, as my Lord of Essex was in his voyage to Cadiz, I say, if you had commanded an Admiral, and all the ships of his squadron to follow him, and they had not obeyed you, then you knew who was backward and whom to have punished. But your direction and execution was all of a sudden, without form or deliberation ; then what could you expect but confusion ?

*Author.* When all the fleet came to an anchor, and I saw the Spanish ships fly before me, I immediately called a general council to lose no time, and the opinion of seamen was to clear the two forts for securing the fleet.\* Then I demanded what kind of forts they were. They told me, that twenty of the colliers, and some of the Dutch, would beat them to dust by the morning. Whereupon I commanded the ships warned should go up to the fort, and that they should receive directions from my Lord of Essex, who had orders from me.

*Answer.* If my Lord of Essex had orders from you, what need was there to call a council and lose time ? Or why should you give order to my Lord of Essex beforehand, and not to the ships that should second him till the very instant : still writing, directing, but no acting. But for the advice in clearing the forts—surely the advisers were not well advised therein. And in this case you should have enquired what my Lord of Essex did upon the same occasion, when he attempted the shipping. Then it would have

\* *I.e.* to ensure a safe passage for the English ships intended to follow the Spaniards.

appeared to you that he followed the Spanish galleons, fighting with them six or seven hours, and overcame them before he landed or took the fort. He made Puntal no impediment to his design ; he would not lose his opportunity for fear of a fort, nor refer his enterprise to a sudden council, but first he determined and then acted what was resolved of before.

*Author.* I commanded that, upon sight of my billet, they should be ready to assault the fort of Puntal in the morning, and to pursue the ships. I advised with the most experienced captains and masters to conduct the ships to Port Royal, which was difficult, for want of water ; and at three of the clock in the morning I arose, and received the communion aboard the Anne Royal. After which I commanded the master to carry up the ship to Puntal ; but he excused it, for want of water.

*Answer.* Here is still direction, writing, and communion, when there should be fighting. And, because he speaks of the communion, it is not improper to set down what Queen Elizabeth said upon a journey with the like success in 1590. Sir John Hawkyns, being sent General of a fleet to sea, spent seven months without taking one Spanish ship. At his return he writ a long apology to the Queen ; and for his conclusion, told her, that ' Paul planteth, Apollos watereth, and God giveth the increase.' ' God's death,' said the Queen, upon reading his letter, ' this fool went out a soldier and is come home a divine.'

But now in answer to the excuse, in not carrying up the ship for want of water. It served not my Lord of Essex for a reason in his voyage in 1596 ; for he found water, though his master and others made the like allegation. He

would not trust mariners in that case, but appointed a sufficient captain at the helm, and the captain of his ship to con from aloft, as he saw other ships go afore him, having his lead on both sides continually heaving. But, had the General been experienced, he might have answered the excuse of want of water as Sir Walter Raleigh was answered in the same place, and upon the same occasion. Sir Walter Raleigh being ordered over-night to lead the van, and Sir Francis Vere to second him, Sir Walter came to an anchor at such a distance from the galleons that he could not reach them with his ordnance. He returned aboard my Lord of Essex, excusing it for want of water; a gentleman well known to the world standing by, said, 'It was strange that the Spaniards, who drew much more water, and had no more advantage of the tide than he, could pass where his ships could not follow.' I protest Sir Walter was much abashed at this speech and thereupon went aboard his ship, causing his master to weigh again and go higher, where he performed the part of a noble and valiant gentleman. This answer from the General had stopped the mouths of the masters' exceptions. And they would have found this channel as deep for their ships as the Spaniards did, going up before them, and the same channel my Lord of Essex did when he was there. I will leave taking Puntal by the land forces, with which he fills two or three leaves, directing and ordering things, my intention being only to prosecute the enterprises by sea.

*Author.* The 24th I went by six o'clock in the morning to my Lord of Denbigh, and spake thus to him: 'You are no old seaman, and therefore I would desire you make all the haste and



get all the seamen together to council ; and I desire you to think upon the best way how to burn and destroy the enemy's ships.' He went upon it without delay, which he did very earnestly and punctually.

*Answer.* Though the General wanted experience himself, yet he made choice of an excellent commander, you see, who performed it carefully and punctually. But what did he perform ? For, hitherto nor after, nothing was performed, and yet there was commendations of a Lord for his punctual performance. If this Lord was lorded for his service past it is more than I know or have ever heard. If for service to come it is yet to do, for anything he did punctually against Puntal or the ships in Cadiz.\* If any men deserve honour for this voyage it is those that dissuaded it at that time of the year ; for indeed they had saved a great deal of dishonour this kingdom now undergoes. They had enriched this kingdom with much money, thus unadvisedly spent ; they had preserved many a brave man's life, that might have lived to have done their country service. And lastly, the Spaniards had not been heartened and emboldened as now they are. But for all the General, council, and directions, or the careful and punctual carriage of the other Lord, the ships escaped without firing or sinking. The General's design, in landing his men, it seems, was not to take Cadiz, as he confessed in the 16th leaf ; for the King, before he went, was acquainted that it was extraordinarily fortified and so he found when he came to view it.

I hold up my hands and eyes to heaven when

\* William Fielding was created Baron and Viscount Fielding in 1620 for services to the State ; he had married Buckingham's sister. He was made Earl of Denbigh in 1622.

I consider the poor design and weak carriage of this last voyage to Cadiz. For now it appears it was intended for San Lucar, though the impossibility of it, by his own confession, was known before their going from home. Missing it, by their landing they intended the attempt of Cadiz although he likewise confeseth the extraordinary strength of it, and yet, notwithstanding, to enterprize them both, which was little better than madness. They could not allege any design upon ships because it was impossible to have intelligence of them before their going out of England. Then what man, be he never so wise, can excuse this design, or the absurd carriage of it, seeing it is now divulged in print to the eye of the world. Most men, I confess, had an ill opinion of the voyage before their going, a worse after their return, but worst of all upon publishing the pamphlet. For it has stopped the mouths of all those that could force arguments to excuse it: some out of charity and good nature forbore to think the worse of it; some out of judgement did no more condemn it than an action that failed by fortune in the execution; some that would seem wiser than others, said, there was a greater mystery in it than the ordinary people conceived; some said, they had intelligence with Cadiz, or other places of importance, but took no success. But this book has put them somewhat to muse, for they find the project was as ridiculous as the execution of it. I do verily believe it was writ in cunning to discover the absurd design to excuse somewhat the General's evil carriage. I do the rather believe it because the aspersion which is cast upon him by his rude multitude of soldiers is that he took not the town of Cadiz, they not knowing then the impossibility

of it. But now they are informed of the truth he may hope it will be a means to stop their scandalous mouths against him and cast it upon the plotter and projector.

*Author.* The 25th there was a motion to march four or five miles to recover some boats, to serve instead of their long boats they had lost at sea. And so they marched forward and back again, brought away their boats, spoiled the fishermen's nets, masts, and other provisions they there found.

*Answer.* Here was marching forward and backward, which we may properly call a set dance. These boats, I confess, saved your honour ; for something you did upon them, though you did nothing upon the ships. And for your attempt upon the fishermen's nets, you made the enemy have a feeling of it, they being tied to observe fasting days of fish, which now they must want.

*Author.* The 26th the colonels met at Puntal : and here it was resolved that nothing could be done upon the ships because of the wind and tide, and for that the Spaniards had sunk themselves,\* and the channel was so narrow, which was the reason my Lord of Essex in his journey, 1596, could send no ships to do the enemy harm.

*Answer.* I confess, that if my Lord of Essex had followed your example, to be talking three or four days of what he performed almost in as many hours, he had done the enemy no more harm than you. But what he did, and by the good advice he did it, I have shewed before. And if you call it no harm to the enemy to have the best ships Spain ever enjoyed burnt and taken, to the number of fifty odd sail, with a mass of

\* The Spaniards sank a vessel in the fairway leading up to Puerto Real where the fleet had taken refuge. See map, i. 386.



wealth in them, and this to be done in despite of your fort, which takes up three leaves of paper in your book of difficulties, I say, if this be no harm, and your taking of fishermen's boats and nets be a spoil and harm, I confess yours was the honourable action, and that of my Lord of Essex of small consequence in respect of yours.

*Author.* The council of war did consider that going to the bridge of Suazo was no great design, but to meet with the enemy and spoil the country. And that when my Lord of Essex took Cadiz, Sir Conyers Clifford was taxed by Sir Francis Vere for mistaking his directions, which were to go no farther than within shot of the town, where he might be seconded and relieved. But Clifford went to the bridge, so in regard there was no such necessity he returned back again.

*Answer.* Here was a strange consultation, a strange consideration, and as strange a council of war, to conclude the taking of the bridge to be nothing more than to meet the enemy and spoil the country. I must tell you that in that journey of my Lord of Essex, which you say did the Spaniards no harm, there was a consultation, and a resolution before their landing, to possess the bridge as the chiefest and materialest service to be executed. Wherefore, at my Lord's landing, he divided his army; three regiments he sent to the bridge, the rest he led himself to the town. Both these directions had good success; the bridge was possessed, and the town surprised; and yourself abused by him that told you Sir Conyers Clifford had no order to go to the bridge, or that Sir Francis Vere was angry with him for so doing.

I confess it was not Sir Francis Vere alone, but my Lord of Essex, and all in general, were angry

for quitting the bridge, as they had reason, for the main business of the service depended on it. But it seems they wanted reason in comparison of you and your council of war ; for by that bridge all succours was to pass from the main land to the relief of Cadiz ; by that bridge we were to attempt other parts of the country, as we intended ; by that bridge the galleys were to pass and escape us, which otherwise they could not have done : and if this be no great design let you and your council consider it. But that you may the better understand it I will lay before you a comparison that may be made to concur with it. Suppose an enemy should land in Surrey, with a design to take Wimbledon, and that there were a bridge to pass the Thames at the barony of Putney. Do not you think that a council of war would advise to take that bridge, as a means to hinder the succours that might be sent from Middlesex, or the counties thereunto adjacent, to the aid of Wimbledon ? If they would not advise this they were a council of war fit for you, and not for my Lord of Essex.

*Author.* And I have been so long in the wars, (leaf 19.) that I dare undertake they who think Cadiz was to be taken cannot tell how to come at it without cannon, if there were none but women in it.

*Answer.* When you speak truth I will concur with you, for if your carriage in the journey had been in nothing more worthy of blame than in not attempting Cadiz you had not been disparaged by it. But, indeed, your want of experience in sea-affairs, your often councils, which lost time and opportunity, your multitude of directions to no purpose, and the carelessness of your captains to disobey your command, was your

blemish and blame. But, more especially, your want of expert men to advise what had been practised in fleets, for every man that can manage a small bark is not capable to direct a fleet. Especially if you had made choice of one that had been in the journey of Cadiz of 1596 it had been a great help to you. Moreover you should have required, and no question but that they are still extant, all the counsels and determinations held in that journey. You should not have relied upon sailors put into the habits of gentlemen, and made knights before they knew what belonged to gentility, nor were ever expert but in poor petty barks. This was the bane of you and your reputation.

*Author.* The one and twentieth I embarked again, thinking to have landed at Port St. Mary if the wind should not serve the fleet to go out of the bay of Cadiz. But as ill luck would have it the wind came good even as we were in council, and if we had not taken that wind in the instant perhaps we had not come out in a long time.

*Answer.* That which was good for your coming out, had not been ill for your landing at Port St. Mary, though I confess it had been a rash attempt, as I said before.

*Author.* Monday, the last, the wind came westerly and we could not come out of the bay.

*Answer.* And yet you said before the contrary. No wind, no counsel, no directions, would answer your expectation after your loss through your delays, negligence, and carelessness of the opportunity upon the ships.

*Author.* The third day, by general consent, we were to stay, and expect the fleet from the



Indies, till the 20th of November. But it pleased God such sickness came that we had not men enough to handle our sails.

*Answer.* First, I must tell you it was strange to hear of a fleet from the Indies at that time of the year. Therefore I believe it not. Perhaps they might be some few ships of ginger from San Domingo ; but let them be one or the other they might be partakers with you in your disasters and foul weather, but if you had met them I fear they had not been so ill appointed, in respect of you, but that they might as well have taken you as you them. But suppose you had taken them or some part of them ? How would you have brought them to England for want of mariners, for, by your own confession you had not seafaring men sufficient to handle your sails, which I do verily believe. When you departed England you were far undermanned with sailors, which made your miseries so much the greater as you found afterwards. And this proved you had no design upon the Indies fleet, or any other action at sea, by your carrying soldiers to pester your ships, for take it for a maxim that no journey by sea and land together can ever succeed well.\*

*Author.* The sixth day (and 24th leaf), we took a man of war of Algiers who had taken two prizes ; one of them John Isack, a Scotchman, that dwelt at Dover, laden with wood and iron from Biscay for San Lucar, by the King of Spain's subjects ; which shews the

\* The Flota arrived at Cadiz two days after Wimbledon left it. Observe Monson's opinion of ' conjunct ' expeditions, but it is in contradiction, direct and tacit, to his statements elsewhere. This passage does not occur in the Churchill edition.

great want that King has of timber and ships to carry it.

*Answer.* This was as wise an observation as if a Dunkirker had taken a Frenchman freighted with coals by an Englishman from Newcastle to London, and should say, the King has great want of coals and shipping to carry them. I must tell you that as Newcastle sends coals to London, so doth Biscay send wood and iron to San Lucar as the chief commodity of that country. And by the freighting strangers' ships it shews the employment for their own is better and greater upon other voyages to the Indies, Guinea, and Brazil.

*Author.* On the tenth Sir Michael Geere, who had been five days wilfully wanting, came again to the fleet. His master told him of it, and he beat him with a cudgel but his master had bore better command than ever he had. And in the 25th leaf he says he sent aboard the Dreadnought for ten tuns of beer that was put into her for the use of the Anne Royal, but the company mutinied and would not deliver it. Neither would the captain nor master acknowledge who were the mutineers.

*Answer.* Would ever General set down the contempt and abuses, and not shew the punishment he inflicted upon them? It is no marvel you were no better obeyed in weightier things that could digest these petty disgraces. Surely Geere might have come home a knight, though the strangest that ever was made, but he should not have come home a captain, nor made capable ever to bear office if I had been in your case. Honour was wont to be conferred on men of desert for services done by them before they received it; but this knight and others were made

knights so unworthily that it bred not only an admiration \* but a contempt to that order.

As backward as you were in the affairs of Cadiz, you were as much too forward and liberal in giving and taking honour. To delay it before your going had been to some purpose, for a noble mind would not have received it till the world had taken notice he had deserved it. As there was great difference in the carriage of things betwixt the Queen's time and these, so there was in the bestowing of honour. For though my Lord Admiral was the son of a Baron, and the grandson of a Duke, though he had the office of Lord High Admiral of England, and many other dignities and preferments, though he had gained so great a victory in 1588 by repulsing an enemy that might have endangered the kingdom, though he spoiled, beat, sunk ships, and destroyed cities of the enemies in their own countries, yet had he obtained and performed all these exploits before he could be admitted to the degree of an Earl.

*Author.* In the 27th leaf.—The defects of the ships were such that he called a council for going into the islands of Bayona. And here he sets down the losing of company, breaking masts, splitting sails, and shifting of winds, and particularly because that wind that would carry them for England would not serve to come out from the island of Bayona.

*Answer.* Herein you shew yourself no mariner, for know that Cape Finisterre bears from thence north-west, and by north 13 leagues and Cape Finisterre and the Lizard in Cornwall N.N.E. 112 leagues so that you have not above four points

\* Wonder.



more for your advantage in coming from Cape Finisterre than from the islands of Bayona.\* I do this rather to shew your ignorance of the art of navigation than to approve your going to Bayona, for there was no reason in it. And after followeth losing company, breaking the main yard, foul and fair weather, with many other trivial observations. These things are so impertinent to a relation of a warlike action as a General was evil advised to set them down, unless he did it to cause mirth in the reader, and all these accidents happened but in 120 leagues sailing. Such observations are only proper to mariners, and that in long voyages or discoveries, not in a General to note or relate. He might as well set down that on such a day they seethed the kettle and the company dined at 11 of the clock, or that they hoisted or struck their sails as the master directed, or set the watch at eight of the clock at night.

*Author.* Now was I arrived at Kinsale in Ireland. On the nineteenth of January came in a Dutchman from Lisbon, who reported he saw letters from Cadiz that the Plate fleet came home within a few days after my coming away, and that a hundred caravels were sent to stop them, but none of them could meet the said fleet for they came upon the coast of Barbary. Insomuch,

\* Wimbledon meant that he could not weather Finisterre from the Bayona islands with a wind that would serve from Finisterre to the Lizard, and, with the ships of that date he was no doubt right. Reckoning three sea miles to the league the distance from Finisterre to the Lizard is about 150, and from Bayona to Finisterre 16 leagues. The exact value attributed by seamen to the league has always been very indefinite and it is quite likely that Monson used the Spanish variety. Cf. *ante*, i. p. 261; ii. p. 329; *post*, iv. p. 159.

that if any of the three accidents following had happened we had been masters of the Spanish fleet. The first was, if the council had consented with me to keep Puntal fourteen days. The second, if the wind had not changed as it did. The third, if the Plate fleet had but kept the same course they have for this forty years, for they had no manner of news of us. But man proposes, and God determineth. And moreover, the Dutchman said that on the last of July there were not four barrels of powder in Lisbon.

*Answer.* Could the Plate fleet arrive in Cadiz and not be vulgarly spoke of in Lisbon but by some few letters, the arrival of that fleet being of such consequence that, not only Lisbon, but all Spain would ring of it? And unless you had better assurance of their arrival than by this poor Dutchman, that was in your custody, prisoner, and would invent anything to please you, you were ill-advised to print it because every merchant upon the Exchange was able to contradict you. Wherefore you should have first considered, before you believed it, whether it was likely that a hundred caravels should be sent to meet the fleet,—a number of caravels never employed, nor to be found in all Spain. Could they be so improvident as to hazard so many vessels, the taking of one of which would discover the height\* the fleet came home in? Could the fleet be met and stopped at sea, that was both foul, weak, heavily laden, wanted victuals, and must be compelled out of necessity to seek a harbour?† Could a hundred caravels spread themselves at sea, and your fleet not see any part of them? Could the fleet come home in four days after your being at Cadiz, when,

\* The latitude.

† Cf. p. 167.

computing the time, you could not be above twenty leagues west from thence, and likely by some accident to hear of them? Or could the Spaniards be so mad, at that time of the year, to venture to keep the coast of Barbary, being subject to northerly winds, and to fall in upon Cadiz road, just at your quitting it, when you confess they knew not of your being there? To wise men these things seem improbable.\* And moreover, for the satisfaction of the reader, you should have set down your reasons, why you advised the keeping of Puntal fourteen days. All the reasons made in Spain would not give satisfaction to a reasonable man; for it is to be imagined, you must have one of these reasons in it, as namely, that you had correspondence with Cadiz for the surrendering it; or that you expected a revolt in the country; or that the Spaniards were resolved to quit Andalusia to you; or that you hoped for supplies in fourteen days; or that you knew of the Indies fleets repair thither in that time. One of these I conceive to be the end of your persuasions. Then, on the other side, I think with myself the mischief that might have ensued upon it in the space of those fourteen days. Your victuals would have been much wasted, for it seems then you began to want; your people being sick, as they were, it is probable they would rather grow worse than recover health. In that fourteen days the Spaniards would have had leisure to prepare fresh ships and men to encounter your feeble and weak army. Your supposed hundred caravels might have met in those fourteen days with that imagined Plate fleet, and have conducted them to Lisbon whilst you were propping up of

\* However, they happened.



Puntal for so doth the word signify.\* You had proof what the lingering of fourteen days might have brought you and the fleet unto by the misery you found in your return. It was no less ridiculous that you should believe the Dutchman's report, that at the last of July there should be but four barrels of powder in Lisbon. Whosoever knows Lisbon and the castle, knows the great quantity of powder there is still kept in it and would have commended the Dutchman's wit in galling you with these fopperies when he was a prisoner in your hands.

*Author.* I put to sea three times against the seamen's opinion. They desired to see the winds settled before we should set out, but I did not hearken to them.

*Answer.* It will appear by this rashness of yours how desperately the fleet was hazarded in your hands, and how wilfully and unadvisedly you determined. In the 16th leaf you confess your ignorance in sea affairs, and refer yourself to men of experience in an attempt of much less consequence than this, where it concerned the danger of men only, and were content in that case to be ruled. But in this, the safety of his Majesty's ships was to be adventured to no end but a desire you had to be at home. You put them to a rash hazard of your own, against the approbation of mariners, who only could judge what was convenient in such a case. I confess, nothing in your discourse doth make it appear to be writ by a soldier at land or sea but a plain and absurd style, and improper terms used of the sea and ships, and the often repetition of some words, which is not proper in oratory. From

\* *Puntal*, a prop, fulcrum, upright post.

soldiers, neither eloquent words nor forms is required. Their actions must give matter for scholars to amplify upon ; and though this may excuse the writing of the pamphlet, yet it can no more clear you of blame in your carriage of the action than the projector of it, who indeed deserves as much ill as can be imposed by a King on a subject. It is hard to judge which of you two deserves the most blame, the one in advising or the other in executing.

But if this journey had been undertaken by men of experience, understanding, and reason, it had more annoyed the State of Spain than any enterprise of ours heretofore,\* as it shall appear by what follows.

\* The Churchill text has ' either in the Queen's or King Charles's reign ' here. If this was in the MSS. used by that editor, the section must have been revised by Monson very late in life. The reader will observe on comparison of the Churchill text with that now printed numerous and important textual variations.

## How to have ruined Spain by the Fleet of 1625.

SPLEEN, passion, and envy to some they love not, and the want of knowledge in themselves, are the bane and destroyers of all warlike actions, either by sea or land, which could not be better verified than in this last unfortunate fleet to Cadiz I have spoken of. For I must say, that in many ages (or rather in no age) we shall have the like opportunity again to annoy the State of Spain, as was then offered us, if the enterprise had been as well projected and directed, as it was rashly begun and prosecuted, as may appear by what follows.

If our land forces had been discharged at the beginning of summer, when they were first raised, and the fleet employed upon a sea action that year, for that both of them together cannot succeed well I have formerly shewed. It was the time we knew that, at the latter part of the summer the Spanish Armada that had dispossessed the Hollanders of the town of Bahia, in Brazil, a little before, was to make its return to Spain. In which ships was conveyed all kinds of wealth to the value of a million pounds; and this happened when the Spaniards had no suspicion of us as enemies, there being no shew of hostility to give them warning or mistrust. If therefore we had employed our fleet then in readiness to the Terceira Islands, where we assuredly knew the Spaniards would touch in their return, as indeed they did,\*

\* Cf. *ante*, p. 133.



all scattered and ill provided, we had without all doubt or question intercepted them, and possessed so much wealth of theirs as would have maintained a royal war against them till his Majesty had been revenged of the affronts offered him, at his being in Spain, as he hath oftentimes declared. And, besides this, we had cut off the whole force of the King of Spain at sea, and disabled him from ever undertaking any action upon us with ships. He would have found his loss so great by the interception of his Armada, it being to the number of fifty or sixty of the best ships of his kingdom, that it could not have been reinforced in many years after.

## The Errors committed in the Journey to the Isle of Rhé.

IN my examination of the voyages in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, I make often reflection, without fear or flattery, upon the errors then committed, as well by us as by the Spaniards our enemies. Which kind of proceeding I follow in these two last expeditions, the one to Cadiz in 1625, which I have treated of, the other to St. Martin this present year 1627, which two did equal the best enterprises of the Queen's as well in number and goodness of ships as in proportion and quantity of men. Though I was no actor myself in the two last expeditions, there being no relation that can give a more true account of them than those published by the authority of State, I have, upon view of these pamphlets, collected such errors as the actions themselves have given just cause to except against. Let it not be imputed to me that I do it out of a carping or detracting humour, or a malignant disposition, or an evil or contesting nature, or out of a vain or fantastical curiosity, or pride, or arrogance, to make small errors seem greater than they are. I have no other end than what I have often expressed, *viz.* by discovering the faults and oversights past, to make them serve as a warning for time to come. I would not be so bold and presumptuous as to examine the grounds of this last design upon the island of St. Martin, or the carriage of it upon their arriving

and landing. For I never doubted but that a matter of such great consequence as the breach of peace between princes, and wherein his Majesty's honour was to be engaged, and the reputation of the chief commander considered, was not only discussed and argued by the grave and wise senators of the State, but advice taken of the most experienced captains both by land and sea this kingdom could afford. Which being so, the success must be referred to Him who is the giver of all victories, for I am like the Carthaginians, who did not esteem the less of the general that lost a battle, but of such as fought against reason.\* For success is the tutor of fools ; whereas conduct proceeds from judgement.

This expedition to the island of St. Martin was begun from Portsmouth on the 27th of June 1627, a place designed for the rendezvous. And to that end the ships of provisions that attended the resort of the army to Plymouth, were drawn from thence to Portsmouth, though with ill success. First, in respect one of those ships miscarried, and others were in danger to have done the like. Secondly, I must make the rendezvous at Portsmouth the ground of my argument to except against the carriage of the action, and the chief ground of the mischief that ensued. You must understand that Stokes Bay, where our ships rode, is forty leagues from Plymouth, by the way of St. Helen's Point, and the course of the Channel is east-north-east. Ushant, which is the headland of France, and by which you must pass either from Plymouth or Portsmouth, if you will sail to St. Martin, is twenty six leagues from Plymouth south-

\* Monson must mean the Romans. The Carthaginian custom was to crucify a general who lost a battle, whatever his excuse.



westerly, so that there was forty leagues run to fetch those ships which could have brought themselves. And a ship lost, which had not so happened but by their going to fetch them. When they put to sea they had the wind easterly which wind was good to carry them to Ushant, but from thence in their teeth to St. Matrin. Now should they have held a grave consultation, if they had done well, how to proceed afterwards, for there were three propositions to consider. The one, whether to keep the sea with that easterly wind, or no, which in little space would bring them to leeward of all. The second, whether to land in Conquet road, or some part of France. The third and last, was whether to return to Plymouth or Falmouth, there to attend a better opportunity of wind. If they kept the sea they did themselves injury for that wind would carry them to leeward ; if they sought to recover Brest, Conquet, or any other road in France, they did themselves more injury for then they would be discovered and might be prevented. But if, with that wind, they had stood over for Plymouth or Falmouth they had withstood the other two evils and might have attended for a northerly wind to carry them directly from Plymouth to St. Martin. But, to be short, unadvisedly they took the worst of the three, and kept the sea till they were to leeward of all French shores. In which space they had pursuit of certain Dunkirkers, whom indiscreetly they chased a whole day, when in two hours they might have discerned whether they could fetch them up, or no.

If they had anchored in France, or any part of that coast, notice would have been taken of it by the French, and it would have given a sudden alarm, and been a cause to arm all places

they might suspect we would attempt. If they had repaired to Plymouth or Falmouth it would have put a doubtfulness in the French whether our design had been against them, or no, and they would have made the less preparations to resist us. Spain would also have taken the alarm, being in as great a doubt and danger of us as France. But by drawing the ships from Plymouth to Portsmouth, Spain could not conceive that it was intended against them, and France was in as great assurance that it was designed upon them. Thus you see from Portsmouth they were to attend the uncertainty of two winds, and give warning to France to provide for themselves. Whereas from either of the two ports of Plymouth or Falmouth, one wind would have carried them directly to St. Martin, which might have been run in two or three days without fear of scattering, or other disaster. These inconveniences and hazards should not have been only foreseen, but prevented, if it had been referred to men of experience in sea causes, or else they were unworthy of their employment and the blame deserved to lie upon them rather than upon the General whose experience could not teach it to him. But, being as it is, I will make a repetition of the proceedings of the fleet from the time of their departure from Stokes Bay until their arrival at the island of St. Martin, by relation of the book lately printed. As I have said before, they departed the 27th June from St. Helens and the accidents that happened at sea were these. They chased certain vessels that they termed Dunkirkers, which sailed better than they, and so escaped; whether they were Dunkirkers, or no, I will not much insist upon. Afterwards a storm took them which parted the

fleet ; the Nonsuch and some other vessels received damage in that storm. The 10th July sixty of the ships arrived at the island of St. Martin ; the rest three days after. Now follows the mischief that ensued upon keeping the sea. They were subject to foul weather ; they were in danger to be put to leeward, as they were, especially by the chase of the Dunkirkers, and their men not being accustomed to the sea, and pestered in ships, were like to bring many inconveniences. The foul weather taking them parted them, which they found to be the reason of all the mischiefs that after ensued, and, lastly, their ships were hazarded and defects found in them by keeping the sea. No doubt the chase of the Dunkirkers brought them further to leeward than they could recover again in a good space and so lost them the opportunity of fetching either Plymouth or Falmouth, when, if men of experience had carried sway, they would have known in two hours the difference between the Dunkirkers' going and theirs.

The sixty ships first arriving put the French out of doubt but that was the place we intended, and gave them opportunity to do as much as the time would permit. And this was the true bane of the voyage, for it is well known if they had all come in one fleet together, as they might well have done, either from Plymouth or Falmouth, they had either suddenly surprised them, or possessed all the victuals in the island, which in that short time we gave them they carried into the fort, being before but ill provided either of victuals or any thing else.

Thus have I run over such errors as I have briefly collected out of the ill-carried action to



the island of St. Martin, wishing that it may prove a warning for succeeding enterprises that Generals may not only see, but foresee, that they may with judgement determine what they shall put in execution before they attempt it with force and courage. For great actions ought to be resolved on with leisure, and performed with speed. They should not say and stay, but say and do. They must consider that the first enterprise in war gets the best reputation, and that they put not themselves to Fortune, for nothing is so uncertain as the fortune of war. They may make account that a thing well begun is half ended.

As I have set down the Names of the Ships the Queen left at her Death in my First Book, now shall follow the Names of those that were built by King James and King Charles; and the present Rates for Seamen's Wages, according to the Ranks of Ships and Officers, increased Anno Dom. 1626.

### Ships built by King James.\*

Ships.	Year.	Tons.	Guns.	Men in Harbour.	Men at Sea.
Reformation . .	1619	752	42	9	250
Happy Entrance . .	1619	582	32	7	160
Victory . . .	1620	875	42	9	300
Garland . . .	1620	683	34	7	160
Swiftsure . . .	1621	887	42	9	250
Bonaventure . .	1621	675	34	7	160
St. George . . .	1622	895	42	9	250
St. Andrew . . .	1622	895	42	9	250
Mary Rose . . .	1623	394	26	6	120
Triumph . . .	1623	922	42	12	300

\* This list is only from 1619 and is here extended and corrected. The Happy Entrance and Reformation were intended by their names to commemorate Buckingham's accession to the post of Lord Admiral and the new and improved discipline he intended to introduce into the administration of the Navy.

## Ships built by King Charles.\*

Ships.	Year.	Tons.	Guns.	Men in Harbour.	Men at Sea.
Henrietta Pinnace .	1626	68	6	3	25
Maria Pinnace .	1626	68	6	3	25
Ten Whelps † .	1627	185	14	3	60 some 70
Charles . . .	1632	810	44	9	250
Henrietta Maria .	1632	793	42	9	250
James . . .	1633	875	48	9	260
Unicorn . . .	1633	823	46	9	250
Leopard . . .	1634	515	34	7	170
Swallow . . .	1634	478	34	6	150
Roebuck . . .	1636	90	10	3	30
Greyhound . .	1636	126	12	3	60
Nicodemus . .	1636	105	6	—	—
Expedition . .	1637	301	30	—	—
Providence . .	1637	304	24	—	—
Sovereign . .	1637	1500	100	—	815

\* This list corrected and enlarged is only of ships added down to 1637. In neither list are rebuilt vessels included, nor any of the prizes added to the Navy by Charles.

† The '10 Lion's Whelps' called the 1st, 2nd, and so on, Whelp were intended to deal with the Dunkirkers, Sallee pirates and other fastsailers. They were failures. Two were rather larger than the others.



The New Rates for Seamen's Wages, confirmed by the Commissioners of his Majesty's Navy, according to his Majesty's several Ranks of Ships and Degrees of Officers, Monthly, Anno Dom. 1626.\*

Ranks,	I		II		3		4		5		6	
Number of Men.	500	400	300	250	200	160	120	100	80	60	50	40
	<i>l. s. d.</i>		<i>l. s. d.</i>		<i>l. s. d.</i>		<i>l. s. d.</i>		<i>l. s. d.</i>		<i>l. s. d.</i>	
Capt. Ordinary .	14	00 00	11	04 00	09	06 08	7	00 00	06	12 00	04	13 04
Lieutenant . .	03	10 00	03	10 00	03	10 00	—	—	—	—	—	—
Master . . . .	04	13 09	04	10 00	03	15 00	03	07 06	03	00 00	02	06 08
Pilot . . . .	02	05 00	02	00 00	01	17 06	01	13 09	01	10 00	01	03 04
Master's Mates 3	02	05 00	2	02 00 00	01	17 06	01	13 09	1	01 10 00	01	03 04
Boatswain . .	02	05 00	02	00 00	01	13 04	01	10 00	01	6 08	01	03 04
Boatswain's Mate	01	06 03	2	01 05 00	01	00 08	01	00 08	2	01 00 08	01	00 08
Quarter Masters 4	01	10 00	4	01 05 00	4	01 05 00	4	01 05 00	2	01 05 00	2	01 00 00
Quarter Mas- ter's Mates }	4	01 05 00	4	01 00 08	2	01 00 08	2	01 00 08	2	01 00 08	2	00 17 06
Yeo- { Haly <sup>ds</sup> men { Sheet { Tacks { Jeers }	4	01 05 00	4	01 01 00	2	01 01 00	2	01 01 00	—	—	—	—

\* The new rates were proposed and agreed to at a meeting of the Privy Council held at Whitehall, 4th September 1626 :—

'This day the Lord Admiral presented to the Board a proposition and list *in hæc verba*—a proposition for the proportioning of his Majesty's gracious allowance to mariners and seamen employed in his Highness's service by increasing the medium from fourteen shillings to twenty shillings *per mensem*, wherein the number and quality of the officers are respectively considered according to the burden and countenance of the ships, viz. (here follows the above list).

'Which proposition and list their Lordships, having duly considered, do altogether approve both in the whole and every part thereof, and do likewise order that the same be accordingly observed, and to that purpose directions given by the Lord Admiral to all those whom it may concern.' (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I. xxxv. 19.*) Private owners were ordered not to raise wages.

There had been a temporary increase to fourteen shillings for the Cadiz expedition of 1625.

Ranks.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Corporal . . .	01 10 00	01 08 00	01 05 08	01 03 04	01 00 00	00 18 08
M <sup>r</sup> Carpenter . .	01 17 06	01 17 06	01 10 00	01 06 08	01 03 04	01 01 00
Carpenter's Mate	01 05 00	01 04 03	01 03 04	01 01 06	00 19 02	00 18 08
Other Car- penters and Caulkers	9 01 00 08	6 01 00 00	4 01 00 00	3 01 00 00	—	—
Purser . . .	02 00 00	01 16 08	01 10 00	01 03 08	01 03 04	01 03 04
Steward and Cook	01 05 00	01 05 00	01 05 00	01 03 04	01 03 04	01 03 04
Surgeon . . .	01 10 00	01 10 00	01 10 00	01 10 00	01 10 00	01 10 00
Surgeon's Mate .	01 00 00	01 00 00	01 00 00	—	—	—
M <sup>r</sup> Trumpeter . .	01 08 00	01 06 08	01 05 00	01 05 00	01 05 00	01 01 00
Other Trump <sup>rs</sup> 4	01 03 04	3 01 03 04	—	—	—	—
Drum and Fife .	01 00 00	01 00 00	01 00 00	01 00 00	—	—
Coxswain . . .	01 05 00	01 05 00	01 03 04	01 00 00	—	—
Coxswain's Mate	01 00 08	01 00 08	00 19 02	—	—	—
Skiffswain . .	01 00 00	—	—	—	—	—
Skiffswain's Mate	00 17 06	—	—	—	—	—
Two Swabbers .	01 00 08	1 01 00 00	00 18 06	00 17 08	00 17 06	—
Swabber's Mate	—	00 17 10	00 16 08	—	—	—
Armourer . . .	01 01 00	01 01 00	01 01 00	01 01 00	—	—
M <sup>r</sup> Gunner . . .	02 00 00	01 16 08	01 10 00	01 06 08	01 03 04	01 03 04
Gunner's Mates .	01 02 06	2 01 01 00	01 00 00	01 00 00	01 00 00	00 18 08
Quarter Gun- ners	4 01 00 00	4 00 18 08	00 18 08	00 18 08	00 17 06	00 17 06
Quarter Gun- ners' Mates	4 00 18 08	4 00 17 06	—	—	—	—
Yeomen of the Powder Room	01 00 00	00 18 08	00 18 08	00 18 08	—	—
M <sup>r</sup> Cooper . . .	00 16 08	00 16 08	00 16 08	00 16 08	—	—
Grummets . . .	6 00 11 03	5 00 11 03	4 00 11 03	3 00 11 03	2 00 11 03	00 11 03
Common Men 367. 4 out of each 100 are the Captain's Retinue	00 15 00	20 00 15 00	14 00 15 00	65 00 15 00	41 00 15 00	23 00 15 00
Boys . . . 5	00 07 06	4 00 07 06	3 00 07 06	3 00 07 06	2 00 07 06	00 07 06
Gunmaker . . .	01 01 00	01 01 00	—	—	—	—

If I were worthy to advise his Majesty he should follow the precedent of the Earl of Lincoln, late Lord High Admiral of England, who two years before he died, and in the year 1582, caused a general muster to be taken of all ships, their burthen and mariners, belonging to the ports of England, as here follows.\* And withal, I wish

\* There is no MS. authority for the statement that the Earl of Lincoln set a 'precedent'—if the word be applied

there were a computation made from the year 1582 till the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign in 1602, all which being compared with the increase of ships and mariners since that time, and their greatness in burthen, it will seem wonderful to all his Majesty's subjects, who shall understand it, that since the first year of King James's reign, till this, which is the 13th of King Charles, the navy of England is so much increased and augmented. And thereby they may conjecture what wealth hath been imported and transported since that time, to the infinite enriching of all people in general, which will make them repine the less at paying ship-money.\* They must truly confess how much the kingdom is, since the year 1582, strengthened and fortified by sea, and the commonwealth enriched by trade. For though the merchant, only, runs the hazard of ships and goods that go to sea, yet the whole kingdom receives benefit and profit by it, from the handicraftsman to the labourer.

in its modern meaning which seems to be the sense—therefore Monson must not be convicted of historical ignorance on the evidence of the text. As a matter of fact it had been customary, from at least as early as the reign of John, for the Crown to call for returns of the ships and men available for service in the maritime counties. Most of these returns have perished; a few imperfect papers remain for the reign of Henry VIII. and some more or less complete ones for that of Elizabeth. This return of 1582 (*State Papers Dom. Eliz.* clvi. 45 and *Cott. MSS.* Otho E. ix. f. 249) is one of the most perfect, and the Churchill text, full of clerical and other errors, is here corrected by comparison with the original.

\* There is no MS. reference to ship-money. The whole paragraph seems to have been recast later, by many years, than its first composition.



A Muster of Ships and Mariners throughout  
England, taken two Years before the  
Death of the Earl of Lincoln, Lord  
Admiral.

*Somersetshire.*

THIRTY seven ships, whereof ten above eighty  
tons.\*

Mariners, masters, and fishermen at home	462
Abroad . . . . .	40

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In all 502

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*Chester.*

Fourteen ships.

Mariners, masters, and seamen . . . . .	113
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*Lancashire.*

Fifty three ships, whereof ten above eighty  
tons.

Masters and mariners . . . . .	163
Fishermen . . . . .	36

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In all 199

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\* None, unless Bristol be included, in which case there were 11 of 80 tons and upwards; of vessels of from 20 to 80 tons there were 27, including 19 belonging to Bristol.

*Essex.*

Eleven ships above eighty tons.

Hoys, crayers, and other small vessels . . . \*143

Masters and seamen . . . 693

*Cornwall.*

Five ships above eighty tons.

Threescore and five other small ships.

Masters . . . 108

Mariners . . . 631

Other seamen . . . 1184

In all 1923

*Lincolnshire.*

One ship of eighty tons burden.†

Twenty small ships.

Masters . . . 20

Mariners . . . 195

Fishermen . . . 334

In all 549

*London.*

Sixty two ships above a hundred tons.

Twenty three ships of eighty tons and above.

Forty four small ships.

Masters . . . 143

Mariners . . . 991

Watermen, or ferrymen . . . 957

Fishermen . . . 995

In all 3086

\* Including part of London.

† Belonging to Grimsby.



*Hampshire.*

Eighty six ships and boats, whereof ten above eighty tons.

Masters	.	.	.	.	.	.	46
Mariners	.	.	.	.	.	.	244
Fishermen	.	.	.	.	.	.	180

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In all 470

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*Yorkshire.*

Fifty four ships, whereof eighteen above eighty tons.

Masters and sailors	.	.	.	.	.	373
Fishermen	.	.	.	.	.	507

---

In all 880

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*The Cinque Ports.*

Two hundred and twenty ships and boats, none above eighty tons.

Masters and sailors	.	.	.	.	.	804
Fishermen	.	.	.	.	.	148

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In all 952

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*Kent.\**

Ninety nine ships and boats, none above eighty tons.

Masters and sailors	.	.	.	.	.	243
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\* Exclusive of Cinque Ports.



*Sussex.*

Sixty five small ships under eighty tons.

Masters . . . . .	28
Sailors . . . . .	371
Fishermen . . . . .	122

In all 521

*Dorset.*

Ten ships above eighty tons.

Fifty one small ships.

Masters and mariners . . . . .	545
Fishermen . . . . .	100

In all 645

*Devonshire.*

Ten ships above eighty tons.

One hundred and nine small ships.

Masters, mariners, and fishermen . . . . .	2164
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*Norfolk.*

Twenty seven ships above eighty tons.

One hundred and forty five small ships.

Seamen of all sorts . . . . .	1670
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*Suffolk.*

Twenty six ships of one hundred tons and upwards.

Seventy four small ships.

Seamen of all sorts . . . . .	1282
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*Gloucestershire.*

Twenty nine ships under eighty tons.  
 Masters, seamen, and fishermen. . . . 219

*Cumberland.*

Twelve small ships under eighty tons.  
 Mariners and fishermen . . . . 195

The total of all vessels 1495

Above eighty tons 223

Mariners of all sorts \* 16306

\* Northumberland is omitted, but at Newcastle there were 17 vessels of from 100 to 220 tons, and eight of 80 to 100 tons.

The particular Number of Ships and Mariners in the Fleet of eleven hundred Sail, in the Days of King Edward III. ; with the Names of the Cinque Ports, viz. Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover, and Sandwich.\*

*The South Fleet.*

<i>The King's</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	25
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	419
<i>London</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	25
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	662
<i>Alford</i> ( <i>Aylesford</i> )	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	24
<i>Hoo</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	24

\* This Roll of Calais, which is said to have been a Wardrobe Account of the reign of Edward III., is persistently copied and used by historians as though it were an original paper. All the transcripts known to me (*Cott. MSS.* Titus F. iii. f. 262 ; *Harl. MSS.* 3968, f. 130 ; *ibid.* 246 ; *Stowe MSS.* 570, f. 230 ; *ibid.* 574, f. 28 ; *Rawlinson MSS.* (Bodleian) C. 846, f. 17) are of the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries and bear internal evidence that the original document was almost or quite illegible in places when it was copied. It may be added that in its present shape it does not conform to the usual type of Wardrobe Account. Moreover, no two of the transcripts themselves are in entire agreement. Thus, some of the identifications in this list are very doubtful.



<i>Maidstone</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	51
<i>Newhythe</i> *	Ships	.	.	.	.	5
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	19
<i>Margate</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	15
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	160
<i>Hope</i> †	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	40
<i>Morton</i> ‡ (? <i>Milton</i> )	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	23
<i>Feversham</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	23
<i>Sandwich</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	22
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	504
<i>Dover</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	16
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	336
<i>Wight</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	13
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	220
<i>Winchelsea</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	21
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	596
<i>Weymouth</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	20
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	264
<i>Lyme</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	4
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	62
<i>Seaton</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	25
<i>Sidboth</i> ( <i>Sidmouth</i> )	Ships	.	.	.	.	3
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	62
<i>Exmouth</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	10
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	193
<i>Tegmouth</i> ( <i>Teignmouth</i> )	Ships	.	.	.	.	7
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	120

\* Oy. on the Medway. There was another at Colchester.

† Oy. by Sandwich. There is also a Hope near Romney.

‡ This occurs also as Motme, Mœme, Morrie, Motene, Motne, Mone, and Montormont.

# THE CALAIS ROLL

195

<i>Dartmouth</i>	Ships . . . .	31
	Mariners . . . .	757
<i>Portsmouth</i>	Ships . . . .	5
	Mariners . . . .	96
<i>Plymouth</i>	Ships . . . .	26
	Mariners . . . .	603
<i>Looe</i>	Ships . . . .	20
	Mariners . . . .	325
<i>Yealme</i>	Ships . . . .	2
	Mariners . . . .	48
<i>Fowey</i>	Ships . . . .	47
	Mariners . . . .	* 770
<i>Bristol</i>	Ships . . . .	24
	Mariners . . . .	608
<i>Tinmouth</i> †	Ships . . . .	2
	Mariners . . . .	25
<i>Hastings</i>	Ships . . . .	5
	Mariners . . . .	96
<i>Romney</i>	Ships . . . .	4
	Mariners . . . .	75
<i>Rye</i>	Ships . . . .	9
	Mariners . . . .	156
<i>Hythe</i>	Ships . . . .	6
	Mariners . . . .	112
<i>Shoreham</i>	Ships . . . .	20
	Mariners . . . .	328
<i>Sofford</i>	Ships . . . .	5
(? <i>Seaford</i> )	Mariners . . . .	80
<i>Newmouth</i>	Ships . . . .	2
(? <i>Newhaven</i> )	Mariners . . . .	18
<i>Hamhook</i>	Ships . . . .	7
( <i>Hamble</i> )	Mariners . . . .	117

\* The number of men assigned to Fowey is quite incredible. See, for reasons, *Victoria County History of Cornwall*, i. p. 480.

† Tegmouth and Tinmouth perhaps represent East and West Teignmouth. But Tinmouth might be Tawmouth, by Barnstaple.

<i>Hoke</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	11
( <i>Hook</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	208
<i>Southampton</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	21
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	576
<i>Lymington</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	9
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	159
<i>Poole</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	4
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	94
<i>Wareham</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	3
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	59
<i>Swansey</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
( <i>Swanage</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	29
<i>Ilfordcombe</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	6
( <i>Ilfracombe</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	79
<i>Patrickstown</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
( <i>Padstow</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	27
<i>Polerwan</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
( <i>Polruan</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	60
<i>Wadworth</i> *	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	14
<i>Hendess</i> †	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
(? <i>Cardiff</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	51
<i>Bridgwater</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	14
<i>Carmarthen</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	16
<i>Carlchesworth</i> ‡	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	12
<i>Milbrook</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	12

\* I am unable to offer even a tentative identification of Wadworth. 'Worth' was a mediæval variant of the terminals 'mouth' and 'wick,' but that does not seem to help here. There is a Wadsworth in Yorkshire, on the river Calder.

† Or Hentles, Henllis, co. Monmouth, Wentloog Hundred (*Pat.* 23 Ed. III., Pt. 3, m. 25).

‡ Qy. Galliswick, Milford Haven.



*The North Fleet*

<i>Bamburgh</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	9
<i>Newcastle</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	17
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	414
<i>Walcrick</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
(? <i>Waldridge</i> )*	Mariners	.	.	.	.	12
<i>Hartlepool</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	5
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	145
<i>Hull</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	16
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	466
<i>York</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	9
<i>Ravenser</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	28
<i>Woodhouse</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	12
<i>Strockeeth</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
(? <i>Stockwith</i> )†	Mariners	.	.	.	.	10
<i>Burton</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	3
(? <i>on Trent</i> )	Mariners	.	.	.	.	30
<i>Swinfleet</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	11
<i>Saltfleet</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	49
<i>Grimsby</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	11
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	171
<i>Wainfleet</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	2
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	44
<i>Wrangle</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	8
<i>Swinhumber</i>	Ships	.	.	.	.	1
	Mariners	.	.	.	.	32

\* Co. Durham, near the R. Wear.

† Co. Lincolnshire. A ship of 160 tons was built at Stockwith-on-Trent in 1568 (*Exch. War. for Issues*, Bdle. 107).

<i>Boston</i>	Ships . . . .	17
	Mariners . . . .	361
<i>Lynn</i>	Ships . . . .	19
	Mariners . . . .	482
<i>Blackney</i>	Ships . . . .	2
<i>(Blakeney)</i>	Mariners . . . .	38
<i>Scarborough</i>	Ships . . . .	1
	Mariners . . . .	19
<i>Yarmouth</i>	Ships . . . .	43
	Mariners . . . .	1905
<i>Dunwich</i>	Ships . . . .	6
	Mariners . . . .	102
<i>Orford</i>	Ships . . . .	3
	Mariners . . . .	62
<i>Gosford *</i>	Ships . . . .	13
	Mariners . . . .	404
<i>Harwich</i>	Ships . . . .	14
	Mariners . . . .	283
<i>Ipswich</i>	Ships . . . .	12
	Mariners . . . .	239
<i>Merten</i>	Ships . . . .	1
<i>(? Mersea)</i>	Mariners . . . .	6
<i>Brightlingsea</i>	Ships . . . .	5
	Mariners . . . .	61
<i>Colchester</i>	Ships . . . .	5
	Mariners . . . .	170
<i>Whitbanes†</i>	Ships . . . .	1
	Mariners . . . .	17

\* Qy. Gosford Hundred, co. Suffolk, in which is Hadleigh. But Mr. R. G. Marsden has favoured me with the following note: 'Ships of Gosford, Goseford, are often mentioned down to the sixteenth century or thereabouts. I have no doubt that the Suffolk river now called Deben was the haven "Gosford haven *aliter* Bawdsey haven" (*Exch. K.R.* 333, rot. 7, Easter). The river is called Bawdsey haven by local seamen to-day.'

† Qy. Whitburn, co. Durham.

<i>Maldon</i>	Ships . . . . .	2
	Mariners . . . . .	32
<i>Derwin</i> *	Ships . . . . .	1
	Mariners . . . . .	15
<i>Barton</i>	Ships . . . . .	5
(? on <i>Humber</i> )	Mariners . . . . .	61

*Cinque Ports.*

<i>Hastings</i>	Twenty one ships with twenty one men each, and a grummet.
<i>Romney</i>	Twenty one ships, each twenty one men, and a grummet.
<i>Hythe</i>	Five ships.
<i>Dover</i>	Twenty one ships.
<i>Sandwich</i>	Five ships, to be raised out of goods, and not of land.†

They were, upon forty days warning, to furnish these ships for fifteen days, upon their own charge after setting sail, and to do it every year if they were demanded ; the rest of the time the King to pay them. The privilege of the Cinque Ports was first granted by St. Edward the Confessor, and William the Conqueror, and continued by the succeeding Kings.

\* No identification at present.

† The individual 'service' from each of the Cinque Ports varied at times ; by 1229 it was settled at twenty one ships from Dover, five each from Romney, Hythe, and Sandwich, and twenty one from Hastings, Rye, and Winchelsea. The burgesses of the Ports were freed from rates and levies for military service, which is probably what is meant by the obscure last sentence.



Of the Supremacy of the Sea of England, and  
of the Right belonging to the Office of  
Admiralty in the same.

As I have proved the antiquity of England's strength by sea, and the number of ships thereunto belonging of old, and comparing them with these modern times in which we live, it will appear there was good cause for all Europe to acknowledge a sovereignty to our Kings upon the seas, as then they did and yet ought to do. For the satisfaction of any man that shall doubt it I have inserted, word for word, a registered record which still is to be seen in the Tower of London for an authentic testimony thereof. It is as followeth : \*—

To you our lords auditors,† deputed by the Kings of England and of France, to redress the wrongs done to the people of their kingdoms, and of other territories subject to their dominion by sea and by land, in the time of peace and truce; the procurators of the prelates, nobles, and of the admiral of the sea of England, and of the commonalties of cities and towns, and of merchants, mariners, messengers, inhabitant strangers, and of all others of the said kingdom of England, and the territories subject to the dominion of the said King of England, and of others under the jurisdiction of the same, as also divers other nations, inhabitants

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\* This record (*De Superioritate Maris Angliæ*) is of some time between 1303 and 1307. Nicolas thought that it was not the original but a contemporary copy, and only a draft of proceedings before the commissioners which may or may not have taken effect (*Hist. of the Royal Navy*, i. 315).

† Or commissioners.

of the sea coasts of Genoa, Catalonia, Spain, Almaine, Zealand, Holland, Friesland, Denmark, and Norway, and of divers other places of the empire, do declare :—

That whereas the Kings of England, by right of the said kingdom, from times whereof there is no memory to the contrary, have been in peaceable possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of England, and of the isles within the same, with power of making and establishing laws, statutes, and prohibitions of arms, and of ships otherwise furnished than merchantmen use to be, and of taking surety, and affording safeguard in all cases, where need shall be, and of ordering all other things necessary for maintaining of peace, right, and equity, between all manner of people, as well of other dominions as of their own, passing through the said seas, and the sovereign guard thereof; and also of taking all manner of cognizance in causes and of doing right and justice to high and low, according to the said laws, statutes, ordinances, and prohibitions, and all other things which may appertain to the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction, in the places aforesaid. And whereas A. de B. deputed admiral of the said sea, by the King of England, and all other admirals appointed by the said King of England and his ancestors heretofore Kings of England, have been in peaceable possession of the said sovereign guard, with power of jurisdiction, and other the aforesaid appurtenances, (except in case of appeal, and of complaint made of them to their sovereigns the Kings of England, in default of justice, or for evil judgment); and especially for making prohibitions, doing of justice, and taking surety of the peace of all manner of people using arms in the said sea, or carrying ships otherwise furnished and set forth than merchantmen are wont to be; and in all other points where a man may have reasonable cause to suspect them of robbery, or any other misdemeanour. And whereas the masters of the ships of the said kingdom of England, in the absence of the said admiral, have been in peaceable possession of taking cognizance, and judging of all actions done in the said sea, between all manner of people, according to the laws, statutes, prohibitions and customs. And whereas in the first article of the league lately made between the said Kings, in the treaty upon the last peace at Paris,\* are comprised the words following in a schedule annexed to these presents :—

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\* Treaty of 20th May, 1303 (*Dumont, Corp. Univ. Diplom.* Amsterdam, 1726).

'First, It is concluded and accorded, betwixt us and the agents and procurators aforesaid, in the names of the said Kings, That the said Kings shall from this time forward become to each other good, true and faithful friends, and be aiding to one another against all men, save the church of Rome, in such manner that if any one or more, whosoever they be, shall intend to disturb, hinder, or molest the said Kings, in the franchises, liberties, privileges, rights, and customs of them and of their kingdoms, they shall be good and faithful friends in aiding against all men living; and ready to die, to defend, keep, and maintain the franchises, liberties, privileges, rights, and customs aforesaid, (except on behalf of the said King of England, John Duke of Brabant, in Brabant, and his heirs descending of him, and of the daughter of the King of England; and except on behalf of our lord the King of France, the excellent prince Monsieur Albert, King of Almaine, and Monsieur John, Earl of Hainault, in Hainault) and that the one shall not be of council, nor aiding, where the other may lose life, member, estate, or honour.'

Monsieur Reyner Grimbald,\* master of the navy of the said King of France, who calls himself admiral of the said sea, being deputed by his aforesaid Lord in his war against the Flemings, did, after the said league made and confirmed, against the tenour and obligations of the said league, and the intent of them that made it, wrongfully assume and exercise the office of admiralty in the said sea of England, above the space of a year, by the commission of the said King of France, and used the same one year and more, taking the people and the merchants of the kingdom of England, and of other places, passing through the said sea with their goods; and committed them so taken to the prisons of his said Lord the King of France, and delivered their goods and merchandize to the receivers of the said King of France by him deputed in the ports of his said kingdom, as to him forfeited and due, to remain at his judgement and award. And the taking and detaining of the said people with their said goods and merchandize, as also his said judgement and award for the forfeiture and acquet of them, he hath justified before you lords auditors in writing, by virtue of the authority of his said commission of the admiralty aforesaid, by him usurped

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\* Or Grimaldi.



after this manner and during a prohibition or restraint generally made and proclaimed by the King of England, in right of his dominion according to the tenour of the third article of the league aforesaid, which contains the words above written, requiring that he may thereupon be acquitted and discharged of the same, to the great damage and prejudice of the said King of England, and of the prelates, nobles, and others above named.

Wherefore the said procurators, in the names of their said Lords, do pray you lords auditors aforesaid, that you cause due and speedy deliverance of the said people, of their goods and merchandize so taken and detained, to be made to the admiral of the said King of England, to whom the cognizance of the same of right appertains, as is before expressed, so that without disturbance from you, or any other, he may take cognizance thereof and do that which belongs to his office aforesaid. And that the said Monsieur Reyner Grimbald be condemned, and constrained to make satisfaction for all the said damages, so far forth as he shall be able. And in his default, his said Lord the King of France, by whom he was deputed to the said office. And that after satisfaction given for the said damages, the said Monsieur Grimbald be so duly punished, for the violation of the said league, that his punishment may be an example to others in time to come.

Thus much for England's authentic proofs of her sovereignty on the seas in these latter times.



## A more ancient Proof of the Sovereignty of the Seas.

BUT England may plead a more ancient sovereignty over the seas. And not only the Narrow Seas that divide France and her, but also all other seas that encompass her, as well east and west, as north and south.

Julius Agricola was the first that sailed about England and Scotland, and subdued the Islands of Orkney, when England was called Britain. King Eadgar made his summer's progress, as appears upon record, by sailing about the whole island of Albion, and was guarded with a navy of four thousand sail, which he divided into four squadrons, and appointed one thousand ships to every squadron.\* King Arthur subdued Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Gothland, and many other kingdoms, which he could not have done if he had not been master of all the then known world by sea, and in shipping.†

\* Allowing 40 men to a ship, Eadgar's navy, which the chroniclers number at from 3600 to 4800 sail, would have involved the employment of from 144,000 to 192,000 men, figures which at once show the absurdity of the statement. Their description, also, of Eadgar's customary cruise round Britain with the western and northern divisions of his fleet is evidently derived from the system developed at latest by the thirteenth century to which they were accustomed, and therefore easily antedated by them in the absence of the historical instinct.

† Monson seems to have taken for granted the accuracy of the mediæval legends which agglutinated round the memory of Arthur.

And if we speak of our English conquests since William of Normandy, we shall find that Richard I. in his expedition to Jerusalem, in 1090, had with him two hundred and fifty four tall ships and sixty galleys.\* Prince Edward, son to Henry III., in his voyage to Asia in 1270 had a gallant navy of ships, which God blessed above other princes that joined with him in that expedition, for he lost never a ship by tempest when the others had one hundred and twenty sail cast away.† Edward III. had a fleet at one time of one thousand one hundred vessels; and because it shall the better appear, I have set down the particular numbers of them and their men, with the names of their ports from whence they were furnished, immediately before these two discourses of the sovereignty of the Narrow Seas.‡ And as for the time of Queen Elizabeth, I have set down her offensive and defensive fleets in the said First Book. Comparing the strength at sea in the days of King James and King Charles, we may very well say and conclude that they are treble to those in the Queen's time, both for the number, greatness, and goodness of ships.§

\* I do not know Monson's authority for the number, but in any case Richard's fleet was not English only but was collected as well from the continental possessions of the Crown.

† According to Walter of Hemingford Edward's squadron consisted of only thirteen vessels. The gale happened at Trapani.

‡ This refers to the Calais Roll, *ante*, p. 193. Collected for the blockade of Calais and transport across the Channel of troops and stores many of the ships were little more than fishing boats, and were almost certainly not employed simultaneously but at various times.

§ If this is a comparison of the military navies only it is an absolute exaggeration as to number and quality. The seamanship and leadership were of course both very much worse than in the days of Elizabeth.

The rustical people that go about to impugn the prerogative due to England by sea are the Hollanders, not only by calumniations and malicious practices, but by scandalous pamphlets, which they divulge to prove the liberty of the sea. But the nature of those base people ought to be considered who turn all things topsy-turvy, and make it their business to alter and change the course of the world and the laws anciently settled in it. They withstand the rightful power of Kings, established by God himself, and cast it upon beer-brewers and basket-makers, whom they obey as Kings. They make the chiefest offenders judges, and the justest judges delinquents, and therefore it is no marvel if they use his Majesty malapertly at sea, that treat their natural prince rebelliously on land. But mark the end of such injuries, wherein they offend God more than man, and commonly such irreligious acts never escape without cruel revenge in the end.

Precedents, known to the Author, of Princes,  
as well Turks as Christians, standing up  
for Prerogatives in their Seas and Ports.

THE prerogative of princes, within their own dominions, is without limit, and ever received and practised by consent of all Kings and monarchs, for which reason princes are bound to maintain one another's rights in that point. And to put the case in the accident lately happened in the Downs, through the insolence of the Hollanders surprising certain ships of Dunkirk, I confess, though the injury and loss be great to the King of Spain's subjects, to have their ships taken by violence from under the safety of the King of Great Britain's fortresses, yet the indignity is much more to his Majesty than the offence to the others, because they were forced away from under his protection and safeguard. All ports and harbours of princes are called their chambers, and as dutifully to be observed and revered by strangers resorting to them as the others are; and therefore the Hollanders might as contumeliously have seized on the person of a Dunkirker within his Majesty's chamber of presence as have offered this inexcusable contempt within any of his Majesty's ports.

And because examples and precedents are the rules, in such cases, to make good princes' rights, and uphold their honours, I will collect some accidents that happened in like case, as well in the reign of King James of famous memory,



as before that under Henri III., King of France, and will moreover insert the example of barbarous princes that hold and observe this prerogative most religiously within their ports, though they have not strength to maintain their right by sea. In the year 1588, when the Spanish fleet was put from its anchors by our fireships in the road of Calais, the Admiral of the four galleasses,\* Don Hugo de Moncada was forced ashore and could not get off again. Whereupon my Lord Admiral commanded her to be attempted with some ship-boats manned out of his fleet; and making an attempt upon her, the governor of Calais, Monsieur Gourdan, thought it such an indignity to his master that he defended her with shot from the town, to the death of some of the English, saying that she being on shore was under the protection of his master, and prohibited any further attempt upon her, which the English obeyed although it was in their power to have burnt her. That same year, and in the same action of 1588, one of the galleons of Spain put into Newhaven in Normandy.† Queen Elizabeth understanding this, sent some of her ships to surprise her in the harbour, and, as her ships were bearing into the said port, they were forbidden to meddle with her, with shot from the castle; which we obeyed, though it is well known that in those days the French King did much more favour the Queen and her proceedings than the King of Spain. But it is true, that princes are always more jealous of their honours than private persons, which the English considered and desisted from her. To this I was an eyewitness.

\* The flag-ship of the galleass squadron, the San Lorenzo.

† *I.e.* at Havre; the Santa Ana, Recalde's flagship.

King James, after his entrance to the Crown, finding that many occasions of controversy were like to arise betwixt the Dunkirkers and Hollanders, who were then at war, and the King a friend to both, he directed by his proclamation how far he would protect either of them that should first arrive under his protection, commanding that such one of them as should arrive first in any of his ports, being pursued one by the other, that they should have liberty of two tides to depart before they should be pursued by the enemy. And because he would have all the extents of his chambers declared, for all nations to take notice of its limits expressed therein, he caused it to be drawn by a line from headland to headland, by the advice of the Trinity House, who could best determine it, and as it is yet to be seen.\* This act of his was duly obeyed by the Spaniards and Hollanders in all his reign, although at the beginning thereof the Hollanders found themselves much aggrieved when they could not have their wills on several Dunkirk ships that arrived in the Downs. Yet such was his Majesty's respect to his honour and justice that he caused his royal proclamation to be duly observed and obeyed without respect to either, which Sir William Monson saw obeyed. And whereas a ship of Dunkirk arriving at Portsmouth, through some defect the captain sold her, reserving her tackling, ordnance, and other habiliments, which he shipped in an English bark for Dunkirk, but by contrary winds the bark put into the Downs, where his Majesty at that time had never a ship abiding, and a Holland man-of-war thither resorting, and understanding the bark

\* Declaration of 4 March 1604-5 (*S. P. Dom. Jas. I.*, xiii. 11).

was laden with provisions aforesaid for Dunkirk, not respecting his Majesty's honour he seized on the said bark and carried her for Holland. But this affront being made known to his Majesty by Monsieur Hoboken, then ambassador for the Archduke, his Majesty caused restitution of ship and goods to be made; and the States seemed offended with the captain that did it. If a commission might be granted forth to examine things of this nature many others would appear wherein his Majesty did graciously defend the tenour of his proclamation. All such Englishmen as trade into Barbary can testify that if any ship, abiding in those ports, be assailed by any strange nation, (I will make comparison betwixt an Englishman and a Spaniard) if an Englishman shall offer to surprise a Spaniard in time of war the King of Morocco will instantly seize upon the persons and goods of all the English within his country, and make forfeiture of their goods, if not of their lives, so respectful he is of the reputation of his State and monarchy. Myself was a witness to this in a case of my own in 1587. And, besides these precedents of prerogatives of princes aforesaid, the civil law which is universal, and decides all controversies at sea, has adjudged this case *amicus soli*, (*viz.*)—if a ship taken by an enemy be brought into the port of a friend to both, the prize not having been at home with him that took her before arrival in a friend's country, she is as free as if she had not been taken. And if this be a resolution in the law, how much more a prince is injured by the case aforesaid, and therefore punishable, I refer to consideration, for harbours and ports of princes are sacred things and not to be disturbed or questioned.



A Discourse directed to the Subjects, exhorting them to pay Ship-Money, and contribute with their Fortunes and Persons to punish the Insolences of the Dutch.\*

CUSTOM begets a law, that can plead no ancients right, especially where that custom is maintained by force and power, for it is an old saying, that custom has taught nations, reason men, and nature beasts. Tyrants will not admit of custom, nor submit to the justice of their cause, but to their own proper power and will. But, God be thanked, this kingdom never accepted of tyrants' titles, but of their true inheritors, descending from their ancestors; and if this descent were at any time impugned by usurpers yet they flourished not long, but right prevailed against them, like the true religion, which pestiferous heresies could never darken nor suppress. As antiquity, descent, and justice, have crowned the Kings of this land with lawful authority, from our first William to this

\* The heading in R, is 'The following was writ upon the affront the Hollanders gave us in the Downs and other places in the sea'; this probably refers to Tromp's attack 11 Oct. 1639, on the Spanish fleet which had taken refuge in the Downs. That in S, is 'Here followeth a discourse writ to the subjects upon the offence offered to his Majesty in taking of ships by violence out of his ports and from under his castles, and the usage of his ships at sea, with many other particulars not set down.'



very day, so have the seas given as authentic privileges and prerogatives to the Kings thereof, by consent of foreign nations, as the former record doth declare. And, ever since, we have held an undoubted succession which makes our title the more strong and potent. For, first, we plead consent and allowance of other countries, secondly, the long use and execution of it, thirdly, a continual possession without contradiction or opposition. And, lastly, our force, that in all ages has been able to maintain our privileges, in the spite of any that should gainsay them. And as we have received this prerogative from our forefathers, from whom all other goodness descended, as both tradition and records do witness, who should doubt of the truth thereof, or who may not as well question the clemency of Julius Cæsar, the magnificence of Alexander, or the goodness of Trajan? If actions and accidents of times past be not allowed all things that are gone before are like a dream, which when we awake we remember not, nor know any thing of it. Cicero saith, that if a man knew no more than when he is born he should be always a child; for history and monuments make heroical deeds to live again, which otherwise would be buried in everlasting forgetfulness.

Can there be a more approved testimony than that we live and enjoy the ancient right left to the Crown of this kingdom, as many ancient families have done their lands and possessions to their heirs and successors, who since, through the lewdness of the times, have prodigally consumed them and made themselves the scorn of the world. Therefore let the greater mischiefs be shunned by example of the less, that we may avoid the disgrace, imputation, and shame the

Hollanders endeavour to put upon us by questioning and denying the sovereignty of the sea, as is apparent by their late insolent carriage to his Majesty's ships serving in the Narrow Seas; an injury without satisfaction, unless we be publicly righted by open proclamation, not only in the excuse of the fact but in acknowledging his Majesty's undoubted right. Which, if they deny to do, they must be made to know that the way to wipe out old offences is not to offer new ones. If ambiguous words, or feigned promises, will give us content no doubt they will think it little lip-labour for their tongues to pronounce it, but in that point they are like spies that will pretend one thing and act another. It will be all one to us to be deaf as to hearken to what they say, unless we compel them by force, for the nature of them is to be proud when successful. And on the contrary so base, withal, upon loss that when cast down they will yield and sink under calamity, which is the right property of cowards.

Here is an occasion offered for all true Englishmen to have a feeling of a public and national wrong; for a reproach to a discreet man is more than the lance of an enemy. What affront can be greater, or what can make a man valianter, than a dishonour done to one's prince and country, especially by a people that was wont to know no more than how to catch, pickle, and feed upon fish, till now they are made drunk with our English beer? And so rude and unruly that they strike at us, their next and best neighbours and friends. But since our English beer has that operation on their brains let us keep it from them, and let them find the effect of our laws against drunkards, which is the

whipping post, as not worthy of a better revenge. For a prince that punishes public offences, and forgives private injuries to himself, has true honour.

Towards this defence of our reputation it is requisite some be aiding with money, and others with their persons. They that have not the one must supply the defect with the other. Let the honest mind of the rich be shewn by willingness in payments and means, and refer the rest to the forwardness of soldiers that will bear in mind revenges according to the first wrong. And nothing moves revenge more than contempt offered to one's prince. This done, the next thing to be recommended is celerity, as the principal advantage in war. And therefore let us disdain, and not dally with the Hollanders; for delay gives a coward courage. Our houses are not made of glass, that we need fear their throwing stones; we shall find them like a lion, not so fierce as he is painted, nor themselves so terrible as they are imagined. Let us strike, and not threaten, for that is womanish; and it is an old saying, 'That a threatened man eats bread.' \* Yet let not what we do be done in fury, for fury admits no reason. Let our actions be governed with discretion and temper, for rashness causes repentance; and he that seeks not to avoid danger, as well as with valour to encounter it, tempts God more than he trusts in him. The worthiness and skill of a Captain is how to obtain a victory with the least loss. For stratagems of war are inventions of wit, opportunity, and secrecy to avoid suspicion and the

\* Spanish, 'Los Amenazados pan comen,' but common to all countries, 'Threatened folks live long.'



least shew of what is meant to be done; a boar may be chastened with a wand sooner than with a dog.

The property of a soldier is to be courageous in fight, and free from fear, but yet not to be esteemed desperate, for the true valiant man loves life and fears not death. He is spurred on to revenge of injury and jealousy, and knoweth that death cannot be avoided, and is therefore the less to be feared. We see daily what little value life is of, since every soldier will venture it for twelve pence. The badge a soldier should bear ought to be writ in his forehead, *For my God, my Prince, and Country I adventure my Life*. Then seeing life is of so little value, and the honour of one's prince of such high esteem, let us not shew ourselves backward, or regard whether we die or live: let us seek to imitate the Lacedæmonians, among whom a matron being told they only had the rule of their husbands answered that it was no wonder, because they only brought forth valiant children.\* I need say no more to this point, since you are Englishmen, and therefore brave: you see yourselves, your prince and country all in one injured and indignified, which your ancestors were never wont to smother without bitter revenge. The people that do this wrong are so inferior to you that they are unworthy the title of gentlemen, or the name of a nation; their original being drawn out of the sea, as by the etymology of Zealand it appears, that is to say, sea and land. Their lives, their religion, their education, and breeding,

\* A foreign visitor remarked to the wife of Leonidas that the Lacedæmonian women were the only ones who could rule men: 'With good reason,' she replied, 'for we are the only women who bring forth men' (Plutarch, s.v. *Lycurgus*).



differs as much from the society of civil people of other nations as they differ from one another in diversity of sects and schisms. They live more by false fame and fortune than by any truth spoken of them ; their fame is gained by the intestine war they maintain against their prince and country, and by the people of the several nations that serve them, who spread abroad their own glory and praise because they are the actors of their wars. Few enter into the true cause of their renown ; for, if we judge according to equity and truth, it is the situation of their country, their rivers, the sea filled with the multitude of their ships, and the jealousy other nations have of the greatness of Spain, that are the original causes of their fame. As for their fortune, I do not marvel at it ; for Fortune commonly favours the unjust more than the just ; she is inconstant, deceitful, and unsure. But God, who is the disposer of fortune, as all things else, can change their good into bad ; and many times he suffereth a wicked man to climb that he may give him the greater fall when he is at his highest. Therefore let nothing dismay your heroical spirits, but go on with your undertakings. God hath seated England in a place to annoy them more than all the world besides.

Now let me speak to men of means and estates, who must bear the burthen, as the soldiers do the brunt of the war. There are two motives that lead you to revenge : the one is honour to our nation ; the other a general and particular affront done to yourselves and country. The affront done you is often repeated, as is natural to the qualities of the people that did it, which are such as can challenge no honour to themselves by the rule of God and a Christian commonwealth,

which makes the scorn the greater than from a King or prince, who can distinguish concerning giving or taking affronts. A disgrace to few is borne by a few, but when it is done to a country all men of that country ought to have a feeling of it, by the law and rule of nature. And whereas a private man's reputation is dear to him, so ought (in a higher degree of comparison) the honour of our prince and country to be, as the noble acts and deeds of the Romans have taught by sundry examples. Let not the meanness, the baseness, and the situation of the Hollanders make us despise their force and abilities to endanger us, for we want not precedents that all the flourishing and civil commonwealths of the world have been subdued and conquered by as mean and rude people as they are. Brennus was enticed to the conquest of Italy by the sweet and delicious wines that country afforded, which neither he nor his soldiers had ever tasted. The air, the soil, and plenty, drew the Goths, the Huns, and the Vandals, from out of the habitations of snow and ice to people the delightful southern parts, where the sun spreads forth his beams and heat. All goodness that is comprehended in these southern countries abounds in England, and is much desired by the Hollanders who well know the state of it and us. You are not ignorant what will ensue by their labouring to exceed us so much in shipping. If they prevail, you shall find our laws and government obnoxious to them; your fair buildings without, and ornaments within, will give better accommodation to Hans than a mean cabin in a fisherboat, which is his ordinary abode. There is nothing so unjust or cruel which they will not find a text of scripture to execute upon you, they are so perfect in the

interpretation of it. Our danger is the greater by our neighbour having, as it were, but a pond betwixt us, but especially through the ignorance of our common people that are bewitched with their republican government, with their fantastical religion, and with their imagined integrity and sincerity; but, principally, out of faction and discontent against the time we live in, not having sense to consider the benefit they receive, nor ever ceasing to slander the actions of others. But let them beware, for it is better for the mouse and frog to agree than for the kite to be umpire. It will be better for you to contribute now whilst you have something than to be bereaved of all you have. He that hath nothing adventures nothing, and is as ready to make havoc of you as an enemy.

The question will be, whether fear or covetousness shall prevail? Fear makes you prevent the worst; but covetousness keeps you from preventing it, when money is required, until at last they be both rolled up together in a violent death. Fear is not so grievous to a miserable man that only hears of it, but does not see it, because he presumeth his wealth will defend him. But let him beware. Where law serves not, weapons have power over him and his wealth; and then he will have cause to say that poverty was evil, but riches much worse, to bring him into that thralldom which he will be forced to confess was not caused by poverty but by too much plenty, and want of discretion and grace to employ it. You are like a covetous man, who, out of avarice, will not be at the charge of mending his chimney to avoid the hazard of burning his house, or the stopping of an inundation of water with the cost of casting up of a bank. But here you will encounter with

what is worse than fire or water, that is, with a merciless unavoidable war, where all comfort shall be taken away but only that you shall see your enemies in as evil case as yourselves. Do like the matrons of Rome, in case of necessity, who wanting a cup of gold to present to Apollo, contributed towards it with their jewels and bracelets, for which they received the reward of virtue, honour, and fame.\* And, to conclude, these changes will make you confess and find that man is the pattern of frailty, the play of time, the game of fortune, the image of inconstancy, and the trial of envy. Therefore trust not the world, for it pays not what it seems to promise.

\* Plutarch, s.v. *Camillus*.



Some conceived Reasons by the Author why his Majesty did not take a speedier course with the Hollanders after Affronts offered in the Narrow Seas, and for his setting out the Fleet in 1635.

THE King, out of his great providence and wisdom, weighing the state of things, as they then stood abroad, thought not good by force and strength to right himself upon the Hollanders for their insolences committed in the Narrow Seas, though all the world knew he had a power by the force of his Navy to revenge himself on them. But his Majesty, graciously, rather imputed the Hollanders' carriage to the rude and rustical behaviour of some unmannerly captains, who were never taught morality, civility, or humanity. Wherefore his Majesty held it fitter in this case, that their masters, the States, should know their errors by a sharp reprehension, declared by his Majesty's resident there abiding, than by any way at present to chastize them. He also saw that his neighbour princes were distracted, and strove underhand to join in league one with another for the best advantage of their State, wherein he was to behold and expect the success and event of things then in hand, being no more assured of one's friendship than of another's, till this year, 1635, his Majesty had trial of the Hollanders' inconstancy and unthankful proceedings ; for, contrary to the rules of honour or honesty, they neglected his Majesty's

often overtures of peace, repeated from his predecessors and himself, to make an end of those long and intestine wars they had long suffered under : but, I say, they little regarding or esteeming his favours in that kind, rather cast themselves upon France, that offered to support and maintain their ancient and unlawful divisions.

After much working, and ambassadors often passing between them and France, at last they concluded on an offensive and defensive league by which France was to declare war against Spain. The consequences of such a league being dangerous, and an unlimited ambition never with safety to be trusted, his Majesty had just cause to be suspicious of what this league might in time work, or what the end of ambition was like to prove, it being at first not known. Therefore his Majesty, grounding his suspicion upon reason as to what such innovations might tend unto, considered these things and the cause why Holland and France should so strictly combine and league together, both of them being neighbours to him. And why it should be now hastened more than in former times, when France and England gave an indifferent and a sufficient relief to Holland by consent. The King also seeing the ambitious enterprises of France, assisted by Holland, to disturb the Christian and peaceable commonwealth of Europe, and unjustly to seize upon his neighbouring territories, without cause given, yea, not sparing by treachery and force to enjoy the countries of his weakest and nearest friend, the ancient State of Lorraine, which lay in his way to hinder his unlawful designs ; \* these were sufficient motives and reasons for the King's

\* The French invaded Lorraine in 1633.

Majesty to behold his own case with an eye of prevention. But, especially, finding a combination betwixt France and Holland to divide and devour the provinces of Flanders betwixt them, and to possess the maritime towns, as Dunkirk, and others, opposite to England, this made his Majesty to think how to quench the fire that might flame into his own house. And having intelligence that they were both of them to join in one fleet, a thing not usually done by the French, and they making no public declaration of the cause of their employment as commonly princes use to do in such cases, his Majesty could make no less construction than that they intended to deprive him of his ancient and allowed prerogative of the Narrow Seas, which behoved him as much to defend as his kingdom ; for he that covets the one will do as much by the other if it were in his power to effect it. Wherefore his Majesty armed these ships following to sea, to require reason at their hands if there were occasion ; not intending to injure any nation but to keep himself and subjects from being injured, and to abate the pride of any people that should go about to infringe his royal prerogative.\*

\* If Monson knew that the United Provinces were negotiating with France for the joint conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands he must also have known that in 1631 and 1634 Charles negotiated with Spain for the joint conquest and partition of the United Provinces. Charles set the example and his plans were so far advanced that on 16 Oct. 1634 a treaty embodying them was sent to Madrid for ratification. Four days later, to provide the machinery to put them into execution, the first ship-money writs were issued.

A Navy set out by his Majesty in the Year  
1635.\*

Ships.	Captains.
The Merhonour, a Ship Royal,	Robert Earl of Lindsey, Admiral.† Captains, Wm. Rainsborow and Thos. Kettelby, successively. Robert Beale, lieutenant.
The James,	Sir William Monson, Vice-Admiral. Wm. Haukridge, lieutenant. Peter White, and Thos. Rabnett, masters.‡
The Swiftsure,	Sir John Penington,§ Rear-Admiral. Robert Fox, lieutenant.
The St. George,	James Mountague.   Edward Bagward, lieutenant. Jas. Bamford, master.
The St. Andrew,	Walter Stewart. Thos. Bardsey, lieutenant. John Craven, master.
The Henrietta Maria,	Thomas Porter. Barnaby Burley, lieutenant. Thos. Askew, master.
The Vanguard,	Sir Francis Sydenham, and Thos. Mennes (successively). Philip Hill and Andrew Mennes, lieutenants, successively.
The Rainbow,	John Povey. Jonathan Downes, lieutenant. Thos. White, master.

\* Compiled from *P.O. Decl. Accts.* 2275.

† Lindsey 4*l.* a day, the captains ten shillings.

‡ Monson 2*l.* a day; the lieutenants all two and sixpence.

§ Penington one pound a day.

|| Private captains eight shillings a day.



Ships.	Captains.
The Lion,	John Mennes, and Sir Fr. Sydenham (successively). Philip Hill, lieutenant, John Man, master.
The Reformation,	Lord Poulett, and Thos. Kettleby (successively). Kenelm Digby and Geo. Carteret, lieutenants, successively. Wm. Ellis, master.
The Leopard,	Lewis Kirke.* Robert Turner, lieutenant, Nich. Roberts, master.
The Mary Rose,	George Carteret and Kenelm Digby † (successively). John Lingwood, master.
The Adventure,	Rich. Paramore. John Carrell, master.
The Swallow,	Henry Stradling.
The Antelope,	Richard Fogge.
The Lion's First Whelp,	Anthony Penruddock. ‡
The Lion's Third Whelp,	Peter Lindsey.
The Lion's Eighth Whelp,	Thomas Price.
The Lion's Tenth Whelp,	William Smith.
Merchant ships.	Commanders.
The Sampson,	Thomas Kirke.
The Royal Exchange,	John Hyde.
The Freeman,	Richard Feilding.
The Pleiades,	David Murray.
The William and Thomas,	John Fletcher.
Minikin, ketch,	Roger Barton.

THIS glorious and victorious fleet § departed from Tilbury Hope the 27th of May, with direction and resolution to give no occasion of hostility, or to make any nation enemy to his Majesty ; only to

\* Kirke six shillings and eightpence a day.

† These two five shillings a day.

‡ The captains of the Whelps four shillings a day.

§ The Admiral, Robert Bertie, Earl of Lindsey, was born in 1582, Elizabeth and the Earls of Leycester and Essex having been his sponsors at the font. Besides military service on land he had been with Cumberland in 1598 and

defend his and his kingdom's honour, that had been lately and lavishly taxed by the vain boasting of a fleet of French and Hollanders, which joined off Portland the last of May. Their bragging pretence was to question his Majesty's prerogative on the Narrow Seas, and they stuck not to proclaim wherefore they came. But it is to be observed that the greatest threateners are the least fighters, and so fared it with them, for they no sooner heard of our readiness to find them but they plucked in their horns and quitted our coast, never more appearing upon it, which gave great satisfaction to the shires we passed that before were troubled with a kind of a terror. And because we would be the better informed where the fleet was abiding and what it did, in a witty and politic manner we sent a bark upon the coast of Brittany, whither we knew they were retired, and by it understood their designs, the weak estates of their ships, hearts, and abilities any more to look upon the English coast.\* From the time of the return of

was with Leveson and Monson when they captured the St. Valentine in Cezimbra, bay. Since then he had commanded fleets while his former Admiral had been laid on the shelf, and now that they had come together again it was as Monson's superior.

\* The combined French and Dutch fleets were lying in Portland Roads and Lindsey sailed from the Downs on 6 June with the intention of forcing them to yield the Salute. Richelieu, however, evaded an unnecessary meeting by ordering the fleet to the coast of Spain. On 2 July Monson directed his master's mate—Hailes—to scout along the coast of Brittany for Turkish pirates (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I. ccxciii. 15*). On 21 July Lindsey reported the same, or a second, reconnaissance, but describes it as a search 'for French ships' (*ibid.* 21 July). Lindsey's instructions were also to search all foreign ships, men-of-war or merchantmen, for English seamen and gunners; if any were found he was to take them out and 'admonish' the captains of such ships (*ibid.* 2 May 1635).

this bark, till the first of October, we made good our seas and shores, gave laws to our neighbour nations, and restored the ancient sovereignty of the Narrow Seas to our gracious King, as was ever due to his Majesty's progenitors.

Whilst this fleet was preparing, and money raising to furnish it, there were many idle, factious, and scandalous reports invented, and spread abroad by such people as have ever shewed themselves refractory to his Majesty's proceedings. Their speeches tended to the dishonour of the King, and no less to the imputation of his ministers of state, saying, that the fitting out of such a fleet was but made a colour and excuse to draw money from the multitude, to be otherwise employed than was pretended. But when they saw the end in arming such a royal navy, and the necessity of it to give terror to the world after so many imputations cast upon our nation, by our former unfortunate actions at sea, it bred a great alteration in the disposition of people, as well at home as abroad. It appeared at home by the readiness and willingness of those that before seemed to oppose it and were most averse unto it, who now being satisfied as to the mistrust they had, shewed themselves more ready and willing to contribute to it than others, being satisfied it so nearly concerned the honour of their King and country. We may say it bred the same effect abroad, where, at the beginning of our preparations, the gazetteers stuck not to divulge in all languages many false invented reports, which no doubt they received out of England, as namely, the discontent of the subjects and their general denial to contribute towards it with moneys; besides many other invented calumniations which now they find themselves



abused and deceived in. For whosoever will speak with travellers lately come from beyond sea, or confer with merchants and others that have weekly intelligence and correspondence by letters from all parts of Europe, will find what the world conceives of this fleet, and the fear all nations apprehend of it, not knowing which of them it may bring into danger. They now acknowledge what wise men in England knew before, that the King and his kingdom could not be more honoured than by this noble expedition, for the terror of it has made them that did not love us at least to fear us. It has stopped the mouths of detractors, who now impute our former ill-governed actions to the true and infallible causes, when witless partiality, want of experience, and the vain undertakings of men of place and authority, more than reason, had the disposing of them.\*

The Hollanders by this time, I doubt not, find that this royal fleet of ours is able to make the seas quake under us where we pass, and themselves to tremble when they call to mind the intolerable affronts they have put upon us, fearing they may require revenge. For there is no nation naturally so base, so soon elevated with good fortune, and dejected when they see themselves overmastered. They are rash and mad in their fury and drink, but want valour or courage to justify their actions when they are sober and called to an account for them. But if the threatening shew will not abate their insufferable insolences, then let us consider the state of their country, their harbours, their

\* On 29 September Sir Kenelm Digby wrote from Paris to Coke, 'although my Lord of Lindsey do no more than sail up and down yet the very setting of our best fleet out to sea is the greatest service that I believe hath been done the King these many years' (Hist. Man. Com., *Coke MSS.*, ii. 95).



depths, or what advantage else we can take of them by stratagems, or otherwise, if they offend us. I will begin with the north part of Holland, and take Zealand and the ports of Flanders in my way till I arrive at Calais in Picardy, in the dominions of France. I will not speak of the port of Emden, because it cannot be accounted Holland, for properly it belongs to the Earl of that name, called the Count of Emden. But this town imitating the precedent of rebellious Holland, whose doctrine is to persuade all subjects to cast off the yoke of monarchy and to live under the rule and government they have begun and taught, the subjects of the said Earl have deprived him not only of his estate but of his life also. But God, who is the revenger of all evil actions, and commonly inflicts the same punishment on the actors as they offend in, has made an example of that city and country that is made most miserable and unhappy since they practised their foul treachery against their prince, insomuch as they are now become most slavish to the Hollanders, who tyrannize over them with an irresistible garrison; and thus they are become oppressed without any hope of redemption. There is no comparison for goodness between this harbour of Emden in the east of Friesland, and all others from it to Brest in Brittany, until you arrive there. Next to it, to the southward, is the Texel in Holland; it lies north-east and south-west, forty seven leagues from the Foreland in Kent, and from Yarmouth, in Norfolk, thirty two leagues.\* Not to speak of the channel of the Vlie, nor another channel betwixt the Spanish channel and the Land Deep which are

\* E½S., 36 leagues from Yarmouth, and N.E. true, 50 leagues from the Foreland.

for small shipping, I will describe the two main channels, that is to say, the Spanish Gat, and the Land Deep aforesaid. They are both of one sort and goodness, though not for all winds ; they flow at a spring tide twenty four feet, and sixteen at an ebb ; they lead to a road under the island of Texel, which defends them from the sea. This island is poorly inhabited, and of small strength as it is used ; but he that has it has the command of all the towns in that part of Holland, Guelderland, and Friesland, who can neither pass in nor out without the permission of the island. And this is my first observation of the advantage we can take of Holland.

The next port of importance to Texel, is the Maas \* in West Holland, twenty four leagues south-west and by south from thence, and to the Foreland west and by south twenty four leagues. The Maas has three channels, two better than the third, like unto the Texel ; all three meeting at the Brill, which commands all ships of Schiedam, Rotterdam, Delft Haven, Dort, and all other creeks thereabouts. My second observation for our advantage, is to get possession of the Brill, as formerly we had.† Two leagues from the Maas, south-west, lies the Goeree, the same course and distance from the Foreland in England that the other is.‡ This harbour exceeds all the rest rehearsed, having eighteen feet at low water, with a large and broad channel, but not frequented by great ships but out of necessity, when they have not water sufficient to go into the Maas till

\* R. Meuse.

† Flushing and the Brill were placed in Elizabeth's hands in 1585 as security for money advanced to the insurgent provinces. The Dutch resumed possession in 1616.

‡ E.N.E. and W.S.W.

they have unladen part of their goods at Goeree. The cause why this harbour is no more in request is by reason that Rotterdam and the other towns before named are far distant from thence, and such merchandize as is brought in great ships to the Goeree must be transported in smaller vessels through a creek called the Spy,\* which is a great delay, trouble, and expense to the merchant. Six leagues south-west from thence lies the island of Walcheren, in Zealand, where Flushing is seated. There are three channels likewise better than the rest, except the Goeree. The inconvenience of these channels, is, that they are long and narrow, and yet I have known at several times most part of the King's ships turn in at the Wielings. This is so well known to the English that there needs no other repetition of it.

The next good harbour to Flushing, laying aside Sluys, which is not worth naming, is Ostend, twelve leagues west-south-west from thence; and eight leagues farther is Dunkirk. The King of Spain makes great use of these two towns for annoying the Hollanders by sea; but a league and a half from Dunkirk there is lately another harbour erected, called Mardike, that will entertain a whole fleet of the greatest ships that sails on the seas, and lies more to the hurt and damage of England than all the rest of the harbours aforesaid. And therefore, if ever wars should happen betwixt us and Spain, it would behove us to get possession of it, for we have had a late trial of the mischief it hath done us by our late short war with Spain. I confess it will be a hard thing for us to effect it because of the extraordinary fortifications to seaward. And to think to keep in their ships by

\* The Spleet Gat.

sinking vessels in the mouth of the channel is a folly, for the quicksands are such upon that coast that as often as a ship shall be sunk she will be suddenly swallowed up in the sand, so that this stratagem will not serve.\*

\* Mardike has long ceased to exist as a harbour and the navigation up to Emden is, now at least, very difficult. The Dutch names, and the channels themselves, have altered considerably since Monson wrote, but they can be traced on old charts. It is, however, interesting to notice his appreciation of Emden seeing that Germany is making it an important naval station.

See also p. 260 *et seq.* for further details of Lindsey's cruise.



## An Introduction to the Earl of Northumberland's Voyage in the Year 1636.

HIS Majesty finding that the last year's fleet of 1635 produced both renown and safety to himself and realm, as is apparent by the voyage of that year—he resolved to persevere in his former resolutions, that it should not be imputed by other nations as a sudden unpremeditated determination, or a vain needless ostentation, to shew what he could do if put to it by an enemy. Therefore he prepared, this year 1636, a fleet nothing inferior to the others, to make good what he had declared before, *viz.* To uphold the prerogative and authority of the seas due to the Crown of England in all ages, and left him by his progenitors. As also to defend the peaceable commerce and traffic that had evermore belonged and continued to his jurisdiction, but had lately been violated and abused by a stronger party impeaching the weaker, much to the disreputation of his Majesty to have the sovereignty of his seas questioned or encroached upon. But as this fleet could not be furnished and prepared and maintained without great expense, it was thought convenient for the expense to be indifferent betwixt King and subject in respect the employment tended to the common good and safety, as well to the subject as for the King. For as the office of a King is to be careful of all his provinces, countries, and subjects, to be partial to none, but a father to

all with indifference, so the part of subjects is to pay a dutiful obedience when they shall be called upon, for the reasons aforesaid. Whereupon his Majesty directed his letters to every shire, to levy such a proportion of money as would suffice for the furnishing of so commanding a navy.

But as general demands and contributions of money are commonly distasteful to the multitude, who are divided in opinions, every one pretending a seeming reason and excuse; so did it make as great a difference in men's minds and humours, some complaining of their want and poverty, some excepting against it as a needless and unnecessary charge, disapproving the design; and others excepting against the inexperienced commanders, who, they said, were fit to make a good design miscarry. But if the detractors will but weigh, and with indifference consider their supposed objections, it will appear rather to proceed out of a refractory disposition, that desires to possess others with the like perverseness, than any just cause they have to complain against it. If these demands seem too heavy a burden for all the subjects in general to undergo, let them look back, and with indifference compare the times of Queen Elizabeth with these, and they will find what daily demands of money were then required at their hands, and how willingly they were granted for the maintenance of a war against so mighty a prince as the King of Spain upon his own coast, for the relief of Holland many years together, the aid and assistance given to the King of France, besides the domestic, dangerous, rebellious war in Ireland. Which expenses they will perceive were, beyond comparison, greater than the present, as appears by what follows.

\* In 1588 the city of London being required to furnish five thousand soldiers and fifteen ships of war, of their own accord they granted ten thousand soldiers and thirty ships. And, by their example, other towns within the realms furnished in ships and pinnaces thirty, besides what the nobility and country sent in horse and foot. In the expedition to Portugal, in 1589, her Majesty furnished only six ships of her own, whereof two were of the smallest rank, and adventured in that expedition 60,000*l.*, the whole number of vessels being a hundred and forty six, with fourteen thousand soldiers and four thousand sailors. That same year London sent a thousand soldiers to the aid of the King of France, and several shires sent the like aid upon the same occasion into France, under my Lord Willoughby.

The city of London, in the year 1594, furnished six ships, two pinnaces, and four hundred and fifty soldiers, for three months, and the following year, 1595, London furnished a thousand soldiers with all sorts of provision, and sent them to Dover, to the relief of Calais, when it was taken by the Cardinal. Many other forces were sent out of the country upon that service.

The following year, 1596, was the expedition to Cadiz, and the year after the Islands voyage ; to which two exploits, not only London, but all England, contributed very largely.

In January 1598 a great tax was laid upon London for Holland ; and our soldiers there were sent into Ireland. The like was done in February

\* There is no MS. authority for the portion from here to the attack on the luxurious indulgences of the taxpayers on p. 239.



following. The same year London furnished sixteen ships and six thousand men, besides a great number of horse and foot that were sent out of the country, at the time that my Lord of Essex was in Ireland. And, in the year of 1600, London sent five hundred men into Ireland, and furnished them, besides great numbers sent out of the country. That same year the city of London built and furnished five galleys to sea, and was at a great charge for the Earl of Essex's entry into London. One thousand soldiers were sent into Holland, and every one allowed then three pounds ten shillings *per* man, besides those that were sent out of the country. Moreover, there were four hundred soldiers sent in October out of London; and in May following there was a great press in London for Ostend. In the last year of Queen Elizabeth, London sent and furnished two thousand soldiers into Ireland, and two ships and a pinnace, which stood them in 6000*l*.

If these benevolences were granted so willingly, and without repining or gainsaying of the subjects, as well appears, let us consider of times, and judge withal of the estate of men in those days, compared with the present. First, in the men's forwardness to serve their prince and country, which their hearts and minds are now alienated from. Secondly, it is to be considered how much more able men are now to contribute than at that time they were, by their increase of wealth and riches, which they have gained by King James's bringing peace with him into this realm, as shall appear by these particulars following, that shall be by the way of queries.

*Quære*, Of the state of London in the days of Queen Elizabeth, compared with these present; as namely, the buildings, with the number of



inhabitants in them, and by consequence the riches increased.

*Quære*, Of our trade and commerce betwixt the time I speak of, and now in being, as namely the traffic with Spain, and all the dominions thereunto belonging, which we were then debarred of by reason of our wars with Spain. The profit whereof may be in value to the subject ten times as much as the King's customs comes to, as may be apparently made out by the customs books.

*Quære*, Of our trade to the East Indies, and the gain thereof, begun and followed since King James came to his Crown. As also a late trade we have found into Guinea for gold.

*Quære*, The state of Greenland, and the whale fishing there, that hath been discovered and prosecuted with little charge and great profit to the merchant since King James possessed this kingdom.\*

*Quære*, Of the several plantations and colonies since that time, with the employment of people which otherwise would have been a burden, and a consuming of victuals to this commonwealth.

*Quære*, Of the abundance of shipping that hath been employed, in that navigation, as also of the increase of ships since the days of Queen Elizabeth, which is no hard thing to know, for

\* The Greenland whale fishery is said to have commenced in 1598 (Anderson, *Hist. of Commerce*, ii. 193, ed. 1787). Possibly the earliest reference to it occurs in the *Acts of the Privy Council* (17 April 1580) when a licence was granted to the Samaritan, belonging to the Muscovy Co., 'to go on a fishing voyage in Lappa.' An Order in Council of 12 April 1614 approved the enterprise of the Russia Co. in going to Greenland for whale and gave them permission to defend themselves against the Dutch. In the same year there were fourteen vessels engaged in the fishery (*Harl. Misc.* iii. p. 290, 'The Trade's Increase,' 1615).

when she died, there were not above four merchant ships in England of four hundred tons each. And reckoning but the increase of ships since then, it would cause admiration, and be a reason for men to contribute to ship-money, when they shall consider the wealth increased by the trade of those ships that are never idle but continually sailing from place to place.

*Quære*, Of the peaceable state of Ireland, and the long continuance of war before King James came to the Crown. As also of the excessive charge England was continually at to maintain that kingdom, that now is not only able to uphold itself but to afford great profit to his Majesty.

But whereas our refractory men allege for their excuse, in denying his Majesty's demands of money, and comparing the times together, say, they were forced to it in the Queen's time out of necessity, being drawn to it by a dangerous war with Spain, not weighing with themselves that his Majesty's actions have been to anticipate and prevent a war, as is to be seen in my next narrative. No man can be so ignorant but he must confess it is less hazard to prevent a war before it is begun, than with valour and courage to resist after it is begun.

Wherefore are our castles seated on the sea coast but to prevent the invasion of an enemy, or other insolences offered by strangers? Or why are people trained in several shires but to be in readiness to prevent foreign and domestic attempts? Whereas if castles were to be built, and soldiers trained, after the time the enemy shall appear upon the coast, in what estate were England to make a defence? And this employment his Majesty now has by sea may be paralleled with the other two comparisons. And I will

therefore conclude, that the wit of man doth not consist so much in seeing as in foreseeing, and preventing peril and danger that may fall upon him.

But whereas poverty is made the excuse for people not giving what his Majesty requires, the true cause shall appear that hath bred your want, as you shall confess, and that it is in your powers to redress it ; as, namely, your pride, and other needless and unnecessary expenses that depend on it. The second, is your gormandizing and excessive feasting, lately crept in amongst you, not formerly used. The third, is the hateful and loathsome custom of drinking, which begets all disorders, and bereaves men of sense that they cannot judge of the difference between those benefits and these distempers. The fourth, is a vain and ambitious desire of titles, which after they are purchased with money drives them to a wasteful consumption of their estates, to maintain that port so dearly bought. The fifth, is the sumptuous buildings, and ornaments of houses, all men striving for ostentation to out-do their neighbours, with whom they are in faction and emulation. The sixth, is the miserable covetousness of some, and the lavish prodigality of others. The seventh, is the want of care to have things sold according to their just value in equity of law ; but that every man rates his own commodity according to the necessity of the buyer. The eighth, is the extortion taken by griping usurers from people that are necessitated. But, above all, the number of mechanic lawyers that stir up suits, not with a charitable intent, to end, but knavishly to multiply them ; and with that expense to the client, as that no question can rise of what value soever, but a bill, answer, and order, will be of



more charge, both to the plaintiff and defendant, than what is demanded of most of you towards the furnishing his Majesty's Royal Navy. These are the true causes of want in commonwealths, which proceed from your own superfluities, vanities, and your revengeful humours. Most of these abuses were foreseen by Lycurgus, the great law-maker, who made decrees against them. He also forbade pompous burials, and banished the use of silver and gold, as things most prejudicial to commonwealths, which law of his continued five hundred years and yet no man found himself aggrieved for want of money; for it made the greatest love and friendship, and banished all manner of vices. But that which you term want, cometh not from poverty but from plenty, for he that hath much desires more, covetousness being never satisfied. The true use of riches is in him that hath most and desires least, for the best riches is to abstain from covetousness.

In old times he was esteemed rich that was of a fair, upright, and good behaviour. He that shall except against the honourable design of this fleet may be accounted an arrogant and ignorant person, and a contemner of the King's propositions, excusing it under colour of want, and with little reason. Those that repine at princes' actions out of stubbornness, or refractoriness, are within the next degree of impugning their sovereignty, and in such a case they want nothing but power to carry on their conceived treason. They do not consider that princes are born not to obey any but their own laws; and the subjects are born to submit to the wills of princes, where reason shall be required at their hands, for the good of the commonwealth; and that nothing deserves such severe chastisement from Kings, as such contempt



as opposes them or their authority. Asinius Pollio says that commonwealth is everlasting where the King seeks obedience, and people labour to get his love by their carriage. Latter times have taught us a most woeful and lamentable precedent, in the like case, to parallel with this. Louis II. King of Hungary, being threatened with the power of Suleiman, the great and magnificent Turk, required aid of his subjects to withstand so puissant an enemy, that was like an inundation of water to overflow him, them, and their country. But most of his subjects, whom you too nearly imitate in obstinacy, refused to contribute to his demands, standing upon the privileges of the law so long till it was too late to give succour; and, in conclusion, the King and his army were destroyed, and his people and country became slaves to the Turkish government, under which they now live.\* Herein appeared the ingratitude of the vulgar sort to their King; and how easily they might have met with this danger before it lit so heavily upon them. They regarded not the benefit they had received, or might receive at their prince's hands, if they had been willing to have yielded to his desires. For that subject that will not yield to obedience may as well renounce the name of King and his authority, and by consequence resist laws, justice, and peace; and then follows a continual war, without hope of reconciliation, and the commonwealth is destroyed. I observe that nothing breeds this wilfulness in subjects so much as jealousy, that thinks princes have other ends than they pretend, not considering that Kings'

\* At the battle of Mohacz, 1526, but Hungary was never completely occupied by Turkey.

affairs must be kept secret ; for their designs being discovered are disappointed and ruined. There is an old saying that suspicion is no proof and jealousy an unjust judge.

The Romans' success was imputed to nothing so much as secrecy in their expeditions. They were wont to say that when they discovered their secrets they gave away their liberty, accounting secrecy as the guardian of their affairs ; and it is an old saying, ' That a secret is hard for one to keep, enough for two, and too much for three.' Of all things, a subject should not desire to know the secrets of princes. Philip of Macedon bid a philosopher to demand any thing at his hands, and it should be granted ; the philosopher humbly besought him, as his greatest suit, ' That he would not discover to him his secrets.' \* And yet you would be wiser than philosophers, to murmur at Kings' actions, when you should with obedience seek to gain their love ; for no King can be so unnatural to himself, or such an enemy to his people, as not to govern to the profit of both, because he receives equal gain or loss with his subjects. Nothing deceives men more than a false conceit of themselves, which makes them run into unavoidable dangers. But let such men learn that wisdom is life and ignorance is death ; the one understands what it does, as the other is dead for want of understanding. Much danger ensues for want of reason, and much good is left undone by too much folly.

If this refractory counsel you embrace proceed from others, and not from yourselves, despise it ;

\* Thus in both MSS. and printed text, but it was the answer of Philippides to Lysimachus. Monson probably took it from Montaigne's essay, ' Of Profit and Honesty,' where the French writer uses it as an illustration.

for it has another design than they think fit to let you know which may ensnare you, like a bee that is often hung in his own honey. Therefore be not enticed with fair words, doubtful hopes, or seeming probabilities, but remember that a man has power over himself and tongue before he speak or promise, though after his words are out of his mouth they have power of him : and you will find that perverse and desperate counsel is full of perturbation where men are embracers of evil advice. And therefore think an hour before you answer to their propositions, and a day before you yield to uncertain things that may bring danger. You must likewise think and consider of the condition of them that counsel you, the occasion of their counsel, and the probability of what they counsel. If it be out of private ends, out of anger, out of discontent, out of revenge, or to the prejudice of Kings' designs, conclude such to be evil counsellors, and shun them as you will a serpent that never stings so deadly as when she hisses not. If you suspect their counsel proceeds from ambition, beware of it, for ambition teaches one to become disloyal, and he then desires to draw others to consent to him in his ill purposes. If you be young, to whom this seditious counsel shall be given, follow the advice of Solomon, who says, ' That folly is tied in the hearts of young men, and cannot be untied but by good instruction.' For indeed young men want experience : they are incredulous of good advice, wanting years to judge, and as poor in their judgement, being apt to delight in the music of their own praise.

Let the warning of our late Parliament admonish you, for there cannot be a more perfect precedent than by things lately done and in your own remembrance. There you shall see the



fruit of self-conceited subjects that oppose the King in his demands, and the reward they have reaped by it. You have beheld the imprisonment of some and the disgrace of others, which still lies as a heavy burthen upon their shoulders and cannot be discharged without submission, and acknowledging their errors, which some have done.\* And yet for all their obstinacy they have produced no good to the commonwealth, for the wiser sort censure them as giddy, rash, and inconsiderate, to offend so highly with their tongues, or to meddle with affairs above their reach or what they could pretend to as members of Parliament. For Parliaments are called by authority of the King, who has power to dissolve them as he pleases which puts an end to all they can say ; wherefore a man should be silent, unless silence hurt him or his speech be profitable to others. Your part in a Parliament is to give way, and obey such laws as shall be made by consent of the House, which laws have no authority till the King confirm them. Neither can you challenge any privilege after the confirmation till it be warranted by commission from the King, either in office or employment, for it is the King that rewards or punishes at his discretion. And by proof you have found, and ever will find, that after your wrangling and jangling nothing will get more favour than obedient diligence ; for heroical Kings are not drawn by violence but by humility and meekness. The Scripture tells us that the way to get love of our princes is by suffering, and not forcing, for so they may taste of his goodness and mercy. It is a great virtue

\* The Parliament of 1628-9 ; nine members were arrested and imprisoned at the dissolution.



and wisdom in man not rashly to enterprise a thing above his reach, or to be led by persuasion of fair words, glozing speeches, or forward threats, that deceive none but fools who have no strength against truth or the power of a King. If you rely upon the instigation of others, that are of your fraternity and familiarity in Parliament, who have nothing but words for their best witness, it is insolent madness, for what can they do but shew passion, like silly women, whose tongues are their best weapons. All you can do, for the present, is, to challenge the privilege of the Parliament of which you are members. But when that is over you are brought to account for the indiscretion of your tongue, which is the best or worst member in a man's body, but not to be so much used as the ear or mind which in reason should rule the tongue. Another observation I collect, that wise men impute to your inconsiderate folly, is that your words have produced no profit to the commonwealth but great prejudice to all. For thereby you have incensed the King and given him occasion to stretch out his prerogative to the uttermost, as also to awaken laws that have been many years sleeping, to his advantage and inconvenience to the subject. For laws are established to bridle the haughtiness of men's minds, and the stubbornness of their conditions, and therefore it is dangerous to vex and anger princes upon such occasions. The best thing subjects can do is to live peaceably ; for by concord small things increase to the good of all, whereas by discord all is lessened and in the end nothing comes but repentance.

The third exception against those two fleets, as it is vulgarly bruited, is, the insufficiency of the captains and commanders, wanting experience

as they suppose. Which I suppose rather to be divulged without truth or proof than on any good ground they have to lay that imputation upon them, and to be a mere scandal proceeding from discontent and ill nature. After that rate any man may be scandalized, howsoever worthy, if calumny pass for truth. But if there were any such cause of exception to their sufficiency, there were none so like to find it or mend it as the King himself, or his Lords, that have trial of their abilities, and therefore it is a great malapertness to insist upon this. The ground they have to confirm their belief may be our long peace, which has given no occasion of war, and no means to gain experience; and the death of so many commanders who lived and were employed in the Queen's expeditions, a time when they sailed with victory. The common sort of people, who are led by shew and ignorance, esteem no man valiant but such as can shew scars and hurts as tokens of their courage, like deboshed cutters, or quarrelsome fencers, who never regard the justice of the quarrel, honour, wise conduct, or value victory obtained without blood, or the discreet management of a warlike action. And if a man go about to advise them of their errors he had as good speak to the deaf, for he shall neither be heard nor believed. The last year's fleet was set out on account of the French and Hollanders vying with his Majesty as to prerogative and power, and where there was that scornful comparison it was little better than a contention that in a short time would have blazed out into open war had it not been prevented by a speedy fleet, which some of our refractory men repine at; not considering that it was better and less chargeable to meet danger before it fell upon

them than to expect the coming of it. For the first enterprise in war gains the best reputation, especially when our enemy sees he is neither feared nor dallied with, which will make him think how to escape danger rather than to go forward with force and courage, and we must account that victory most honourable that is obtained with least loss and effusion of blood.

The Saxon King, Eadgar, left a brave reputation to all posterity, and to this day we look upon it as an act of renown and fame that he sailed about England, Scotland and Ireland with thousands of ships, not once, but often. And yet no history makes mention of any conflicts or encounters he met with, but only did it for the safety and reputation of his kingdoms, and to daunt his enemies if they had appeared. Which case may be paralleled with his Majesty in these our days, who is lord of the same seas, enjoys the same right King Eadgar did, and has a greater strength and force than he to maintain it. And while King Eadgar held this uncontrollable sovereignty at sea he was a terror to all his neighbours, a safety to his dominions, and a supreme King, esteemed of all Kings. But after, when his successors neglected his precedent and his ships and forces by sea went to decay, his kingdoms became a prey to the Danish nation who ceased not continually to make incursions upon England, to the perpetual vexation of the English nation, until the days of William Rufus, son to the Conqueror. This case, in my opinion, is to be compared with this age if his Majesty employed not fleets to sea, and should fail and neglect in keeping the royalty of his seas and not seek to uphold his shipping. All other nations we see increasing in ships, and



they will be glad and ready to take possession and challenge the jurisdiction of our seas.

If it were not for the honour and sovereignty of the seas due to the King, who knows not but that it is more safety and ease to pass out of the kingdom in a small vessel than in a royal ship of the King's. For every harbour is able to entertain a bark of little draught, but it is not for his Majesty's reputation to accommodate a prince or ambassador, who comes courteously to visit him, in such a vessel, which every man may hire and lies open to all dangers of enemies and pirates. We have many precedents of Emperors, Kings, and Queens, passing our seas, that have been honoured and accompanied with the fleets of England for their security, and to shew the King's magnificence and prerogative on the seas, and yet no hostile act appeared. I would ask the detractors in this case—whether in reason or reputation the King should not have shewed his greatness for the guard of the seas, and the subjects should not contribute to that extraordinary expense since they are interested in the dignity of it? For all succeeding ages, when they shall read of it, will look upon it as an honourable and noble action; and though the King and subjects be all dead their honour will never be forgotten.

In 1588, when the Spaniards threatened a conquest of England, if they had happened to have been diverted, as it was once thought they would, can you believe it had been safe or prudent for us, upon a bare supposition, to have stopped and stayed our fleet from going to sea? Or to have called it back when at sea? Or do you imagine the subjects at that time would have thought it discretion to have saved their moneys laid out in fitting our Navy, and have made excuses



of want, or dislike of the designs, or the lack of experienced commanders, who I will undertake were fewer, and knew less than they now do? In the year 1599, the Queen, with admiration to all her neighbours that beheld it, rigged, victualled, and set to sea, the most part of her ships in fewer days than any of her progenitors had ever done, expecting an invasion from Spain, the rather believed because the Spanish preparation was at Coruña, the next harbour to her, which fleet of the Spaniards was the same year diverted by the pursuit of a fleet of Holland that had lately surprised the Island of Canary. Though the Queen was made secure by this accident, and her fleet returned from the Downs without view of an enemy, yet did not a man in the realm repine at the expense demanded towards the furnishing of it. By this you may see the difference of times, and the difference of men's conditions, and how prevention and foresight in war are as much to be approved and esteemed as the active part when men shew their valour in fight.

If you were as willing to know, as you are apt to judge the difference of times, you would find that the great and fortunate victories in the days of Queen Elizabeth were not achieved so much by force and fighting as by fortune and providence and the fear the Spaniards conceived of us. For unless it were in the year 1587, when Sir Francis Drake made an attempt upon Cadiz road, and quelled the enemy that was preparing for an invasion of England; in 1588, when we were put upon our own defence; in 1596, when my Lord of Essex and my Lord Admiral took Cadiz, and defeated fifty nine ships of great value and burthen; and in 1602, when Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson took a carrack, destroyed and

seized upon certain galleys—the rest of the fleet employed by the Queen had never cause nor opportunity to shew their valour or force in a naval battle. Though I confess there were many other famous and fortunate voyages with wealth and reputation to our nation, as namely, and in my First Book I have treated, Drake to the West Indies in 1585, the Portugal expedition in 1589, the Earl of Cumberland the same year to the Islands, where he met with many encounters by land, and prevailed, and what ships fell into his hands was without resistance. Many other voyages were worthily performed by him; by the Lord Thomas Howard in 1591, the taking of a carrack by private ships in 1592, being a ship of great value; Drake and Hawkyns to the Indies in 1595, where they both died; Sir Martin Frobiser to Brest in 1594, and the Earl of Essex to the Islands in 1597.

And to make a short repetition of the Hollanders' actions, so unworthily boasted and bragged of by themselves and their friends. It cannot be found that they ever made a fight with six ships to six since their wars with Spain, which is nigh seventy years, though it is not to be doubted but that they have many able and sufficient captains amongst them, bred from their youth in sea affairs, that would have shewed themselves sufficient commanders if there had been occasion. And in the same manner would those of ours, you call unable captains, have done the like, for they are of the condition of the Hollanders I speak of; they know as much in ships, and how to govern or fight, as the longest-experienced captain that has had the fortune to exchange most bullets with the loss of their blood. I wonder that this can be an exception to our captains, but that such envious

persons will seek all pretences to slander them ; for how can you think that without practice of war men can become experienced captains ? And their purses will tell them they have not much furthered their employment since the death of Queen Elizabeth ; which shews not only an evil disposition, but a dangerous consequence that may light upon this kingdom by refusing their reasonable and convenient payments, seeing they mean thereby that we shall not only live in ignorance but to take away all occasions to breed soldiers and commanders. For war is not to be followed for pleasure if men see not the means to maintain it, or hopes of preferment. Let them consider that, in natural bodies, the longer one lives in health sickness is the more dangerous when it comes, and so it is in war falling upon a fruitful country that has long enjoyed tranquillity. And therefore, though no likelihood of war appear, yet do you like a skilful physician who prevents a disease before it seizes his patient rather than struggle with it when it has taken possession of him and his remedies come too late, for dangers may be sooner avoided by wise men than overcome by force and courage, so they be prevented in time.

Let these people I have spoke of pretend what they list, or frame fooleries to please their fancies, if they have no worse purpose in it, yet I am persuaded all ancient English men of honour, blood, and name, will contribute to the preservation of the Narrow Seas from the violence of oppressors, who seek unjustly and outrageously to commit disorders, which cannot be resisted but by numbers of ships to equal those that seek to commit this contempt upon his Majesty and his jurisdiction. And if people out of perverseness deny to con-

tribute to a design so just, noble, and of such reputation, when the matrons of Rome voluntarily offered their jewels and bracelets, which obtained great privileges, what shame will it be in you to deny it upon such slender and ill-grounded reasons? Let us compare our seas with our flourishing cities in England that are orderly and carefully governed. Think you it were well done of people to repine at the charge of their watches, as a needless expense in our peaceable commonwealth where our laws give authority to punish offenders? We may well believe that murders, thefts, and disorders will follow if such watches should be taken away and abolished. And the like, or greater, would ensue if the same providence and care were not had in the government of our seas. Now will I proceed to the management of the expedition in 1636, where the Earl of Northumberland commanded in chief.



## The Voyage itself.\*

Ships.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Masters.
Triumph	The Earl of Northumberland, Admiral Capt. Wm. Rainsborow	Robt. Noys	Wm. Cooke
St. Andrew	Sir John Penington, Vice-Admiral	Thos. Fox, And. Mennes	Thos. Rabnett
Victory	Captain Walter Stewart, Rear-Admiral	Thos. Barsey	John Craven
James Repulse	Sir Henry Marvin, Captain Lewis Kirke	And. Mennes Christopher Love	John Heaman John Man
Nonsuch	Captain John Povey	Leonard Lidcott	Reuben Broad
Unicorn	Sir Hen. Manwaring	Rd. Owen	John Wiles
Henrietta Maria	Thos. Porter	Ed. Popham	Thos. Askew
Defiance	David Murray	Hen. Reyes	Wm. Ellis
Charles	Thos. Kettleby	Thos. Wade	Jas. Bamford
Bonadventure	Hen. Stradling	Rice Button	Wm. Bradridge
Assurance	Jeremy Brett	John Berry	Nich. Roberts
Adventure	Thos. Price	—	David Hailes
Garland	Rd. Fogge	Thos. Moyle	Geo. Lamber-ton
Swallow	Thos. Kirke	Thos. Wynde	Wm. Nicholls
Entrance	Geo. Carteret	Wm. Browne	Thos. Newport
Convertine	John Bargrave	—	Rich. Seawell
Mary Rose	John Fletcher	—	John Lingwood
2nd Whelp	Philip Hill	—	Rd. Billiard
4th Whelp	Sir Elias Kirke	—	Tim. Bugby
5th Whelp	Peter Lindsay	—	Wm. Balolo
10th Whelp	John Burley	—	Jas. Warren
Roebuck	Francis Smith	—	Robt. Colborne
Greyhound	Robt. Slingsby	—	Robt. Wheeler
Swan frigate	Robt. Turner	—	Ab. Dunning
Fortune Pink †	—	—	Hen. Pett

\* *P. O. Decl. Accts.*, 2276. Northumberland received 4*l.*, Penington 2*l.*, and Marvin 1*l.*, a day. Rainsborow was paid 10*s.* and the captains of the larger ships 8*s.* a day; other commanders from 4*s.* to 6*s.* 8*d.* according to the rate of the ship. Lieutenants received 2*s.* 6*d.* a day.

† Northumberland's kitchen ship.

UNDER correction, I must crave leave and liberty to examine the errors and oversights committed in this voyage, if any shall appear, as I did in the beginning of my First Book and have continued till my last. Wherein I took upon me a freedom to except against the ill-carried actions of that time, and shew the way how they might be amended and better ordered, for small faults at the beginning may be easily prevented by admonition, if it be well followed. What I did was not out of fear or flattery, and, as I have said before, I walked so uprightly that if the commanders deserved well I gave them their due ; if ill, no man can say I spared them. Nay, I was so bold, that if there were any error or fault committed by the State in their directions, with modesty I reprov'd it and shewed my reasons for so doing, to give the better light to succeeding enterprises ; for experience is the mother of knowledge and to be valued above authority or opinion.

This royal fleet being all furnished and ready for the sea, but not without some defects in the ships, as appeared by the disasters that befel many of them, his Majesty made choice of the Earl of Northumberland, a gallant and hopeful young gentleman, to command as General. Though there could be no exception to the Lord of Lindsey, the former commander, his carriage giving no distaste to the King that ever I could hear of, as appeared by his Majesty's own words, declaring, that the reason of electing him was because he desired to breed up his nobility to give them encouragement to take a liking to the sea, by former precedents, as men principally to be chosen for great employments ; and that he meant to make a yearly custom to keep a fleet to guard and defend the seas. The ship appointed for

Vice-Admiral was the *Anne Royal*, equal in greatness and goodness with any of his Majesty's ships, and one that had made trial of her sundry fortunes. The first in the year 1588,\* where she was honoured as Admiral, and carried the arms of England, as due to the Lord Admiral, and this was the first time of her appearing at sea. The next action of hers was in the enterprise upon Cadiz in 1596, where my Lord Admiral commanded in her with no less victorious and honourable success than the first. She was chosen as much for her goodness as for my Lord's affection to the ship, for in truth she was worthy of all honour.†

But as Fortune is of that perverse and uncertain temper that she never sheweth herself constant, but mutable; and what she gives is not to continue long but only lent, since she has that power of herself that no body can hold her against her will; so this paragon of ships was attended with the greatest and crossest mishap that ever befel ship belonging to the Crown of England, and far unworthy her former exploits. For in her way from Chatham to Tilbury Hope, (a thing not to be believed if the lamentable truth did not put it out of doubt) whether through the negligence of the Officers of the Navy, or their indiscretion, or of the master, or the unskilfulness of the pilot, for in such cases every one will lay it upon another to excuse himself, she run aground and lay as a lost ship, a heavy spectacle to behold. An accident so rare that it made

\* Then called the *Ark Royal*.

† She was also the flagship in the Cadiz voyage of 1625 when her degenerate officers complained that she rolled unbearably and made them all sea-sick. Nottingham called her 'the odd ship of the world of all conditions.'



many ignorant and superstitious people divine and fear that some ill fortune would attend the voyage.\* It was the more wondered at because in the eighteen years' war under Queen Elizabeth no such disaster befel any of her ships, which had gone through more dangers and all kinds of hazards in the open and spacious ocean, where their business was, than ever happened since. But I thank God, (excepting the loss of her, which with the charge of another ship will be recovered, and that of a Whelp that miscarried by the insufficiency of the pilot)† the rest of the ships returned safe, though not without some peril which is naturally incident to sea affairs, and the rather in this because some men imputed it to carelessness, others to the insufficiency of officers, and some to destiny.

My Lord arriving in the Downs, expected his Vice-Admiral, the *Anne Royal*, which you have heard unluckily miscarried. He set sail with the rest of his fleet for the west country, and the *St. Andrew* was appointed by the King to supply the want of the *Anne Royal*. As there was occasion my Lord employed sundry of his ships in several services; and the *Victory*, one of the principallest, was sent into Spain and returned an ambassador from that King into England, he being forbidden the passage through France because of the wars betwixt the two kingdoms. Therefore they did not adventure to send him by sea, unless it were under the guard of one of his Majesty's ships.

\* The master and pilot gave contradictory orders and she was bilged upon her own anchor.

† The Fifth Whelp, which must be the one meant by *Monson*, was not lost at *Helvoetsluys* until July 1637; anyhow, the others can be traced after *Northumberland* returned.



### The Errors committed in this Voyage.

Now to proceed to the exceptions of this voyage, and collect such errors, mistakes, and oversights as seem worthy of reprehension, hoping it will give no more offence, or be imputed to presumption in me, any more than those I have excepted against in my First Book and part of this Second. With whom I have been free, not with an intent to dishearten or disparage them, but as a friend to warn them; for, according to the old saying, he that is warned is half-armed, and prevention is as much to be commended as valour in execution. It is held far greater wisdom to foresee than to see, the one being natural to all eyes to behold, the other proceeding from judgement, care, and discretion. Callicratidas, General of the Lacedæmonians, might have saved himself and his army had he hearkened to advice, in forbearing to charge the Athenians, but by his improvidence he was overcome.\* Quintus Fabius, the Roman, through his foresight and carefulness did the contrary, and retired for his advantage. Here appeared the wisdom of Fabius, and the headstrong wilfulness of Callicratidas; the one lost life and honour, the other purchased the name of Maximus, given him by his country.

Nothing can be a better instructor to a General than admonition by precedent, for which cause I bring these examples to give light to succeed-

\* At Arginusæ, 406 B.C.

ing times and succeeding commanders. The first exception against this expedition I observed, was, as I have said, the loss of the *Anne Royal*, which was neither blemish nor blame to my Lord General, for she followed the directions of others before she came under the command of him. I know not who well to blame, whether the master, pilot, or a disordered drunkenness, though in all likelihood it must principally lie upon the Officers of the Navy, who, for want of experience in sea affairs, are led principally by precedents of former times, it being too lamentable to behold that their government must depend upon the example of times.\* And yet, if they had but walked the paths of them that went before them, they should not have introduced this innovation to direct our fleets to Tilbury Hope, there to press men out of colliers and other merchant ships, when two small pinnaces might have done the same service, and as they were pressed have put them presently on shore, where they were to travel but three or four miles by land to Chatham, there to be entertained and entered into pay. And whereas they pass by the Ness in going from Chatham to the Hope or standing to sea, they might have been sooner

\* In 1636 the civil control of the Navy was in the hands of a committee of the Privy Council styled the Commissioners of the Admiralty. They were seven in number, but the Earl of Lindsey was the only one of them with any slight experience of the sea. Of the Navy Commissioners, Sir William Russell was Treasurer of the Navy, Kenrick Edisbury, Surveyor, Sir Henry Palmer, Comptroller, and Denis Fleming, Clerk. Palmer had been to sea, but Russell was a London merchant and Edisbury and Fleming little more than clerks; all were bent on gaining money by what they called perquisites but by processes which the law would have called theft. Monson's criticisms are not nearly so severe as those they suffered from their superiors and their subordinates.

at sea with that wind from Chatham than from the Ness to the Hope whither they went. Thus, you see, people that are governed by precedent failed in not following precedents, and this unhappy mishap that fell upon the Anne Royal came by a precedent of their own, which otherwise had not happened. This new begun precedent, I will undertake, was never with advice or consent of any captain, for they were put to an extraordinary expense by it, being a means to draw their friends and acquaintance aboard whom they entertain with costly banquets, which proves a greater charge to them than the whole voyage. And, till of late his Majesty did strictly prohibit it, more powder was wasted by their vain ostentation in shooting, than they spent otherwise in the journey.

\* The next error committed and never before used was the General keeping on board his ship and disliking the companies going on shore for pleasure. If this had been held an act of convenience in the Queen's time, that she had war, we should have found the mischief of it, and been ladened with sick and imperfect people when we advanced to sea, for nothing breeds diseases in men and ships like the pestering of people and being ill provided of apparel, and nothing breeds so great a health and comfort to them as their breathing on shore. I do think no reasons can be propounded to approve this a necessary benefit to the service, but it may be answered with many more arguments to contradict it, especially in such an action as this where no enemy is declared. I confess that negligence

\* The portion from here to 'the errors committed in the last voyage as I began' (p. 266) is only found in S.



in a commander at sea is not only to be blamed but chastened. In a case where ships retire to ports, to be furnished with water, with wood, ballast, victuals, with contrary winds and foul weather, a General that shall keep his company on board till he be fitted of them gives way for many inconveniences to ensue, for whereas the chiefest discretion of a General is to keep his men in health, this will be a means that sickness cannot be avoided. Secondly, it will prove a grief and discontent to sailors that are detained for that time as prisoners without just cause. Thirdly, it giveth them occasion to practise their escapes on shore and leave their ships unfurnished of men. Fourthly, it will be an evil example to future voyages, for men to absent themselves from the press and draw their hearts from his Majesty's service with no little prejudice to his affairs. If it be done to prevent disorders on shore, as I can conceive no other cause, the General's presence on land keeps men in as great awe and obedience as if they were on board, for wheresoever he is he carrieth a threatening authority over them, and a punishment from him is of greater terror and force than from an inferior magistrate. If this severity be taken with men for the safety of the ships arriving in a road, fearing they may be surprised by an enemy, it is to be considered that no fleet of an enemy can be descried on sea, and a General chance to be on land, but he shall have space sufficient to embark himself and company and to make three returns to his ships before a fleet can approach them with a fair wind. Of this we had experience in 1588, my Lord Admiral being on land when news was brought of the enemy directing their course for Plymouth, notwithstanding he and all his



company had leisure to ship themselves, to have home his anchors, and to give them a meeting at sea. This supposed security was so little dreaded or feared by Generals, in my time, that I never knew one of them lie on board their ships until the very time they were ready to depart, and yet the employment was known to be more dangerous, and therefore more careful, than now-a-days to be looked unto. I have known some cases where Generals and commanders have had better advantage to further their service by being on shore than if they had resided aboard their ships, for being on shore they had leisure and opportunity to treat with magistrates and settle businesses concerning their future affairs, which could not be so conveniently done with letters from aboard their ships. Moreover I will suppose that a fleet of the enemy be descried from the shore at Lands End, or the Lizard, or so far from Plymouth to the eastward, the wind being against them, a General shall be sooner advised by land than by sea, and much to his advantage if he be on land.

Some that would have eclipsed my Lord of Lindsey's carriage in his last action cast the frequenting on shore to his imputation, and perhaps it was a means my Lord of Northumberland avoided it because he would deserve no such blame of speech, and therefore excelled as much the other way by keeping on board, but to justify my Lord of Lindsey that he did nothing in that journey but what was noble, honourable, and justifiable, and that he lost no opportunity whereby he might do service, nor neglected occasion wherein he might give the King satisfaction, observe what followeth. The first aspersion laid upon him was, as I have said, his being too

common and familiar on shore, and giving leave to his company to do the like, whereby they took occasion to abuse and debosh themselves, the second, that he imposed the title of knighthood upon some gentlemen that was thought by service deserved it not. If these two conceived exceptions had been worthy of reprehension or of so great a blame as is imagined, it is like my Lord should have found some public rebuke, but being no further accused or questioned but in the vulgar people's reports, that, like the causes heard, need no further excuse or answer than that of Plutarch, that malice will not believe a friend, it hath an unbridled tongue, it speaks with envy, and will admit of no reason. Yet, because evil tongues shall be curbed and controlled, this following shall serve for a bridle to stop the foul mouths, for lavish speech and popular reports are like merciless fire that burns without respect if it be not suddenly quenched. Let envy do her worst, and shew herself as captious as she list, I will here present her with matter if she can find just cause to work upon it, or except against it, and make a brief repetition of my Lord's carriage in that journey and will aver what I shall say upon my reputation, and draw others to join with me that have been witnesses to it. He set sail from Tilbury Hope the 20<sup>th</sup> day of May with his whole fleet and arrived at the Downs the 27<sup>th</sup> day of the same, from whence he departed and repaired to the Isle of Wight the 6<sup>th</sup> day of June. By the way he had intelligence, which was confirmed after from the island, of the French and Hollanders meeting in a body of one fleet, not striking to speak big the what they would do to maintain the cause of their employment. This put a terror in the country where they

passed and gave intelligence one to another on shore as though they had been professed enemies. The place of their rendezvous was Portland, upon whose meeting there passed many shews of joy, not sparing to exchange powder and shot to welcome one another. My Lord's celerity, speed, and hearty desire to meet them, did appear by his keeping the sea against expectation of all men when he arrived, who did think it was impossible to get so far to windward, the wind and weather being so contrary, and notwithstanding that he found impediment by the breaking many topmasts \* and other defects in ships. In his way from the Isle of Wight to Portland he met with 68 Holland ships, which considering the place and intelligence he formerly received, he thought them to be the coasting fleet, but proving otherwise he dismissed them, but hoped at Portland to meet them. But here he found them gone for Torbay, liking not our neighbourhood, where we likewise chased them like hunters in pursuit of a herd of deer, but all in vain, for this vain fleet having knowledge of our approach, and fearing to be questioned for their haughty and lavish tongues, they utterly quitted our coast and retired to Brest in Brittany never more appearing for giving us offence. But here my Lord left them not, for seeing he had no more particular order further to follow them, and having done so much as he was directed, *viz.* to defend the honour and right of his Majesty's prerogative of the seas, yet, notwithstanding, in a witty manner he fitted a small bark whereby he understood the state, the strength, and the

\* Eleven ships sprung their masts or carried away top masts (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I. ccxcix. 28*).



design of that fleet and other forces then preparing, which gave his Majesty great satisfaction. This being the effects of the employing this fleet, and having performed so much as was enjoined him by his commission, there rested nothing more for him to do but to defend and make good his former act, and to encourage and hearten those shires that before had received fear. According to wind and weather, repairing the defects of ships and other wants incident to them, sometimes he repaired into the ports where he was entertained with great alacrity from the shore when they saw their security preserved and the morning duly employed according to the intention they meant it.\*

My Lord and his captains were not behind them in requital of their courtesy and spared not cost to entertain them on board their ships, which gave them so great content that his Majesty was much honoured at the charge of his captains. This civil and kind usage, by their own confession, was one great willingness to contribute to the setting forth of the next year's fleet, and I doubt not but the carriage of the second fleet has done the like to encourage a third, and one to succeed another successively so long as his Majesty shall have occasion to keep his ships at sea to the satisfaction both of King and subject, which will make a sweet consent and harmony in a commonwealth governed. When my Lord had done so much as concerned him in the westerly employment he returned to the Downs, and in his way visited every road and harbour for the countries to take notice of his Majesty's care of them, and of his being the minister employed therein. He

\* Obscure; but there is no other text with which this can be collated.



arrived at the Downs where two months' more of victuals was in readiness to be put on board him, and, as the wind gave opportunity upon his men victualling, he took occasion to range along the coast of France to abate the pride and insolence of the French when they should behold him. From thence he crossed over to the Isle of Wight, where by the way he met three East India ships distressed which he relieved, and here he stayed until he received order to repair to Chatham with some of his ships and dispose of others, some for the sea and the rest to winter at Portsmouth.

And here accounting the end of the voyage, having done as much as could be required at his hands, and as much by terror and fear as he could have done by force, if he had found resistance, which is all one in effect, for he that can attain his ends by fair means will not covet to have it by foul, and for a farewell to this fleet he made choice of six gentlemen whom he honoured with knighthood; this caused some exceptions to him for it by those perhaps that deserved it not so well. And because the quality of these six young knights shall appear, and also to prove that the like hath been done to men of meaner rank in less service when knights were more scarce than in these days, I will parallel them together, and then it shall be seen whether my Lord committed any error for so doing; but rather, if it be truly considered, he deserved commendation for an act that would encourage other gentlemen to put themselves into the actions at sea, for the future service of their prince and country. The first of these knights was the Lord Poulett, a man of that birth, merit, and means, that I know not where he could be scarcely equalled, laying aside his title which is far above it. The

next was his eldest son, a young gentleman who is like in all likelihood to succeed his father in fortune and virtue. The third, M<sup>r</sup> Douglas, son to the Earl of Murray, who giveth hope to follow his father's steps. The fourth, M<sup>r</sup> Charles Howard, whose name is sufficient to challenge that degree, having a fair possibility to a greater honour and descending out of Dukes and great houses. The fifth, was M<sup>r</sup> Digby, a gentleman of name and blood, whose ancestors have been honoured with that title, and the sixth was a Pensioner \* of the King's, who had no more honour done by it than his Majesty did to many of his fellows in his journey to Scotland when his absence kept him from it at that time. You see that three of them were not dignified by that title, and the fourth may prove as great as the greatest of them. And comparing these six with seven that were knighted by my Lord of Essex in the Islands journey, or observing times in comparison of this, and where the services were alike for any act done, you shall judge whether my Lord of Lindsey's six, or my Lord of Essex's seven had more cause of exception.† But to take away all scruple in that point, a man of honour will judge that a gentleman of quality and means to maintain it, that will put himself voluntarily into a warlike action where his life shall be endangered is more worthy of that dignity than other mercenary knights that neither will nor dare hazard to deserve it, and indeed it is an honour properly due to soldiers. The seven knights made in that journey to the Islands was a younger son to the Lord Evers, and though his degree

\* Qy. One of the Gentlemen Pensioners.

† Cf. *ante*, ii. p. 72.

of birth gave him a precedence of the rest yet he is inferior as I have said before to three, and the hope of power. The next was M<sup>r</sup> Arthur Gorges, a gentleman of quality, and at that time a younger brother. The third, was M<sup>r</sup> Thomas Vavasour, a Pensioner to the Queen and captain of one of her ships in that action. The fourth, was M<sup>r</sup> Edward Greville, at that time declined in his estate. The fifth, Captain Dockray, an ancient captain by land. The sixth Captain Browne, who went voluntarily in that journey, and the seventh a deboist young drunken German whose name I remember not. And, if you will require a strict account of all knights made since the last seven by my Lord of Essex, I think many of them will rather lose their knighthood then be enjoined to bring in their pedigrees to approve their blood, or record to make good their estate. And defending the honour and reputation of my well deserving Lord of Lindsey, it hath diverted me from my intention to collect the errors committed in the last voyage as I began.

My Lord of Northumberland being now at sea, and having ranged and scoured the shores of France, where it is most likely that fleet would have appeared if there had been any to have opposed him, he returned to the Sound of Plymouth, to be further informed of the state of things thereabouts. And finding no ships, nor shew of opposition to his design, he left the shore having received intelligence of certain Turkish pirates that lay hovering thereabouts, and had committed some spoils upon his Majesty's subjects. My Lord lost no time to hasten the pursuit of those pirates as he could be informed of them at sea, for in truth both his care and celerity were to be commended, though his haste had



little availed to have subdued the pirates if he had met them; for by reason of their swift sailing they have the advantage of all other ships they meet in the spacious and open sea. This may seem strange to them that know it not, that ships can be built to such advantage in sailing, all of them being built with one kind of iron and timber; but what follows will make it apparent to any that doubt of it.

You must understand that all the Turkish pirate ships are vessels of Christians, taken from them by violence, which when the Turks are possessed of they use all art and industry to make better sailers than all other ships. To this purpose they first cut down their half decks, and all other weighty things over head which make them wind-tight and burthensome; they take out most part of their knees and all other binding works to make them nimble and swift, like a man that is straitly trussed, and has his doublet buttoned, that by loosening it he is able to run the faster. They never regard the strength of their ships more than for one voyage, for they want not continual prizes which they take of Christians and thus use. Every fortnight or three weeks they grave their ships and make them clean, to go the better; they carry no weight over head, or in hold, but victuals, by means whereof and all these things considered no ship is able to equal them in going. The only hope I confess my Lord had, if they had met them, which in truth was very uncertain, was in a storm over-bearing them with sail, and then the others would have been forced to take in their sails. The second, if there happened a calm, and the pirates scattered so that they could not help one another, with the number of his

long boats he might board and master them with the multitude of his small shot. The third, was to surprise them in harbour where they could not get out and escape. The fourth, that with less and nimble ships they might have the hap to board some of them, and so keep them employed to hinder their way till greater ships could come to relieve them. But all these are uncertain.

My Lord being now at sea with his fleet and looking out diligently for pirates, he met with an Irish ship, lately come from France; and being asked for news of that coast he did assure him that the French fleet, which made so great a noise, was fitted and gone to the eastward of the Channel, and that it was generally supposed they meant to beleaguer Dunkirk by sea. This intelligence made my Lord immediately bear up, and take that wind to follow them, but arriving at the Downs within few days after he found himself imposed upon and abused by this false information, for neither was there any such fleet arrived nor any likelihood of their coming. At this time the wind continued so long westerly and southerly that my Lord was not able to recover the western parts again, by which means the pirates committed great insolences and spoils upon the coasts. The error and oversight of the carriage of this business was in giving over much credit to the report of the Irishman, it being the ground my Lord was to proceed upon afterwards; and had he waited but a few hours before he stood to eastward he might have been informed of the truth thereof by ships that continually passed the Channel. Whether the Irishman might not have been corrupted by the French to give false intelligence, to divert my Lord's purposes,

could not speedily be determined by only asking questions; for the like happened heretofore in our war with Spain, the Spaniards subtly causing a caravel of advice to be taken with counterfeit letters, directed to the General of the West Indian fleet, requiring him to come home in thirty-five degrees. Which we, finding by the letters, hastened into that height to expect them, but the true and former directions to the General was to haul in thirty-six degrees and twenty leagues to the northward of it, whereby he avoided us so many leagues. It should have been likewise considered, and men of greater experience than my Lord should have made it known to him, that there was no great occasion to pursue the French with that unadvised haste. For their anchoring before Dunkirk, to beleaguer it at sea, is no more to the taking of the town than if they had kept their ships in the ports of France; for the coast gives no liberty to land, being a plain flat and sandy shore. Besides, they run a great hazard, both to ships and men, being there at an anchor, for if a storm take them with a wind out of the sea they cannot avoid both shipwreck and death of men. Besides, why should the King of France put an army in peril to invade Flanders by sea when his territories lie within nine miles of Dunkirk by land? And to prove the danger the ships were to undergo had they brought themselves to an anchor on that coast, I will shew, as it were in a glass, an accident that happened on the like case wherein their folly would have appeared. When our wars of 1625 began with Spain, some men, out of singularity to get fame, which proved but a shame by their ignorance, with certain ships of war undertook to surprise the enemy's vessels lying at Mardike, a new



harbour near Dunkirk. And though this overture was much opposed by experienced seamen, who alleged unanswerable reasons against the enterprise, yet wilfulness had that predominate power over wit and reason that the contriver of this stratagem attempted his idle project and commanded the ships to anchor where they were directed. Before they had lain there long they were surprised with a storm at north-west, so that they could not claw off the shore, and, in short, three of the ships, with all the men, wilfully perished, the enemy on land beholding it. This made a doleful cry and complaint in the ports of Dover and Sandwich, for there appeared flocks of widows bewailing their miseries through the mad and silly undertaking of ignorant directors. Here you see the danger of putting authority in the hands of inexperienced men, except they be accompanied with skilful directors, and the danger that may ensue to them in taking so great a command upon themselves when they know not how to govern.

If the French had thought that the beleaguering of Dunkirk with ships would have cut off relief and succour from sea, their weakness and want of knowledge in sea affairs had appeared, not in words, but by example, precedent, and proof of the thousand Spaniards at Dover before spoken of, who notwithstanding there were forty or fifty ships of war of Holland placed to intercept them, some in the road of Dover, others in the roads of Gravelines and Dunkirk, yet, by my advice and counsel aforesaid, arrived safe in the port of Dunkirk, the hour and tide assigned by me for the town to bid them welcome. And because this shall be a light to aftertimes, (if there be the like occasion) this knowledge they shall receive

from me, that with a leeward wind, and a leeward tide, ships may pass into the ports of Flanders in despite of any force that shall forbid them.

My Lord lying at the Downs, waiting a north-east wind to carry him to the place whence the south-west wind first took him, in the mean time his Majesty resolved upon an employment for his Lordship of greater importance than this was, *viz.* to send him to the northward amongst the fishermen that fished there, to make good his Majesty's proclamation, not long before divulged, to prohibit and forbid any such fishing upon his coasts of England and Scotland by all foreign nations that would not acknowledge his Majesty's prerogative on those seas.

My Lord was as ready to perform that service as his commission gave him authority to do it, for no man can charge him with negligence, and with speed repaired to the places of fishing aforesaid, where he met many busses of Holland, of whom he took, by way of tribute, (acknowledging his Majesty's regality) a certain sum of money from each of them; though some other fishing vessels escaped by flight, fearing they should have been worse used than the rest of their fellows were. But neither do I hear that the States of Holland do approve this act, as allowed or allowable by them, such is the pride and ingratitude of popular States. But if I may speak without offence to this point, or that my opinion had been demanded what to have done herein, I should have advised that my Lord should have repaired to Bressa Sound, in Shetland, an island belonging to his Majesty by his kingdom of Scotland, there to have arrived the two or three and twentieth of June, a time limited by the Hollanders to make their abode in that port. The day following, the four

and twentieth, they have liberty by their own laws to put out of harbour to cast their nets and to prosecute their fishing. Thus had his Majesty brought the Hollanders to his mercy, possessed their strength, their wealth, and indeed their whole provinces, which he might have released and restored afterwards, if he had pleased, upon acknowledging a sovereignty, and obliging them to pay a yearly acknowledgement. This would have shewed a commanding power over them, and yet directed by goodness and mercy. And thus much of the voyage in 1636.

I will now address myself to advise such great persons as shall take upon them the command of Generals by sea.

#### THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS OF 1635 AND 1636.

Northumberland's Instructions were nearly the same as Lindsey's in the preceding year and had especial reference to the exaction of the Salute and the enforcement of the English claim to the Sovereignty of the Narrow Seas. In addition to this it was his duty, as Monson says, to watch a French fleet supposed to be destined for Dunkirk, and it may be that his appearance at sea did divert the French from that project. But his move westward was, primarily, to secure the passage of Sir Francis Stewart who was bringing treasure for Philip from Spain to Dunkirk. The idea of making the Dutch fishermen take a licence from the English Crown in order to prosecute their calling in the North Sea was by no means new in principle; but it was put in force under new conditions which made the question one full of danger in its application, for the Dutch now resented keenly any step which might be used as an argument against their contention that the sea was free. There was a report in England that the refusal of the Dutch would be supported by the active assistance of a French fleet,<sup>1</sup> but anything that Baron Charnacé, the French ambassador at the Hague, may have said was formally disavowed by his government. Early in 1636 Charles had informed the Dutch ambassador of his intention to assert

<sup>1</sup> Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. III., App. p. 72.



what he considered his rights, but the Dutch government eventually decided to confine resistance to placing a protest on record. It may be noticed that while the Earl of Northumberland sailed into the North Sea to collect fishing money from the Dutch, Saltee pirates were taking English fishing boats in the western Channel. In the North Sea the Admiral proceeded to various high-handed measures, including the seizure of Dutch men-of-war acting as convoy ships, and he succeeded in extorting 50*l.* from the fishermen by threats of taking out their crews and nets.

In 1637 it was thought that some of the risks inherent in the attempt to prosecute the claim might be avoided if the Cardinal Infant, Ferdinand, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, could be persuaded to recognize the efficacy of the English licences and spare their Dutch holders from capture; this might have tempted the Dutch and would have been an implicit recognition by both Spain and Holland of English sovereignty. There seemed to be some likelihood of success at Brussels, but the Spanish admiral commanding in northern waters declared that he would not recognize such protections for a moment so that the scheme at once broke down. This failure occurred in June, 1637, but the Admiralty had already sent Northumberland a stock of licences entitling him to levy a shilling a ton from each fishing boat, and directing him to capture those who persisted in fishing after refusing to take them. Circumstances rendered Charles disinclined to risk the consequences that might have followed the use of open force, and Northumberland was expected to cajole or deceive the Dutch fishermen into receiving the licences. He did not appear on the scene himself and the Dutch, more strongly convoyed this year, were deaf to the threats or blandishments of his representative.

No doubt the English ship-money fleets were taken very seriously abroad, and so far justified their existence, but if foreign ministers had seen some of the reports made by those who served in them they might have inspired less respect. The civil administration, both in the dockyards and at the Navy Office, was rotten from top to bottom; it may be asserted roundly that no official did his duty, even if he knew it, and that very few of them, whether officials or workmen, were honest. Practically there was no administrative head, and therefore no responsible authority to receive and distribute orders and be answerable for their execution. The results always showed themselves at sea, whether in fleets or single cruisers, throughout the reign, and under the stress of active

service the ship-money fleets would soon have broken up from the bad workmanship put into the ships, the bad quality of the victuals, and the inefficiency of officers and men, just as did the great fleet of 1625 and its successors. Sickness raged in both Lindsey's and Northumberland's fleets, so that in both years several ships were disabled from this cause alone. In August, 1635, Penington wrote to Nicholas that the fleet was then nearly immobilized by disease and desertion among the crews;<sup>2</sup> in 1636 the men, with much experience of the royal service, ill-fed, unclothed, and unpaid, were only anxious to desert when any opportunity offered and were quite willing to sacrifice the wages owing to them for the chance of freedom. When the crew of the Anne Royal was turned over to the St. Andrew, after the accident to the former, 220 out of 250 men seized the occasion to run away. That the men were half naked was due, again, to the iniquity of the administrative officials. In December the captain of the James, still in commission, wrote to the Lords Commissioners that most of his men were sick from exposure due to want of clothing, having 'scarcely rags to hide their skins'; that they would 'rather starve than buy them' he attributed to the heavy fees levied by clerks and others on the sale to the men.<sup>3</sup>

Northumberland was very dissatisfied with everything while in command and soon made his opinions clear; he was nearly ready to say of his ships as George II. said of his generals, that he did not know whether they inspired fear in the enemy but they did in him. The Earl drew up his indictment in the form of a series of articles for the information of the King and Privy Council.<sup>4</sup> The Repulse, Defiance, Assurance, Mary Rose, and Adventure were old, he said, unseaworthy, and could not work their guns; all these ships were of the reign of James I., the Mary Rose being only thirteen and the Adventure fifteen years old, while much money had at various times been expended on their repairs. The Black George, Tenth Whelp, St. Denis, and Dreadnought he held not to be worth repair; the Dreadnought dated from 1612, the Whelp was only eight years old, the St. Denis was a prize, and the Black George a storeship. Other vessels required girdling to stiffen them and were over-burdened with great stern and quarter galleries; all were more or less leaky, and the masts, yards, and cordage of the Triumph, Defiance,

<sup>2</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* 31st August, 1635.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* cccxxxvii. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* cccxxxviii. 39.

Victory, and Swallow defective and bad. Of the crews he reported that out of 260 men on board the *James* there were not more than twenty who could steer, that in the *Unicorn* there was hardly a seaman except the officers, that of the crew of the *Entrance* a third had never been to sea and only twelve could take the helm, and that in general the men were weak physically, insufficiently clothed, and that in all the ships were many who had never been to sea. There were plenty of good seamen in England but they ran away or bribed the pressmasters. There was a contemporary proverb that 'the pressmaster carryeth the able men in his pocket,' *i.e.* the money they had paid him to be passed over. Although the ships were so laden with stores and provisions that they would neither steer nor sail, the provisions themselves were bad in quality and, when served out, short in quantity; in the beer, for instance, the men lost a quarter of their allowance, the missing quantity being a perquisite of the purser. Sick men had either to be kept on board, a source of danger to their fellows, or to be turned ashore helpless and starving to die, as some had been seen to die, in the streets. Others of his articles deal with the exorbitant prices of clothes, due to the fees levied on them, the incapacity or dishonesty of the management of the Chatham Chest, and the routine methods of the paymaster which bore hardly upon the men even when he had any money wherewith to pay them.<sup>5</sup> Sir John Penington, one of the best seamen of that generation, endorsed Northumberland's strictures.<sup>6</sup>

If Charles was justified in the use of the prerogative in 1634-5 for the purpose of calling upon the ports and coasts to assist in the equipment of a fleet he was certainly justified in asking for money instead of the ships themselves, for, as has been remarked several times, the merchantmen were no longer of any use in the fighting line. The principle, however, was maintained by the allocation of the cost of each man-of-war to a particular district.<sup>7</sup> The real accusation against the

<sup>5</sup> Clothes had been sometimes sold to the men, either provided by the Admirals or as a private speculation, during the reign of Elizabeth, but the provision became departmental, under the Navy Commissioners, from 1627 (*S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxxvii. f. 57). A storehouse at Deptford, with a clerk in charge, was set apart for the supply and the prices were at once loaded with a commission of fifteen per cent. to pay expenses.

<sup>6</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* cccxxvi. 13.

<sup>7</sup> *Pipe Off. Decl. Accts.* 2436.



King, now and throughout his reign, lies in the use made of the money spent on the Navy, for he never produced one efficient fighting fleet, either by reason of his natural inability to select capable men as administrative officials or in consequence of the personal attention he bestowed on naval administration and his interference in it. Monson's paper of criticisms on Lindsey's voyage is printed as an Appendix (*post*, p. 380), but it is a commonplace production and is more remarkable for what it does not say than for what it says. It will be noticed that he is entirely silent about the superior administration and dilates upon comparatively immaterial points; it was evidently written with a view to further employment and a desire to offend no one who could injure his prospects.

It is rather curious that while the principal object of Lindsey's fleet was to exact the Salute, as affirming the British Sovereignty of the Four Seas, the only effective opportunity occurred after the body of the fleet had returned to port, when the chance of enforcing it fell to a single ship. Captain Henry Stradling, in the *Swallow*, met two French men-of-war (one of them a 32-gun ship) off the Lizard and, at first, they both bore up to windward defiantly. Stradling fired at them, when they at once struck their flags and lowered their topsails, saluting the *Swallow* with three guns to which she answered with one. Edward Nicholas was very jubilant about this incident: 'I write this in particular as having been one of the most remarkable passages that has happened in this late expedition, between his Majesty's ships and the French, and it was done since my Lord of Lindsey came in.'<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Hist. Man. Com. Report VI., App. p. 279.

## Advice to Great Persons and inexperienced Generals at Sea.

COMMONLY great persons of authority, place, and blood, are elected and chosen chief commanders in great expeditions and actions at sea, to give the greater honour and reputation to such enterprises as they shall be employed in. And therefore, as a servant to such great persons, I will advise, by way of caution, some things before they accept of so weighty and important a charge, who cannot challenge it out of experience, or other deserts more than their prince's favour and their own greatness, for many times perilous dangers and uncertain casualties depend upon such uncertain employments.

Many examples, both ancient and modern, shew, that the best-deserving Generals have bitterly tasted the displeasure of their employments. For no man's carriage can be so clear, without blot or blemish, or his success prove so uncontrollable, but there may be found some cause of exception by evil and malignant spirits that he shall leave behind him, and who, perhaps, will be made judges to censure his actions. So dangerous a thing it is to come under the hands of ire and wrath, for that we call ire the Grecians termed a desire of revenge, which is sometimes increased upon provocation, and sometimes proceeds only from ill nature. It has that evil and cankered disposition that it believes not a friend ;

it speaks with malice and will not admit of reason ; it will bury men alive and unbury them being dead, and the greater your desert in your employment, the greater malice attends it from such perverse defamers. The worst is there is no defence against such envy, for we are all the sons of envy ; we are born, live, and die with envy : she spreads herself and poison against those that fortune raiseth highest, and sets her thoughts to dispraise desert. There is an old proverb amongst good men, 'That God will defend them from wicked persons and the tumult of the common people.' The second cause that makes men covet employment is to shine above others in authority, as a means to obtain their haughty ends, which may be truly termed ambition. Ambition is of that nature that it sees not what is before her eyes, nor considers the state and uncertainty of man's life ; for if he be of low degree he stands upon brass, if high, he treads upon glass. His ascendant way is rugged and the height slippery ; he climbs by steps and degrees, but falls suddenly when he least looks for it.

There are three things that make a man's way dangerous to walk in, ice, glory, and ambition. There is no affection so great as ambition, though naturally it is insatiable : like a hungry dog, that will leave his first prey and fall upon another, so is ambition, not respecting what one hath got but still seeking more. Nothing doth more nourish this humour of ambition than base flattery, and a man had better fall amongst thieves than flatterers. Your best natures are observed to be aptest to embrace flattering counsels, like worms that easily creep into soft and sweet wood. But the difficulty is how to know such flatterers from others, for wolves resemble dogs and flatterers



look like friends. The cunning of a flatterer is how to entice good natures with hopes, for there is nothing more sweet to man than hope, nor any thing more displeasing than to be debarred his hope. Therefore time will be the discoverer of such deceitful sycophants ; for when a man shall suspect such a one let him not connive with his untruths or delays but tie him to a limited and prefixed time to perform what he gives hope of, because nothing but delays gives him advantage to deceive. Thus shall the flatterer be taken in his own snare, when he shall fail of performing what he promised, and the party flattered shall own that nothing is so vain as to be deluded with idle hopes of glory. It is like a soldier that is led by an ill captain into error, and yet with a seeming pleasure. The third thing an inexperienced commander is to fear is the doubtfulness and deceitfulness of Fortune, in whose ship he must embark himself to try the inconstancy of the sea. The power of Fortune is so universal that she rules kingdoms and overcomes armies ; she destroys princes and raises tyrants, and indeed she is so obstinate and perverse that no art can prevail against her or detain her by force. She is like a spirit not to be touched or treated with ; she hath a bewitching power unavoidable by man, for the evil she gives we see not ; she pinches and we feel it not ; what she says we hear not, and when we think we have her she is farthest from us. Her property is to bereave us of sense that no sight or example shall help us, as we see by many men that lose their money at play and yet cannot forbear it ; and though some marry and repent, yet they will not be warned by it ; and though people be daily drowned yet it will not terrify others from adventuring to sea, still hoping for better

hap, like desperate gamesters that put their fortune upon a chance at dice. Whereas, if they would duly consider, the best hap at play is not to play at all, for though Fortune give the luck to win one day, she revokes it the next with double loss. Beware of her therefore, for she never truly favours, but flatters; she never promises what she intends to perform; she never raises one so high but she plucks him down as low again; she shews herself not so fickle or wavering in any thing as in accidents of war where success is uncertain. Hercules, who escaped so many dangers by land and sea, at last died by the hands of his friends. Alexander ended not his days in the war but was supposed to be basely poisoned. Julius Cæsar, who won fifty two battles, was killed sitting in the peaceable senate house. The way to revenge one's self of Fortune, and to avoid the evil in her, is rather to submit to reason than to rely on her. The Carthaginians\* would never judge of fortune, effect, or success but according to wisdom, judgement, and discretion. They would not be raised by good fortune, or dejected by bad, but like a tree well rooted that no wind or weather could move. For my part I think the wisdom of man is to be temperate, mild, and patient, and to take in good part what Fortune sends.

You may see by what is gone before the property of malice and fortune. So that a great commander is not to encounter with an enemy alone to shew his valour against, but the other two will also have an interest in him which wisdom cannot prevent: but the safest way, in general, is to observe the admonitions following

\* Qy. the Romans.

for the best securing of himself and action. The first, is maturely to examine his own ability and whether he covets the employment himself, or not, or that it was imposed on him by the King. If desired by himself it is the more dangerous, and what errors he commits are the less excusable, and he put to rely on the favour of the prince only for excuse. Let it be the one or the other, his securest way will be humbly to crave his Majesty that such a Vice-Admiral may be appointed as is approved for his sufficiency and integrity; but not to give him that authority and command as to derogate from his honour, and yet to give him that power that nothing do pass without his approbation and signed with his own hand. And because this chosen man shall never be absent and unable to deliver his advice it will be convenient he be resident aboard the General, and still ready and at hand, and for him to appoint an able man in his own ship till they come to battle. So necessary a thing it is to have a man of experience and judgement to be assistant and always at hand to a young General. This did Philip, King of Spain, to his natural brother Don John of Austria, in the famous battle of Lepanto. Don John being young, valiant, and forward, it was thought convenient to temper him with a grave adviser, which was Don Lewis de Requesens, Comendador Mayor of Spain. In the action in 1588, for England, the same King employed the Duke of Medina Sidonia for General, but gave authority to Don Diego Flores de Valdes, a man of great experience, to advise and counsel him, which proved a happiness to the Duke, for the enterprise failing by the counsel of Valdes, as is to be seen in my First Book, the blame lighted on Valdes, which he worthily deserved; and the



less fault was found with the Duke for it. This advice of mine is noway dishonourable to such a General for what good success shall happen will be attributed to him, for all men will not know this private instruction. I would not say thus much if I were not a friend and servant to nobility, and desired their spirits might be nourished in such brave employments ; and will be ready with my best endeavours to do them all the honour that lies in my poor power.

How a King should elect a General by Land  
or Sea, a Counsellor of State, and a  
Governor over his People and Provinces.

ADDRESS to the Reader :—Noble and well-deserving captains and gentlemen ! What I have said to you is no more than your years and experience have taught you by the occurrences and passages of war in the times of Queen Elizabeth and King Charles, wherein you lived and were actors. I fear the tediousness of this that shall follow will disgust you, but I considered with myself of the coherence betwixt history and arms, for all authors, in all ages, and in all degrees have symbolized them together, making them depend one upon the other, like loving companions in society, amity, and inseparable friendship. When the Romans most flourished in arms they were more advanced by learning than by war. When Julius Cæsar was with his army he was wont to have his lance in his right hand and his book in his left, and when he quitted the one he betook himself to the other. Histories are the chronicle and record of noble acts which otherwise would die, and Cicero tells us they should be carried with that uprightness that shall not publish falsehoods nor dissemble truths. My drift in this discourse is to handle the condition and state of Kings, their election of counsellors, generals, governors, captains, and soldiers, each in their profession and calling, in which I do desire to advance the honour of Kings

and princes, out of a zeal I bear to monarchy, under which I was born, now live, and will ever love.\*

Having declared in my Third Book the office of a General by sea, and, in this Second, admonished such Generals as take upon them so weighty and important a charge, without experience first gained, to be cautious and wary before they accept of such a command, now shall follow the care a King ought to have in the choice of a General, either by land or sea. And because Generals are commonly guided by instructions from a King, resolved on by his council of state, to which consultation Generals are seldom called till the charge of the expedition be committed to their management, I will now give my private opinion what kind of man a King should make election of for a counsellor of State to be assisting to him with his advice ; of a General, who has the rule and government of his forces and actions ; and of a governor, whom he sends into several countries and provinces to rule over his subjects. For the prosperity of his kingdoms depends upon their sufficiency, *viz.* a counsellor to advise, a General to execute, and a governor to rule.

I will begin with the counsellor of State, as the first considerable thing a prince ought to think of. A King's election must be according to the profession the party is bred in, as artificers' tools are chosen to do their office and labour, for a King is abused, and his judgement questioned, that shall be made to believe all men are capable of all places and employments, when indeed some of them are of no more use than an axe to an auger, or a knife to a sickle ; and it is as unseemly a thing to prefer

\* This ' Address to the Reader ' is found only in S.



such a counsellor as to present armour to a woman, books to a clown, or nets to a scholar. Kings therefore must have a care to whom they commit the affairs of the realm, either domestic or foreign, civil or ecclesiastical, and not refer all to one man, for they are distinct things that require several counsellors, and not to be executed by him that thinks a King's favour adds knowledge to his conceived understanding.\*

The counsellor that is most fatal to a commonwealth is the unworthy favourite to a King, that useth his countenance to unlawful ends. The name of a favourite is a new word but an old wound to people that taste his displeasure; his condition is to be naturally proud, ambitious, revengeful, and wants no other vice to deserve hate, which breeds sorrow in the subjects to see their sovereign so seduced, and both in one injured, for his property is by his master's power to bring in innovations as well in court as country. To alter laws and raise discontents they suppress the noblest, and support the unworthiest, banish the innocent, and embrace base flatterers, despise the virtuous and entertain the vicious, and they invent delights to please princes. The scandal of commonwealths is when a prince makes more of a favourite than of well deservers, and he cannot be called a just prince that will rather satisfy the covetous desire of one than the grievances of many; and yet more is the boldness and madness of such a prince that doth those unworthy things than the shameless impudence of a favourite that desires it. It was written by the tutor of Alexander that that prince was not

\* The portion from here to ' flattery than force ' (p. 289) has only been found in S.

wise but mad, or worse than mad, that would adventure himself for the love of one and not seek to be loved of all, or rely upon such a one rather than him of greater counsel who perhaps is chosen out of merit and not out of fancy. Mark Antony saith it is great reason a prince should follow the opinion of many wise counsellors, than yield to him that is but one.

When these impostors are thus engulfed in their ambitious folly, and aspire to higher things than they can govern, they run headlong into a sea, wanting a compass to sail with, discretion to judge, and anchors of experience to hold by. And, because they cannot amend the evils they invite, they engulf themselves into a greater ocean, that for want of knowledge makes a prince infamous that giveth advancement to those that deserve it not. If a King favour one more than another, that is proper and incident by instinct of nature to all men, yet let his preferment be according to the other's education, as learning, courtship, exercise of body or things he is capable of. But above all let him beware he choose him not for a counsellor, for by his power with the King he will bring in other counsellors to concur with him in all his propositions, be they good or bad. And being naturally ambitious, splenitive, and revengeful, they care not what they put upon a King to serve their perverse humours, like a whore whose tongue is steeped with malice. Princes that hearken to them are made more miserable than other men because commonly truth is kept from them, and Seneca saith that he wanteth all that wanteth one to tell truth, or he may happen upon such a prince that doth desire rather to be obeyed than counselled. Theopompus being demanded how a prince might preserve his estate, answered by

giving his friends liberty to speak and keeping his subjects from oppression. We are not without example how hateful favourites have made odious princes. Jeronimo, King of Cyprus, was wholly governed by his favourite, Andromodo, which was the death of him.\* Perennis was favourite to Commodus, Otho to Galba, which brought all their masters to destruction. The Romans' virtues appeared when they banished parasites that were in the nature of favourites, and raised their worthiest men, who they esteemed not so much for their birth as for their worth.†

The word favourite makes it not so hateful as custom hath begot it, for a good and discreet disposed man in authority may do both his master and commonwealth good service; but latter times hath bewitched favourites, as though God would have no more good come by them than by damnable witches. They are no sooner come into the grace of a prince but they entertain three followers, *viz.*; Folly, Fancy, and Flattery, and reject and abandon Virtue, Goodness, and Wisdom. They will not know that a good favourite should have these properties;—to endeavour that his works be good and just, to persuade a prince to peace and avoid occasion of war, to content himself with competency, to let his gettings for himself and friends be with moderation; if he affect title of honour to be without hurt or hate to others, and not to make it mercenary; to have his house well governed, the servants well disposed; to be charitable and pay his debts duly; to avoid suits or the countenance of them. They shall consider

\* *Sic* in MS. Qy. Hieronymos, King of Syracuse, and Andranodoros.

† This diatribe against favourites is evidently directed to the address of Buckingham.



that princes should not be swayed so much by their own affection as by the public utility of the kingdom, if it were put in their heads by a wise and discreet favourite, for take it for a maxim that a man cannot be both a friend and a flatterer to a prince. The next bane to Kings are flatterers who follow their fortunes, and not themselves. Princes ought therefore to take heed what they speak, for their words are no sooner out of their mouths than hold is taken of them by a flatterer, that chameleon like will take advantage and make uses of them, as (to the contrary) good men without blushing will admonish a King, if words escape him, that his flattering courtier will not, nor dare not do. Agesilaus, King of Sparta, said he liked well to be praised of his friends, who would not spare to blame him if he gave occasion. A flatterer doth bite like lice, and may be compared to them, for as vermin never haunt the dead after the blood is out of him so will a flatterer never approach a man when he is decayed. The definition of flatterers is they are the pest of praise, the soft bed whereon princes lie in their insecure security of vice, and enticing music that draws them from the true rule of reason and discerning of the good, a golden pill in which is hid most deadly poison, they see not the truth but through the passion of bad servants and flatterers. Instead of flattery how happy were that commonwealth where Kings would lend their ears to clemency, piety, mercy, justice and to hear the complaints of the oppressed, such a prince is a dove in condition, sweet in words, quiet in thought, acceptable in conversation and full of integrity. He is displeasing to none but evil natures, to the sharp, contumelious, tumultuous, fearful, and the obdurate in heart. The clemency of Cyrus to Croesus, King of Lydia, was of great

value to his conquest, for he got the love of all the Greeks by it. Augustus Cæsar pardoned a kinsman of Pompey, who afterwards practised his death again, and yet once more he gave him his life, saying 'this day shall begin our friendship.'\* This got Cæsar love, and both he and his uncle Julius Cæsar were more envied by his enemies in sparing than if they had killed them, and they were more praised for their clemencies than for their victories; by the first they overcame by themselves, the other by the valour of their armies, fortune, and prevention. Cicero saith that nothing makes a man like God but in pardoning, for it makes a man not only love him but all others that see it; mercy and truth defend Kings and their Crowns as that cruelty never escapes unpunished. Xerxes found the effect of flattery to his own destruction, for his army being so great that Greece could not detain them, trusting to flattery or flatterers he had an ignominious overthrow; some told him the sea groaned under the heavy burden of his navy, others, that it was to be feared that by the escape of his enemies he should lose the triumph of a glorious victory. Amongst thousands of flatterers one faithful servant called Demaratus told him that a confused multitude had more weight than strength, evil to govern, and not to be trusted; he was visibly overthrown by flattery having the greatest army that ever trod upon earth. Curtius saith that princes are oftener overthrown by flattery than force.

Kings and princes ought to have two especial cares in the government; the one, how to rule in peace, the other, how to carry their affairs in war; both which must depend upon the choice of

\* Lucius Cinna; the story is given by Seneca and used by Montaigne. Many of Monson's philosophical reflections are adapted from Montaigne.

counsellors who must be provident what they advise, and assured that what they say is honest, necessary, profitable, and possible. They must not quickly determine lest they repent at leisure : they must advise slowly, but execute speedily. They must not rely on the name and false word of Fortune ; for to great persons she is deceitful, to good men unstable, and to all unsure. A good counsellor ought to have these properties ; to be good and just, for such have weight in their words ; to be virtuous and speak truth, as well in absence as in presence ; they must be plain in business and reprehend with love ; they must praise the good and admonish the bad ; they ought not to speak much, and when they do to let it be to purpose ; for what they have in their mouths must be the picture of their hearts. If their opinion be asked in point of war they must be cautious what to answer, for the security, honour, and good hap of their master depends on it, and the man's reputation of wisdom will appear by it. Which, when it shall be known to his enemy, will breed terror, for when King David had war with Absalom, he prayed, ' That God would blind the understanding of his principal counsellor Achitophel, whom he more feared than the force of Absalom's host.'

A counsellor cannot give a better answer to his master's demand in point of war, than Augustus Cæsar did in the like case, who said, ' That a war ought to be commanded by the Gods, justified by philosophers, maintained by princes, and executed by wise captains and courageous soldiers.' And moreover he advised, ' That neither battle nor war be undertaken unless there evidently appear more hope of gain than fear of danger.' He compares it to him that angles with a golden hook,



which, if it be snatched away, the fish that is taken cannot countervail the loss. Cæsar would not so much rely upon himself, as upon the opinion of Virgil, how a commonwealth should be best governed; who answered, 'If wise men hold the helm, and good men be seated in place over the bad; if the best men have due honour, and the rest be not injuriously dealt with; if judges and men in authority will not be led by malice, friendship, anger, or love.' For nothing ruins commonwealths but hypocritical and covetous counsellors, that persuade Kings to unreasonable things as in laying taxes upon subjects, and make a prince believe he cannot err, all to support their deceitful credit. But a wise King will soon know such a counsellor by observing his words, which will discover his intentions and lay open his conditions. And a just King will reward him that shall thus falsely seduce and corrupt, as in reason he should be rewarded that poisons a public fountain or spring whereof all people drink, for both King and subject have part of this pernicious counsel. A King therefore ought to be careful of three things; the first of himself, the second of his subjects, and the third of his counsellors, officers, and servants; for Cæsar in his time complained of the miseries of princes, saying, 'They are subject to perfidiousness, to imaginations, to detestable treasons, deceitful conspiracies, and destructive poisons; some deceive, and others flatter and betray them'; so that they are made the subject of all discourse.

For the honour of the sex I will mention Zenobia, a Queen of Asia,\* and will make her the mistress of counsel for counsellors to imitate.

\* In MS., 'Zenoconah, Empress of Asia.'

They write of her, that she was constant in her enterprises, faithful in her words, liberal and just, severe in punishment, discreet in speech, grave in determining, and secret in her doings. If these virtues were found in her sex it were shame for princes to lessen that that she excelled in.\* It is vanity in a King to exceed his subjects in apparel and external shows, or to delight above measure in a thing that may be compassed with money, for he is the exchequer of his subjects, and hath the command of their wealth in his hands if he have their love, for it is an old saying the wealth of the kingdom is the wealth of the King. A prince must take upon him State, and not make himself too common in sports and assemblies, for it breeds contempt in subjects which is worse than envy. The universal school of a prince is the person, house, and court where he lives. He must be constant and absolute in his determinations, for that commonwealth is unfortunate where there are as many intentions as counsels, and a prince cannot avoid censure or being condemned for weakness that shall commit so public an error. It is a pestilent disease that wounds himself, kills many, poisoneth and infecteth all, makes his friends bewail him, breeds scandal to his kingdom and subjects abroad, and none can mend this lightness in him but himself and a faithful counsellor that loves him more then his gifts; and above all he should beat down a self conceit of his own brain which is the folly of all follies generally in man. The next vice to this is covetousness and desire of riches, which is both abominable and pernicious in princes, for, besides the envy it

\* From here to 'should govern them better' (p. 295) is found only in S.

begets in subjects, it is the root of all evil and mischief, for there ensues upon it robbing, bribes, exactions, cruelties, and no reward of worthy persons. The innocent are condemned, offences pardoned for money, it causeth unlawful war, and dishonourable peace, such princes offend as much by the evil example they give to subjects as by the fact they commit. Therefore they ought not much to affect punishing others' enriching, for covetousness takes away the name of gentleness, which liberty and liberality buyeth. A King must know that no man serves him but for reward, and that he is bound to reward desert of necessity, he must not impose nor lay new devised taxes, or prey like a wolf upon his people, for the impregnable strength of Kings is the love of their subjects, as mercy and truth establisheth their thrones. They must remember that innocent blood is bottled in heaven's treasury, and that they must give a strict account of the least drop spent through their default, for they are placed on high to behold vices on earth, and chosen and authority given them to do good. The best counsel a counsellor can give in this case to a King is to persuade him to follow the precedent of the King of Persia, that enjoined his servant every morning to put him in mind of his kingly office by these words, ' Arise O King and go about thy public affairs for the good of thee and thy subjects.' A careless and inconsiderate King that is opinionated of his own wit, to which he joineth his will, is elevated by the flattery of his followers, which I do impute to be the greatest bane of princes. But if a well disposed counsellor will let him see the reason that he cannot be wiser than other men no doubt but it would move him, for how can a prince think to attain wisdom to equal others



when he applies himself more to sports and pleasure than pain, more to liberty than learning, more to spending than sparing, more in external delights than to spend time in privacy or public business. Though I confess what Kings want in this to make them wise is helped by experience and practice of State affairs, and by the continual counsel and advice they receive if they make choice of a good and understanding counsellor ; but that is like a physician in practice that hath no learning to warrant his art, for it is pains and willingness that must further a prince's education if he be not obdurant and obstinate in his overweening conceit of wisdom. Such a King I speak of, who respects a day's pleasure more than an hour of pain or the good of his people committed to his charge, offends God in such an act as much as if he omitted to do a virtuous deed ; for it followeth necessarily that he must resign his authority to others, who if they do injustice it breeds a disdain, hate, scorn, and many times revenge against the persons of them, for the subject will think it better for a kingdom to have an evil King than evil ministers. If they be old men he maketh election of it sheweth disability in himself, if they be young it sheweth a lightness, if he be absolute and take upon himself it sheweth boldness and rashness, and if he will be subject to be seduced by flattering servants that will make their will his power. But if he govern by himself and others it sheweth wisdom, for great counsellors ought to have most credit in business of greatest weight and importance, who will govern according to rules of State, and will be directed by precedent. But with this caution, that it be done with honour, duty, and reverence to their masters and security to themselves, for

it is not the name of a counsellor that giveth reputation but the due execution of his place. For God hath so seated the world that no commonwealth was ever overthrown but by want of counsel, for every country may support itself if it be well governed, therefore there must be an equal distribution lest by labouring to make one part too fertile he leave the other part barren. A King should punish but seldom, and then unwillingly, if not drawn unto it out of necessity of justice. This government will make subjects know their happiness, and to distinguish betwixt upright Kings and cruel and perverse tyrants, and how to love the one and abhor the other. The Scripture tells us that goodness and truth uphold the throne of Kings, for indeed a King should carry the name of father, religious, meek, gentle, provident, just, humane, a contemner of riches, over-ruling affection, sound in judgement, wise in counsel, upright, firm, full of authority, princely, majestic, industrious, and constant, a careful watchman over his people, ready to do good, slow in revenge, easy to give access, and not to reprove complaints against judges or other officers be they never so great, keepers of peace, friends to soldiers, and, if need be, both Kings and Captains. When Kings prove not this, think our sins to be the just cause of our afflictions, and that God sometimes sends evil Kings to punish evil people. Homer saith Kings are keepers and shepherds of their people, and that prince that regardeth not the cry of the poorest of them shall cry and not be heard. The errors and vices that subjects commit are blemishes to them who should govern them better.

The indifferent man to make a counsellor to a prince is neither to be too old nor too young.

For youth shews lightness ; and if a prince take absolute power to himself it shews a bold rashness, and he will be subject to be seduced by flattering servants that will make his will their authority. A counsellor ought to be wise, and cautious, withal, what advice he gives. For there are two principal things that make a prince beloved of his people, the one, is defending them against oppression, the other, to have peace and alliance with those countries and princes that afford them trade and commerce, which war seldom produces. Yet I confess, that that war is well made that produces a more perfect and firm peace, and the best time to make such a war is in peace that moneys may be best raised. And though, according to conscience and Christianity, all war of itself is unjust, yet a good cause may make it lawful, but not when it is out of humour, out of spleen, or out of private respects. Yet let it come when it will, they cannot propose any war to a prince but it is better to accept of mean conditions of peace than endure the fortune of it ; for Aristotle says, ' Fortune shews herself most favourable where there is least hope.' The Athenians hearing the counsel was dishonest which Antisthenes gave Themistocles, though profitable, with one voice cried, ' If it be not just it cannot be commodious nor commendable,' whereupon Themistocles commanded it should be no more talked of. Let this be a caveat to counsellors that they either hold their peace, or speak things that are probable and honourable to Kings and kingdoms, and take it for a maxim, ' That peace is the nursery for happiness.'

The solidest advice a counsellor can give his master, is, to win the affections of his subjects, for then he will have their hands, their hearts, and



purses, which is the marrow and sinews of war. Yet, as I have said, all things considered, it is better to avoid war, for the nature of it is to bring one into bondage while peace makes him free; the one is a tyrant's will, the other a prince's decree. But if the necessity of a war cannot be avoided the first thing a prince must provide is plenty of money; it will encourage soldiers, terrify enemies, and embolden alliances when they shall see no likelihood of want thereof to go forward with their enterprises. The next consideration, is to have a grave consultation for the prosecution of the war, not once, but often, for the first advice is not so safe because better reasons may be found out upon discussion than were thought of at first. But let them beware they rely not upon passionate advisers, for choler is an enemy to counsel and never to be allowed of but in extremity, when desperateness is the last and best remedy and help. Great actions ought to be resolved on at leisure, and executed with speed; and it is better to escape with judgement than to go forward with courage, or to use victory wisely than to get it happily. The victory Hannibal obtained was attributed to the direction and advice of his council; and many who are brave in the field want maturity to direct themselves or others, which shews all men are born, as well in war as other faculties, to support one another. When princes are provided of counsel, money, and all other things for the war, let not them nor their Generals presume upon their multitudes, strength, or power of men. For God orders battle, and bestows the victory when He pleases to stretch forth His arm, which is of greater force than all princes, powers, and armies, but commonly He does not use to do it but in

defence of equity. For generally the chance of war is like a cast at dice, either good or bad, and may be spoiled by oversight or mended by play.

Now shall follow the sufficiency, and next the election, a prince should make of a counsellor, for many men fly with the wings of others, and seem outwardly to be what inwardly they are not. And if he hearken to the praise of others' reports they are uncertain, because delivered out of hate or affection; for good words deceive both the wise and the foolish. It behoves a King therefore to enquire after such a man's birth, education, and reputation, though I confess his birth is the least exception, for all ages prefer virtue before blood. Caius Marius, a great Captain, was born of base parentage; the Emperor Valentinian was the son of a ropemaker, and divers others little better.\*

The philosophers did not account the lives of men by their degrees and callings, but by the good they did and the virtuous name they held. Silence is a great light to discover the discretion of a counsellor, for hastiness, anger, and wrath are the properties of a fool; the empty vessel makes the greatest sound, and the least wits are the greatest talkers: but the greatest folly is for a man to trust too much to his own wit and to be proud when he is praised. Learning is a great help to wisdom; it makes young men sober and is a consolation to old men; it enriches the poor, and adorns the rich. It is evil to disdain learning but worse to impugn it, and the want of it is the worst of all. For indeed there is as great a difference between the learned and the unlearned as betwixt

\* Gratianus, the father of Valentinianus I., was of obscure birth and nicknamed 'the rope man,' but he rose to high military rank, to which circumstance his son probably owed the choice of the legions.

the living and the dead, or a physician and his patient ; though learning can no more help a dull wit than labour make a barren ground fertile. There is a surer method (for a King) to choose a counsellor, than by his birth, education, or reputation, for a man may have all, or most of these parts, and yet want judgement, or be of a pestilent temper that shall destroy the rest. For there are some who can give good advice and not follow it, like a harp that is pleasanter to others than to him that plays on it, or a bay-tree that is ever green but without fruit. Therefore judge not of gold by the colour, no more than of a man at first sight till you prove him. The surest rule for a King to try the sufficiency of a counsellor is to examine him in private and suddenly, and to propose to him things of the greatest importance and wisdom for the government of a commonwealth. Then, to command him immediately to write his opinion to all the particulars proposed, in his own presence, not suffering him to return or have conference with any others ; which will be a surprise upon him, and the King will see and discover his abilities, and whether he be a worthy minister for his service, or no, or commended for kindred, friendship, bribes, faction, or other false pretences, and esteem him accordingly that commends him. And thus much, for the King's knowledge, how to elect a counsellor of State.



## How to Elect a Governor.

THE next that follows shall be the choice of a governor a King sends to rule over his countries and provinces. Let Plato be the adviser in this point, who says, 'a governor must be loved of many and feared of all; he must endeavour to do good actions and deceive none with words; he must be constant and pitiful,' for the clemency of a governor makes a man ashamed to commit offences. Seneca says, 'that clemency is a great ornament in a governor; and that mercy, which is not accompanied with justice, is a fault reprehensible; and that justice without mercy is not justice, but cruelty.' When Augustus Cæsar sent his governors into several countries to rule, he was wont to tell them, 'I trust you with my honour, and commit my justice to you, that you envy not the innocent, nor be a butcher to offenders, but that with one hand you be a help to the good and encourage the evil to amend: my meaning is, to send you to be a tutor to the fatherless, a support to widows, a physician to the sick, a staff to the blind, and a father to all.' Alexander found the country of the Sidonians in much disorder, and the people desired a just and upright governor to rule them. Which being granted, the chief of the nobility expected preferment and to be advanced in the government, but Alexander deceived all their hopes and appointed one Abdolonimus, whose virtues he

was informed of, and who was a poor labouring man, though of regal descent.

A governor in all his actions must be secret, pleasant, and liberal ; he must fear nothing, but be ever feared ; he must imitate Alexander and Hadrian in justice. A man complaining to Alexander against another, he stopped his ears, saying, ' He must keep them for the party accused.' Hadrian, the Emperor, upon an information made to him, the accuser brought his complaint in writing ; the Emperor told him, ' It was but paper and ink, and perhaps forged ; therefore wished him to bring witnesses.' A philosopher advised princes not to send children, fools, malicious or covetous persons, or that are revengeful, to govern. He that is appointed governor of a country is little less than tutor of a prince's person, or instructor in his breeding. He is the pilot of his ship, the standard of his army, the keeper of his people, the guide of his way, the treasurer of all he has, because all is put into his hands to govern. Agesilaus exhorts his deputies rather to study justice, and to govern well, than to give way to the insatiable desire of riches. For a King loses much love by others' corrupt dealing, and as injustice provokes despair so revenge is the executioner of injustice. An ambitious governor, who covets and affects greatness over the people he rules, is like a rat that would make himself lord over mice. But such high minded men must know that there is nothing so great as to tread false greatness under foot.

Above all others, never choose a melancholy man counsellor to a prince, governor of a country, or General of an army, for commonly they are basely minded, vain, enemies to noble thoughts, malicious, superstitious, and fantastical. As, on

the contrary, a sanguine complexion is witty, has a good memory and judgement, can discourse well, is loving, affable, loyal, liberal, and of great courage. And yet all these parts and properties are nothing without secrecy, which is the guardian of great affairs : secrecy was wont in ancient times to be pictured as a goddess with her hand stopping her mouth. I confess it is a difficult thing to keep counsel, and dangerous to reveal the secrets of a King. It is an old saying, 'That a secret is hard for one to keep, enough for two, and too much for three.' Plato says, 'Whosoever reveals his secrets gives away his liberty, and a fool being secret is held wise ; an open man is like a clear glass which can hide nothing that is put into it.' Counsel without secrecy is like an abortive, brought forth without life, that was imprisoned in the womb of secret thoughts. Secrecy is the key of the cabinet where counsel is enclosed, and the reward of secrecy is that it is without danger. And thus much for the election of a governor ; and to proceed to my third point, which is the choice of a General for war.



## How to make Choice of a General.

IT is necessary that a General have these properties following : knowledge, valour, authority, fortune, and a ready wit ; for the fairest tilter is not the best soldier, nor a favourite at court more fit to making a General than a sheep to have the leading of lions. The first man that brought war into discipline was Osiris, King of Egypt, who made not war to conquer countries but to spread abroad fame and renown. The person of a General is as much to be feared by his soldiers as his enemies, for too much clemency and familiarity towards his soldiers breeds a neglect and contempt. The Romans were ever strict and severe in their commanders. They never entertained soldiers they could not maintain and govern, for a great army has more weight than force : they are ill to rule and worse to trust. Neither would they entertain an army of strangers, saying, ' They took a wolf by the ear,' for as it was dangerous to detain them so it was worse to let them go. They chose young and generous men for soldiers, that were virtuously inclined ; they gave them an oath not to fly from battle, or leave their stations, unless it were to take up a dart and throw at an enemy, or to save a friend. Alexander rather chose expert soldiers than multitudes, for brave soldiers make glorious captains that will exchange their life for honour. They know their bodies are subject to death but their

deeds remain to the world's end, and the greatest honour a soldier can obtain is that a King will confess that he has gained by his merit what he granted him out of liberality.

The qualities of a soldier must be to have a good heart and brave spirit ; he must not be idle or ill employed ; he must not give nor take wrong ; he must serve God, and despise the Devil ; he must observe the wise and love the good ; he must let the enemy see his face and not his back ; and give God the glory of all his actions. Valour is not all that is required in a soldier : it must be mixed with discretion and conduct, for rashness is hot in the hand and slow in the end, that will adventure without fear or hope of prevailing. There are many things in war which give better counsel to men, than men to things, and therefore a General ought to be no more limited than a pilot at sea that has the conduct of a ship. The greatest honour and esteem a captain can purchase is to overthrow his enemy by stratagems rather than by hazarding ; by counselling rather than by combat. That captain who has performed any exploit by policy enjoys more in the fame of it than in the salary or reward given him.

Let Generals, captains, and soldiers beware their war be not against their King or prince, that being unjust though there were provocation. For no provocation can give lawful power to begin such a war and purchase the name of rebels, whose circumstances are such that they are followed with threats and kept up with entreaties, they feed upon promises and attempt with fear, they are very suspicious and live upon hope, they are not content with little nor pleased with reward, because they leave not the King to follow the best cause, but out of hope of benefit by

robbing and spoiling. And indeed a rebel knows not what he desires, nor has a feeling what he doth, for their fury is such as not to admit of counsel which makes their minds full of perturbation because they are embracers of their own will.

An heroical captain will oblige his enemy by good deeds rather than by fear, for so did Scipio Africanus to those of Carthage he took prisoners, humility and clemency being brothers to nobleness. A country conquered is better preserved by love than force or cruelty, for a soldier ought as well to relieve the oppressed as to overcome his enemy. It is written of Cæsar that he never left man unrewarded nor offence unpardoned, whereby he grew popular. He told the Senate of Rome that nothing was so glorious nor pleasant in this world as to pardon an injury done, and indeed no man is victorious and conqueror but he that uses victory with clemency. The Emperor Titus pardoned one that would have slain him, which got him much love and esteem amongst the Romans. Hadrian treated with those men that had been his enemies before he was Emperor, which got him no less love and respect. Suleiman the great Turk, called the Magnificent, reproved John von Zapolya, the new-raised King of Hungary, because he would not pardon the Archbishop of Gran, saying that there could not be a greater felicity than to pardon our enemies; and though they should prove unthankful yet it were better to be requited with ingratitude than fail of the glory of shewing mercy. This act made his actions more favoured in Hungary. Augustus Cæsar proclaimed twenty five thousand crowns reward to him that should apprehend Corocota, a great robber. Corocota, hearing of it, went secretly and submitted himself to Cæsar; which so much



moved him that he pardoned and received him into his favour. When Scipio took Carthage he found a beautiful woman betrothed to a gentleman called Indibilis,\* and she being in Scipio's hands he sent her to her parents : in recompense whereof they returned a great quantity of money which Scipio refused to accept of but commanded it to be given to the young woman in dower. This courtesy so far prevailed upon those people that they submitted themselves to Rome. The same temper Pompey used to many fair ladies he took in his war against Mithridates, which wrought the same effect. Selim, the great Turk, who was so cruel that he slew his father and brother, took many beautiful ladies, whom he used honourably and sent to their parents, which availed him much in his victories. Josephus writes that the covetousness of Marcus Crassus, who robbed the temple of Jerusalem, was the cause of his punishment, he dying miserably in his army and in the hands of his enemies. Julius, uncle to Julian the apostate, robbed the church of Antioch and was visibly punished ; his entrails rotting out, and worms creeping out of them, and his excrements coming out at his mouth.† Alexander, to his praise, would not suffer hurt to be done to the temples, nor any thing within them, when he sacked Tyre and Thebes. Leo, the Emperor, took a rich crown from the church of St. Sophia in which were many precious stones, and among the rest a rich carbuncle, and he putting it upon his head

\* New Carthage in Spain. Indibilis was a Spanish King or chief, and his daughter, held as a hostage by the Carthaginians, fell into the hands of Scipio Africanus Major at the capture of the city.

† This is, originally, from Chrysostom, *Contra Judæos et Gentiles*.

an aposthume, called a carbuncle, broke out there whereof he died.

Honour is the next degree to clemency and mercy in a soldier, and nothing accounted more dishonourable in him than breach of his promise and word given ; it makes not only himself odious but it leaves an everlasting stain of perfidiousness upon his nation and posterity. I could tax some of our Christian Kings with this abominable vice if I thought example or shame would restore them to better grace and wipe away their old offences, for nobody can seek praise by his counterfeit virtue. Fame cannot profit him, but shame may hurt him in the end. A soldier must not be stained with vice ; his care must be how to think well, and how to do well, for death is a continual watchman over him. A true soldier is of so heroical a spirit that he had rather perish in his desires than live in base thoughts. He cannot covet a thing of more honour and more acceptable to God than to redeem a virgin that is in danger to fall. He should not be moved with adversity, nor elevated with prosperity ; for Plato says that a noble and brave minded man hath more trouble to tame his heart than to attempt great matters, and will think it more pain to stoop to a straw than to reach to a bough. He will scorn to desire honour and not to deserve it with virtue and valour, and will think it an unworthy act to have his thoughts upon base things. A philosopher says that he dies not who leaves a good fame, nor he lives not who hath not a good esteem : they did not value men by their birth or age but for their noble deeds. The triumphs that were so famous at Rome were not esteemed unless the party had done some act of honour or renown.

I will now distinguish betwixt such worthy

soldiers as I have spoken of, and the contrary, who make others' virtues their vices. The heathens had such regard to their oaths that they made it death for a man to forswear himself. Hannibal gave leave to ten prisoners he took to go to Rome, with promise to return ; two of them failed, which they found afterwards to be an act of so great indignity that they killed themselves. Parmenio advised Alexander to overcome his enemies by deceit and treason ; Alexander answered, ' If I were Parmenio I might do it ' ; but being Alexander, he would not offer it.\* The physician of King Pyrrhus made overtures to Caius Fabricius to poison his master, if he would reward him, but Fabricius was so far from consenting to so foul an act that he discovered it to Pyrrhus, and writ to him that it was not the custom of the Romans to overcome their enemies by treason. Justinian, the Emperor, being at war with the Persians hired the Huns to serve him, but they falsely put themselves into the pay of the Persians. Justinian informed the King of Persia of it ; who justly commanded the Huns to be strangled for breaking their words, to the shameful example of a Christian King. Ladislas, King of Hungary, being at war with Amurath, the great Turk, he swore the articles of peace made betwixt them, but falsely and perfidiously broke it. Hereupon the battle followed, and Amurath took out of his bosom the articles sworn to by Ladislas, and lifting his hands and eyes to heaven, said, ' These are the conditions sworn to by the Christians which falsely they have broken ; but if thou be'st God, as the Christians

\* There was no ' deceit or treason ' in the matter. Parmenio simply recommended Alexander to accept the ransom Darius offered for his wife, mother, and daughters, and the cession of territory offered by the Persian for peace.



do esteem thee, revenge this falseness they have done me.' He had scarcely spoken these words, but Ladislas was slain, the Hungarians routed, and Amurath got the victory. Here Ladislas perfidiously broke his faith, and though he had lived yet he had lost all by losing it. But to redeem this treachery by a Christian Emperor, of more fame and worth than the latter times have sent forth, I mean Charles V. He being in the wars of Tunis, in Barbary, the baker of Barbarossa his enemy, the titular King of Algiers, repaired to him with offer to poison his master with a loaf of bread of his own baking, which the Emperor worthily rejected, and told him it was an act of a Turk and not of a Christian, and gave him leave to depart like a villain as he came.

God is so angry with unjust actions that many times he punisheth the intentions of those that desire to commit unnatural cruelties. As by example Charles, King of Sicily,\* who after his subjects had rebelled and massacred the French at the Sicilian vespers, besieged the city of Messina, and put it to such straits that the people begged mercy. But with great anger and passion he refused it, upon which they grew so desperate that they made choice rather to die than submit, and courageously sallied forth upon the King's army, overcame him, and became free. This rashness made the King afterwards subject to the government of Don Pedro, King of Aragon.†

\* Charles I. (of Anjou), King of Naples, youngest son of Louis VIII. of France.

† The Sicilian Vespers occurred on 30th March 1282, and was followed by an expedition under Don Pedro III. of Aragon who raised the siege of Messina. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies did not become an actual appanage of the Crown of Aragon until the fifteenth century.

In the like manner Louis, Earl of Flanders, was used at the city of Ghent, for being before it with thirty thousand men, and it being put to a great extremity and pinch, the people of Ghent craved mercy, as Messina had done, which the Earl refused unless they submitted themselves to his mercy with ropes about their necks. But they finding his obstinacy and wilfulness so great, six thousand of the citizens sallied out of the town, overcame the Earl, and made him fly in disguise to a little cottage near Bruges, and upon this defeat many other places revolted from him.\*

Had these princes had any grace, or sense of their religion they outwardly professed, they would have known what a father of the church had taught them—that to pardon many for the merits of one was Christianity, but to punish many for the fault of one was tyranny. Out of conscience one should be more fearful to injure a poor man than a rich; for a rich man revenges himself, as those of Ghent and Messina did, by force; the others with tears. Let cruel and perverse natures think what they please of themselves and actions; they will find the pleasures they do to a friend will make him more friendly, and a courtesy done to an enemy will be a means to make him become a friend. But the ground thereof must proceed from God; for Cicero says that take away the piety towards God, and you will take away all fidelity and conjunction of human society.

To conclude this point I treat of, I think that prince most happy who has the three sorts of people aforesaid to serve him, *viz.* wise and grave senators to counsel, just and upright magistrates

\* Louis II., Count of Flanders, after the battle of Beverholt in 1382.

to govern, and valiant, young, and discreet soldiers to execute. The one supports the other in convenient time, like fruit which comes not altogether or ends altogether; some learning, others obeying; or like ancient and sage fathers that leave their tender sons to succeed them in their professions and virtues.

\*And now I will end with the employment of the King's ships, from the year 1635 till this year 1640, wherein you have seen the cause of their employment, for then his Majesty began to have a feeling of the insolences committed on the Narrow Seas. Which he redressed by those fleets aforesaid, and since has so quelled his neighbours that they dare not but do reason to his Majesty's subjects, as appears by these particular benefits following it has produced.

The first, is an acknowledgement of his Majesty's sovereignty of the seas, which of late years seemed to be questioned. The second, is the peaceable trade we now enjoy into the ports of Flanders, which the Hollanders were wont to forbid, though they were warranted by the articles of peace in 1604; which trade of Flanders hath turned to great profit to his Majesty in customs, and ten times as much to his subjects by the commerce of that province. For I must confess with grief that our nation was much injured till now of late by those base people of Holland, seeing they stuck not to interrupt our trade, seizing of our English barks at the very instant they permitted ships of their own to enter the ports without impeachment.

\* There is no MS. authority for the remainder of Book II., except for the last section 'An admonition addressed to Gentlemen,' &c.



And though I have made often and sundry complaints thereof yet no remedy could be obtained. And, as I conceive, it was connived at out of policy, which these fleets aforesaid have now ordered for the liberty of the subject and reputation of the King and country.

The next that followeth is,

## How to make War upon Scotland if they follow their rebellious Courses.

THOUGH this discourse of Scotland is fitter for the Fifth Book, which contains projects and strata-gems of war, yet because it is an active time and concerns the sea, which is the chief drift of my narrative, I have annexed it to those actions that are gone before, and will proceed to make war against Scotland with most convenience and least expense and charge.

The proportion of his Majesty's ships to be employed I would not wish to be above three, for the reason that the world should not think it a service of that importance, as to require a greater force. And to these three ships to have an addition of ten or twelve colliers, of two or three hundred tons burthen, that trade to Newcastle. It is not fit for above three ships of his Majesty's to be so far from the Narrow Seas since France and Holland front upon us, which want no ships nor readiness to arm to sea, whatsoever they should intend against us. But we shall prevent any such design of theirs when our ships shall appear at sea upon our own coast. In the colliers' ships aforesaid to transport a regiment of fourteen or fifteen hundred soldiers, and, to ease the charge, to allow every ship but thirty seafaring men, which will not amount to the third part of charge of victuals and men and yet do the same service as so many of the King's ships would perform.

Besides the colliers aforesaid, I would wish that as many fisher barks may be pressed, to arm them with small guns and every man to have his musket and pike, and to be furnished with all other provisions, as salt, and hooks to fish, that when they are not otherwise employed they may continue their fishing and supply the army, both by sea and land. We shall find these vessels of great importance, as well to send from port to port upon any occasion as to transport our men from one shore to another.

At our first arrival that we have care to possess and fortify very strongly some town near the sea, on the north side, and the same on the south and Lothian side, and to put into them a sufficient garrison out of the fifteen hundred men aforesaid, and the rest of the soldiers to keep as a running camp to forage the country. For by help of the fishing vessels, aforesaid, they may be speedily transported from the north side to the south, or from the south to the north,\* and havoc and spoil the country as they list, the two towns possessed and fortified serving them for a retreat. And the country of Scotland thereabouts will be forced to maintain four thousand men continually for its defence ; two thousand on the one side, and two thousand on the other, for the Frith so divides them that one cannot succour another under a hundred miles march by the bridge of Stirling. Besides, these towns being fortified and made strong, will serve such Scots for places of rendezvous as shall fly from the Covenanters and submit themselves to his Majesty's obedience, which no doubt many will do, if the former proclamation be published which his Majesty set forth when

\* Of the Frith of Forth.



he was in Scotland—for all tenants to leave their landlords upon the condition expressed in that proclamation. Only I would have this added to it that whosoever shall thus fly shall bring with them their arms to the places of rendezvous, where they shall receive ready money for such arms as they shall bring, to the uttermost value, and this will be a ready way and means to disarm great part of the rebels. The next care must be to supply the army with corn, for the boats will be of great help to succour them with fish, the corn to be baked into biscuit, either in Holy Island or at Berwick, and thence sent to the army; which for want of ovens, mills, and perhaps of wood to bake it, cannot be so well furnished with bread.\*

\* It seems that Monson thought that three men-of-war and 1,500 men, of whom some 700 were to be in garrisons, would be sufficient to subdue Scotland. The events of 1639 and 1640 show this view to have been an egregious, and rather ludicrous, miscalculation into which even Charles and his entourage did not fall. From the following sections it would appear that Monson advised a modified Vallum Pii; a practical abandonment of central and north Scotland, and the suppression of the nationality of south Scotland. Clearly, he knew little of the Scots! The scheme does not merit serious comment, but it must be remembered that he was at least 70 years of age when he wrote it.

## How to carry the Action at Sea with least Expense to his Majesty.

IMPRIMIS, To take away the ancient abuse of pursers, commonly known, whereby neither King nor subject shall be wronged. This I will make apparent when there is occasion to treat of it by the council of war.

*Item*, Whereas every four men are messed with equal proportion of victuals in the King's service at sea, we have often used in the Queen's time, in our southern expeditions, to make our victuals go the further, to bring five men to the allowance of four, and so we have got a week in every month.

*Item*, The same course we may now take and with more content to the company. For in those days, and those voyages of the Queen's, we could never be supplied with victuals, no, not so much as water, till our return, but here we shall have plenty of fish and water.

*Item*, That one of the best colliers' ships be appointed for the Officers of the Ordnance to carry such provisions as properly belong to that Office, which will nothing hinder the transportation of such soldiers as she carries.

*Item*, To carry in her ten or twelve culverins and demi culverins to fortify the island of Inchkeith, which is the guard and defence of the harbour of Leith.

*Item*, Besides plenty of all kind of ammunition that they carry a thousand arms to supply the

King's party if there be occasion. As also good store of seasoned deal boards, spikes, all manner of iron tools for carpenters and smiths, provision for pioneers ; and every pioneer to have a pike-staff to lie by him, whilst he is at work, that he may take himself to it if he be assailed by an enemy. Also to carry good store of fowlers as of great importance many ways ; to carry twenty pitch pots of iron, with all kinds of ingredients, to be used in a stratagem to set on fire their coal pits. To be careful that the mould for the bullets do fit the bore of their muskets.

*Item,* Besides the spoil the English soldiers shall make in the country, that they be careful to destroy their corn as the next way utterly to ruin them. For, besides that they will take away their bread, they will utterly destroy their straw which is the food of their cattle and horses ; for hay they have none.



## How to provide for the West Part of Scotland.

THERE must be as great a provision made for the west part of Scotland as for the east I have spoken of. And how to do it with the least charge, and most convenience, I will here set down.

*Imprimis*, To furnish three ships of a hundred tons each to be provided and fitted at Barnstable, in Devonshire, with forty mariners in each ship. We shall save thereby five hundred miles sailing by furnishing them at Barnstable, or that part of Devonshire, or Cornwall, and not at London. Besides the shift of three several winds, as from Barnstable, a southerly, westerly, or an easterly wind will carry us directly to Ireland, or opposite to Ireland, so that there will be much time gotten and great expense saved.

*Item*, There must be the same provision made of fisher boats, corn, salt, arms, and all other necessities, as is set down for the east part of Scotland.

*Item*, To command, upon pain of death, that there be no manner of trade betwixt Ireland and Scotland, or betwixt the Isle of Man, or any other place whatsoever and Scotland.

*Item*, That the three ships and boats aforesaid do seize upon all barks and vessels whatsoever, great and small, on that western side of Scotland and carry them into the ports of Ireland, there

to put them safe ashore, taking out of them their sails, masts, ropes, rudders that they may not steal, or be stolen, away. And if his Majesty have occasion to transport an army from Ireland to Scotland these ships and boats will be able to do it, which otherwise on a sudden all Ireland cannot furnish.

*Item*, That a discreet gentleman be chosen to command this action to the west part of Scotland, and so to order things that there be one ship in a port of Ireland, and another in a harbour of Scotland, to send and receive intelligence of the state of the two kingdoms, and what help and assistance is required from one to another.

*Item*, That a scout \* royal be built in the island of Arran ; and such a place to be chosen where the water and channel is deepest for ships to ride and float. This fort will be able to defend such ships of ours as we shall employ on that coast if it happen that France, or any other nation, shall give the Scots assistance by sea.

*Item*, To make the castle of Dumbarton impregnable, which may be easily done, and there to keep a magazine for all provisions of war. Dumbarton is so seated that it keeps all the northern parts of Scotland in awe ; and that Frith of Arran, where it lies, goes as far to the eastward as Glasgow, and westward to the cape or mull of Cantyre. So that betwixt Glasgow and Cantyre there will be no passage over the water, having no provision of boats. And from Glasgow to Stirling is but ten or twelve miles, † from whence the river runs into the east Frith and so into the sea. In which space likewise there is no passage

\* Sconce.

† Thirty-one miles in a crow line.

for want of boats and bridges, insomuch that we shall have but ten or twelve miles to fortify, *viz.* from Glasgow to Stirling, which if we do we secure the south part of Scotland to England from any incursions the northern parts or Highlanders can make against either of us. And so we shall pale them in their own bounds and country, where it is not fit for civil men to live.

This being done, if his Majesty please he may join that southern part of Scotland with England and make it but one entire kingdom, allowing the inhabitants the same privileges the English enjoy. And this is no more than has been in former times, for some while Northumberland and Cumberland belonged to Scotland, and sometime to England. If his Majesty shall please to do it, and make himself absolute master of Scotland, let him raze the castle and fortifications of Edinburgh. For we may see by example of all ages that the castle of Edinburgh is the place (in all combustions) that either King, rebels, or foreign enemies covet to take, as whosoever possesses it is not so quickly or easily beaten out of it. For, indeed, the castle is the defence of the whole country, being supplied with victuals. And instead of Edinburgh, which is the supreme city, and now made the head of justice whither all men resort as the only spring that waters the rest of the land within the kingdom, I would wish his Majesty did fortify, strengthen, and make impregnable the town of Leith, and there to settle the seat of justice, with all other privileges Edinburgh enjoys, referring it to the choice of the inhabitants of Edinburgh whether they will make their dwelling where they do, or remove to Leith, where they shall enjoy the same liberties they did at Edinburgh.



His Majesty may do it out of these respects. Leith is a maritime town, and will save a great labour and charge in carrying and conveying their merchandize to Edinburgh, which no man but will find a convenience in. Leith is a sea town whither ships resort, and mariners make their dwellings, and the Trinity House there settled. It lies more convenient for transportation and importation, being the port town of Edinburgh, and in time of war may cut off all provisions betwixt the sea and Edinburgh and bring Edinburgh to the mercy of it. From Leith to Moray Frith, and from Moray Frith to the Islands of Orkney, there is never a harbour in that part of Scotland that will entertain any ship of great burthen. Insomuch, that if his Majesty fortify the town of Leith, and the island of Inchkeith, it will secure the whole kingdom of Scotland, for by sea no enemy can attempt it and by land we shall be provided to defend it. By famine an enemy can have no hope to force them to yield because we shall supply them by sea; if the people within the town prove mutinous and rebellious, with our ordnance out of ships we shall be able to beat their houses about their ears and make them submit their lives and goods to our disposal. As I advise the castle of Edinburgh to be absolutely razed, so would I in like manner wish that all the castles in Scotland were so served, except Leith and Inchkeith, as aforesaid, Dumbarton, the new erected castle in the island of Arran, and, if there be need, to continue fortified the two towns, the one of Lothian side and the other on Fife side. These places excepted, it were good there were a law enacted that it should not be lawful for any one piece of ordnance to remain in Scotland, under any pretence

whatsoever. Then shall the fortifications aforesaid be without danger, either by siege or otherwise, and of strength sufficient to defend themselves against all enemies, domestic or foreign, especially when the sea lies open to us to relieve with fish or food, and in our power to forbid others to take benefit of the sea.

For the northern part of Scotland, which I have paled out from the rest of the country as unworthy to be reckoned with these southern parts, both in respect of the soil as also for the brutishness of the people, I wish considering their qualifications that they may be only taught so much civility and breeding as to acknowledge his Majesty the true sovereign King over them, without imposing any kind of tax on them, for the country cannot afford it. And because their natures and dispositions are turbulent, and never free from quarrels and tumults among themselves, I would wish that they should be encouraged in that factious way with one another, that their thoughts may be employed otherwise than in plotting and contriving mischief against the southern and civil part of Scotland. This would in time either reduce them to civility, or by divisions quite extirpate them.

This western part of Scotland, I have treated of, is the most dangerous place of all the kingdom to receive relief out of France by shipping. And the more dangerous because from many parts of France, as namely Brest, Rochelle, and all that coast thereabouts, one wind will carry them out of their harbours, without ever striking sail, till they arrive in that part of Scotland.

An Admonition addressed to Gentlemen to  
beware how they engage in Sea Voyages,  
or give Ear to Projectors that shall advise  
them to such Actions.

MAN, for hope of gain, is apt to be led into many inconveniences when he has an opinion of the wisdom or honesty of him that persuades. And this nowhere appears plainer than in sea adventures, into which such impostors and cheats have drawn gentlemen, to the ruin of themselves and posterity. I know some who have persuaded gentlemen that the Indies afforded nothing but gold, and that for fetching, and in the meantime they filled their own purses with gold while those poor, silly, gentlemen ran headlong to destruction, without giving ear to advice or believing any friend that advised them to the contrary. But that such gentlemen may see their mistake I will touch upon the state of the West India trade, by which they may perceive what they are to expect by robbing at sea. For I have already made out what they are to get by pillaging ashore and made plain what they are like to yield. I wish this may come to the hands of those who are in danger of being drawn in by such deceitful projectors.

He that will undertake a voyage, either with a fleet or private ships, must consider that in the West Indies he is out of all hopes of carracks, ships from Guinea, or Brazil, and all other trade,



and must expect only such as are bound thither or trade from place to place. They must also consider that their ships will soon grow foul, and not be able to fetch up those that have been lately trimmed. Fires made ashore will give warning of an enemy being on the coast, and so prevent him. And, lastly, the wind and current sets with that violence and constancy that it is impossible to keep to windward of any port if we keep the sea, or to recover a height if we are put to leeward of it. Therefore the error of our planters in Virginia and the Bermudas shall appear, who were drawn principally into those enterprises, in hopes to annoy the Spaniards' trade in the West Indies, not knowing that the current sets with such force from Cape Florida to the northward that it is impossible to beat up with a tack. They were so ignorant as not to know that if they go from those places to the West Indies they must first fetch the Canaries for a wind, which is a thousand leagues from them and but five hundred from England. So that they are five hundred leagues nearer the West Indies going out of England than out of Virginia. Nor do they consider that the water does not rise so much in Virginia as to grave their ships; or the small convenience that place yields to careen them; or the sudden gusts that come from the land and will endanger them in their careening.

But suppose Virginia to be nearer, and no impediment for our ships to sail from thence to the Indies, I would ask what possibility there is rather to meet a fleet in the open seas there, where I have shewn the force of wind and current will put them to leeward, than on the coast of Spain, whither they are bound and must repair,

and where there are capes and headlands which they must make before they put into the shore or ports? Reason will make any one confess it is more likely to find a man one looks for at the door he must certainly go in at than on a vast heath where he has many ways to go by. And so it is with ships, it being better to wait for them at a cape or headland, which they must make, than in the spacious and open sea. And thus much for this point.

But seeing I have run over the casualties or uncertainties, or rather the impossibilities, to annoy the Spaniards in the Indies, I will shew the inconstancy of sea affairs by precedents of the English fleets that were employed against Spain in time of war, wherein the wealth taken in the voyages will appear. And by it let us judge what profit we are to expect by such actions, which are governed by inconstant winds and fortune.

The Number of Voyages set out by her Majesty during the War, and the Profit they turned to.

- 1585. SIR FRANCIS DRAKE to the Indies ; some few pieces of ordnance.
- 1587. Sir Francis Drake to Cadiz Road ; after which he took a poor carrack that had wintered at Mozambique.\*
- 1588. A defensive, but a victorious action.
- 1589. The expedition to Portugal ; no profit at all.
- 1589. My Lord of Cumberland ; some gain to himself but nothing to her Majesty.
- 1590. Sir Martin Frobiser, and Sir John Hawkyns ; no profit at all.
- 1591. The Lord Thomas Howard ; almost a saving † voyage.
- 1591. The Earl of Cumberland ; no profit at all.
- 1592. Sir Walter Raleigh's fleet, a carrack taken ; many adventurers.
- 1593. The Earl of Cumberland ; some gain to himself, none to the Queen.
- 1594. A defensive fleet in Brittany, no profit. Sir Martin Frobiser slain.
- 1595. Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkyns to the Indies, where they both died ; only some ordnance.

\* The San Felipe could not, justly, be called a poor carrack ; see *ante*, i. p. 150.

† *I.e.* profitable.

1596. Cadiz expedition, two galleons with their ordnance ; the galleons sold for 300*l*.  
1597. The Islands voyage ; almost saving.\*  
1599. The Downs action ; a defensive fleet.  
1600. Sir Richard Leveson ; no profit at all.  
1601. Sir Richard Leveson, but with a defensive fleet in Ireland.  
1602. Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson took a carrack, a ship of great value, but the Queen died and had no profit by her.  
1602. Sir William Monson ; no profit at all.  
1603. A defensive fleet ; the Queen died.

\* The St. Matthew and the St. Andrew were condemned out of the Navy in 1604 and given to Sir John Leigh. Their only service was in the Islands voyage of 1597 ; they never left Portsmouth harbour afterwards.

*The End of the Second Book.*



## APPENDIX A.

## MONSON'S LETTERS, 1604-1635.

(10)

Cecil MSS. cvii. 62.

MONSON TO LORD CRANBORNE.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 12, 1604.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—Sir Wm. Monson to my Lord from Dunkirk.]

MY duty most humbly remembered to your Lordship, being come to Dunkirk by my Lord Admiral's order with Señor John Babtista de Taxes<sup>2</sup> I thought it my duty to advertise your Lordship of such occurrants as are here. This 12 of October there came news of the death of the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Cecil was created Viscount Cranborne, 20th August, 1604. I have not thought it necessary to print the addresses and postal endorsements of these letters. Those of this one may be given as an example :—' For his Majesty's special service. To the right honourable and very singular good Lord, the Lord Viscount Cranborne, principal Secretary to his Majesty—Give these in haste, Post haste, haste, Post haste, haste. Will. Monson. At Sandwich the 15th of October past one of the clock afternoon. At Canterbury the 15th of October past three in the afternoon. Sittingbourne the 15th of October past five in the afternoon. Rochester past seven o'clock at night. Dartford at past in the night. London past nine in the day.'

<sup>2</sup> Juan Baptista de Tassis, cousin of Juan de Tassis, Conde de Villa Mediana, resident Spanish ambassador at the Court of England. Juan Baptista acted as interpreter to the Spanish embassy (*S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* iii. 81).

Prince of Orange, who is said to be poisoned by a Frenchman in Paris for love that the Frenchman bore to his brother, Count Morris.<sup>3</sup>

Upon Sunday last the governor of Dunkirk was at Arras with the Constable, and the same day in his presence all unkindnesses betwixt the French King and the King of Spain was ended, the 30 in the 100 is taken away, and the same conditions of traffic that is betwixt the King of England and Spain is concluded betwixt the King of France and Spain.<sup>4</sup>

I have nothing else to inform your Lordship of from these parts, but that the Hollanders continueth their evil language against his Majesty, and thus, with the remembrance of my duty to your Lordship, I humbly take my leave of your Lordship this 12th of October, 1604.

Your Lordship's for ever to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

<sup>3</sup> Philip William, Prince of Orange, eldest son of William the Silent. He had been seized in boyhood, brought up in Spain, and had become completely Hispaniolized. The report was wrong; he did not die till 1618.

<sup>4</sup> In 1603 Spain had imposed a duty of 30 per cent. on all goods exported or imported between France and Spain and Flanders. France retaliated, but more to her own loss than to that of Spain. Through the mediation of the Pope direct negotiations between the two powers resulted in a settlement signed in Paris on 12th October (N.S.), 1604, but the articles of the agreement were by no means so few or simple as indicated by Monson (Sully, *Memoirs*, iii. 94 *et seq.* Bohn's ed.). The object of the 30 per cent. duty had been to destroy the carrying trade in Dutch goods the French were beginning to develope, and, from that point of view, is interesting as showing the recovery of the French marine. Readers will remember Monson's reference to the number of French trading ships he met in 1602 (*ante*, ii. p. 392). Beyond one fruitless interview with Sully at an early stage, the Constable of Castile had nothing to do with the affair, but he may have given directions at Arras.

(11)

Cecil MSS. cvii. 72.

## MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

*October 19 [1604].*

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—Sir Will. Monson to my Lord Admiral, 1604  
Oct. 19.]

My duty most humbly remembered to your Lordship. I carried over Sig: John Baptista de Taxis, and returned him with his wife and family according to your Lordship's directions. I find by the Hollanders which rides before Gravelines that they have received late order from the States to impeach all English ships whatsoever that shall trade to any port of the Archduke, and moreover that they shall burn all such vessels as they shall take in that trade, which they say they have warrant for out of England. Thus much I am informed this morning by a bark which came from them but the tide before, and was rifled by them although there was no merchandize aboard her.

I am likewise certainly informed that there are fifteen small flyboats and pinks of the Hollanders laden with fish in Yarmouth road which are bound for Nieuport the next spring. Upon Monday last there was five others laden with wine and salt which went peaceably into Nieuport, their men of war riding before the harbour ; myself can witness of two Flushingers that put into Ostend upon Saturday in sight of four of their men-of-war who never offered them violence. Thus your Lordship may see they are willing to relieve their enemy themselves, and to bar his Majesty's subjects of trade, which I refer to your Lordship's good consideration and myself wholly to your Lordship's service, which I will ever honestly perform towards your Lordship.

Your Lordship's during life to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

(12)

Cecil MSS. cvii. 100.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

Nov. 6, 1604.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed:—6 Nov. 1604. Sir Wm. Monson to the Lord  
Admiral.]

My duty most humbly remembered to your Lordship :  
Being upon my way as far as Canterbury towards your  
Lordship with such information as I could upon the sudden  
gather of the Hollanders' usage of our Englishmen, I met  
here with the Duke's servant, who informed me that the  
Duke<sup>5</sup> would be at Calais upon Thursday expecting my  
coming thither, whereupon I am returned, and have sent  
your Lordship the examination of some dwelling in Sand-  
wich and Deal ; those of Dover I intend to bring with me  
to your Lordship upon the Duke's return, and until then,  
with the remembrance of my humble service, I take my  
leave of your Lordship this 6th of November 1604.

Your Lordship's during life to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

<sup>5</sup> Ulric, Duke of Holstein, brother of Anne of Denmark.  
He remained in England until the following summer.



(13)

Cecil MSS. exc. 120.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.<sup>6</sup>

July 2, 1605.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed:—1605, July 2. Sir William Monson to my Lord from aboard the Vanguard.]

My duty remembered to your Lordship: Presently upon the receipt of your Lordship's letter for the stay of Sir Robert Dudley,<sup>7</sup> Mrs. Southwell and Mrs. Rice, I divided my ships; one I have sent to ride in Calais road and there to search all vessels that shall pass in, the frigate I have

<sup>6</sup> Lord Cranborne became Earl of Salisbury 4th May, 1605.

<sup>7</sup> Sir Robert Dudley was the son of Leycester by Douglas Howard, daughter of William, first Lord Howard of Effingham, and widow of Lord Sheffield. She is said to have been twice married to Leycester, once secretly and, again, publicly. However, in 1578 she married Sir Edw. Stafford, and Leycester married Lettice, widow of Walter, Earl of Essex. Dudley appears to have been considered a legal son until his father made this marriage. In any case, Leycester left him the bulk of his estates, and his suit for the titles is said to have been stopped only through the influence of his father's widow. It was his disgust at this interference with the course of justice that led him to apply for a licence to travel; but he improved upon the licence by eloping at the same time with his cousin, Elizabeth Southwell, the lady mentioned in this letter. The deserted (second) wife was made a Duchess by Charles I., and the patent recognised the legitimacy of Sir Robert Dudley. His first wife was a sister of Thomas Cavendish, the circumnavigator, and the relationship perhaps explains Dudley's interest in maritime matters. Besides his service at Cadiz, for which he was knighted, he fitted out more than one expedition, and himself commanded a small squadron to the Spanish Main in 1594. In his exile at Florence Dudley devoted himself to naval matters, and drew plans of improved galleasses, which he sent to Prince Henry. In 1611 Dudley

appointed to keep betwixt Boulogne and Dieppe,<sup>8</sup> the Quittance off of Margate for all such ships as shall come out of the Thames, for I hold that the place of most suspicion for their embarking, and myself will keep the sea. To address any ships for the coast of Flanders it is needless because the Hollanders will intercept any vessels that shall pass into any of them ports ; but for the more surety, if I might know it stood with your Lordship's liking to make it known to the Hollanders, no ship can pass the seas but that either they or I should be sure to speak with them ; howsoever your Lordship shall find no negligence in me, but that I will be always ready to execute what your Lordship shall command. And thus with the remembrance of my humble service to your Lordship I humbly take my leave of your Lordship this second of July 1605.

Your Lordship's in all service to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

was recalled to England, and his refusal to obey led to the confiscation of his estates. He turned Catholic, obtained a Papal dispensation and married Elizabeth Southwell, became Grand Chamberlain to the Archduchess Magdalen of Austria, and through her was created a Duke of the Holy Roman Empire, taking the title of Northumberland. Of his great-grandchildren by the Italian marriage one became wife of the Duke of Shrewsbury, the statesman of the reigns of William III. and Anne, while another, the Marquis Paleotti, a colonel in the Imperial service, was hanged at Tyburn in 1718 for the murder of his servant ; and in Paleotti perished the last representative in the direct male line of the magnificent lord of Kenilworth. The only favour Paleotti begged was to be hanged before or after the plebeian beings who were to make the same pilgrimage.

<sup>8</sup> ' Bullen and Deepe ' in MS.

(14)

Cecil MSS. cxc. 123.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

July 5, 1605.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—5 July 1605. Sir William Monson to my Lord.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—At my coming ashore at Calais I found the governor not in town, and in no case his lieutenant-governor would be to know but that Sir Robert Dudley was gone before Capt. Bradgate's coming ashore, which I know to be otherwise and am secretly, and I think certainly, advertised that he is yet in Calais, yea, in the governor's own house, and shall there abide until he have answer from the King,<sup>9</sup> to whom he hath written, and as the King shall direct him so he will do in sending them for England, or conveying them secretly away; seeing there was no possibility for me to speak with him, or to understand more particulars, I am returned for England where I am ready to attend your Lordship's further order.

Count Buccoye<sup>10</sup> is past the river of Rhine<sup>11</sup> with 8,000 and hath built two forts on either side the river. Marquis Spinola is to follow with the rest of the army except those in Flanders, which Count Frederick commands, who it is said shall remove from where he is to Oudenburgh near Sluys. And thus with the remembrance of my service, I humbly take my leave of your Lordship, this fifth of July, 1605.

Your Lordship's in all services to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

<sup>9</sup> Henry IV.

<sup>10</sup> Count Bucquoy. It is unnecessary to rewrite Monson's version of the campaign of the summer of 1605.

<sup>11</sup> 'Reayne' in MS.

(15)

Cecil MSS. cxii. 52.

## MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

September 4 [1605].

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—3 September 1605. Sir W. Monson from Gravelines.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I arrived this day, being the 3rd of September, with the Conde de Villa Mediana at Gravelines, it being the third day after his embarking at the Downs, for the tide being so contrary and the wind so great as I could not with safety put him ashore sooner. Upon his arrival he was met by my Lord Arundel, who reported that he passed over by way of Calais, but examining the matter more particularly I found that he embarked himself secretly in the Adventure, naming himself a servant of the Lord Lisle's who meant to travel from Gravelines to Flushing by land. I understood before how much it was against your Lordship's will he should pass in any of his Majesty's ships, and to prevent it I gave strait charge to the captain of the Adventure that he should in no case take either passenger or follower of the ambassador's aboard him without my warrant, for that both I meant to see and be acquainted with all men's going over; he, notwithstanding, received him aboard, as your Lordship hath heard, and therefore, if there be offence in his manner of going I desire to purge myself, that the blame may light on them that have deserved it, for upon my salvation I was so far from knowledge or consenting to any such stratagem as I did what I could to prevent all occasions of his secret going. Captain Bradgate pretends ignorance in that he knew not who<sup>12</sup> he was, but howsoever he cannot excuse himself in disobeying my command; for besides the charge I gave

<sup>12</sup> 'Hoe.'



him not to receive any man aboard him the like charge I gave him not to land any man without bringing him first aboard me, all which he neglected and therefore worthy of blame. All which I refer unto your Lordship's consideration, and myself perpetually to your service, ever vowing myself your Lordship's in what your Lordship shall command me.

WILL. MONSON.

(16)

Cecil MSS. cxiv. 90.

*MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.*

[Holograph. Undated, but probably 6 September 1605.]

[Endorsed :—Sir William Monson to the Lord Admiral.<sup>13</sup>]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I love not to aggravate matters against a man that hath run himself into those troubles Capt. Bradgate hath done, though in honesty and duty I am bound to deliver a truth of all accidents that shall happen. And I must tell your Lordship that when I seemed to reprove Bradgate for this act of my Lord Arundel's, as also my Lord Arundel himself, by whose instigations I know not, though I have cause to suspect some, to wreak their malice against me, informed the ambassador upon the stay of his barks at Dunkirk that I had betrayed them to the Hollanders, and if I did not engage his Majesty's ships presently in fight without further deliberation or examination of the cause of their stay, I was absolutely concluded either for a traitor to the

<sup>13</sup> This letter was written under the following circumstances. Lord Arundel of Wardour, the colonel of a regiment in the Archdukes' service, was known to be desirous of obtaining a passage across to Flanders with the Conde de Villa Mediana, the Spanish ambassador, who was then going over, by which Lord Arundel would escape an otherwise nearly certain capture by the Dutch cruisers. James required an assurance from the Dutch representative, Sir Noel de Caron, that no attack should be made on the English man-of-war conveying Villa Mediana. This was readily given ; but on his side de Caron gave good

ambassador or imputed a coward.<sup>14</sup> If I had not found the ambassador very honourable not to credit reports, and discreet in disliking my Lord Arundel's courses, my reputation had been in question; I cannot justly accuse Bradgate to be the author of these practices, and therefore I humbly beseech your Lordship they may not be laid to his charge, but that such information was made against me your Lordship shall hear by others. I have sent Capt. Bradgate in company of Capt. Hawkrige, my lieutenant, who is able to say as much touching my Lord Arundel's coming aboard the *Adventure* as any other, because he was aboard the *Adventure* himself when he came aboard disguised with a false beard and raggedly clothen, and put into the gunner room port because he should not be seen.<sup>15</sup> It appears he came in company of Bradgate from Dover and

reasons why the enemies of his government should not be allowed the protection of the ambassador. Therefore 'his Majesty passed his word to Monsieur Caron for the staying of him and his company from going in any such manner.' Although Lord Arundel is the only one mentioned in the letter and in Monson's account (*ante*, p. 36), it seems that there were others of the Archdukes' officers trying to cross with Villa Mediana. Arundel was definitely ordered to remain behind, but given a hint that his passage should not be long delayed. James was indignant at the disobedience shown, and Arundel was ordered to appear before the Privy Council by the end of November (Winwood, *Memorials*, ii. 135, 141). Captain Mathew Bradgate, of the *Adventure*, was superseded on 7th September, and does not appear to have been employed again.

<sup>14</sup> The meaning of this seems to be that some of the small vessels carrying the ambassador's luggage were stopped outside Dunkirk by Dutch ships, and that Arundel and Bradgate tried to persuade Villa Mediana that it was due to Monson's treachery (see *ante*, p. 37). I have inserted a full stop at 'coward'; in the original the sentence goes trickling on to 'hear by others.' As Villa Mediana was at this time the paymaster for Monson's bribe, the latter's indignation was doubtless very genuine, and the fact is better evidence than any statement of his own that he was not a party to Arundel's presence on board the *Adventure*.

<sup>15</sup> Came on board through the gunroom port—aft.

was secretly hid at Waymore<sup>16</sup> until Bradgate sent his boat for him as the ship passed by ; he thought to embark at Deal, but spying Capt. Hawkridge in the boat at his coming thither he waved unto him to go to Waymore. This is as much as the company knows, and this did Capt. Hawkridge see, as also his taking into the ship, besides divers other circumstances which I refer unto Capt. Hawkridge's report. I have committed the charge of the Adventure unto your Lordship's servant, Capt. Humfrey Renals, a man discreet, valiant, and well experienced, one that for his life would not commit so foul a crime.<sup>17</sup> I am now ready to set sail with the ambassador's baggage, but doubt I shall not be able to put it in unless it be by force, which I am resolved not to offer, but to return back again and acquaint your Lordship. And this, with the remembrance of my service to your Lordship, I humbly take my leave of your Lordship, ever resting your Lordship's during life to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

Bradgate called my Lord Arundel cousin aboard the ship, and by the name of Greene.

(17)

Cecil MSS. cxii. 59.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

September 7 [1605].

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—7 September, 1605.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Since my letter the sixth of this month here is arrived the barks from Dunkirk who received as evil usage by the Hollanders at their coming

<sup>16</sup> Walmer.

<sup>17</sup> Apparently Reynolds was put in with the idea of pleasing Nottingham, but the appointment was not confirmed. Bradgate was succeeded by Thos. Button, who kept the Adventure in commission until 18th January, 1606.



out as at their going in. The English master which brought the Spaniards out of Spain to Dover went over with the ambassador to have a dispatch of his business, and coming out in one of the said barks is taken out of her and sent to the States in Holland, and how they will use him I know not, but I fear very evil. The hoy, which is behind, and indeed is of more value than all the rest, the Hollanders hath intelligence of and is resolved to seize upon her, and therefore to avoid the danger of it I have caused all the trunks and fardels to be taken out of her and brought to land to the Downs, and there I embarked it in the Vanguard, and mean to send it in my boats to Gravelines if I can do it with safety ; if not to return it again to England and acquaint your Lordship withal. If I had sent it by water from Sandwich to the Downs the Holland pinnacle, which lieth in Sandwich haven, was resolved to take it and throw the men overboard.

Duncame, which ran away with Bream's bark from the Isle of Wight, is returned to Flushing with a Brazilman of 400 chests of sugar ; there are likewise two other English barks come thither, with each of them a Brazilman. English sailors come daily from serving the Hollanders, but at their parting can get no satisfaction for their service, so that many of them are behindhand a year's pay.

I desire to know your Lordship's pleasure about Cap. Muckell. The merchants which owed<sup>18</sup> the goods he took from under the Isle of Wight is willing to discharge him, so that your Lordship will consent unto it, and if your Lordship intend him any good it must be done before other matters come against him ; for though he was innocent both in this and other actions yet perforce his company did other things which may endanger him. And thus with remembrance of my humble service, with desire to be ever at your Lordship's command, I humbly take my leave.

Your Lordship's during life to be commanded,

WILL. MONSON.

From on board the Vanguard.

<sup>18</sup> *Sic.* Qy. owned.



(18)

Cecil MSS. cxiii. 42.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

Nov. 28, 1605.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—24<sup>19</sup> November 1605. Sir William Monson to my Lord. The Spaniards gone from Dover.<sup>20</sup>]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I am advertised of the departure of the Spaniards this day from Dover about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, with a great and large wind, so that I assure myself about 9 o'clock in the night they will arrive safely in Dunkirk ; their business was carried both secretly and subtly, for neither did the masters of the ships that carried them, or any other of the town, ever suspect their going until the very hour of their embarking, though the barks had been hired above five weeks. The particulars I am not able to inform your Lordship, and therefore refer your Lordship to the report of them that can make a truer relation, and thus with the remembrance of my service I humbly take my leave of your Lordship.

Your Lordship's perpetually to command,

WILL. MONSON.

<sup>19</sup> *Sic*. Dated 28 Nov. in the address.<sup>20</sup> See *ante*, pp. 22, 270.

(19)

Cecil MSS. cxix. 38.

## MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

1606.

[Holograph. No address.]

[Endorsed :—1606. Sir William Monson to the Lord Admiral concerning the Dunkirk that lay in Sandwich.<sup>21</sup>]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—At my coming down I found the four Hollanders which my Lord of Northampton<sup>22</sup> was advertised were sent for to strengthen the rest of the ships in the Small Downs<sup>23</sup> come thither, so that there were in the whole six before the mouth of the harbour and two within. I sent for the captains of each ship and signified unto them his Majesty's pleasure, and for that purpose I was sent down to see the proclamation executed. They seemed to obey his Majesty's command and with great devotion to do him service. I told them my charge was as great not to permit any Englishman to serve the Dunkirk, as also that security should be taken that the ship in her passage from England to Flanders should not offer any violence to any of their merchants or others. Most part of the day they spent ashore, and either myself or some other gentlemen by my appointment feasted them at my charges to their great contentments. The conclusion betwixt us was this : that according to his Majesty's proclamation the two ships within should abide two tides after the departure of the Dunkirker, and for the seeing this executed I promised to be in person myself and to

<sup>21</sup> See *ante*, p. 29, on the subject of this letter ; either the date there given is wrong or this endorsement is wrong.

<sup>22</sup> Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, was Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports ; these events occurred therefore within his jurisdiction. With Northampton and Monson working together the Dutch must have felt themselves between the upper and nether millstones (see General Introduction, i. xx. *et seq.*).

<sup>23</sup> The Small Downs are the North Downs nearer Sandwich.

leave order with my ships to see the like obeyed in the Small Downs. The next day when the tide served I was ready in my boat to see the service performed, and as the Dunkirk was ready to depart the two Hollanders was as ready as she, which I wondered at, considering what had passed the day before, whereupon I sent an officer of my Lord of Northampton's to know their meaning and to will the captain of the great ship to come ashore to me. The captain refused to obey the King's proclamation, as also to come ashore, vowing to cut off any man's head that should come aboard him. Immediately upon this, in a great rage, I returned aboard the Vanguard and left Captain Button to see the ship forth notwithstanding his threats, assuring the Dunkirker that if the Hollander offered to impeach him to be revenged of the rest that rid without, promising to defend him if he would but defend himself until he came within my command. I was no sooner gone but the company of the Dunkirker, all save the Spaniards, quitted the ship and got themselves ashore, thinking they had been betrayed. I imagined it was a plot laid down by consent of all the Hollanders that they which rid without, and under my jurisdiction, should disclaim the fact and lay the blame upon the others because they cannot be commanded as they lie. After my coming aboard the Vanguard I sent for the rest of the captains and vowed that if they did not see the others within obey his Majesty's proclamation I would take present revenge of them ; they all forswore the act, exclaiming at the pride of him within, of whom they had no more command than he of them, and to give me the better satisfaction they entreated my letter with theirs to their Admiral in signifying the other's lewd carriage, which letters they immediately sent away with one of their ships. The contents of my letter was to will him disclaim from the fact ; if he were guiltless so should he clear himself of blame, cause his Majesty to impute it to the stubbornness of one private man, and clear their State of all suspicion. Thus stands the state of the Dunkirker, who I know not how he shall be relieved, for, as your Lordship knows, neither the Vanguard nor Answer can come near the harbour to force them, and to send in the Whelp, being old and weak, where she shall lie aground, will in one tide



break her back. To take revenge of the rest who in conscience are innocent were no course, and for Sir Noel de Caron to compel them I know not how your Lordship will adjudge it to stand with his Majesty's honour that so mean a man's letter should prevail where there is a denial of his Majesty's edict ; but, in my poor opinion, if Sir Noel de Caron would command the sails to be taken from the yards, the captain to be displaced and sent up prisoner, and to be punished at your Lordship's discretion he should do his masters right, and it would warn others hereafter to have more respect for his Majesty's authority. Or if your Lordship will be but a means to his Majesty that I may with leave carry aboard but 20 Englishmen to those that are already in the Dunkirker, though there be great difference betwixt the goodness of the ships, yet will I lose my life but bring her forth in despite of them. I must impute the wilfulness of the Hollanders as one great reason to the animating of the people in Sandwich, who are for the most part either Hollanders or the offspring of them ; and to show their passion and partiality the more, when my Lord Warden's officers, with the gentleman in their company that was sent from Count Aberberk<sup>24</sup> about this ship, returned from doing their office, they were met with at the least 200 people shouting and rejoicing that the Hollander would not suffer her to pass, which was as much as that his Majesty's law could not be obeyed. I do humbly beseech your Lordship's present resolution, for after Saturday the tides decline that until the next spring there is no possibility to get her forth ; neither can the Vanguard stay longer than Saturday for want of victuals, and therefore your Lordship is to consider whether it is better to continue her so long or send the Assurance in her place. The Whelp desires, according to your Lordship's order, that she may go westward, which I refer to your Lordship's consideration whether it is better to send

<sup>24</sup> Probably Count Aremberg. As the representative of the Archdukes Albert and Isabel it would be his duty to protect the Dunkirk ship. The spelling in the text is not a much more extraordinary sea change than other names, about whose identification there is no doubt, suffer at Monson's hands.



her thither, or cause her to attend this service. I find she has not above six days' victuals.

There are this day four ships of London come out of Spain; one of which has been robbed by Hollanders, 27 packs taken out of her, one of her men hanged to death, and two wolden about the head that their brains was ready to come forth;<sup>25</sup> many of these spoils they do upon the coast of Spain. There are six pirates betwixt Ushant<sup>26</sup> and the Start, half English, half Hollanders, that rob all men. Four galleys have taken an English pirate at the South Cape, and those they have not hanged are put into the galleys. And thus with the remembrance of my service to your Lordship, I humbly take my leave of your Lordship ever resting,

Your Lordship's perpetually to command,  
WILL. MONSON.

(20)

Clarendon State Papers (Bodleian Lib.), 26, f. 67.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

September 9 [1608].

[Endorsed:—9 7bris 1608. Sir Wm. Monson of his restoring the French bark to the owners, and his receiving a flyboat laden with sugars from Captain Button.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I received your Lordship's first letter within few hours after I dispatched my last to your Lordship, and according to your Lordship's directions I have restored the Frenchman his bark; and in consideration of hiring a ship in the Isle of Wight which I sent along the coast as I acquainted your Lordship heretofore and other charges which I disbursed for the Frenchmen in Plymouth, I have taken of them but the value of xx. li.,

<sup>25</sup> A cord wound tightly round the forehead and skull with a pistol barrel used as a twisting lever.

<sup>26</sup> 'Using' in MS.

because I consider the loss they have had in losing their time ; but principally because they should speak honourably of your Lordship and the justice of England. The bark they were taken in I cause them to leave with Sir Richard Hawkyns to your Lordship's use, with an inventory of such tackling and sails as belong to her.

Touching the effect of your Lordship's two last letters, I have received from Captain Button the flyboat of sugars with an inventory of all her tackling and sails, which your Lordship shall receive here enclosed. For the goods aboard her I take it by conjecture, for unless we unlade her, which will be both chargeable and hazard the chest, I cannot do it exactly, but in the course I take I will be answerable for any thing that shall be embezzled, for I continue the captain, master, and two others of the Quittance's company aboard who shall as well overlook such men I put aboard, as mine shall oversee them. And to take away all occasion I lade the ship with billets which will so cover the sugars as it is impossible to come unto them. The prisoners and Portuguese boy I have in my custody, over whom I will be very careful.

My repair will not be so soon to the Downs as perhaps your Lordship expects, for that I stay to victual and for a new fore yard ; mine I brake in the Race of Portland. The day before there was a ship of Chichester sunk in the Race.

There arrived the last night a bark of Dover from Lisbon who tells of Don Lewes Fachado's<sup>26a</sup> departure from thence with 20 galleons and of 60 galleys he is to meet at Cadiz ; and being joined they enter the Straits to perform some service upon Barbary side.

Captain Button hath delivered the possession of the Quittance to Captain Wood ; and for the capital offence he is charged withal, which is the harbouring a pirate and receiving two chests of sugar I know him so innocent in either as my testimony will be able to clear him. And therefore I humbly beseech your Lordship not to withdraw your Lordship's good opinion of him until the matter come in hearing.

<sup>26a</sup> Lewis Fajardo.

Upon my arrival in the Downs, which I hope will be about seven days hence, your Lordship shall hear from me, and until then, as ever after, I will be your Lordship's most faithfully to command, and will never cease praying for your Lordship's long life and happiness.

Your Lordship's till death to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

Portsmouth this ixth of September, 1608.

[Addressed: 'To the right honourable his very good Lo: the Earl of Nottingham, Lo: High Admiral of England, give these.]

(21)

Cecil MSS. cxcv. 63.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

Dec. 11, 1608.

[Addressed.]

[Endorsed:—11 December 1608. Sir William Mounson to my Lord.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—It may seem strange to your Lordship that my Lord of Cranborne<sup>27</sup> hath stayed these four days for passage. If any men deserve blame for it, it is myself, for the weather hath continued so tempestuous and uncertain as I held it not discretion to adventure over sooner than I knew it might best stand with his Lordship's safety. This morning about 8 of the clock he set sail from the Downs, and in less than three hours arrived in the road of Calais, where he embarked in a boat hired

<sup>27</sup> William Cecil, afterwards second Earl of Salisbury. 'The young Lord Cranborne is going into France before Christmas, but yet shall marry privately before he go' (Chamberlain to Carleton, 8th November, 1608). He married, on 1st December, 1608, Lady Catherine Howard, youngest daughter of the Earl of Suffolk, and sister of the notorious Countess of Essex. Clarendon describes the husband as 'a man of no words except in hunting and hawking, in which only he knew how to behave himself' (*Rebellion*, bk. vi. 403).

of purpose, and I thank God without peril; he is at this instant going ashore. I have sent over the Vanguard to advertise your Lordship of it, and will attend my Lord myself so long as he shall remain in Calais, and doubt not but within one hour after his arrival he will find himself much better of his sea-sickness. And thus, with the remembrance of my service to your Lordship, in all humble manner I take my leave. From Calais road this 11th of December, 1608.

Yours evermore to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

(22)

Clarendon State Papers (Bodleian Lib.), 37, f. 92.

MONSON TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM.

February 22 [1608-9].

[Endorsed :—22 Feb. 1608. Sir Wm. Monson of his intent to pursue the pirates upon the west coast.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—According to the contents of my last letter to your Lordship I have been at sea from that time until this day, that I am constrained to put into harbour for the mending my sails I split in foul weather, and for the stiffening my ship which is grown very light, as also expecting my victuals. With this easterly wind I can neither meet with the pirates at sea, nor have intelligence of them, more than that about ten days since one of them stole a Frenchman out of Conquet, rode amongst 30 sail that rid there, and from thence stood their course to the southward, which makes me fear the rest have done the like, and yet I am not utterly out of hope, for though they would they have had no winds to seize<sup>28</sup> this coast since they put from it. I make account that after three or four days that the wind hath been southerly they will either repair again for these parts or else fully

<sup>28</sup> 'Ceas.'



resolved to endure their fortunes upon the coast of Spain ; and therefore I hold it best if it stand with your Lordship's liking, when I find little hope here about, that I go to the Isle of Wight for the space of three weeks or a month, in which time they will have intelligence of my departure, and peradventure will be encouraged to come upon the coast again, and when they least think of it I may fall upon them by retur[n]ing hither, or into Ireland, whither I may be bold to go, the season of the year better fitting for that coast than now. The Quittance I have left at Falmouth, who is ready upon all occasions to put to Helford, Mounts Bay, or any place westward ; my self being at Plymouth is ready for Cawsand Bay, Torbay, or any place eastward. No suspected ships can arrive in any of those places but I have so ordered it that by post I shall be advertised of it ; I have caused the mayors and officers of every town and village to forbid the fishermen to give intelligence of my being upon the coast, or any other vessels that shall depart out of their harbours, which I am very well assured they will obey, for I find every man in general much animated against them. I have likewise given them instructions to employ some whom they know to be of great honesty, and respects<sup>29</sup> his Majesty's service, in the night time to repair aboard them with so much victuals as will serve them a meal, and promise to supply them the next night with more, and so with hopes to entertain them until I shall be advertised, and be able to come upon them, by which means they cannot escape if they once again come for the coast. Mr. Bagg is the man to whom I have given them order to address their letters, who I find most ready, and willing to perform any service that tends to your Lordship's honour ;<sup>30</sup> and for the attaching, such lewd

<sup>29</sup> *I.e.* 'respect for.'

<sup>30</sup> James Bagg of Plymouth, afterwards knighted by Charles I., Vice-Admiral of Devon, Government agent for the equipment of ships and troops, John Eliot's opponent and libeller, and known popularly as 'the bottomless Bagg' in view of the amount of public money he was credited with absorbing : a most villainous person.

persons, I thought it my duty to acquaint your Lordship with what I have done in hope my next shall be news of more contentment to your Lordship, and in the mean time I will neglect no opportunity but be ever ready with my service.

At your Lordship's commandment,  
WILL. MONSON.

Plymouth, the 22nd February, 11 of the clock in the forenoon.

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Cecil MSS. cxcv. 146.

MONSON TO THE EARLS OF SALISBURY AND NOTTINGHAM.

April 10, 1610.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—10 April, 1610. Sir Wm. Monson to my Lord.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Upon my coming to Bristol I found the Advantage so unserviceable in men, victuals, sails, powder, and all things else, that it was impossible to fit her to sea; and understanding of Salkeld being still in Lundy, rather than I would lose any opportunity I fitted a bark with 25 men to sea, and departed from Bristol upon Easter eve, but by reason of calms it was Monday before I could arrive in Ilfracombe,<sup>31</sup> where I understood first of Salkeld's escape, in the manner my Lord of Bath hath certified your Lordships, and that he is so unfitted of all provisions as I rather think he will disguisedly put himself ashore than hazard his fortune by sea: whereof to prevent him I have writ to my Lord of Bath to direct his letters to the shires of Devon and Cornwall, commanding the Justices there to be very careful to stay and examine all persons that cannot

<sup>31</sup> 'Ilefordecombe.'

give a good account of their dwellings, their business, their residence for a month's time past, and of their means to live, and the like course I intend to have observed in all the coasts of Wales, whither I am now going in pursuit of him in the aforesaid bark; so that my hope is he shall hardly escape by sea or land. I do perceive by some intelligence here that his intent is to go for Ireland by the course which he held after he put from Lundy, but finding the wind westerly he must be forced for England or Wales, and I have written to my Lord of Bath to furnish a bark for the keeping of the coast of England on these western parts, whilst I do the like upon the coasts of Wales, until the wind shall come easterly or that the King's ships shall arrive, of whom as yet I hear no news; but if they shall come hither in my absence I have left directions that they shall disperse themselves, so long as the wind shall hang westerly or southerly, and after for two of them to make their rendezvous<sup>32</sup> in Lundy and from thence to put for Ireland.

His taking doth much import the safety of poor merchants in all these parts, for I have never known villain so desperately bent against these<sup>33</sup> countrymen, compelling them to forswear their allegiance to his Majesty. All other particulars I refer to the report of my Lord of Bath's letter, whom I have entreated to write more at large thereof unto your Lordships, and so in all humble manner I take my leave of your Lordships from Ilfracombe this 10 of April 1610.

Your Lordships' ever to command,

WILL. MONSON.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> 'Rundevoue.'

<sup>33</sup> 'This' in MS. Probably 'his countrymen.'

<sup>34</sup> On 23 March 1609-10 Thomas Salkeld, a notorious pirate, after plundering in the Bristol Channel landed at Lundy with his crew—sixteen men and boys—and proclaimed himself King of the island wishing that he had his rival of England's 'heart upon the point of his sword.' Salkeld's first kingly function was to set up a gallows upon which to hang those of his crew and prisoners who refused to swear allegiance to him. The latter, their heads shaved as slaves, were set to



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State Papers Dom. James I. lxiv. 3.

## MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

Not dated.

[Holograph.]

[Endorsed:—4 June 1611, Lieutenant of the Tower. Sir Wm. Monson certifying what he found by examination of certain watermen concerning the Lady Arabella and Mr. Seymour's escape. To my Lord.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—Taking boat at Whitehall to go to Billingsgate to change my watermen, my Lord of Walden's<sup>35</sup> man with whom I went told me that yesterday, about five in the afternoon, he being at Blackwall, there passed by in a boat certain gentlemen that were wont to keep company with Mr. William Seymour, and that at the same time there was ashore in a tavern a young gentleman and a middle-aged gentlewoman. For my better satisfaction I carried the said waterman with me to Blackwall, where I understood the fare he waited for was the Lady Gray, daughter to the Earl of Shrewsbury,<sup>36</sup> who he

work in building fortifications. Eventually George Escott, an officer of a Bridgewater coaster which had been taken, led a mutiny of the prisoners and Salkeld at once fled (*S. P. Dom. Jas. I. liii. 100*). The Government either took Salkeld's escapade very seriously, or Escott had good influence behind him, for he was rewarded for his recovery of the island with a pension of eighteenpence a day for life (Devon, *Issues of the Exchequer*, Lond. 1836, p. 309). Salkeld seems to have met his end in 1610 at the hands of another pirate, Peter Easton, who had him thrown overboard (*S. P. Ireld. ccxxix. 124*).

<sup>35</sup> Lord Howard of Walden, eldest son of the Earl of Suffolk. It was usual for men of rank to have their special watermen.

<sup>36</sup> The Countess of Shrewsbury was Arabella Stewart's aunt, and was sent to the Tower on suspicion of assisting her with money. Neither of Arabella Stewart's biographers (E. Cooper and E. T. Bradley) mentions any daughter of the Earl of Shrewsbury in connection with the flight. The only possible Lady Grey of the family was Lord Shrewsbury's second daughter, Mary, wife of Henry Grey, Earl of Kent.



landed at Greenwich ; and that there came to the gentleman and gentlewoman a man by land, and another in a pair of oars by water, both of them in cloaks alike, and he that came by water landed here and put the other aboard his boat, who followed the gentleman and gentlewoman being put from the shore a little before their coming.

Upon further examining I have found and sent to your Lordships the watermen who carried them, and because my going requires expedition I refer most to the man's relation, only thus much it is fit your Lordship should know from me that seven miles below Lee there lay a French bark of purpose to take them in, and had a sign by showing a flag when they should come aboard them. About four o'clock this morning they came aboard and set sail, two hours being spent of the ebb. I make account that tide they recovered but the North Foreland, and if the wind veer easterly they cannot this night recover Calais, whither they are bound. I have already sent to the Narrow Seas for a ship to stand over for Calais, and for the more certainty I have sent another packet to any of the Lords<sup>37</sup> at Greenwich to send way in haste with gallies upon.<sup>38</sup> I have stayed an oyster boat and have put six men and shot into her, and is hasting after them with all the speed I can for my life, which must excuse my brief and rude writing.

Your Lordship's till death,

WILL. MONSON.

<sup>37</sup> Lords of the Privy Council.

<sup>38</sup> *Sic.* Probably 'Calles (*i.e.* tapes) open,' so that any Lord of the Privy Council at Greenwich might read it.

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Harleian MSS. 7,003, f. 130.

## MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.

Not dated.

[Signed.]

[Endorsed :—6 June 1611. S<sup>c</sup> Willm. Mounson to my Lord, concerning the negligence of the post-masters.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I doubt not but that your Lordship hath received two letters directed from the master of my ship,<sup>39</sup> the one to my Lord Admiral, the other to me, wherein your Lordship may be advertised in the manner of the taking my Lady Arabella. Myself hath been at sea some time in calm weather in a Light Horseman<sup>40</sup> off Gravesend. When it blew I took the next ketch or fisherman I could meet withal, and meeting the Charles at sea I have sent her for the coast of Flanders ; and hearing the Adventure was so quickly returned into the Downs gave me assurance she had met with the Lady Arabella, which made me hasten thither with all speed. And though, as I said before, the master had acquainted my Lord Admiral therewith, yet I thought it my duty not to direct my letter to any but to your Lordship and expect his Majesty's directions how to dispose of my Lady, for that I am unwilling that she should go ashore until I have further authority. But in the mean time she shall not want anything the shore can afford, or any other honourable usage. It is bootless to trouble your Lordship with any further relation, seeing the service is performed, I hope to his Majesty's content ; but I must not omit to acquaint your Lordship with the negligence of the postmasters in carrying my first packet. Your Lordship shall know in whom was the fault, and I hope

<sup>39</sup> Griffin Cockett ; Cockett's letter is in *Harl. MSS.* 7,003, f. 128.

<sup>40</sup> Smyth (*Sailor's Word-Book*) defines a Light Horseman as a gig.

he shall be punished accordingly ; and in the meantime with remembrance of my service to your Lordship, and my prayers to God for his Majesty's long happiness, I humbly take my leave.

Your Lordship's in all service to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

I am forced to use the help of a writer, having strained my arm in entering of a ship, which I hope your Lordship will excuse me for.

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State Papers Dom. James I. lxviii. 41.

*MONSON TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY.*

Not dated.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—January, 1611.<sup>41</sup> Sir William Monson to my Lord.]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—My duty most humbly remembered, I find in the French letter your Lordship sent me that a pirate arrived in the road of Boulogne in some distress, and considering how the winds have blown since the time of her arrival, I find she can hardly pass to the westward, and therefore I will immediately stand into the Channel with the Adventure and send the Charles back to the Downs. But, if I may be bold to deliver both my conceit and opinion, the pirate, it seems, came from the westward and therefore not likely she will return again ; but if your Lordship will please to direct your letters into the havens of the north country and Scotland that the officers be careful to take notice of such a ship and men, it is very likely they may seize upon her, for being in that necessity, as it seems she is by the letter, she cannot keep the sea, but must be forced into some harbour in a counterfeit manner like a merchant, and that the officers may have the better

<sup>41</sup> January 1611-12.

marks and knowledge of the men and ship I make bold to send your Lordship the letter again that will direct them. And thus with the remembrance of my service to your Lordship, in all humbleness I take my leave, ever remaining,

Your Lordship's in all service to be commanded,  
WILL. MONSON.

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State Papers Dom. James I. clix. 11.

MONSON TO [COUNCIL].

[Dated 4 Feb. 1623 [-4] (on endorsement only). Signed.]

[Endorsed :—A certificate touching the lighthouse,<sup>42</sup> Feb. 4th, 1623. ]

RIGHT HONOURABLE,—I most humbly desire your Lordships to excuse my personal attendance in respect of the ill disposition of my body, and lameness of my leg at this present. Notwithstanding, I have presumed to deliver my opinion in writing concerning the business, and have

<sup>42</sup> In May 1619 Sir John Killigrew of Arwenack petitioned for permission to build a lighthouse on the Lizard. Killigrew belonged to a family distinguished for more than half a century for its activity in more or less illicit methods of enriching itself. Always smugglers, often privateersmen, and sometimes pirates, the names of individual Killigrews constantly recur during the reign of Elizabeth as subjects of official inquiry. Variety of occupation being now more restricted, Sir John bethought himself of this new source of income. Philanthropy was the avowed object in erecting the lighthouse—towards the support of which he only asked voluntary contributions—but the real intention was, on obtaining certificates of its utility, to get a grant of a fixed imposition on shipping making the Channel from the westward. This, he thought, would be easy (*State Papers Dom. Jas. I. cix. 42*). He was taken at his word, and was given a so-called patent 'under the great seal of the Admiralty,' bearing date June 29, 1619, permitting him to erect the lighthouse and to keep the light burning for fifty years (*ibid.* 160). With a



answered such material objections as I conjecture may be alleged against it, viz. :—

First, it may be alleged that ships coming in with our Channel seek not our coast in the night but in the day, and therefore needless.

Secondly, that men do commonly fall with our coast about Plymouth or Dartmouth, and that many times men seek not the Lizard, either outward or homeward.

staid and perhaps not unintentional humour the patent gave him leave to receive any contributions voluntarily offered to him as he was doing the work 'out of Christian and charitable considerations.' Killigrew's troubles now began. By December 1619 the tower was built and the light was burning at a cost of ten shillings a night for coal. Not only was the light burning, but so also were his neighbours, who declared 'that I take away God's Grace from them, their English meaning is that they now shall receive no more benefit from shipwreck. They have been so long used to reap purchase by the calamity of the ruin of shipping as they claim it hereditary' (*ibid.* cx. 61). When Killigrew petitioned for his patent he had entered into a secret agreement with Sir Dudley Carleton, our ambassador at the Hague, by which Carleton was to have half of all profits accruing from the light (*ibid.* Add. xli. 113). Carleton was to earn this by using his influence in England to get a real patent under the Great Seal allowing Killigrew to levy a fixed duty on English shipping, and his influence in Holland to obtain a similar grant on Dutch shipping passing the Lizard. These schemes both failed. Notwithstanding Carleton's pressure, the Dutch contributed nothing, although certificates from Dutch skippers attesting the utility of the light were not wanting, and although Dutch shipping to the value of 100,000*l.* had been lost on the Lizard within ten years. At home there was active opposition led by the Trinity House, who objected, nominally for the reasons refuted in this letter of Monson's, really because it would not be under their control and would not be worked for their profit—'the Trinity House, who have grown insolent since the Navy Officers were displaced and they put in authority, oppose a patent, pretending that all lights and sea marks belong to them' (*ibid.* cxii. 90). In January 1620 Killigrew made his moan to Carleton that he had spent 500*l.* on the light without any return, and in May he had almost decided

Thirdly, that the Channel is there so broad that men may sail as well by night as day.

Fourthly, the advantage that pirates will take by a light there placed.

An answer to these objections :—

In time of war I hold it dangerous to maintain a light upon our coast, but in time of peace I think it very necessary, by the reasons following.

The art of navigation is not so certain that a man can to extinguish it, but would venture another 50*l.* in coal in hope of an arrangement with the Dutch (*ibid.* cxii. 11; cxv. 3). Apparently the light flickered out, for nothing more is heard of it until 1622, when Sir John made another attempt, and this time more successfully. He wisely gave an interest in the profits to Robert Mynne, a brother-in-law of Sir George Calvert, Secretary of State, and with this powerful influence at work had no difficulty in obtaining his patent (*Rot. Pat.*, December 11, 1622). The patent recites that Killigrew, having built a suitable tower of stone and lime, shall receive, subject to a yearly rent of forty shillings reserved to the Crown, a halfpenny a ton on all ships, except fishermen, passing the Lizard; of this halfpenny a farthing was on the ship tonnage and a farthing on the cargo, and the duty was to be collected by the customs' officers at the various ports. The opposition of the Trinity House seemed to be nullified by a clause asserting the power inherent in the Crown to grant such a licence, notwithstanding any rights of that corporation under the statute 8 Eliz. c. 5. A final reservation on the part of the Crown was the power of revoking the patent if found to be burdensome to the shipping interest; upon any declaration to that effect 'this grant immediately becomes void.' If Killigrew thought that the patent would end his troubles he soon found out his mistake. The outcries of owners who did not want to pay, of officers of customs who did not want the trouble of collecting, and, above all, of the Trinity Brothers who did not want their interests and privileges interfered with, became fiercer than ever, and it was at this stage of Killigrew's struggle to retain his hardly won monopoly that he obtained this certificate of Monson's in support of his case. Even the Trinity House itself did not estimate the amount of the tax at more than 400*l.* a year (*S. P. Dom. Jas. I.* clv. 1); but, for all the weight of authority and influence behind him, Killigrew was not able to retain his patent, the opposition of the Trinity

assume to himself what land he shall fall withal, or the time, and therefore seeing it is undetermined it were fit men should be furnished with as many other helps as can be devised. But in my own particular I have oftener fallen with the Lizard in my return from the southward than with all other lands.

There is no man that hath lain boyltinge <sup>43</sup> at sea any time but will be glad to make a land, for a good landfall is a principal thing desired coming for our coast, and men shall be the more emboldened to bear in with the coast when they shall know a light upon the Lizard that will appear to them seven or eight leagues, for I have been informed it hath been so far descried.<sup>44</sup>

If men do not now covet to see the land until they

House being finally successful (*State Papers Dom. Chas. I.* clxxxii. 63).

In 1631 another Killigrew begged Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, to be a suitor to the King for permission to set up the Lizard light once more ; but nothing came of this, and no more was heard of the matter until 1664, when Sir John Coryton petitioned for a licence for the Lizard and other southern headlands.

A few words may be added on the reference above to the authority attributed to the Trinity House after the displacement of the Navy Board. Most historians of the Trinity House have assigned to the Brethren a commanding influence in the naval administration of the seventeenth century on the strength of two or three isolated statements like the one quoted. As a matter of fact their position was always subsidiary and deferential ; occasionally some were called in to give an expert opinion on ship construction, buoys, or lights, just as expert evidence is taken in a court of law, but their attitude was strictly that of subordinates. For one thing, there was always a latent or active antagonism between the Crown and the Trinity Brethren over the right of the former to grant licences for lighthouses, the latter claiming the right and profits for themselves, and this antagonism re-acted, indirectly, on the posture of the Admiralty.

<sup>43</sup> Boiling, battering.

<sup>44</sup> An absurdly exaggerated distance for a coal-fire light if it means 21 or 24 miles ; but possibly Monson here means ordinary miles.



come as high as Plymouth or Dartmouth, which I will suppose to be the Bolt, yet when they shall know of a light placed upon the Lizard they will rather covet to shape their course for the Lizard, where a light shall appear to them, than for any other headland that shall have no such mark. And what a comfort a ship in distress shall find by this light it is to be imagined by example of a traveller on land losing his way in a dark cold night and espying a light in a cottage, or hearing a ring of bells, by either of which he may be directed.

In the year 1589, I being at sea with my Lord of Cumberland, we sent home a Spanish prize to the value of a hundred thousand pounds, they coming for our Channel, and in distress, bore in with the land, thinking she had been shot in as high as Plymouth, but it happened that she was a little short of the Lizard and forced into Mounts Bay; there, two days after her coming to an anchor, she was cast away. A light from the Lizard at that time had saved a hundred men's lives and 100,000*l.* worth of wealth, for if she had known herself to be so nigh the Lizard the wind was so large as she might have gotten about the land with the foresail, and I dare say there was as good mariners on board her as that time could afford.

The year before this I remember Mr. Cavendish, in his return in his voyage about the world, falling with our Channel. Somewhat short of the Lizard he was taken with so great a storm as he could not make the land, and hath confessed to me he endured more hazard and trouble in two nights upon our coast than in his long navigation. Divers other mischances I could allege, together with the late several wrecks that have been in Mounts Bay, which is sufficient to prove the necessary convenience of a light to be placed on the promontory of the Lizard, so it be carefully performed and maintained with fuel as I am informed now it is.

And for answer of the breadth of our Channel about the Lizard, I say how broad soever the Channel is yet ships must put in with the shore, and no man but will be glad of the light and knowledge of a land in such a case.



I remember in the year 1597 the Spanish Armada was coming from Lisbon to the Groyne, and upon the North Cape thirty-six of their ships and 5,000 men perished, and yet the sea was broad enough, for the next land to the westward was America, yet upon necessity they were to seek the land which they perished upon. Here would a known light from the North Cape have saved this disaster of loss of ships and men.<sup>45</sup>

In answer to the objections of pirates, this I say : the tenth of ten thousand ships that sail that way is not a pirate, and then consider if after that proportion it were fit to take away the light by which men shall receive so much good.

Moreover, the pirates coming for our coast is not so much to rob and spoil as to be relieved with victuals and necessities and to make sale of their stolen goods. And we have experience that since there hath been a course taken to punish such men as connived with them, and justice done upon the persons of pirates when they were taken, the coast hath not been infested with them as in times past ; neither is there any likelihood ever to be hereafter if the course of justice be maintained.

A pirate that puts himself into our Channel runs a great hazard, first, in respect of fear of his Majesty's ships and Holland men-of-war that keep upon our coast ; secondly, they shall have no harbour to succour them, only open roads that are subject to outward winds.

Thirdly, being debarred the resort of people to them to buy and sell, they shall be in a continual fear of treason from the shore, and mutinies on board, for the condition of such people are to surprise and betray one another, as I can instance many after the coming upon our coast and into Ireland.

And therefore I conclude my poor opinion that neither the spaciousness of the Channel, coming in by day only

<sup>45</sup> 'The King of Spain had better have kept a fire of cinnamon than have received so great a loss' (*State Papers Dom. Jas. I.* cix. 78, a rough draft of this paper undated, calendared under 1619, and ascribed to Killigrew).

with our coast, nor falling to the eastward of the Lizard, or the objection of pirates sufficient reasons to hinder the proceeding of so pious an undertaking as the light to be maintained on the Lizard, which intendeth, with good approbation, the safety and lives of his Majesty's subjects, together with the wealth of the kingdom and increase of his Highness's customs.

For that divers times men are mistaken of the land when they fall with it, by which mistaking many ships have perished, but the light will not only give knowledge of a land, but what land it is from whence they may shape their course.

If it be objected the Lizard and Scilly, the Gulf<sup>46</sup> and Land's End lie east and west, so that seeking the Lizard they are in danger to fall with the others, therefore they haul not with it in the night.

In answer to that, whereas in the first objection it may be said they commonly fall not with the Lizard, but with the land about Plymouth or Dartmouth—which I will suppose to be the Bolt—if it be so and that they be assured of such a landfall, I say they may as well miss Scilly and the Gulf and fall with the Lizard, as to miss the Lizard and fall with the Bolt, the course being but one or two points difference, and but three or four leagues betwixt them in distance.

If it be danger to haul in with the Lizard because of Scilly and the Gulf, as perhaps some will allege, I say the like danger is in hauling in with the Bolt, in respect of the Eddystone, that lieth more dangerously than the Gulf because it lieth in the course.

But suppose a man does haul eight leagues to the westward or eastward of the Lizard, he shall have sight of the light and know certainly where he is. So that if he should be mistaken sixteen leagues in his reckoning he shall be helped by the view of the light.

If it happen that a man fall between Scilly and the Land's End with a southerly wind, or in the night, or in a fog that they cannot descry land, if they escape the Gulf,

<sup>46</sup> The Wolf, called the Gulf Rock in old charts.

which, as I have said, is no more dangerous than the Eddystone, they shall be more safer than hauling in with the shore as high as the Bolt, for they shall have sea room, and know certainly where they are by their sounding, for that side only affords ooze. As hauling betwixt the Lizard and the Bolt with a southerly wind, which is an embaying wind and commonly brings fogs and storms, a man shall be in danger to be put to the shore ; therefore it may appear it is more safety to seek the Lizard, if a light be placed upon it, than to seek further into the Channel having no help but only art to help them.

WILL. MONSON.

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State Papers Dom. Chas. I. celxxxvi. 80.

MONSON TO MR. EDWARD NICHOLAS.

April 13, 1635.

[Holograph.]

[Endorsed :—13 April 1635. Sir Wm. Monson concerning watermen.<sup>47</sup>]

GOOD MR. NICHOLAS,—Let me entreat you to inform the Lords what abuse there is in the pressing of watermen. The most sufficient men fly away who have used the sea, others protect themselves by service to noblemen and gentlemen, that his Majesty will be very much disappointed of mariners if some speedy order be not taken therein ; which I refer to your care and myself to your love.

Your very loving friend,

WILL. MONSON.

Covent Garden, 13th of April 1635.

<sup>47</sup> By the 2 & 3 Ph. & Mary, c. 16, any waterman, usually working on the Thames between Gravesend and Windsor, who ran away when a Press commission was in force was liable on his return to a fortnight's imprisonment and the suspension of his privileges for a year and a day.

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State Papers Dom. Chas. I. cclxxxvi. 88.

MONSON TO MR. EDWARD NICHOLAS.

April 15, 1635.

[Holograph. Addressed.<sup>48</sup>]

[Endorsed:—R. 15 April 1635. Sir Wm. Mounson to me to move the Lords for imprest.]

SIR,—I had not leisure yesterday, at your being with me, to desire that at your hands which I do now by letter, which is to crave your favour in moving the Lords of the Admiralty in my behalf to grant me their warrant unto Sir William Russell for impress, who is willing upon sight thereof to disburse it. It is no more than I have usually received upon employments in the Queen's time, as also in King James his, if I required it ; my expense now will be the greater in that I have so long left the sea, and disposed of all things belonging thereunto, that I am to begin the world new again. I do beseech you to do me this kindness as speedily as you can because of my hastening down. I was aboard the merchant ships, and this day they set sail for Gravesend. I have likewise been in the Tower for sending forth the gunners' stores, which will be effected speedily that there will be no occasion of my staying here. And so with my hearty love I betake you to God and will ever rest

Your most assured friend,

WILL. MONSON.

From my lodging in Covent Garden this 15th of April 1635.

<sup>48</sup> To my much esteemed friend, Mr. Edward Nicholas, Esq., at his house in King Street, give this.



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State Papers Dom. Chas. I. cclxxxvii. 3.

MONSON TO MR. EDWARD NICHOLAS.

*April 18, 1635.*

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—R. 18 April 1635. S<sup>r</sup> Wm. Monson certifies he hath known Captain Hawkeridge long to be an able and sufficient seaman.]

SIR,—I understand there is exception against Captain Hawkeridge in going with me. I desire to know what the exceptions are that they do charge him with, that he may answer for himself. I have known him long to be an able and a sufficient seaman ; and before I made choice of him I acquainted my Lord of Dorset therewithal, who approved of him and gave me thanks for him ; but notwithstanding, if there be any just exceptions I am to be ruled by reason, and I beseech you that I may know with speed what I shall trust unto. And so with my very hearty love I commit you to God and rest

Your very loving friend,  
WILL. MONSON.

From my lodging in Covent Garden this 18th of April 1635.

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State Papers Dom. Chas. I. cclxxxvii. 58.

MONSON TO MR. EDWARD NICHOLAS.

*April 28, 1635.*

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—R. 28 April 1635. S<sup>r</sup> Wm. Mounson that he desires Captain Newport to be his master in the James.]

SIR,—Mr. Johnson was with me this day, and told me he was sent unto me by order of the Lords, to know what I thought of his sufficiency to be master of the James. He

told me that for Spain, Italy or Turkey he would undertake the charge, but for France, Flanders or to the northward he was altogether ignorant of, and refused to take upon him the place of master. I could give him no answer hereunto because I knew not the designs—whether to the southward or not; and therefore that must rest upon the Lords' election, who only know the secret of our employment. Mr. Newport presses me to know the exceptions unto him for being put out of the ship, and appeals to my Lord of Lindsey, who hath known him. I had speech with my Lord about him, who doth well approve him, neither can I hear by any other but that he is a man of good sufficiency, and able to undergo the place, and thus much can I approve in him that he discharged himself well when he was master of the Dreadnought, a ship of greater charge than the James, when I attended my Lord Marshal<sup>49</sup> into Holland, and if their Lordships will refer the choice of a master unto me I know no man I would sooner have. And desiring your answer to this point, because it is necessary a master should be on board, with remembrance of my hearty love I cease your further trouble and will ever rest

Your most assured friend,

WILL. MONSON.

This 28th of April 1635.

(32)

Harl. MSS. 4713, f. 59.

MONSON TO LORD MALTRAVERS.<sup>50</sup>

June 21 [1635].

[Holograph.]

MY HONOURABLE GOOD LORD,—In passing by a bark at sea I presented my service to your Lordship in a letter

<sup>49</sup> Thos. Howard, Earl of Arundel, Earl Marshal.

<sup>50</sup> Henry, second son of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel.

to my son with such occurrences as then was. After this in a letter of my own to your Lordship I did the like from the Isle of Wight, but neither then nor since is happened anything worthy of your Lordship's knowledge. The French fleet and Hollanders, it seems, seek to fly us, for wheresoever we come we find they have been there ; and that the French continue their accustomed boasting that they will strike to no prince at sea but their own. We have neglected no slant of wind or keeping the sea in foul weather, to the loss of four topmasts, to compliment with them in a language that will teach them to speak out of a cannon's mouth if they refuse to give us an honest satisfaction. We are this 21st of June arrived at Plymouth and still hear of their flying, but we shall follow them with hue and cry. If it happen the French hath quitted our coast I humbly desire of their Lordships that I may have order to seek them upon their own coasts with my squadron alone, for upon my life, without the help of my Lord and the rest, I will bring them to the old conditions England in former times was wont to do ; for I protest to your Lordship I never found people more ready to buckle with them than my company are. And I must speak it with pity that it is a thing intolerable to see how they are abused in their victuals, and the ships unprovided of all things that should belong to them. I labour my Lord of Lindsey to examine these abuses and corruptions that at our return we may present them to the King : then shall his Majesty discern and see how everything have been evil cooked.<sup>51</sup>

The greatest conflict that we have found was on board my Lord on Tuesday last, where the old sea chief was never better put to it these twenty years. My Lord your father, your own lady,<sup>52</sup> yourself, Sir William,<sup>53</sup> and your

<sup>51</sup> No doubt a sneering pun on Sir John Coke, or Cook, his enemy, and one of the Admiralty Commissioners. Cf. *post*, iv. p. 139.

<sup>52</sup> Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of Esme, Earl of March, wife of Lord Maltravers.

<sup>53</sup> Sir William Howard, third son of the Earl of Arundel, created Viscount Stafford in 1640 ; beheaded in 1678.

young ones was so heartily remembered by my Lord himself, my Lord Conway, the brave old blade Poulett,<sup>54</sup> and myself before we parted as I think your son Charles had as much wit as the best of us,<sup>55</sup> and your Lordship could not have named people that could have showed more affection towards you and your house.

I never long more than to hear from your Lordship, and if your Lordship will do me the favour to deliver a letter to the postmaster, to be brought to the packet, you shall make me happy. Good my Lord, excuse me to my Lord and Lady that I write not, for until I have greater occasion I will make bold to address myself wholly unto your Lordship. My Lord Fielding is now come on board me, and others, which put me from writing to Sir William, but by the next he shall hear from me, and so owing your Lordship more than life I humbly take my leave in great haste.

Your Lordship's most faithful and true servant,

WILL. MONSON.

Plymouth, the first hour of our coming to an anchor the 21st of June, 1635.

<sup>54</sup> John, first Lord Poulett.

<sup>55</sup> Charles, fourth son of Lord Maltravers; 'he could not at this time have been more than five years old. . . . Sir William no doubt means by the expression in the letter that they had none of them much wit left when they parted' (MS. Life, by Lord Monson). According to the deposition of a witness in an inquiry held by the Archbishop of York about the conduct of John Monson it was reported that the Admiral had impressed twenty 'fiddlers,' of whom six were retained in his own ship, so that it was 'supposed they intended to be merry' (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I.*, 13th July 1635).



(33)

State Papers Dom. Chas. I. ccxv. 3.

MONSON TO SIR FRANCIS WINDEBANK.

Aug. 1, 1635.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed :—1 August 1635. S<sup>r</sup> Wm. Munson rec. Oct. 4th.<sup>56</sup> Abuses committed in Torbay to the prejudice of the King's service. Advantages to be gained by the East India voyage.]

My humble respects to your honour,—In my first letter from the Downs to my Lord Marshal I besought his Lordship to excuse me to you, because I have known it a custom in these employments to have letters opened and sealed up again, but what I knew at any time I imparted to your son, of whom (I must say) you may have much comfort of ; for without flattery, his carriage hath been so sweet and witty<sup>57</sup> withal, as he hath gained the love of all men, as well the worst as best.<sup>58</sup>

We departed from Plymouth the 26th of July (being kept there longer than we desired by foul weather and contrary winds), for our victuals drawing to an end, it behoved our repair to the eastward. But in our way I desired my Lord to look into Torbay, being informed of many abuses there committed to the prejudice of the King's service—as namely, that an ancient castle<sup>59</sup> being

<sup>56</sup> *Sic.*<sup>57</sup> Wise, intelligent.

<sup>58</sup> This was probably the Secretary's eldest son, Thomas Windebank, made a gentleman of the Privy Chamber in 1638, and shot to death in the garden of Oxford Castle, by sentence of a court-martial, on May 3, 1645, for the cowardly surrender of Blechington House.

<sup>59</sup> Possibly a blockhouse on Berry Head, *temp.* Elizabeth, built about 1588 (*Cott. MSS.*, Aug. 1, i. 6) ; the fortifications Henry VIII. intended to build at Torbay do not seem to have been erected.

there seated that commanded part of the road is quite abolished and the iron pieces made into horse-shoes ; moreover, we find that the stones of that castle to the value of 200*l.* have been sold to a rich man of Apsome,<sup>60</sup> who hath converted them to the making of lime. And many times the boats that carry them stones are forced (with extremity of weather) to throw them overboard to the destruction in time of the road. And that I found by a cable I had cut, which cost much labour of my mariners to recover it again. I confess it is fit to look to these things ; no road in England giveth that advantage to an enemy, as your honour shall know at my next speaking with you. All which may be prevented and the country willingly drawn to be at the charge of building and making of fortresses, if his Majesty would be pleased to furnish them with ordnance. In my coming from thence, and the last of July, I met with three East India ships, the chief commander, Captain Weddell, a discreet and well-experienced seaman, who I have enjoined immediately upon his arrival to repair to you before he appear to any other of the Council, which he hath faithfully promised. By the little speech had with him, I find he is able to give good information how his Majesty may be honoured and profited by that East India voyage ; he hath been lately with the Viceroy of Goa, from whom he hath a present to his Majesty, who makes such overtures for the benefit of the King and kingdom as in my opinion is worthy to be embraced, for to my knowledge the King of Spain is merchant of all the pepper that cometh into Portugal from thence. And if there be any proposition to be made to the King, I am well acquainted with the state of the Portuguese government in the Indies.

I do desire if your honour have occasion to write to me to enclose your letters in one directed to your son, and I do wish you would please to send to Captain Weddell in my name to put him in mind of his speedy repair to your honour. I humbly beseech you to excuse me to my Lord of Canterbury that I writ not to him, thinking that he

<sup>60</sup> Topsham.

had not been in London, and that you will please to acquaint him with this letter. And having nothing more at this time to trouble you with, with the greatest assurance of my unfeigned affection unto you I rest

Your honour's most faithful servant,

WILL. MONSON.

From aboard the *James*, this First of August, 1635.

(34)

State Papers Dom. Chas. I. ccxvi. 18.

*MONSON TO SIR FRANCIS WINDEBANK.*

Aug. 23, 1635.

[Holograph. Addressed.]

[Endorsed:—23 August 1635. S<sup>r</sup> Will. Monson, rec. 25th at Fetcham.<sup>61</sup> Against the division of our English Fleet.]

MOST HONOURED GOOD SIR,—This place hitherto affords no other news than what was contained in the letter I committed to your son's trust to send you. Here we attend in the Downs, expecting a fair wind (or at the least fair weather) to carry us to the westward, where we are in no possibility to find the French or Holland ships so much vainly boasted of; the Hollanders are gone to the northward for the guarding of their busses; some of the French liked better of the road of the Downs than Calais, and are put over amongst us for their safeties, wondering and admiring at the force of our fleet, that (I think) will hereafter as much daunt them as the name of Talbot in former times hath done.

Here we have a rumour that ten of his Majesty's ships of this fleet is designed to winter at Portsmouth. Besides my long opinion against his Majesty's ships residing at Portsmouth, out of some reasons I have collected, and will be ready to present them to your honour if you require

<sup>61</sup> Near Leatherhead.

them ; but for the present I will put you in mind of the state of this summer's employment, with some reasons for your honour to reflect upon ; and the French having, as they had, the advantage to be first at sea, if our navy had been divided, some at Chatham and others at Portsmouth, and that in the meantime, or before our meeting, they had anchored at St. Helens Point in the Isle of Wight, those of Portsmouth had been beleaguered and could not have come forth, and those of Chatham as impossible to come to them or join with them unless it were with a greater force than their own. And therefore in this case, that may happen hereafter, it is a thing to be considered. What I say is my particular opinion, and hold it dangerous to make a separation of his Majesty's Navy in this doubtful time of friendship abroad. We have daily examples in land service what stratagems are used to cut off one another's forces before their joining, and I think the land cannot afford a greater opportunity than this case of the sea. What I say proceeds out of my duty to his Majesty, which I refer to your honour's favourable construction, and myself to be everlastingly commanded by you, and rest

Your honour's most faithful servant,  
WILL. MONSON.

I do humbly beseech you to confer with my Lord Grace of Canterbury in this point.

From aboard the James, this 23rd of August 1635.



(35)

State Papers Dom. Chas. I. cccix. 5.

## MONSON TO LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Oct. 1, 1635.

[Holograph. Addressed.<sup>62</sup>]

[Endorsed :—R. 2 Octob. 1635. Sr Wm. Monson to the Lords Commissioners. The Mary Rose is victualled for 27 days.]

My duty most humbly remembered to your Lordships,—  
At my Lord General's<sup>63</sup> departure from hence, the last of September, his Lordship left directions with me to furnish the Mary Rose with victuals for a month ; and for one hundred men, ten whereof I spare her out of my ship.

My Lord appointed her in the place of the two Whelps, who are so weak and leaky as they are not able to put to sea ; after this, the James and the Constant Reformation was to repair into Portsmouth according to my Lord's order ; I have furnished the Mary Rose with fifteen days' victuals (for more we could not spare), which with her own will make up seven and twenty days (butter and cheese excepted). To-morrow, the second of October, she is ready to set sail and, according to my Lord's appointment, I advertise your Lordships of it, only I must add of my own that since my Lord's departure the wind with fair weather hath been eastwardly, but if it happen to overblow the fleet will be enforced once more to go room for Stokes Bay. This I write for your Lordships to take notice of ; that, according to wind and weather, and your Honours' occasions you may direct your letters. The Vanguard (one of the ships designed to stay forth) is now at the Downs if your Lordships have cause to dispose of her.

<sup>62</sup> For his Majesty's special service. To the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Navy.

<sup>63</sup> The Earl of Lindsey.

And so with the end of my voyage, the James being safely moored in Portsmouth, but not at the end of my trouble how to get to London. With my dutiful respects to your Honours I humbly take my leave and will be ever ready

To serve your Lordships,  
WILL. MONSON.

From aboard the James at Portsmouth  
this first of October, 1635.

(36)

State Papers Dom. Chas. I. cccxv. 139.

*MONSON TO LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY.*

Not dated.

[Holograph. Addressed.<sup>64</sup>]

[Endorsed:—R. 12 March, 1635[–6]. S<sup>r</sup> Wm. Munson concerning Capt. Wm. Smith.]

IT may please your good Lordships,—The bearer hereof, Captain William Smyth, having showed me a petition referred from his Majesty under the hand of the right honourable the Earl of Northumberland, thereby commanding this captain to attend your Honours, and before you to answer such objections as shall be made against him, hath entreated me for this ensuing declaration of his good carriage, diligent service, and ability in his place during the time he was under the command of my squadron.<sup>65</sup>

Your Lordships may therefore be pleased to take notice that the demeanour and carriage of this captain was not only in mine own observation very civil as well at sea as on shore, but also exceeding well reported of in general, and more particularly by some gentlemen of mine own company who (having gone with him to such places as he

<sup>64</sup> To the right honourable the Lords Commissioners for his Majesty's High Court of Admiralty, present these.

<sup>65</sup> Captain of the Tenth Whelp in Lindsey's cruise.

hath been sent unto, with such persons of quality as have come on board his ship by the command of his Majesty or your Honours to take their passage), have observed a great care in him for the civil usage of such persons, but more especially for that he would by no means accept of money or gratuities offered unto him by any such passengers; notwithstanding he hath (as I have heard) been very liberal in their entertainment (a matter in my opinion much to the dignity of his Majesty). In the second place for the diligence of service I shall ever be ready to testify that he omitted no sort of faithful pains, either by sails or oars, to chase and bring in any vessel that lay in his course; nor at all delaying either for unreasonableness of times or weather to give me a perfect account of his day's work if need so required. But above all others, his care in that voyage, I must especially recommend unto your honourable consideration his discreet behaviour and uncorrupt carriage in the discovering of his gunner's villainies and prosecution of them to the utmost of his knowledge and power; for at the first discovery, and divers times since, he hath made known unto me that he was offered large sums of money to give the delinquent gunner leave to bring in so much powder as was misspent.<sup>66</sup> As also that he was offered liberally by the accuser (being the gunner's mate) if he would obtain the place for him; yet to the first his answer was that no money should corrupt him to conceal a villain and traitor, and to the second his advice was not to spoil his testimony by his too hasty endeavouring for the gunner's place, but after he had performed the part of a faithful subject in a just and faithful prosecution of so high a crime, that this captain then would make the best means and friends he could for his preferment without any charge to him. In short, my good Lords, to cut off all corrupt offers of this or any other man, this captain came to me and entreated me to send one of my gunner's mates on board his Majesty's pinnace the *Lion's Tenth Whelp* to be master gunner, which

<sup>66</sup> *I.e.* to 'fudge' the accounts.

accordingly I did with licence from my Lord Admiral. Furthermore, I must declare unto your Lordships that there wanted no diligent nor discreet carriage in this captain for the examination of his gunner, gunner's mate and quarter gunners, all whose confessions were taken before me on board his Majesty's ship the *James*, then lying in Plymouth Sound. The gunner also and all the examinations I kept many weeks, whom with the examinations I sent unto my Lord at his departure to the Downs when he left me at Portsmouth. In the last place for this captain's ability I think him sufficient to execute the place of a captain in any of his Majesty's services, and for justification of my opinion, your Lordships may please to take a view or cause an examination to be made of his journal. And so humbly begging pardon of your Lordships for presuming by my pen to deliver thus much to your Honours, I humbly take my leave and rest

Your Lordships' humble servant,  
WILL. MONSON.



## APPENDIX B.

**Winwood's Memorials, iii. 285.****THE EARL OF SALISBURY TO SIR RALPH  
WINWOOD.***July 17, 1611.*

SIR,—There hath been of late a complaint made by Sir Noel Caron, by direction from the States, concerning English pirates; pretending that their charge in maintaining ships at sea is wholly lost and their travail to little purpose, in regard they have such free and frequent recourse into the havens and parts of Ireland; where they do not only avoid the danger of being taken when they are pursued, but find means to furnish themselves with victuals and munition so often as they are driven into any necessity and want. For remedy whereof he did in his masters' name make this demand; that either his Majesty would himself be pleased to give present and express charge unto his ministers of that realm that upon peril of their lives they do not suffer these common enemies to enter into any of his ports directly nor indirectly; or else that it may stand with his good liking to authorize them to pursue them so far as to take them within the havens of that kingdom, in case they shall fly thither for their escape. For answer to one part thereof, and to satisfy them how far his Majesty is from remissness in himself, or from suffering any negligence or corruption in his ministers, (besides his inward and essential detestation of that lawless and execrable course of life) they may call to mind what course he hath already taken with those offenders; having with greater expense pursued them at sea, and with severer justice punished

them on land more than any of his neighbouring princes have done ; although their interest was equal, both in point of honour for themselves and of safety for their subjects. For the other part wherein they desire licence to enter into his ports and harbours when there is cause ; although his Majesty will not wrong his own power or justice so much as to borrow another's sword, himself knowing best when to use his own ; yet considering the large extent of his territories (which being environed with the sea do yield great number of ports and places of safety for ships, whereof some peradventure are not always so well provided with force as to hinder every sudden insolence and outrage in this kind), he can be content to yield unto them thus much, that they may set upon or pursue the pirates in any of the roads and harbours upon the coast of Ireland, and whensoever they shall force them into any port where there is not sufficient strength to encounter with them alone, they may (after notice given to his officers and being by them not refused) pursue and follow them even into the port ; but yet with this condition, that they shall not carry away any goods which they find aboard, but leave them for his Majesty to restore unto the true proprietors. This, in effect, is that which was delivered in answer to the ambassador, to which I would not have you a stranger, if happily they shall enter into some further speech with you concerning the same. And because it is not improbable that this complaint, though it were general, was grounded upon some late particular whereof they may have heard some bruit ; you shall understand that not long since the pirate Easton, with some of his companions, coming upon the coast of Munster, found means to make known to the Deputy, that he was willing to yield himself and all his goods (which were of some value) to be disposed by his Majesty, upon condition of pardon for himself and some others. The Deputy though unwilling to proceed in such a kind with persons of that condition ; yet in contemplation of the good that might arise thereby to many poor men, by restitution of that which otherwise in all likelihood was utterly lost and themselves ruined ;

and considering some other circumstances sorting with the present state, was contented to receive him into protection for the space of forty days. In the interim, as it seems, Easton despairing of his pardon, did again, with the rest of his consorts put forth to sea, and hath since taken two English ships laden with merchandizes of good value ; yet at the same time, as it were, detesting this course of life (and desiring to be received into his natural obedience that he might take some better ways, both for the good of his own soul as a Christian and for the service of his King and country as a loyal subject), he delivered thus much unto some of them that were aboard those ships ; that, if it would please his Majesty to pardon him and the rest of his company, they would render into his hands all that they had to make satisfaction to the true proprietors, and themselves to become true and faithful subjects. Upon relation thereof the merchants who were interested in those ships (and some of them had therein ventured the greatest part of their estate, so as the loss thereof might turn to their utter undoing), have been humble petitioners to his Majesty that he would be pleased to grant a pardon for those offenders. His Majesty in compassion of their loss, and foreseeing that without some timely prevention divers others might run the same hazard, which would not only tend to the hurt of private men but cause a decay of trade in general : considering likewise that a rigorous proceeding is not always the best means to reclaim men that are desperate, and that the hope of grace may make those become good subjects who are nothing moved with the terror of punishment ; knowing also that divers princes have on some occasions thought it more wisdom, and to sort better with the present policy, to receive such persons to mercy upon their submission than severely to prosecute them : and lastly, hearing how this sort of people do every day multiply and combine more and more, and the rather because of some princes who are contented (out of their hate to our religion, and consequently to our persons, and in respect of the benefit they reap by such lawless and ungodly practices) to

receive them into their harbours and give them all encouragement. For these reasons he is pleased to pardon the said Easton, and some others, upon condition that they make restitution of all such goods and merchandizes as are now in their possession. Which course, if it shall be thought it may be an occasion to make others enter into the like actions, you can easily answer that the difference is so great between those that repenting their life misled do desire grace, and those that out of a wanton humour and presumption of impunity will become pirates, as that his Majesty can be as just in punishing the one as merciful in pardoning the other.

Thus much I have thought fit to write unto you that you may not be unprovided what to reply, if haply you shall hear them use any speech of this proceeding. And so I commit you to God.

Your loving Friend,

R. SALISBURY.

(Postscript) Easton offers to bring eight or nine ships with him.\*

\* See also *ante*, p. 70, about Easton. He must have been a thrifty pirate, with an eye to founding a family, for he invested part of his gains in the purchase of a Savoyan Marquisate.



## APPENDIX C.

## State Papers Dom. Chas. I. ccxi. 54.

[Endorsed :—12 January 1635 [-6]. S<sup>r</sup> Wm. Mounson's papers of Proposicons.]

BESIDES the defect of the defensive part of his Majesty's ships, that are built with flush decks, and the remedy whereof I have already shewed, I must say, truly, that in the last voyage I have seen more topmasts carried by the board in a reasonable gale of wind than I have known in great storms in the Queen's time when we have kept the seas 4, 5, or 6 months together and never anchored in all that space. And therefore I hold it fit, for the avoiding the like inconvenience, that one of his Majesty's ship-carpenters in ordinary be appointed to go in the fleet to view and direct all things belonging to ships, as masts, yards, and other things within his element.

## CONCERNING THE VICTUALLER AND VICTUALS.

The defects of victuals carried to sea must lie upon the life of the Victualler, for no subject's estate is able to countervail the mischief that may rise upon it, for it may prove the overthrow of all princes' actions.

His Majesty's choice of a careful and honest man that is now Victualler,<sup>67</sup> gives a great hope that hereafter there shall be no cause of complaint, either of goodness or the true proportion allowed by his Majesty. But howsoever I do wish he would have the opinion of some masters that have the ordering of victuals in merchants'

<sup>67</sup> John Crane ; see *post*, iv. p. 145.

ships for I find by this voyage they have a better way for saving their beef and pork then I have known in the King's ships, and yet they must not go without blame in their cutting their pieces too little, which proceeds out of the abuse of those that have the oversight of it ; and it is fitting the merchants should be now warned of it to see it amended in the next voyage.

#### TOUCHING THE PREST MEN AND MARINERS.

I do impute the evil manning of his Majesty's ships, this last voyage, to the lateness of the year before the press went out, for if seamen be not taken at the beginning of March, by the middle thereof they are gone upon their voyages, and all England will not be able to furnish so many men as will man his Majesty's ships. For I account watermen (unless it be those which have used the sea) the worst of all others to be carried to sea, and therefore I would wish no more then five lusty young watermen to be proportioned to every hundred sailors ; and I do it rather to nourish and breed such likely men for the King's future service than for anything they can do in their first voyage.

The abuses of press-masters are great, as I had trial in the last voyage in the *James*, for of all the northern press there was not one man put on board me that ever had been to sea ; which they do on purpose to rid themselves of all loiterers that are burthensome to their towns.

For reformation whereof it were very good that some masters or their mates shall be appointed for the King's ships to be sent down with the press, and to be joined with the officers there resident, commanding the said officers to call before them all seamen there dwelling to be examined by the masters or the mates aforesaid, and according to their sufficiencies to press them, for it is a great charge to his Majesty to pay them to come up, and as much to carry them down, when they shall be refused to serve in his Majesty's ships.

There is another ancient and usual abuse in his Majesty's ships that were fit to be taken away, which will advance his Majesty's service, for by allowance the

worst man of the ship is made equal with the best in pay (officers excepted) which is a thing against reason ; therefore it were good that every man's sufficiency might be rated accordingly (as thus) the captain, the master, the boatswain, and gunner who daily see other men's labours—the master those abaft the mast, the boatswain before the mast, and the gunner in his gunroom—that these men may have authority to take from the one and add to the other according to their defects, not charging the King thereby one penny. If this course be really taken able men will flock to the King's service, without any press, who are now refractory by reason of this inequality ; it will make them love and obey their commanders, it will make them strive to exceed one another in their labours in hope to find the fruit of it, it will take away the heartburning of such sufficient men against their officers who think themselves worthier than the others.

When people shall see themselves so sufficiently provided for, first in goodness of victuals and their pay to equal merchant voyages, this will be a means to keep them from thinking on foreign services, as now they do notwithstanding his Majesty's prohibition.

There is another abuse, both ancient and in practice, that the reforming thereof will be a great ease to his Majesty's expense, and no less content to poor men which is as followeth :—

If men fall sick at sea that of necessity they must be put on shore, such is the charity at the places where they arrive as nobody will entertain them without money, and so long as they shall remain sick on shore, until the discharge of the ship at Chatham, his Majesty payeth them their full pay and victuals, which in this last voyage would have amounted to a good matter if they had been presently discharged and paid.

And seeing his Majesty doth and must pay all those that serve him, and that at that time it will be a great relief unto poor men to have their money due to them, that otherwise must pay double for that they take on trust, it were good that this custom were left and the course



continued it began in the Queen's time, for so should his Majesty and his poor subjects find benefit by it.

The last fleet that the Queen sent to sea against Spain it pleased her Majesty to make me Admiral of it, to whom I made humble request that the abuse aforesaid might be taken away, alleging my reasons for it, and that an under-treasurer with money might be sent with me to sea to give content to people upon their landing sick or hurt, which she granted and meant ever after to continue that course if her death had not prevented it. My Lord Admiral gave me great thanks for it and confessed it to be a service of great import, and as then it gave good satisfaction to seamen so it will now do no less if his Majesty will please to think of it.

#### HOW TO TAKE AWAY THE VAIN EXPENSE OF POWDER.

The wasteful consuming of powder hath been more in use in latter times than heretofore, which ariseth by saluting and answering salutes from ships and castles, by feasting and in those feasts to remember the healths of friends, and after upon their leaves-taking upon their going on shore. If this be done with moderation it is an honour to his Majesty's ship and service and to the captain that commandeth her, but above all nations we ought to avoid the superfluity of the lavish expense of powder and shot considering the mischief we found by the want thereof in 88.

The expense of powder upon salutations is only proper to the Admiral, Vice-admiral; and Rear-Admiral, one of them being always saluted by strange ships that cometh into the fleet, but the rest of the ships are not to take notice of any such salutation, and therefore no cause to spend one shot of powder in vain. This prohibition of shooting must be given to all captains in the fleet under the hand of the Admiral, which will serve for a lawful excuse by the captain to his guests invited when he shall shew it them.

And yet would I have some testimony given how to honour the King's ships and service when people cometh



on board to visit them, for they hold it one of the sumptuousest sights England can afford. And to make them welcome, and entertainment seem the greater, instead of their excessive charge in burning powder out of great ordnance I do wish that the same compliment be performed with musketeers to be placed decently armed, and apparelled soldierlike, upon the upper deck which will seem very graceful to the beholder, and when healths shall be drank and leaves-taking at their departure then to give a volley of shot against a mark made like the shape of a man and put into a barrel point blank distance where the soldier shall take his aim. This will be an act of more pleasure and rareness to strangers that shall behold it then the other is, where they are to expect nothing but the fall of a bullet shot at random having no object to shoot at. In this the eye, the ear, and the sense are all in action and occupied together, besides the soldiers being thus practised they will be made perfect and excellent shot when they come to encounter an enemy, and with so small an expense and charge of powder that a cartridge of a cannon will give as good delight and content out of musquets as so many great pieces of ordnance will do, for the ear is only pleased with the report of a cannon which lasteth no longer than a flash of fire or the twinkling of an eye.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> On 28 January the Principal Officers wrote to the Commissioners of the Admiralty that they had heard that Monson had sent in some propositions for the advancement of the Service and that they would be glad to be permitted to see them. No doubt the Principal Officers desired to know the worst—whether there was any attack upon them.

## THE THIRD BOOK

### THE EPISTLE

To all Captains of Ships, Masters, Pilots,  
Mariners, and Common Sailors.

IN all reason the dedicating of this Third Book is more proper and due to you than any of the others to whom they are commended: forasmuch as what is contained in them you and your profession are the principallest actors and authors of as the wheel from whence the rest receives their motion.

For what would it avail that all boughs of trees were oaks, all riding rods masts, every stalk of hemp a fathom of cable, or every creature a perfect artist to frame, form, and build a ship? What were all these more than to the eye were it not for you, your art and skill to conduct and guide her? She were like a sumptuous costly palace, fairly edified and nobly furnished, and no body to inhabit in it; or like a house in Athens, Laertius writes of, in which all that were born proved fools; and another, in the field of Mars near Rome, whose owners ever died suddenly; both which were commanded, the one by the senators of Athens the other by the Triumvir Mark Antony, not only to be pulled down but the timber to be burnt.

How should we know that France, Italy, and Spain, produced wine out of the grape, or England

other commodities not heard of by them ? How should we know the Indies, and wealth therein, or the means to receive it from thence, were it not for your skill and labour ? How should we know that all nations differ from us in language, or one from another, but by your navigations ? All islands, how little soever, would be in the error of the Chinese who thought there was no other world nor people but their own, till the Portuguese, by their travels and mathematical art and learning, made it apparent to them. All these secrets must be attributed to your art, adventures, and painful discoveries.

What subjects can make their King and country more happy than you, by the offensive and defensive services you may do them at sea ? What wealth is brought in or carried out of the kingdom but must pass through your hands and by your help ? What honour has England of late years gained, and all by your adventures and valour, which has made you excellent above all other subjects and above all other nations ? Who knows not that your parts and profession deserve favour of the State ? Who knows not that the whole kingdom has use for you ; and that there is a necessity to nourish you ?

But whether it be the sea that works contrary effects to the land, or whether it be a liberty you feel ashore after you have been penned up in ships, like birds in a cage, or untamed horses when they are let loose ; certain it is, neither birds nor horses can shew more extravagant lewdness, more dissolute wildness, and less fear of God, than your carriage discovers when you come ashore and cast off the command your superior officers had over you. For though, in desperate perils at sea, you promise to yourselves amendment of life and

perhaps vow never to try that kind of fortune more, as women in labour do, never to have to do with their husbands ; yet when they are past they are soon forgot of both, and you return to your old accustomed vomit, without sense of promise, or danger escaped, but rather augment in your wicked courses.

He that could as easily reduce the ordinary seaman to civility and good behaviour ashore, as to be under the government of a discreet commander at sea, were more than man ; for the nature of sailors is to stand in more awe of a mean officer at sea, whom they love and fear, than of a great person on land, whom they fear under colour of love.\* And therefore the way to reduce them to goodness must proceed from the commanders that govern them : their words must be as well mixed with honey as gall ; they must tell truth, and not please with flattery ; for a man cannot be both a friend and a flatterer.

This advising office is only fit for men that have been bred and trained up in the school of looseness and liberty, and recalled by years and grace to civility. They must teach them to embrace the good and eschew the evil and must use the terror of God's justice and the reward of repentance. They must shew the hate God bears to wickedness, to lying tongues, to hands that shed innocent blood, and a heart that devises mischief : and on the contrary, the love God has for virtue and goodness, advising them not only to be good but to take away the occasion of being evil. This will be the hope to make them leave sinning when they shall be ashamed and afraid to commit

\* The Churchill text reads 'whom they neither fear nor love' which makes better sense than the above, found however in both B and R.



sin ; for Seneca says, ' That the clemency of a governor makes many ashamed to offer offence.'

But now let me apply myself to you, the men of command and authority over these untaught and untamed creatures, to whom this charge is committed. Beware that your counsel be good and that you follow it yourselves ; if not, you are like a harp that sounds pleasantly to others, and enjoys no part itself ; or to Crispianus, a servant of Trajan the Emperor, whose words were sweet and effectual to persuade but who never acted any thing but what was worthy of reprehension and punishment. Remember that example is of greater force than persuasion with many men, and when these men shall see your life concur with your admonitions it will be the strongest force and motive for their conversion. For indeed he is not worthy to live that takes not care to live well ; and Cicero says, ' He dies not who leaves a good fame, and he lives not that hath an ill reputation.'

### BOOK III.

*Containing the Office of the Lord High Admiral of England, and all Ministers and Inferior Officers under him, and what belongs to each Man's Office; with many other Particulars to that Purpose.*

#### The Office of the Admiralty of England.

THE master of the office is the Lord High Admiral of England, who holds his court of justice for trials of all sea causes for life and goods, being assisted by the doctor of the civil law under him, intitled, the Judge of the Admiralty, a marshal, and other inferior ministers of justice, proceeding in all affairs according to the civil law.\* The advocates, proctors, civilians, in all great causes and trials of pirates, especially the Lieutenant of the Admiralty of England, and the four Principal Officers of the Navy, were wont to sit on the bench as assistants to the judges; which Officers of the Navy used to commit such offenders as embezzled the King's goods, or had otherwise misbehaved themselves, to the prison belonging to the court to receive their trial there, unless in the mean time they were released by the Lord Admiral.

\* On the origin and development of the High Court of Admiralty see R. G. Marsden, *Select Pleas of the Court of Admiralty* (Selden Society), 2 vols. 1894.

Every Lord Admiral substitutes his deputy or Vice-Admiral in every maritime shire in England, except in such places where the lords of manors challenge a right formerly granted by the Kings of England, as will appear by their *quo warrantos*.

These Vice-Admirals are carefully to look that all things be performed that are granted; and the Lord Admiral by patent yearly does keep a court in their several counties, where every man's complaint may be publicly heard.

Another branch of this office consists merely in the government of his Majesty's Navy, which since the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's time has been of great consequence, and has divers fee'd officers paid out of the receipt of his Majesty's Exchequer, being patentees under the Great Seal of England for performance of the same, besides many other inferior officers, who hold their places by the Lord Admiral's warrant only, who are the present subject of this discourse. They are as follows:—

l. s. d.

THE Lord High Admiral of England, the grand master of the office, whose fee is <i>per annum</i> . . . . .	133	6	8
The Lieutenant of the Admiralty, whose fee is <i>per annum</i> 100 <i>l.</i> ; his diet 10 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i> ; two clerks, one at 12 <i>d.</i> the other at 8 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> ; and 10 <i>l.</i> for his boat-hire, in all <i>per annum</i> . . . . .	322	18	4
The Treasurer of the Navy's fee 100 marks; diet 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> , two clerks at 8 <i>d.</i> each <i>per diem</i> , and 8 <i>l.</i> boat-hire . . . . .	220	13	4
The Comptroller's fee 50 <i>l.</i> ; diet 4 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i> , two clerks at 8 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> , and 8 <i>l.</i> boat-hire . . . . .	155	6	8
The Surveyor's fee 40 <i>l.</i> ; diet 4 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i> , two clerks at 8 <i>d.</i> a piece <i>per</i> <i>diem</i> , and 8 <i>l.</i> boat-hire . . . . .	145	6	8

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The Clerk's fee* 33 <i>l.</i> 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> ; diet 3 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> , and 8 <i>l.</i> boat-hire .	102	3	4
Three assistants to the Principal Officers, at 20 <i>l.</i> fee each of them; <i>per annum</i> . . . . .	60	0	0
The Keeper of the Great Store † 26 <i>l.</i> 13 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> ; diet 2 <i>s.</i> 6 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> , and 6 <i>l.</i> boat-hire . . . . .	78	5	10
The Surveyor of the Victuals, for his fee 58 <i>l.</i> ; diet 5 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i> , and one clerk 8 <i>d.</i> . . . . .	161	8	4

\* In 1631 the Comptroller, Surveyor, and Clerk petitioned for an increase of pay, pointing out that it remained the same as when their offices were instituted by Henry VIII., when 'a groat was as valuable as a shilling now,' while, in consequence of the growth of the Navy, their work had increased enormously. They supported their plea by adverting to the losses they suffered by the suppression of their fees and perquisites—'these particulars are declared to show what unwarrantable ways hath been formerly used rather than to desire the continuance of this course.' The pay of the Treasurer had been raised in 1630 by a grant of poundage on the money passing through his hands, and it became, in the eighteenth century, one of the most profitable in the gift of the Crown. It was the paradise of placemen, and the only worldly drawback to the possession of what was practically a richly paid sinecure was the fear in which the holders lived of being made responsible for the defalcations or blunders of subordinates. When Sir John Hawkyms was Treasurer he and Burghley really constituted the Admiralty. But Hawkyms was a first-rate seaman and a great administrator and organiser; his successors were nonentities, when nothing worse, and the Treasurer's office soon degenerated into being 'nothing more than a bank to receive and pay' and its responsible chief was rarely seen by his colleagues (*Harl. MSS.* 6287, f. 116).

† At Deptford. He was called Storekeeper-general *temp.* Charles I., and received also £66 13*s.* 4*d.* a year from the Navy Treasurer. These fees in the text differ, in several cases, from the official list in the *S. P. Dom. Eliz.* ccxxvii. f. 76, of February 1628-9, by which they may be checked.



	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The King's merchant's* fee, 30 <i>l.</i> <i>per annum</i> , without any other allowance	30	0	0
The Grand Pilot's fee, 20 <i>l.</i> <i>per annum</i> , Black Deeps†	20	0	0
The Master Shipwright, at 12 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> ‡	18	5	0
Allowance to a master for his attendance in grounding of the Queen's great ships, at 6 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i>	9	2	6
Captains of all her Majesty's castles and forts on the sea side, except the Cinque Ports. §	—		

\* The King's Merchant was the person commissioned to purchase Baltic stores, tar, pitch, cordage, etc., for the Navy Officers.

† There was no 'Grand Pilot.' In 1564 it had been proposed to constitute a 'Chief Pilot of England' on the model of the office of 'Pilot Major' existing in Spain, and Stephen Borough was chosen to occupy the post, but the intention was never carried into execution although his draft commission still exists (*Lansd. MSS.* 116, f. 4). There was however an official acting as Pilot of the Black Deeps, the main channel into the Thames; the first reference known to me of the name is of 1387 (*Pat.* 10 Rich. II., pt. i, m. i, d.). By a patent of 8th October 1540 Henry VIII. gave John Bartelott an annuity of 20*l.* a year for the discovery and marking out of a new channel in the Black Deeps and for piloting the royal ships through it (*Rymer, Foedera*, xv. p. 245). The official list adds here a 'Clearer of the Roads, rather heard of than known,' at a yearly fee of £30.

‡ There were always several Master Shipwrights during the reign of Elizabeth and their allowances varied, but they always received pay from the Navy Treasurer as well as their Exchequer fees.

§ When Henry VIII. constructed fortifications at many points round the coast, in 1539 and the succeeding years, they were at first placed under the control of the Lord Admiral but very shortly passed from his government. Probably the ambitious schemes of Lord Seymour, when Lord Admiral, (1547-9) convinced the Privy Council that it was not advisable to place so much power in the hands of a subject.

These were the ancient officers in fee till the reign of Queen Elizabeth; since which time there is added,

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
A storekeeper by patent at Portsmouth, who is allowed to his fee <i>per annum</i> * . . . . .	20	0	0
Two other master shipwrights, allowed each of them <i>per annum</i> 33 <i>l.</i> 6 <i>s.</i> 8 <i>d.</i> . . . . .	66	13	4
The storekeeper at Woolwich . . . . .	54	8	4

*Memorandum*, That there are many other inferior officers and ministers that are paid by the Treasurer of the Navy,† whereof the four masters attendant and clerks of the checque hold their places by patent, without any fee out of the Exchequer, being granted by King James, with the Lord Admiral's consent, and the rest by immediate warrant from the Lord Admiral to the officers, *viz.*

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The four masters attendant, each at 6 <i>l.</i> 12 <i>s.</i> wages <i>per annum</i> , besides their victuals, and the King's coat out of the Wardrobe ‡ . . . . .	246	8	0

\* Also £20 by warrant from the Lord Admiral.

† A standing counsel, and a solicitor, to the Admiralty were added in 1672.

‡ The establishment of the Principal Masters dates from the early years of Elizabeth's reign and at first they were employed only in connection with the ships lying up in the Medway at Chatham; in 1593 there were six employed in the dockyards (*Pipe Off. Decl. Accts.* 2227, 2230). The enlargement of the office followed the increase of harbour and dockyard work due to the Spanish war, and their duties were incident to the moving of ships in harbour, docking and undocking them, rigging and fitting, and other technical matters in which, and in the management of the seamen

l. s. d.

The clerk of the cheque at Chatham, who is allowed on the quarter-books for his wages *per annum* 50*l.*; in reward of his extraordinary service, 43*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*; and for paper, quills, ink, and travelling charges, coming quarterly with the books from Chatham to London to deliver them to the Treasurer and other officers, 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*; in all . . . . .

100 0 0

The clerk of the survey for his wages, 12*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* and his reward otherwise 30*l.*; in all . . . . .

42 13 4

The storekeeper for his wages 12*d.* *per diem*, and in reward of his extraordinary pains, 31*l.* 15*s.*; in all . . . . .

50 0 0

employed, they were much more expert than the civilian officials or petty officers hitherto responsible. The master was becoming, as he remained, the most important officer of a man-of-war, executing, as he did, the functions of sailing master, navigating officer, and the mediæval pilot; the last gradually ceased to be borne among ships' officers during the second half of the sixteenth century. It was no doubt to mark the exceptional position of the 'principal masters' that they were allowed an extremely gaudy coat from the Wardrobe. The commission of inquiry of 1618 found that two of them, although receiving navy pay and supposed to be doing navy work, were in the employment of the East India Company, and the commissioners therefore promptly reduced the number to four. The first warrant for the coat was issued during the reign of Elizabeth. The basis of it was red cloth faced with velvet, embroidered with silk lace, armed with four dozen silk and gold buttons, and ornamented with designs of 'ships, roses, crowns, and our letters J. R. richly embroidered with Venice gold, silver and silk, and with spangles of silver and silk' (*Add. MSS.* 5752, f. 19: warrant of 6th April 1604). The wearer must have looked like a herald or a Haytian general, especially as he probably wore coarse canvas breeches with the coat.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The clerk of the checque at Deptford, who is allowed on the quarter-books for his wages <i>per annum</i> *	30	0	0
The clerk of the checque at Woolwich, 12 <i>d.</i> <i>per diem</i> †	18	5	0
The clerk of the checque at Portsmouth, who hath for his fee <i>per annum</i> 20 <i>l.</i> and for paper 20 shillings; also for extraordinary pains by way of reward, by the Lord Admiral's warrant of late, 20 <i>l.</i> <i>per annum</i>	41	0	0
A clerk of the ropemakers at Woolwich, for keeping the stores, and checque of the workmen twice a day, 2 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i>	36	10	0
A master workman directing the ropemakers, allowed <i>per annum</i> standing fee	50	0	0
A clerk at Chatham, that keeps daily checque of the ropemakers, and looks to the stores, 2 <i>s.</i> <i>per diem</i>	36	10	0
A master workman over the ropemakers there, at	44	0	0

\* But with allowances, £66.

† And £12 13*s.* 4*d.* 'for keeping ye plugge' (in connection with the dry docks).



Standing officers belonging to the ships, who have wages according to the ranks of ships, besides victuals.

	<i>First Rank.</i>			<i>Second Rank.</i>			
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	
A Boatswain	30	6	7	26	1	5	}
A Gunner .	26	1	5	23	17	11	
A Purser .	26	1	5	23	17	11	
	<i>Third Rank.</i>			<i>Fourth Rank.</i>			
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>l.</i> <i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>
A Boatswain	21	14	6	19	13	11	}
A Gunner .	19	13	11	17	17	7	
A Purser .	19	13	11	17	7	0	
	<i>Fifth Rank.</i>			<i>Sixth Rank.</i>			
	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	
A Boatswain	15	4	2	15	4	2	}
A Gunner .	15	4	2	15	4	2	

A master gunner of Bays Sconce, has wages <i>per annum</i>	14	13	03
A master gunner of Warham Sconce, the like *	14	13	03

#### At Chatham.

A boatswain of the yard at Chatham	25	00	00
Two porters, each at twenty marks <i>per annum</i>	26	13	04
A housekeeper†	13	06	08
A chirurgeon .	13	06	08

\* Bays and Warham Sconces were two small forts on the Medway below Upnor.

† In 1567 a house, in which the Lord Admiral and the Navy Board were to hold their meetings, was rented at Chatham.

## At Deptford.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
A boatswain of the yard . . .	25	00	00
A porter of the gates . . .	13	06	08
A messenger of the Navy * . .	18	05	00

It now remains that relation be made, by way of collection out of former proceedings and customs held in this office, of what may be the general and particular duties of these officers in the execution of their places for his Majesty's service.

And, first, for the Lord High Admiral himself, who is great master and comptroller of the office, I neither can, nor will, presume to intermeddle therewith, being sufficiently known by the extent of his letters patent, and former precedents.

The Lieutenant of the Admiralty is a place not extended to any late precedents, to manifest itself, and therefore omitted.†

The four Principal Officers of the Navy, and

\* All these minor salaries may or may not have been correct when Monson wrote, but it must be understood that they were continuously varying, or rather increasing. For instance, the pay of the boatswain of the yard at Deptford in 1592 was 6*l.* 10*s.* 8*d.* a year, together with his harbour victuals equivalent to another 9*l.* It is not worth while examining many pay lists in order to ascertain to what year or period these particular rates belong. There was an additional source of permitted profit in the fact, not shown in the text, that nearly all the dockyard officials were permitted to have one or more 'servants,' *i.e.* apprentices, whose pay was taken by their masters during the period of servitude.

† From this statement it might be inferred that the section was written between 1605 and 1618, during which time there was no Vice-Admiral of England, *i.e.* Lieutenant of the Admiralty, but the next paragraph refers to the Commissioners who replaced the Navy Officers from 1618 until 1628.

of late times the Commissioners that executed their places, are the conduit pipes to whom the Lord Admiral properly directs all his commands for his Majesty's service, and from whom it descends to all other inferior officers and ministers under them whatsoever.

First, their general duties are, as I conceive, to attend the Lord Admiral, as men for their experience and reputation fit to advise his Lordship in all causes and consultations for the advancement, furtherance, and husbanding such achievements as they are commanded by his Majesty and the State, as well for service of his Highness's ships at sea, as for the building, repairing, and maintaining them at home. And likewise to advertise his Lordship, from time to time, of all occurrences tending to the ordering and managing of his Majesty's service, whatsoever, for the Navy.

Secondly, they are to observe weekly meetings, or oftener if the service require it, at London, as well to attend the execution and direction of such warrants as shall come from the Lord Admiral as also for the ordering of all business furthering his Majesty's service; and to give satisfaction to the subject for all materials delivered, or workmanship performed by them for his Majesty's use.

Thirdly, they are jointly to agree with each merchant, from whom any great provision or bargain of cordage, hemp, timber, planks, masts, great anchors, and all sorts of materials, which are bought for the price, at that present, ordinary sold betwixt man and man. And thereupon to make them bills or contracts for the same, according to the course of the Office, which is the debt from the King, being first vouched from the

inferior ministers in their proper places for the quantity and quality.

Fourthly, they are to use their uttermost endeavours to procure moneys for the maintaining all his Majesty's ships, pinnaces, and other vessels and boats, useful in complete equipage, building, and furniture. And as any of their number happens to decay or perish to supply them with new and repair their wants.

Fifthly, they are to proportion a convenient magazine of timber, seasoned planks, great masts, and all sorts of outlandish\* commodities, as pitch, tar, rosin, hemp, anchors, sails, canvas, and cordage for twice mooring and once setting forth to sea, all his Majesty's ships, and to see the same supplied at all times; to furnish his Majesty's stores, and whatsoever is wanting to acquaint my Lord Admiral, and never to cease labouring to the State for money till those main provisions be furnished; which cannot be had in the kingdom at all times, nor sufficient quantity made ready, when the materials are not had, in many months.

Sixthly, they are, as time and business can permit, to be present themselves, or when more important business hinders them, their clerks, at all payments of wages of all sorts of workmen and labourers, to the end they may be witnesses to the real payments made; and that his Majesty be not abused by the employment of more numbers than is necessary for works on shore, nor for longer time than the service requires; nor that boys and young prentices be paid so much *per diem* as able workmen. Likewise at sea, and in harbour, to see that no more men be paid than

\* *I.e.* foreign.



have truly served. And in case they either find clerks of the checque or pursers faulty in their places, in keeping their books ill, to punish them as their offences deserve.

Seventhly, they are to be careful that no workmen or labourers be received or entered into his Majesty's pay for any works to be done by the day till there be materials first in store whereupon to employ them, nor to use more than is necessary, nor to continue them longer than the stuff lasts to set them on work. Wherein if the master shipwright, or any other master workman, be found faulty by conniving, to suspend such from his place, as an unworthy member, till my Lord Admiral be acquainted with the offence.

Eighthly, they ought to be very careful in the choice of inferior ministers, as any happen to be void, by recommending to the Lord Admiral able experienced men, according to the places; the want whereof has bred much detriment to his Majesty's service both by sea and land.

Ninthly, they are to obey my Lord Admiral's warrant, as well for direction of his Majesty's service in all things concerning this office, as also for extraordinary payments according to usual precedents; as, by virtue of his Lordship's warrant, to direct theirs to the subordinate ministers under them for the execution of so much as concerns their particular places respectively.

Tenthly, they are to oversee all inferior officers and ministers; and as often as they can, by themselves or their authorized substitutes, to muster all men that are employed by sea or land and paid wages out of this Office, and to checque all defaults they find by mustering for his Majesty's most advantage.

Eleventhly, they ought to foresee that seasonable payment be made to all men employed in his Majesty's service, and not to keep them nor ships longer in pay than the service requires. And to this end they should press all frugal courses to save his Majesty's purse.

Twelfthly, they should make quarterly payments to the ordinary, and half-yearly to the ships on the Narrow Seas, as has been accustomed. For want of which his Majesty's charge is much increased and the subject much discouraged.

Thirteenthly, they ought to take a yearly account of the victuals of the Navy, comparing the pay-books in the Treasurer's office with the warrants for victuals. And according to the muster of the men serving to allow of the issues, with such accidental wastes as by ancient precedent hath been usual, and no more.

Fourteenthly, they ought to sign estimates for money, as well for the ordinary service, as extraordinary, to the end the Lord Treasurer may see the charge his Majesty is at, and continuing the same that the payments may be seasonably provided.

Fifteenthly, they ought to take account of all storekeepers once every year at the least, to the end his Majesty may see what provision he has in store and what has been expended that present year.

Sixteenthly, they ought to appoint a surveyor at the season of the year, to mark out and fell timber for his Majesty's service, for supply of store; and to cause the same to be converted into moulded and meet timber, and cut into several sorts of planks most useful for his Majesty. And to see that the summer be not let slip for

land and sea carriage of the same into his Majesty's stores.

Seventeenthly, they ought, upon my Lord Admiral's warrant requiring the preparation of any ships or fleets for the sea, immediately to make warrant from themselves to the Victuallers, to make ready a due proportion of sea victuals, according to the time of service and number of men ; and in the mean time for harbour victuals for so many sailors as shall be employed to rig the ships, to be delivered by petty warrant of any one officer, or the clerk of the checque, as they appear upon muster to be present in the work. Likewise to the masters attendant, the master shipwrights, clerks of the checque and survey, to take notice of the service in hand, and to require a present certificate from them of all wants to perfect the hulls, rigging, ground tackle, and furniture of those ships appointed to be made ready for the seas ; and thereupon to take immediate order likewise for the providing of all materials wanting, and appoint workmen and sailors to go in hand with them with all expedition.

Eighteenthly, that one of the three Officers (not the Treasurer, in regard of his continual attendance for moneys at London) do, in their turns, quarterly reside at Chatham, for the expedition and oversight of the works there, and for providing of necessaries and directing of all the inferior officers ; and the rather to prevent the embezzling of the King's goods. As it was in the time of the late Commissioners' government, who had always one of themselves, or an able assistant, dwelling at Chatham to order the business there, no doubt for his Majesty's great advantage ; the neglecting whereof is no small damage to his Majesty.



## Particular Duties.

*The Treasurer.*

HE is to make estimates of the charge of all his Majesty's Navy, both ordinary and extraordinary, and to present them seasonably, being signed by the Lord Admiral and the other Principal Officers, to the Lord Treasurer of England, who allowing the same, does of course give order to the clerk of the signet to draw a bill for the King's signature warranting the payment of so much money as the estimate amounts to out of the receipt of his Majesty's Exchequer, which he is to issue to those several heads for which it has been demanded. And in case the ships happen to continue longer in employment than was mentioned in the first, then to make other estimates for their surplusses as long as the service endures, and solicit for privy seals and orders for money till it be received, to satisfy the subject for materials to be bought before-hand to furnish the ships, and wages to the company at their return. He is to make a like estimate for building of new ships, or repairing the old ; likewise for the repair of his Majesty's dry docks and storehouses ; and for a magazine of stores when occasion requires.

He is to take due care to get money seasonably to pay all workmen called to any extraordinary works in his Majesty's yards or for reparations aboard the ships, and to clear them off as soon as the works are ended. Likewise for payment of ships' companies returning from sea, that his Majesty's charge of victuals and wages be not longer continued than the necessity of the service requires.



He is to take care to pay the ordinary of the Navy every quarter, and the ships serving on the coasts every six months, *viz.* March and September.

He is to give convenient notice to the other Officers, who are vouchers of his account, of all pays to be made, to the end they may call for books of the clerks of the checque and pursers, for their clerks to take notice of every general and particular pay to workmen and seamen, taking the Officers' hands to the books of the total of the abstract, or number of men paid.

He ought, within six months next after the month of December, every year, to make up his former year's accounts. Which, being fairly engrossed in a ledger book, he is to procure the other Officers' hands to every page thereof, cancelling the particular bills or books first paid by each, then to deliver the same, with an imprest certificate from the auditor of the receipts of the Exchequer, to the auditor of the prest, and after solicit them to examine it, and procure a declaration thereof under the Lord Treasurer and Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the barons' and auditors' hands within six months more. To the end it may appear how he stands charged on his accounts to the King for the money he has received.

He is to keep his office constantly at Deptford or London, that the subjects may certainly know where to find him, to receive their moneys for provisions delivered to his Majesty's use, or for wages due upon lawful discharge.

#### *Comptroller.*

He is to keep counter-books with the Treasurer

of all manner of payments ; and likewise a ledger book written *verbatim*, as the book delivered to the auditors for every year's account, to the end he may upon all occasions witness as well the payments made by the Treasurer, and the state of his account with the King, as also to satisfy the other Officers at large of such precedents and payments as passed by his and their vouchers in the execution of his Majesty's service.

He is likewise to keep like counter-books with the Surveyor of Marine Victuals, and, more especially than any of the other Officers, examine and keep a note of the remainders of victuals returned by pursers at the end of their voyages, and to charge them, on account for the King, on the Victualler.

*Surveyor : The first Part of his Duty.*

He ought to survey the quantity and quality of all manner of provisions delivered for the use of his Majesty's ships or Navy, to the end he may as well satisfy himself as his fellow Officers, at their meeting, what prices are fitting to allow for that which is good. As also to see that no bad and unserviceable ware be thrust on the King for the merchants' advantage.

He is once a year to take survey of all the hulls of all his Majesty's ships, pinnaces, and boats remaining in harbour at Chatham, Deptford, Woolwich, Portsmouth ; and at the return of any ship from sea to view and examine what defects happened in the hull or masts, and to note them down particularly under the title of every ship ; wherein the King's master shipwright, and his assistants, with the master caulker, and the masters attendant, ought to assist and testify,

under his and their hands, in what condition every ship was, expressing their wants at the time the survey was taken.

He ought likewise every year to survey the defects of reparations of all his Majesty's store-houses and wharfs, calling to assist him such master workmen as are experienced to view the same. And then to add in the next estimate a due valuation of materials and workmanship that must be used and employed to repair the same.

He ought likewise, after the launching of every ship new built or repaired in any of his Majesty's dry docks, to take an exact survey of the quantity and quality of all sorts of timber, planks, boards, treenails, masts, nails, and other iron works employed about the said ships remaining in store ; to the end it may appear upon account since the last general survey, before the ship came into the dock, how much of each sort of provision has been expended on her.

#### *The second Part of his Duty.*

He ought also once a year to take a general survey of all the new cordage, sails, canvas, anchors, boats, masts, and all other sorts of materials, whatsoever, under the charge of the several storekeepers in every of his Majesty's yards and ships that lie long in harbour. And thereupon to examine what has been supplied since the former survey, and balance the receipts and issues in an exact form of account ; to take the storekeepers' hands severally to the surveyors' books, charging themselves with what remains.

He, or the clerk of the survey allowed under him, ought, at the return of every ship from sea,

with the assistance of such of the masters attendant as are present at the place, or may be had, to take an exact survey of all the rigging, ground tackle, and furniture belonging to her, noting under every particular dimension their present quality, to the end he may shortly after account with the boatswain and carpenter of that ship for their expenses in that voyage and be ready against their next going out to furnish her wants; that so reasonable demands may be made to supply her in complete equipage for further service.

He is likewise to take the yearly survey of all mooring anchors, other straggling anchors lying spare at the river side, or in any of his Majesty's yards not formerly charged. He ought, in case it fortune that any of the King's ships should put into Plymouth or Bristol, or any other unusual harbour, by reason of leakiness or any other apparent defect, to go himself, or send a sufficient deputy, to take an exact survey of the state of her hull, masts, and yards, with all her furniture and tackling; and after, present an estimate of the charge in repairing and supplying of her wants with all convenient speed. And procure the Lord Admiral's warrant to proceed, to make her able to come about to Chatham, unless she were fitted for further service, if cause required.

#### *The Clerk of the Navy.*

He ought to register his acts, agreed and performed at their public meeting, and to note the days of every meeting and what Officers were then present.

He ought to keep notes or remembrances of all business that is material for the furtherance of his Majesty's service, and to call on them first



to be debated and ordered before any new propositions be received, or any private person's business handled at their meeting.

He ought to keep records, *verbatim*, of all the warrants sent from the Lord Admiral directed to the four Principal Officers, and to keep them safely in a chest locked up, for all their safeties, if any question should after happen.

He ought to take particular notice of all warrants or deputations thought fit to be made for purveyors, pressmasters, and such like ministers, and to present them in a readiness to be signed by them all at the next meeting.

He was formerly employed in taking up all outlandish provisions, as pitch, tar, rosin, oil, and other small stores provided for present dispatches ; likewise of nails, baskets, compasses, lead-lines, and leads, running-glasses, &c.

In all these several duties of each Officer, in case any of the rest desire to be present, or to have copies of any records or matter that more properly belongs to the other places, they are to have it without denial. And, being equally interested in the King's service, every of them ought to perform each other's places in the proper Officer's absence, in case the service requires it.\*

\* Something has already been said of the Principal Officers during the reign of Charles I. and they need only be judged by their works. Much of their time seems to have gone in striving for precedence. Sir Thomas Aylesbury contended with Sir Guilford Slingsby and carried his point as being Master of Requests and a favourite at Court ; they were succeeded by Kenrick Edisbury and Sir Henry Palmer, and as the former was supported by Sir John Coke the latter attended but little to his business. The ' discord and prejudice to the service ' caused by all this was notorious. Monson gives us a long description of the Surveyor's duties, but a contemporary remarks that it was too great to be

*The Officers' Assistants.*

The next in place to the Principal Officers, are the three assistants, who in extraordinary employments in time of war, were, upon the Lord Admiral's command, to give their advice in the consultations about the affairs of the Navy, and, in the absence of the Officers, to execute their business in places remote. But for the last thirty years, it seems, there has not been much use made of them; I suppose rather in respect of the Officers' jealousies to have competitors than for want of employment fit to further the King's service.

performed by himself, that the rest of the Board neglected to help him, and that his clerks shared the embezzlements perpetrated by the carpenters and boatswains. Of the Comptroller we are told that 'the oldest man living' could not remember when he had examined the Treasurer's, Victualler's, and Storekeepers' accounts as he was supposed to do yearly (*Sloane MSS.* 3232, f. 70; *Add. MSS.* 9311, f. 9). The notices of the Clerk of the Acts show that he was sinking into the position of a mere secretary: as to the Treasurer see *ante*, p. 391. Buckingham established a new officer, not however as yet officially recognized, in the shape of a secretary for his Admiralty business. The holder, Edward Nicholas, who became an influential person politically in the later years of Charles I. and with the exiled Charles II., added his quota to the general disorganization by taking bribes for minor appointments. There was no secrecy about it; on one occasion Edisbury, who had procured from him a carpenter's warrant for some one, wrote 'the thankfulness which he left with me I have sent you by the bearer by whom, if you please, I pray you to send the warrant' (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* xix. 42). Pepys called the same thing a 'compliment.' No doubt the carpenter had to bribe Edisbury also. Nicholas's successor, Thomas Smith, Northumberland's secretary, boasted that he never bargained, but that 'what men voluntarily give me my conscience assures me I may take as mere gratuities' (*S. P. Dom. Chas. I.* ccccxlii. 33). *Qui s'excuse s'accuse!*

*The Keeper of the great Stores.*

He has, by his letters patent, the keeping of all the stores belonging to his Majesty's Navy. But, in respect his salary was not sufficient to maintain deputies in all places where the King has cause to use them, necessity of times has begotten several storekeepers in all his Majesty's yards where the King's works are managed. And at Woolwich and at Portsmouth they have grants for their places under the Great Seal, and fees paid out of the Exchequer as he hath.

He at his first coming receives his charge upon survey, and puts his hand to the Surveyor's book, acknowledging to be charged with all the provisions therein contained.

He ought not to receive any thing into his charge but by warrant, nor deliver any out. And properly, in regard of his account, the Surveyor of the Navy should be the one to direct his warrant to him for all business.

*Surveyor of Victuals.*

This Officer, who, it seems, was at first instituted to survey the quantity and quality of all victuals, to the end neither his Majesty may be deceived in goodness, nor the subject of his due, is now become Victualler himself. Whereupon there are many abuses crept into the office, fit to be reformed.

*The King's Merchant.*

No doubt this office, at the first institution, was of notable good consequence for his Majesty's profit, when he was employed only for his understanding, to inform the Officers of the rates of all

outlandish provisions, as hemp, cordage, tar, pitch, oil, masts, deal boards, &c.

But, since, it has been converted from advising for the King to merchandizing for himself, which of late has been quite out of use. But in case it were reduced to the first quality, without question his service would be very beneficial for providing of those materials at the best hand when the season may afford it at the cheapest rate.

### *The Grand Pilot.*

This man is chosen for his long experience as a pilot on a coast, especially to carry the King's great ships through the King's Channel, from Chatham to the Narrow Seas. As also for his knowledge to pass through the channel called the Black Deeps.

### *Three Master Shipwrights.*

These men ought, in their turns, to have the new building and repairing of all the King's ships and pinnaces. And when it happens, by order of the State, any ships are built by contract with strangers\* some of them ought always to attend the oversight of all timber, planks, and other materials put in them, that they be of fit scantlings and sizings, well seasoned, and of strength and quality sufficient, according to the burthen agreed on, and so finished in all points workman-like.

### *Four Masters Attendant.*

These men attend at Chatham, quarterly, one after another, as well to direct and oversee the

\* *I.e.* by private builders.



boatswain and ship-keepers in harbour to perform their ordinary service of the ships, as also to carry in and out of the river such ships as happen to be prepared for sea, and to see them rigged and fitted completely. Also one of them is allowed sixpence *per diem* for his particular attendance at the grounding of the King's great ships.

*Clerks of the Checque.*

These men are of great trust, and much business committed to their charge, *viz.* the entering all seamen into pay aboard the ships in harbour, and the shipwrights and other workmen in day work: the first he must muster once a month, and the other twice a day. His ticket serves, in the absence of an officer to the Victualler, for the victualling of the ordinary ship-keepers and other seamen employed in rigging of the ships bound to sea. He keeps, likewise, a book of the receipts of all provisions received into the stores, and prepares quarter books, for the four Officers, for ordinary and extraordinary men's wages.

*Clerk of the Survey at Chatham.*

He is to certify the wants of every ship prepared for the sea, and to send the certificate, under the masters attendant and his own hand, to the Surveyor of the Navy at London, to the end he may take present order to supply all the provisions wanting to be sent with all speed to Chatham; which being come down he is, by ticket under his hand, to direct the storekeeper to deliver to every boatswain and carpenter their due proportion of all kinds, as well to furnish the ships in complete equipage in harbour before they go out with sea stores for the voyage. He is to make indenture

betwixt the Surveyor and boatswains and carpenters concerning all manner of ground tackle and furniture belonging to the ship, and for sea stores to the carpenters, and to take their hands severally to the one, and to put his hand to the other part, which they are to carry with them to sea to shew their captains what stores are in the ships.

At the return of any ship from sea he is, with one of the masters attendant and a master shipwright, for things in their elements, to survey the remnants of all stores returned, and to note down all particular qualities—to be half worn, or fourth part worn, or decayed, according as the master shall judge them to be useful for the King's service. And thereupon he is to make up the account of waste in the voyage, and to dispose the remainder to be returned into the King's store, or left in the ship, as shall best accommodate the King's service.

*Clerk of the Rope Yard.*

Receives into his charge all the hemp, tar, and other necessities for the making of new cordage, and delivers the same to the master workman, being first dressed and heckled, to be spun into yarn for ropes. He doth also keep checque by calling all the workmen twice a-day to their labour, and keeping them to their strict hours to labour.

*Master Workmen over the Ropemakers.*

There are two of these, one at Chatham, and another at Woolwich, to direct the labourers and spinners of yarn. And afterwards in laying the same into several sorts and sizes of cordage, and in stowing the most part at Woolwich, and tarring it only at Chatham.

*The Boatswain, Gunner, and Purser, are Officers aboard the Ships.*

*The Boatswain.*

Has the chief charge in looking to the safe riding of the ship at her moorings in the river, and to under-run them as often as need requires.

He has the keeping of all the ship's stores, rigging, and furniture, charging himself on account to the Surveyor of the Navy by acknowledgement under his hand to a book mentioning all the particulars, whereof he hath a true copy delivered him. He is also to come himself and bring the ship's company with him to the dock, or to such other places as the flag is hung out, to shew where the works of that day are to be performed.

*The Gunner.*

The gunner has the charge of the ordnance, their carriages, with such stores as appertain to them, accounting for all to the Office of the Ordnance. No other service is required here but his attendance on board, and being found faulty that way is chequed of his victuals for that time.

*The Purser.*

He is to give his continual attendance, and to see that the company's victuals in harbour be brought them aboard weekly in their proportion, and well conditioned.

*Gunners of Sconces.*

They have several houses, and some pieces of ordnance and ammunition under their charge, and are required to give their daily attendance in them.

*Boatswain of the Yard.*

He commands the labourers to their several works, and sees the provisions taken out of hoys, or returned from the ships, and carried safely and laid orderly in the storehouses within the yard.

*Porters of the Gates.*

They attend to open and shut the gates morning and evening, and to wait at the doors all the day to keep in the workmen in time of work, and to prevent carrying away or embezzling any of the King's provisions ; and one of them attends every morning as soon as the watch is broke up till the workmen come in.

*Housekeeper.*

He takes charge to look to the King's house at Chatham Hill, and the Officers' lodgings there, and the King's stuff, against their coming to Pays or other meetings for the King's service. He keeps the orchard and garden belonging to the house in good order likewise.

*Surgeon.*

He attends daily to cure such hurt men as happen among the ordinary ship-keepers.

*Messenger of the Navy.*

He attends the Officers at their meetings, and provides horses and victuals for the paymasters at such time as they go to make payments. He is also, at the Officers' directions, to fetch any delinquent before them, and to keep him under custody till they give order for his release.



## What kind of Men are to be chosen for the four Principal Officers of the Navy.

I CONCEIVE that the Treasurer of the Navy were fit to be either a merchant or a marine man, that is or has been an owner of ships, and can judge by his own experience both of the goodness and use of all the materials belonging to the building and tackling of ships, and may, upon special accidents of service, cut off his Majesty's charge, or take up a good sum of money for his Majesty's ease, and content the subjects that otherwise will be grumbling for their wages when the service is ended.

The Surveyor's place, being too much for any one man to perform, to be separated into two distinct offices : the one a shipwright, who, for his experience in building new ships for the King or merchants the precedent part of his life, may be absolutely enabled to make choice of materials of timber, planks, and all other incident provisions in season ; and can both command and direct workmen of all sorts to be employed in the building and repairing of all his Majesty's ships and vessels ; which cannot be so perfectly performed by any other man that has not had use of the mechanic part of that art, and is a full employment for any one to act, besides the public meeting for general dispatch necessary for the Navy.

The other a mariner bred, that hath had the charge as master, and greater place as captain, if such can be had, of ships of countenance and strength, knowing all the furniture and tacklings of a ship and can well judge and rate the materials of all kinds, and so be able to make choice and recommend to the Lord Admiral such persons as he finds fit to execute the boatswain's place ; and can, of his own experience, judge of all wastes expended at sea, and take the accounts of the ships returned from sea, besides other general and particular duties mentioned under the title of the Surveyor's place.

The Comptroller's and Clerk's places to be reduced into one, who should be an experienced clerk, long bred in the office and understanding thoroughly passages of all demands, accompts, and allowances usual and of right appertaining to all particular places throughout the office of the Victualler and Treasurer of the Navy. Which a stranger, though never so good an accomptant or clerk, cannot in many years attain to if he has not been brought up in the execution thereof.

Provided, always, that besides their experience and abilities to perform the active part of his Majesty's service, these men be of good substance and esteem in their estates ; otherwise the inferior officers will scorn to be commanded or directed by them. Besides the obligation his Majesty will find from men of means to perform his Highness's service faithfully, rather than from needy, meanly qualified persons.

Now it remains, that every one of these officers, from the highest to the lowest, under the Lord Admiral, should be limited and ordered by particular instructions to perform the duties of

their places. Which by reason that some have trenched beyond their right for private profit, and the most have been negligent in performing what they ought and of necessity should have done for the furtherance of his Majesty's service, there hath been much abuse heretofore.

Places granted by Warrant from the Lord  
High Admiral.

*At Chatham.*

THE three assistants to the master shipwrights.  
Anchor-smith.  
Master caulker.  
House carpenter.  
Two chirurgeons for the ordinary or extraordinary  
Storekeepers.  
Ropemakers.  
Clerk of the ropehouse.  
Housekeeper at Chatham-Hill.  
Painter for the Navy.  
Gunners of Warham Sconce, Bays Sconce.  
Boatswain of the yard.  
Two porters of the yard.  
Pump-maker and top-maker.

*At Woolwich.*

Ropemaker.  
Clerk of the yard.

*At Deptford.*

Boatswain of the yard.  
Porter of the gates.  
Messenger of the Navy.



All places of boatswains, gunners, pursers, cooks, carpenters, belonging to his Majesty's ships and pinnaces.

All captains and masters in his Majesty's ships and other vessels, and in all other ships in his Majesty's pay.

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADMIRALTY.

As might be expected, the country which was the first in northern latitudes to show a more or less continuous combatant power at sea was also the first to develop a permanent administrative organization, primitive in its earlier form but expanded under Henry VIII. into a shape then again in advance of anything existing at the time elsewhere, and excellent enough in principle to constitute the framework of the Admiralty organization of to-day.

The records show that from and including the reign of John there was no English King who did not possess ships of his own; did we possess similar documentary evidence relating to the reigns of John's predecessors we should, in all probability, find that they likewise possessed a Royal Navy.<sup>1</sup> There is a list of 51 galleys, belonging to the Crown in 1205,<sup>2</sup> laid up in various ports; but for John, as for the Kings who came before and after him, it was cheaper to call upon the coast towns to provide ships and men, as they were bound to do by custom, than to fit and man the royal ships. For ordinary services, whether of dynastic war or for the transport of the court and troops to Normandy, the Cinque Ports and the adjacent coast on the south and east could supply an always partially mobilized fleet sufficient for everyday needs. It was only when a large army was to be transported, or foreign fleets were to be fought, that the kingdom as a whole was called upon to assist and the King's own ships were employed. The latter might also be considered a reserve in case of rebellion affecting the ports, although their utility would be minimized in that event by the fact that there was no standing force of seamen.

<sup>1</sup> The Conqueror bought a vessel of one Utchel for which he gave a carucate of land (Ellis, *Domesday*, i. 336); William Rufus refers in 1088 to 'naves meas' (Freeman, *William Rufus*, i. 112); Henry I. bought two ships in 1130 (*Rot. Pip.* (Rolls Series), p. 133).

<sup>2</sup> Cl. 6 John, m. 10.

The first Keeper, Governor, or Clerk, of the King's ships known to us by name is William de Wrotham, Archdeacon of Taunton, who filled that post for John. His duties were purely administrative and were of the same character as those performed by the later Navy Board, although of course more limited in scope. If, however, there was a Crown Navy belonging to the earlier Kings it is probable that there was also an official charged with their care, for there is nothing to indicate that William the Archdeacon filled any newly erected office. It is known that the civil service of the country grew out of the use made, anterior to the Conquest and in both England and Normandy, of the King's chaplains for the clerical work incident to revenue and correspondence; and eventually the Chancery, under the superintendence of the Chancellor, was the organized product of the casual employment of individual members of the King's chapel. There is therefore nothing surprising in finding a cleric acting as Keeper of the ships, seeing that they were the personal possession of the sovereign and that the Keeper took his orders direct from him. As the civil organization of the various branches of the royal service broadened and became subdivided the Keepers were usually laymen who belonged to some department of the household.

After the loss of Normandy in 1204 and the appearance of France as a maritime power the necessity arose for largely increased strength at sea and its maintenance on a semi-permanent basis. This led to the constitution of the northern and western fleets<sup>3</sup> which appear in commission year by year during the thirteenth century although their commanders are not styled Admirals until late in the reign of Edward I. It is now very difficult to define what, beyond their purely military ones, were the exact powers wielded by these early 'captains and governors' of the King's fleets, but it is quite certain that they had no control over the Keeper of the ships, nor any connexion with such interior and permanent administration as existed, which emanated directly from the King and Council. It may be conjectured that the earliest 'governors' of fleets were employed simply and solely as soldiers for military purposes and that their civil authority grew out of the necessity for preserving order in the fleet, for protecting the King's rights in prizes and the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and, later, in resisting the

<sup>3</sup> The mouth of the Thames was the dividing line; the western fleet included the south and west, the northern the east and north.

encroachments of the governing bodies of the maritime towns of their districts. But for a long period although the same man might be re-appointed as Admiral in successive years his authority, limited to the time of his command, was confined to his fleet, and to the exercise of restricted judicial functions in connexion with it and in such ports as were situated on the coast immediately under his charge and were not free by charter from external interference. As in the case of most military offices of State the powers attached to the post grew with time; in 1338 the dignity of the Admiralship was added to by the appointment of a Vice-Admiral, and by the second half of the fourteenth century we find the Admiral wielding wide powers, for he was authorized by his commission to try maritime causes generally, to take up ships and men, to punish delinquents, and, vaguely, to enjoy such privileges as had been customary to his predecessors. The right to impress ships and men, under the commission of the Crown, formed a precedent for the action of the later Lord High Admirals, but there are very few instances, in these early centuries, of the exercise of such a power by the Admirals of the north and west; in the records it nearly invariably follows the issue of writs direct from the King, and put in force by his clerks or serjeants-at-arms, some of whom were told off to each district to arrange, with the local authorities, the selection of ships and crews and see them despatched to their destination. If the Admirals had exercised the same power co-ordinately the reduplication would soon have been found to be a source of confusion and miscarriage, and it is probable that the apparent instances are only examples of the completion or maintenance of a mobilized force.

In 1360 and 1361 the western and northern fleets were united under the command of a single Admiral, illustrating the tendency towards centralization, but a more important step in the evolution of the High Admiralship was made in 1398 when John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset, was created Admiral, for life, of the northern, western, and Irish fleets, thus becoming actually although not formally the first Lord High Admiral.<sup>4</sup> In their Letters Patent Beaufort and his successors are styled simply Admirals, later the form 'magnus admirallus' came into use, but 'Lord High Admiral' is hardly, if at all, earlier than the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup> The

<sup>4</sup> Pat. 21 Rich. II. pt. ii. m. 23; pt. iii. m. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Fournier says that the first Admiral of France was Pierre le Megue in 1327 (*Hydrographie*, Paris, 1643, p. 403); there



Beauforts, legitimated sons of John of Gaunt, were high in favour with Richard II. and kept their position under Henry IV. These early appointments were probably not even political—not designed to strengthen the Crown by retaining in a permanent place a noble with a disciplined and devoted force at command who might be trusted to support the King under all conditions, but only intended to endow a favourite with valuable fees and perquisites.<sup>6</sup> The Admiral, whether appointed for a cruise or for life, was only a soldier with no connexion, either by instinct or training, with the maritime class; no knowledge of them, their wants, hopes, or modes of thought; no sympathy with their needs or grievances, and no acquaintance with the technical details of naval administration. As ships were collected from all quarters for a campaign or a summer cruise under his command and dispersed at its close he remained a stranger to the seamen, officers and men, with whom he had no direct relation of permanent government and who did not look to him for protection or favour.

It is an obscure question, hardly worth detailed inquiry, as to who was the first High Admiral, but if Beaufort's life appointment is considered insufficient evidence perhaps the nomination of Thomas of Lancaster, second son of Henry IV., to the territorial designation of 'Admiral of England' may be held to be a better qualification. The title was now taking its permanent form and in 1409 was enlarged, in favour of Thomas Beaufort, Earl of Dorset, into the Admiralship of England, Ireland, Aquitaine, and Picardy. The High Admirals during the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries were all great nobles, sometimes relatives of the King, whose functions were military and judicial and who had no connexion with administration even in relation with the very small standing navy which sometimes existed during the fifteenth century. Often they deputed their military duties to subordinates, and such political influence as they had was due to their titular rank and influence as nobles, and their quality as soldiers, and not to their position as High Admirals. Their main interest in maritime affairs lay in col-

was certainly an Admiralship of France in 1373 (*Black Book of the Admiralty* (Rolls Series), i. pp. 430 et seq.) and its existence may have had some influence in the institution of the English office. For Spain see *post*, iv. p. 131.

<sup>6</sup> The Admiralship must have been becoming one of the most profitable gifts in the Crown. See the list of fees and rights in the *Black Book of the Admiralty*, i. pp. 171, 397-407.

lecting their fees and profits from causes tried in the Admiralty or within Admiralty jurisdiction, and from wreck and other sources; the King-maker and Richard, Duke of Gloucester, would have exercised just as much power, without the title, by reason of their military and territorial position. It was only a post of favour and honour, not a working one like that of the Chancellor or Treasurer; in fact, towards the end of the fifteenth century, it was sinking into a merely honorary court appointment with profitable perquisites attached, and as officers of State the High Admirals compared unfavourably with their historical ancestors the Admirals of the north and west.

The great alteration in the position of the Lord Admiral, which gave him again active duties to perform and brought him into immediate and intimate association, at least in theory, with the everyday work of naval administration, took place under Henry VIII. in 1546, when the King swept away the old and worn-out system and founded a board of naval commissioners responsible for departmental control under the governance of the Lord Admiral. But even before that there are indications—especially on the legal, or Court of Admiralty side, of his dual functions—that the High Admiral was becoming important, or renewing his importance, as an officer of the Crown. The effect of foreign treaties and home statutes relating to piracies, depredations, convoys, etc., was to enhance his authority by placing the responsibility for their application, and the punishment of offenders, on him.<sup>7</sup> On the executive side in 1512 the then Lord Admiral, Sir Edward Howard, had gone to sea in command of the English fleet, the first time for many years that a Lord Admiral had actually exercised his nominal functions. Howard had then also performed some administrative duties; it must have been the experience of this and the succeeding wars with France, together with the inability, in time of peace, of the Clerk of the Ships to deal with the extended administrative necessities attendant on the vastly increased *matériel* of the Navy, that decided Henry to make such a sweeping change. Howard had entered into a formal contract with the Crown in 1512 which had relieved the Clerk of the Ships of some of the pressure of preparation, but the experiment could hardly have been considered satisfactory, and all through the reign tentative alterations and additions were being made of, and to, the civilian *personnel*. Local

<sup>7</sup> See R. G. Marsden in *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, xxiv. 97.

clerks of the ships were appointed at the dockyards, as well as local paymasters and storekeepers, but there was division of responsibility and no real control; so that at last Henry, himself the greatest civilian First Lord in English history, founded the Navy Board probably on the model of the staff of the already existing Ordnance Office. The Lieutenant of the Admiralty—later the Vice-Admiral of England—the descendant of the Vice-Admirals of the north and west Admiralties of the fourteenth century, was, under the Lord Admiral, the president of the Board which consisted, as well, of a Treasurer, Surveyor, Comptroller, and Clerk of the Acts as registrar and secretary. The Clerk of the Acts still performed many of the duties of the mediæval Clerk or Keeper and was, historically, his representative; in the Navy account sheets he is called, indifferently, Clerk of the Acts, Clerk of the Marine Causes, and Clerk of the Ships. Theoretically the Surveyor was next in rank to the Lieutenant; practically the Treasurer soon became the predominant official. There were only two Lieutenants of the Admiralty in succession from 1546; the office then remained vacant until Leveson was appointed and, after his death in 1605, again vacant until Mansell received the post in 1618. A writer of the Restoration era, who had known Mansell, remarks that he had heard him express his intention to sit at the Navy Board as president, in virtue of his office, after the Board was reconstituted in 1628.<sup>8</sup> Mansell however never did so; possibly he received a hint that his presence was not desired. In the same way, although for different reasons, the Lord High Admiral, until James, Duke of York, took active control in 1660, interfered very little with the administration. On paper the ultimate decision about everything rested with him; in reality the determining factor was the cost, therefore all questions came first into the hands of the Navy Treasurer and were referred by him to the Lord Treasurer, with whom naval requirements were discussed and decided, thus making the Navy Treasurer the representative of the Board in dealing with the Government. Therefore, during the reign of Elizabeth, Burghley was actual First Lord of the Admiralty, and with the exception of Buckingham, who to a certain extent did rule, the responsibility during the first half of the seventeenth century was more conglomerate than individual and lacked any controlling mind. Buckingham's position, indeed, was more commanding

<sup>8</sup> *Add. MSS.* 9335, f. 51.



than that of any of his predecessors because he was also Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, a jurisdiction over an important section of the coast which had hitherto always been exempt and separate from the control of the Lord High Admiral; but although the Duke did a great deal at first to reorganize the administration he afterwards left it without due supervision when he became absorbed in the larger interests of home and foreign politics. After the murder of Buckingham, in 1628, the High Admiralship entered into its last phase by being placed in commission although many years were to elapse before such an arrangement became permanent. During the reign of Charles I. and to a large extent during that of Charles II. the commissions, when they existed, consisted of a committee of the Privy Council and, except as Privy Councillors, the members exercised little authority and took little or no responsibility.

The Vice-Admiralties of the counties, referred to by Monson,<sup>9</sup> grew on the one hand out of the judicial side of the office of the Admiralties of the north and west and, on the other, out of the military functions performed by the 'keepers of the coast' appointed by the Plantagenet Kings to organize defence against raid or invasion. As they existed later the Vice-Admirals exercised both judicial and naval functions, and in the fully developed form of the post as constituted in the sixteenth century they were essentially the officers not of the Crown but of the Lord Admiral and drew their authority from him. But during the second half of that century their responsibility for the safety of the coast in time of war made them practically officers of the Crown in direct correspondence with ministers and the direct recipients of their orders.

We find, in the fourteenth century, evidence of the existence of an official acting on land as the Admiral's deputy, and as early as 1360 his commission gave him power to employ such an officer. In 1375 the Admiral of the north appointed Hugh Fastolf and John Buce, of Yarmouth, as his lieutenants and deputies; the duties of these deputies were to attend to the pecuniary interests of the Admiral, especially in the maritime courts, and, naturally, Yarmouth would be a profitable centre. Half a century later we find Thomas Babron acting for the Duke of Bedford, the then High Admiral, as his deputy for Sussex, Hants, and Dorset. The legislation of Henry V. assisted the tendency to nominate local officials

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 390.



of the High Admiral although, in this instance, the object was national. Henry, determined to suppress piracy and privateering, instituted officials, called conservators of truces, in every port, who, assisted by two legal assessors, were to have power of inquiry and punishment concerning all guilty of illegal proceedings at sea ;<sup>10</sup> they also kept registers of ships and seamen belonging to each port and acted as adjudicators in such cases as did not go before the Admiralty Court. These officers were nominated by the High Admiral, except in the Cinque Ports, and were a link between the Admiral's deputies, the still earlier keepers of the coast, and the later Vice-Admirals. Henry's statute did not remain long in force and the political conditions of the fifteenth century were not favourable to the evolution of fresh institutions. But when Henry VIII., in his turn, determined to deal with piracy the memory of previous institutions may have had much to do with the shape in which the new offices were established. In the years following 1525, when a treaty with France was made concerning maritime depredations, there came gradually into existence a new band of officials, the Vice-Admirals of the counties, who combined the duties of the still existing Admiral's deputies with those of the former keepers of the coast and conservators of truces and who, although appointed by the Lord Admiral, were backed by the direct support and encouragement of the Tudor despotism and thus were better able to make themselves obeyed. Their position was rendered more authoritative by the circumstance that a Vice-Admiral was usually chosen from among the county families and was, therefore, locally respected, instead of being, as often happened with the deputy, a stranger of no social rank. Moreover, the post was seldom or never allowed to remain vacant, so that there was no intermission during which authority might lapse by cessation of exercise. Besides his services as the representative of the Lord Admiral and collector of his dues in the matter of wreck and other rights, the Vice-Admiral was charged with the application of the new statutes<sup>11</sup> for the suppression of piracy, the execution of press warrants for men and ships, the acquisition where possible of naval stores, the registration of ships and men available, the exaction of bonds from the captains and owners of ships going to sea as security for good conduct, the salvage and safe keeping of wreck

<sup>10</sup> *Rot. Parl.* iii. 2 ; 2 Hen. V. st. i. c. 6.

<sup>11</sup> 27 Hen. VIII. c. 4 and 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15.

and of prizes and prize cargoes, and the watch over the safety of his section of the coast. Every Vice-Admiral had his own maritime court, a miniature reproduction of the High Court of Admiralty in London. We see therefore that he executed many of the functions not only of ancient officers of the Admiral such as the deputies and conservators of truces, but also of ancient officers of the Crown such as the keepers of the coast and the Clerk of the Ships. Whether there was any intentional combination of these separate, yet in some respects cognate, offices, or whether the Vice-Admiralships grew naturally out of new necessities and changing conditions, may be uncertain.

The Vice-Admirals were appointed by a patent, sometimes for life and sometimes during pleasure, from the Lord Admiral, and their emolument was provided by dividing with him, in half or smaller proportion, the proceeds from fees or wrecks, occasionally large in amount, recoverable in their counties. During Monson's lifetime and the reign of Elizabeth the post was one of importance and responsibility, and its holders were frequently in communication with members of the Government on naval and other matters of national consequence as well as on those of mere local police. But its practical utility steadily diminished during the seventeenth century as the hand of the executive grew stronger and kept order on the coast by the application of ordinary law, and as the growth of the Navy and the establishment of a standing army and army administration lessened the need for local watchfulness and preparation. Therefore the constant correspondence of Vice-Admirals with Secretaries of State tended to cease and, with it, their implicit recognition as officers of the Crown. In the eighteenth century the post was almost entirely honorary, although it was still sought by men of the highest rank, and there are still some survivals in the shape of modern nominations.

A brief Collection out of a Discourse of a  
principal Seaman touching the Shipping  
of England, and Officers of the King's  
Ships.

THE native shipping of this kingdom has been esteemed (through the Almighty providence), as walls of brass to secure it from foreign invasions or incursions as long as we remain masters of the Narrow Seas.

Besides the great riches and honour the Crown and subjects of this kingdom have gained in peace, by transporting our native commodities into the remotest parts where any known trade by sea has been, bringing home the chiefest riches and merchandize of the earth; and by means thereof in time of war beating our proudest enemies, even at their own doors, and have returned with honour and riches. It may therefore easily appear how necessary it is, as well for our honour and welfare, as for our security and safety, to maintain the shipping of the kingdom.

In the year 1588 there was not above one hundred and twenty sail of men of war to encounter that invincible Armada of Spain, so-called, and not above five of them all, except the Queen's great ships, were two hundred tons burthen, and did not exceed those ranks in all Queen Elizabeth's time; so that our seamen were, by their experience and courage, rather



the outward cause of our victories, than the ships.\*

Then in the beginning of King James his reign, who brought peace with Spain and all our neighbouring countries, our merchants, in regard the Hollanders and Easterlings had greater ships than our nation without ordnance,† being able to transport commodities to and fro at far cheaper rates than the English, freighted strangers and neglected our own shipping; insomuch, that our owners suffered their ships to decay, not regarding to repair them. So that in the thirteenth year of King James there were not ten ships of two hundred tons left belonging to the river of Thames, fit for the defence of the kingdom. Whereupon the Trinity House men complained to the King of the state and decay of shipping, entreating his Majesty to revive divers ancient statutes against transportation of English goods on foreign bottoms;‡ producing for example, likewise, that the Venetian state finding the decay of their shipping, prohibited their merchants to export or import any merchandize but in shipping of their own country, or to freight any strangers' ships in foreign parts if any Venetian ship were in that port wanting freight.

\* Compare N.R.S. *Armada Papers*, and *ante*, i. p. 182. note 1, and the list of merchantmen employed in 1589, pp. 182 *et seq.* So far is the statement in the text from being even approximately correct that the names of 81 merchantmen, of from 200 to 600 tons, can be given as having been launched during the reign of Elizabeth. They can be traced by means of the bounty of 5s. a ton given on all ships of 100 tons and upwards, but it is probable that many of the warrants for payment have perished and that the list is by no means complete.

† R reads 'with our ordnance.'

‡ In 1609 (*Lansd. MSS.* 142, f. 306).



But the merchants, opposing the mariners, prevailed against them so that no redress was then had. And not long after it happened, in the fourteenth year of King James, that two great Holland ships, of three or four hundred tons apiece, came to London from the Levant, laden with currants and cottonwool upon the account of Holland merchants to sell here, which our merchants, apprehending it might endanger their trade, immediately became petitioners to his Majesty and the Lords of his Council for redress, and so prevailed with the State that a proclamation was published, that no Englishman should carry out, or bring into this kingdom, any manner of goods but in English ships.\*

Hereupon the mariners and owners of ships of this kingdom began to build shipping again; and finding profit to be gained by them, and because the pirates and Turks of Algiers and Tunis were many and strong by sea, able to overcome all small ships, they built ships of greater burthen, *viz.* three, four, or five hundred tons each, and furnished them with ordnance and ammunition proportionable to their burthens, and plenty of men for their safety in sailing outward and homeward. Insomuch, that within seven years after, the State, finding so many great ships built, thought fit to save his Majesty the five shillings upon every ton, which Henry VIII. and his successors to that time, had allowed their subjects for building of ships of one hundred

\* The proclamation in question, of 17th April, 1615, prohibited the export or import of goods in strangers' ships and ordered the enforcement of the earlier navigation acts of 5 Rich. II., 4 Hen. VII., and 32 Hen. VIII. The argument in the next paragraph of the text is, however, very much of the *post hoc propter hoc* variety; there were other factors at work.

tons and upwards, and took it quite away. Which, notwithstanding, did not discourage the owners to build, finding the benefit of trading in ships of strength.\*

And in the first year of King Charles, besides the ships trading to Newcastle and in the East-land trade, being two hundred at least, at two hundred tons each, the most part whereof were afterwards fitted with ordnance for men of war, there were found belonging to the port of London one hundred sail of merchant ships furnished with ordnance. A number, in the opinion of most seamen, fit to parallel the forces of any State or prince in Christendom.

The number and strength of the subjects' ships, built and maintained without any charge to the State on the profit of trade in time of peace, or the advantage of reprisal in time of war, preserves the strength of shipping and seamen in England, and not only the power of his Majesty's Navy Royal, though it be conceived to be of more force than any other King's in the Christian world.

On the contrary, if there be no benefit of trade to support it, of necessity it must decay as fast, being always decreasing where ships bring in no gain.

The experienced, valiant, sea-soldier and mariner, who knows how to manage a ship and maintain a sea fight judiciously, for defence of himself and offence of his enemy, is only fit to be a captain or commander at sea. For, without good experience, a man otherwise courageous may soon destroy himself and his company.

\* Henry VII. commenced the payment of a bounty, indeterminate in amount; it did not settle down to the uniform 5s. per ton until the reign of Elizabeth or shortly before. It was renewed by a proclamation of 24th April, 1626, by which, also, the wages of seamen serving the Crown were raised.

The sea language is not soon learned, much less understood, being only proper to him that has served his apprenticeship. Besides that, a boisterous sea and stormy weather will make a man not bred on it so queasy sick that it bereaves him of legs, stomach, and courage, so much as to fight with his meat. And in such weather, when he hears the seamen cry, starboard, or port, or to bide a loof, or flat a sheet, or haul home a clue line, he thinks he hears a barbarous speech which he conceives not the meaning of. Suppose the best and ablest bred seaman should buckle on armour and mount a courageous great horse, and so undertake the leading of a troop of horse, he would (no doubt) be accounted very indiscreet, and men would judge he could perform but very weak service ; neither could his soldiers hope of good security, being under an ignorant captain that knows not scarce how to rein his horse, much less to take advantage for execution or retreat. Yet it is apparent to be far more easy to attain experience for land service than on the sea.

The bred seaman is for the most part hardy and undaunted, ready to adventure any desperate action, be it good or bad ; as prodigal of his blood, into whatsoever humour his commander will draw him unto if he loves or fears him. The seamen's desire is to be commanded by those that understand their labour, laws, and customs, thereby expecting reward or punishment according to their deserts. The seamen are stubborn or perverse when they perceive their commander is ignorant of the discipline of the sea, and cannot speak to them in their own language. That commander who is bred a seaman, and of approved government, by his skill in choice of his company



will save twenty in the hundred, and perform better service than he can possibly do that understands not perfectly how to direct his officers under him.

The best ships of war in the known world have been commanded by captains bred seamen ; and merchants put their whole confidence in the fidelity and ability of seamen to carry their ships and goods through the hazard of pirates, men of war, and the danger of rocks and sands, be they of never so much value, as many of them of 50,000*l.*, 100,000*l.* and 200,000*l.* in one bottom. Which they would never do under the charge of a gentleman, or an inexperienced soldier, for his valour only.

The United Provinces, whose safety and wealth depends chiefly upon their sea affairs, and who for some years past have had great employment, and enlarged their dominions much in remote places, use only their expert seamen to go captains and chief commanders in all their ships of war and trade.

Great care must be had to choose a commander or captain. Discretion and good government are to be preferred beyond skill and experience, for where the seamen are left without orderly discipline there can be nothing expected but confusion and shame.

The seamen are much discouraged, of late times, by preferring of young, needy, and inexperienced gentlemen captains over them in their own ships. As also by placing lieutenants above the masters in the King's ships, which have never been accustomed by the English till of late years.

The seaman is willing to give or receive punishment deservingly, according to the laws of the



sea, and not otherwise in the fury of passion of a dissolute, blasphemous, swearing commander. Punishment is fittest to be executed in cold blood, the next day after the offence is committed and discovered.

A captain should choose able and honest men for his company, as near as he can. But especially his master and mate should be of good government, whereby he is like to have a prosperous and good voyage.

#### *Punishments at Sea.*

A captain may punish according to the offence committed, *viz.* putting one in the bilboes during pleasure; keep them fasting; duck them at the yard-arm, or haul them from yard-arm to yard-arm under the ship's keel; or spread them at the capstan, and whip them there or at the capstan or main mast; hang weights about their necks till their hearts and backs be ready to break; or to gag or scrape their tongues for blasphemy or swearing. Being sufficient to tame the most rude and savage people in the world.\*

\* This small section deals with a very large subject. Those interested in it should read the collections of sea-laws brought together in the *Black Book of the Admiralty* (Rolls Series), 4 vols. 1871-6, and in the *Lois Maritimes* of J. M. Pardessus, 6 vols. Paris, 1828-45. The general remark may be made that from the period of the laws of Oleron onwards, the tendency had been to greater severity in disciplinary punishments. This comes out clearly in Thomas Audley's 'Book of Orders for the War by Sea and Land' (*Harl. MSS.* 309, f. 10 *et seq.*), drawn up by command of Henry VIII. in or about 1532, which may be considered to be the first modern Articles of War. For Monson's period Boteler's *Dialogical Discourse of Marine Affairs* (*Sloane MSS.* 2449) gives full details of punishments at sea. It was printed in 1685, but edited so as not to fall foul of some of the institutions and ideas then existing.

*Discouragement to Seamen.*

When they have inexperienced, needy, commanders ; bad and unwholesome victuals, and complaining of it can have no redress ; cutting their beef too small ; putting of five or more to four men's allowance ; want of beer ; long staying for their wages.

The Election of a General or Admiral by sea,  
and what is requisite in such a Com-  
mander for the Government of the Fleet  
under his Charge.

No kingdom can be well governed without a head ; no flock of sheep without a shepherd ; no army by sea or land without a General, or supreme commander, who must be authorized, either by immediate commission from a prince, or his substitute that holds his place by patent from him ; as, namely, for matters of the sea, from the Lord High Admiral of England.

There have been often disputes, whether the title of Admiral or General were more proper to a sea commander ; and though I dare not presume to conclude of either, yet I think it is as improper to call an Admiral a General by sea, as to call a General an Admiral by land. Though I confess their authorities are alike in command of men's persons, yet is the jurisdiction of the Admiral by sea greater than the other, in that he ruleth and guideth a fleet of ships, which are of more importance to the safety of the King and State than the lives of men are that serve in them. The authority of a General being granted, the next consideration is in his election, that he be a man of experience, valour, conduct, temper, constancy, and discretion ; that by his clemency and good carriage he gain love, and by his justice, fear, as well from his soldiers as enemies, after

the example of Julius Cæsar, who, to his great praise, is said never to have forgot the service done him, or ever remembered an injury offered him.

Such a General is to make election of his captains, to be of the same temper ; and out of them to make choice of three or four to be of his selected council, upon whose judgement he may presume and rely, not trusting altogether to his wit and will. For wilfulness and want of experience in Generals are the utter overthrow and bane of actions, as may be collected out of sundry of those which I have treated of in my First and Second Books. The next caution I give a General, is that neither ambition, covetousness, vain-glory, nor honour, make him seek employment till the prince command him ; but, especially, that he be no projector of voyages where princes are not the undertakers. Let Sir John Norreys and Drake be an example in their voyage to Portugal, and Drake and Hawkyns to the Indies ; for he that desires to undertake an action which does not absolutely depend on the prince must examine the state of himself and friends who engage themselves with him ; and if he is to have the whole disposal of the action to forecast that there be no want of things necessary. But, above all, he must take care that his project be grounded upon such assurance that he fail not in the performance of it. Though this latter is impossible. It is only in the power of man to promise, but in the hands of God to dispose ; for if any of his designs fail it will prove the overthrow of his action, the loss of his reputation, his disgrace by his prince, and shew the weakness of his judgement ; whereas, on the contrary, he that is called to a place of command by his sovereign



shall perform the service with a good conscience, be furnished with all his wants for the action, and follow the directions prescribed him. So that whether the event be good or bad he shall keep his credit and be thought worthy of employment. For the principallest thing of a General, is to obey the directions of his prince ; and of an inferior officer, to perform the command of his General which Sir Richard Greynvile neglected, to his own destruction.

Amongst the Spaniards private men undertake no public actions, but the King is the whole adventurer and disposer of them himself. And Generals are appointed as they are esteemed, who, if they disobey the King's directions, answer it with life or disgrace ; as, to instance, in Don Diego Flores de Valdes in 1588 ; Don Alonso de Bazan ; \* Don Juan de Portocarrero, and Diego Sotomayor, the one commander of the galleys, the other of the ships, in our voyage to Cadiz, in 1596. † Don Juan was banished into Barbary ; the other committed to prison, where he died. This makes them not desire employment, as amongst us, and more careful to perform the service for their own safety when they are employed.

A General is to examine the state of his ships, men, and victuals, before he put out of harbour ; and finding any impediments he is to punish the offence where it deserves, and to see himself provided of all wants before his departure. For when at sea it will be too late to be relieved ; and herein Sir Francis Drake, though an old captain, shewed himself but a young General in his voyage to the Indies in 1585, and to Portugal

\* See *ante*, i. p. 291, note 39.

† See *ante*, ii. p. 6, note 118

in 1589. The next care of a General is to give instructions to his captains in as brief and plain a manner as he can, that no ambiguities may arise, as, namely, the place of meeting, if they lose company. Secondly, how to govern their men. And, thirdly, how to work upon any occasion that shall happen at sea, as by shewing of lights in the night, by shooting of ordnance day and night, or striking their topsails by day ; for the better understanding whereof I have set down some particulars touching that point joined to their directions. After a General is provided of all those things I have related, the next thing is to expect the opportunity of a wind and fair weather, and not to put out of harbour but with a settled large wind. And being at sea he must be as provident to slack sail for his fleet as he shall see occasion, for it is a great weakness in a General, upon a contrary wind to bear a press sail, seeing the rest of the ships must strive to do the like though it be to the hazard of their masts and sails ; for if they miscarry in either they must of necessity be forced home, whereas in bearing a slack sail they will not lose two leagues in four days which will be recovered in less than two hours with a large wind. And herein we may blame the unadvisedness of my Lord of Essex in keeping the sea in his voyage to the Islands in 1597 with a contrary wind, foul weather, and a press sail till his fleet were scattered, when in three hours he might have harboured in Falmouth and avoided the rigour of the storm.

A General must have a care to assign a place of rendezvous where his fleet shall meet, and especially to provide, as the necessariest thing in his expedition, to have intelligence of his enemy, and to keep them from intelligence of

him, by example of 1588 and 1595. A General that is only appointed for sea service, not for land, ought to be careful not to carry gentlemen, more than some few for the reputation of himself and action. For, whatsoever gentlemen promise or pretend to the contrary before their going out, when they have been long at sea and are tired with the tediousness thereof, and find the want of victuals, they are apt to be the first to cry home, whose examples will make others do the like, as I have shewed in the voyage to Cadiz, and the year following to the Islands.


A General that is to enterprise a service of importance, ought, before he propose it to his council, to require the opinion of his best and trustiest captains in writing, who shall have sufficient leisure to debate all circumstances before they give their judgements. For a man that is suddenly and rawly taken cannot give that resolution as upon mature deliberation. It is like a second consultation, which ever proves the best; and a General, out of their writing, will be able both to judge and determine what to do. And this did my Lord of Essex in his voyage to the Islands, requiring a captain he relied on to give his judgement in writing:—first, whether he should attempt the King of Spain's ships in Ferrol, or no; secondly, whether before or after his being at the Terceiras; and lastly, the manner how to assail them. The captain's answer you will find in the First Book, with that voyage.

The Directions of a General to his Ships, if  
they lose company.

If you happen to lose the fleet, you shall seek to  
get yourself into the height of        and there  
lie off and on        leagues for        days ;  
and if you meet not the fleet, nor with directions,  
you shall ply to the height of        and keep  
some        leagues to seaward ; and if you  
hear nothing        days, you shall get yourself  
into the height of        and lie off and on till  
you meet the fleet or directions.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME





# THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

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
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
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